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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is a phenomenologically oriented ethnographic study on the experiences of 
palliative and hospice patients in Finland. The overarching research question concerns how 
contemporary urban Finns, who have been diagnosed with a terminal illness, experience and 
negotiate their end of life, death, and dying. The study explores what kinds of language, 
imageries, and possible rituals exist in relation to dying, the variety of means that dying patients 
use to face their mortality, and how different environments and perspectives—medicine, rituals, 
and aesthetics—support patients in their negotiations vis-à-vis their existential situation. 
The research material was gathered through ethnographic fieldwork comprising interviews 
and participant observation among terminally ill patients in 2014–2017. The research 
participants were recruited mostly from two locations, a hospice home and an oncology ward 
at a university hospital. The former became the primary research site. The analysis is based on 
data collected from 21 research participants, including materials that they shared (such as 
photos and artwork), and two blogs. A collection of ancillary materials (such as newspaper 
articles and reports from the Social and Health Ministry) helped to contextualize the subject. 
The study explores and analyzes the ways in which patients received their terminal 
diagnosis, and how they were affected by different spaces and places toward the end of life. 
The main body of the work concentrates on the practices and activities around and by palliative 
patients from the perspective of ritual studies. The overall phenomenological orientation of the 
study highlights the embodied and embedded aspect of the research participants’ lifeworld. This 
approach is complemented by critical mediated posthumanism as well as anthropological ritual 
theories. Together these locate the patients’ illness and dying trajectories within the larger 
cultural and biomedical context. In addition, the study employs critical analysis of the dynamics 
of the care environments, using the Deleuzoguattarian conceptualization of striated and smooth. 
The main findings of the study speak to embodied and mediated manners of experiencing 
death and dying, even as existential matters were expressed in relation to everyday life and 
corporeality. Rituals at the end of life were twofold: institutional medical rituals and personal 
ritualizations in the form of death avoidance rituals and death preparatory rituals. Of the various 
empowering and metaphysically meaningful frames that arose in the material, such as religion 
and spirituality, aesthetics and nature were the most accessible and efficient means for the 
research participants to process their approaching death and even find existential comfort as 














A wood pigeon came next to me 
into the middle of the roses,  
all tamed. 
 
Fresh summer breeze! 
 
– Haiku by a patient written at the hospice home 
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Prologue 
It was a late summer afternoon and the sun was beaming through Kirsi’s kitchen windows. We 
had met each other a few times at the day hospice, but had not had a chance for a proper 
conversation yet. Now she had invited me to her house and we were sitting by her kitchen table 
where she had brought various pictures and a pile of handwritten papers. I placed my recorder 
next to them. “You told me that you had something you wanted to share with me,” I started 
(Kirsi/1). Kirsi seemed well prepared. “Oh, yes,” she said, and began by telling me about an art 
project in which she had participated at the hospice home.1 Kirsi had chosen to write about two 
art pieces: one was a painting featuring a warm Italian summer landscape with rolling yellow 
fields, while the other was a Finnish painting, which belonged to the hospice home’s own art 
collection. “The second one was a more sombre one,” Kirsi commented, and pulled out a picture 
from her papers and showed it to me. It featured a misty landscape with a small Finnish lake or 





                                                 
1 This research project aimed at analyzing the meaning of visual art for the hospice patients (Helin et al. 2018).  
Figure 1. The landscape painting by Finnish artist Maila Ponkkonen.1982. Photo: Maija Butters 
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Kirsi looked at the picture on her table pensively: 
It is perhaps dawn or twilight, and those could be spruce trees on the right and some 
hardwoods on the left, but mainly I was [drawn] to the painting for its… The thing is that 
there is no heaviness here. The images mirror themselves onto the water and it is completely 
still and quiet. And that which reflects the future, whether it is about being alive or about the 
afterlife, if there is any such a thing (laughs), it goes on here… It is the same thing in the other 
painting. From both of them I found continuity. The water goes on. (Kirsi/1) 
Kirsi proceeded to read the text she had written for the project, in which she depicted how she 
boarded a boat that started floating toward the shadowy mist—without knowing her destination 
but also not knowing fear (see Helin 2018; Helin et al. 2018). Kirsi’s depiction led me to my 
next line of inquiry, which had to do with life and death as a landscape. Finally, I asked the 
question that intrigued me: “Have you ever assigned any color to death?” Kirsi fell silent for a 
moment, and then continued thoughtfully: 
Kirsi: I have encountered quite many deaths personally… and… a great anguish (tuska) 
relates to all of those deaths. What could be the color of that anguish? … It is not necessarily 
black or grey. Now I cannot say what would be the color of pain or suffering. On the other 
hand, it could be, for example, screaming red. 
I: Does this relate especially to pain, in a physical sense? 
Kirsi: Physical pain, precisely… and a sense of total hopelessness. And then, in the end, even 
when the person is unconscious, even then their eyelids are moving in such a way that one 
can imagine that they are still sensing pain. I don’t know. I have only witnessed deaths that 
relate to pain. I have not seen other sorts of deaths. (silence) 
I: Mmm… 
Kirsi: And then, of course, when I think of my own death, I could imagine that it is that kind 
of… (gives a light laugh) grey… grey, that kind of light grey (kevyen harmaa). Because my 
wish is that… I have expressed my wish that when the time comes, I could be at the hospice 
home, and I have given them instructions and told my wishes about how I would like to be 
cared for. 
I: And how is that? 
Kirsi: Based on what I have experienced and heard of and seen during this illness, I absolutely 
wish for this… what was this again? It is not euthanasia but now I forget its name… it is… 
oh boy, what is it again? 
I: Do you mean sedation? 
Kirsi: Sedation! Yes, that’s it. Because I assume that it is a soft death. One does not need to 
linger in pain until the very last moment. With this lung cancer, I know people who have been 
in pain, gasping for air until the end, and I want to avoid this. The doctor has promised me 
this—of course, depending on the various factors at that moment then. But this is what I have 
wished for. 
I looked at the picture featuring the misty water surrounded by the hazy trees; it seemed to 
perfectly represent Kirsi’s light grey, soft image of death. 
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This conversation with Kirsi—but one of many that I had with my twenty-one research 
participants—reflects well the mediated nature of the experiences of death and dying that I 
discovered during my ethnography. Here the mediatedness happens through contemplation on 
visual arts, but in addition to aesthetics, the experiences and perceptions of death and dying 
were mediated via various kinds of rituals and medicine. The role of medicine also becomes 
visible here in Kirsi’s story, where, in the end, she refers to medical sedation as her preferred 
way to die. This discussion offers one example of how death and dying can be imagined and 
talked about in today’s Finland. It is noteworthy how actively Kirsi participated in the creation 
of her own “deathscape” (Maddrell & Sidaway 2010), both by imagining her preferred end-of-
life but also in practice by making her wishes known to the care staff. Not all of my research 
participants exercised their agency in the face of death as actively. The ability to affect one’s 
situation and one’s immediate environment in the end of life, as well as the way in which one 
is affected by the environment, comprises further key themes in this study.  
In short, Kirsi’s depiction offers a glimpse of an answer to my overarching research question 
of how contemporary Finns, who have been diagnosed with a terminal illness, experience and 
negotiate their end of life, death, and dying. The focus of this study is on the subjective 
embodied experiences of dying patients, as I sought to understand how people receive the news 
about terminal illness, how they orient themselves in the vicinity of death, and what kinds of 
tools they had in their use to handle their situation. Before going into detail regarding the topic 
and aims of the study, I will introduce some of the previous research and thus situate this work 
in the international field of death studies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1.1 Previous studies on death and dying  
In Finland 
Death studies is a multidisciplinary academic field that has been strongly growing in popularity 
for the last 15 years (Borgstrom & Ellis 2017). Within death studies, there are multiple 
approaches to the topic of death, dying, bereavement, and end-of-life care. Until recently, the 
most prevalent perspective in Finland has been that of nursing science, on which several 
doctoral dissertations around end-of-life care have been written in the last two decades.2 A few 
Finnish studies concerning issues of end-of-life care have been written in the faculty of 
medicine.3 In both of these fields, the studies have concentrated primarily on the care staff and 
relatives rather than the dying people themselves. 
Another field that has been active in regard to studying death, dying, and bereavement in 
Finland is theology.4 In the humanities, Finland has a rich tradition of death studies, starting as 
early as the turn of the 20th century (Waronen 1898) and continuing today in the disciplines of 
history, folklore, and folk beliefs surrounding death and dying (e.g., Pentikäinen 1968, 1990; 
Fingeroos 2004; Kemppainen 2006; Koski 2011). Outi Hakola’s (2014) edited volume 
Kuoleman kulttuurit Suomessa (“Death Cultures in Finland”) is a good example of 
contemporary thanatology, in which death and dying can be approached from such various 
angles as medicine, biology, media studies, philosophy, and history. The most recent additions 
to Finnish death studies are compilation books, the first one on the history of death in Finland, 
Suomalaisen kuoleman historia (Pajari et al. 2019), and the other on transcultural death (Saramo 
et al. 2019). 
In my own field of the study of religion, in the last ten years contemporary death and dying 
have gained attention from students, resulting in several MA theses written on the topic. 
                                                 
2 Terhikki Miettinen’s dissertation (2001) focused on relatives’ experiences of palliative care, Hilkka Sand (2003) 
studied hospice homes and their care culture, Varpu Lipponen (2006) studied the rapport between the primary 
(professional) caregiver and the dying patient, and in the latest study Mirja-Sisko Anttonen (2016) wrote about 
how dying patients encounter or dismiss the thought of dying, as well as what kinds of care can help patients come 
to terms with death. 
3 Hanna-Mari Hildén (2005) has written on physicians and nurses’ views on the decision-making processes in end-
of-life care, Marja-Liisa Laakkonen (2005) studied Advance Care Planning among the elderly, and Helena 
Karppinen (2019) explored older people’s views on living wills. Reetta Piili defended her medical dissertation in 
2019 on the changes of end-of-life decision-making among physicians and medical students in 1999–2015. In 
addition to these, Aili Huhtinen’s (2005) dissertation on the discipline of adult pedagogy concentrated on death 
education among nurse practitioners. 
4 In her study about worldviews and religiosity among long-term, elderly hospital patients, Raili Gothóni (1987) 
touches on attitudes toward the end of life and death, and Gustav Molander (1999) wrote about elderly people’s 
thoughts and attitudes toward death. The latest studies include Markku Siltala’s (2019) analysis of experiences of 
the presence of deceased and so-called post-death contacts, Juha Itkonen’s (2018) study on grief over stillborn 
babies, Matti-Pekka Virtaniemi’s (2017) work on the existential processes of patients with amyotrophic lateral 
sclerosis (ALS, or Lou Gehrig’s disease), and Suvi-Maria Saarelainen’s (2017) study on meaning-making among 
young people with a cancer diagnosis. 
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Dissertations, however, remain few, and ethnographic studies are even scarcer.5 Scholar of 
religion Terhi Utriainen’s (1999) dissertation Läsnä, riisuttu, puhdas is one rare exception; her 
study profited from ethnography among the care staff at a hospice home and she wrote on the 
role of women as caregivers for the dying from an embodied perspective. Sociologist Anssi 
Peräkylä (1990) studied ethnographically relationships between staff members and dying 
patients in hospital surroundings, while sociologist Riikka Lämsä (2013) has examined the 
hospital ward and questions of anonymity from a material perspective in her dissertation 
Potilaskertomus. Lämsä’s notions on how institutional practices construct the experiences of 
patienthood proved to be especially useful in my analysis of the affectual care environment. 
My own focus on death and dying attends to dying persons, which here are regarded as 
“patients,” since they are all in a professional medical care relationship. I am interested in how 
patients experience their situation of being terminally ill, how they feel about their trajectory of 
illness and their care, and how they think of death. This differentiates my study from many in 
the field of death studies. Especially in Finland, hospice and palliative care have previously 
been mostly studied from the perspective of care staff, on one hand, or from that of the bereaved, 
on the other. Although my understanding of subject is relational (i.e., subjectivity6 is seen as 
generated from and realizing itself in dynamic embodied relations with the environment), I 
wanted to limit my scope here by concentrating on the patient. In my study, the surrounding 
people—whether they are medical personnel, family members, or other significant people in 
the patients’ life—become visible only as part of the patients’ experiential lifeworld.  
The phenomenological notion of lifeworld (Lebenswelt, introduced originally by German 
philosopher Edmund Husserl in 1936) is used throughout the work as a way to accentuate the 
subjective experience7 of the world and everyday life, which is at the center of my scholarly 
interest. The term “lifeworld,” which is commonly used in phenomenological anthropology, 
creates the general theoretical frame for my study. It is akin to concepts such as lived body (le 
corps vécu), as contrasted with the body-object, originally introduced by French philosopher 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty in 1945. Later on, the phenomenological way of emphasizing lived 
experience became apparent in such concepts as lived religion (Orsi 1985) or lived eschatology 
(Venhorst 2012). 
                                                 
5 Media anthropologist Anna Haverinen (2014) wrote her dissertation on death rituals and grief on the internet, 
whereas Mari Pulkkinen’s (2016) dissertation in the study of religion explores the experiences of grief as described 
by people in their written narratives. Likewise in the field of the study of religion, Salome Tuomaala (2011) 
focused on women’s agency in abortion and Leila Jylhänkangas (2013) wrote about euthanasia debates in Finland. 
6 The Oxford Companion to Philosophy defines subjectivity as “pertaining to the subject and his or her particular 
perspective, feelings, beliefs, and desires” (Solomon 2005). I prefer the more extensive definition by social 
scientists Ellis and Flaherty (1992: 1), according to whom subjectivity is “human lived experience and the physical, 
political, and historical context of that experience.” 
7 I follow pragmatist John Dewey’s approach to the concept of experience, according to which experiences are 
understood to occur when aspects of the world and the self come together in a manner that evokes emotions, ideas, 
and conscious intent (Dewey [1934] 2005: 36). More on the notion of experience can be found in Chapter 2. 
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International studies 
Even internationally, ethnographic accounts on Western death and dying have been less 
common, especially within the realm of anthropology (Goodwin-Hawkins and Dawson 2018). 
In his recent article in Annual Review of Anthropology, anthropologist Matthew Engelke (2019) 
writes on contemporary trends within the anthropology of death, and even though he touches 
on some of the same themes which are central to my study (e.g., materiality and medicine), 
most of the actual research he discusses continues to be about the corpse, commemoration, and 
societal issues around the dead. The article does not mention any studies on actual dying 
processes, especially from the perspective of the dying themselves.  
Some exceptions do exist, however. Of the international death studies literature, the most 
relevant works in regard to mine are two ethnographies on hospice from the UK (see also 
Kaufman 2005). 8  The first one, Jennifer L. Hockey’s Experiences of Death: An 
Anthropological Account (1990), is a seminal anthropological study on hospice. Hockey 
investigates death and dying in two institutional settings—a residential care home for elderly 
people and a hospice—while also commenting briefly on a third setting, a bereavement support 
organization. My approach to the ethnographic material follows that of Hockey; she focuses on 
the cultural and social framing of human experience, and especially on the role of ritual and 
metaphor used in order to manage death in contemporary society (Hockey 1990: 81–89). 
Hockey did her ethnography in the 1980s, and both the UK and Finland have changed 
significantly since then in regard to elder care and palliative care. However, Hockey’s 
theoretical insights continue to be valuable, especially the ones about the position of hospice 
itself as a ritual space and time, viewed especially in terms of liminality (Hockey 1990: 156–
157). The major difference between our studies is that, unlike Hockey, I am particularly drawn 
to the patients’ own endeavors to seek ways to handle their situation, whereas Hockey looks at 
hospice more from a systemic point of view, analyzing how various professional actors affect 
the construction of death. I continue Hockey’s interpretation on hospice and other institutional 
care places as ritual locations, but add the individual ritual activities that patients practice. 
Another study that has special relevance for mine is Julia Lawton’s The Dying Process: 
Patients’ Experiences of Palliative Care (2000). While doing extended ethnography at both a 
day hospice and a hospice ward, Lawton’s theoretical questions revolved around the ideas of 
self, body, and personhood, and how they were constituted in contemporary Britain. Due to 
Lawton’s personal and academic inexperience in relation to death (Lawton 2000: vi–viii), the 
corporeality and bodily aspects of dying shocked her once she started her ethnography. 
Subsequently, a large portion of her study reflects on and investigates the meaning of bodily 
                                                 
8 The renowned North American medical anthropologist Sharon R. Kaufman wrote an influential account on 
hospital death in the United States: …And a Time to Die: How American Hospitals Shape the End of Life (Kaufman 
2005). Many of Kaufman’s notions (such as those relating to how death might be shaped not just by medicine but 
also by bureaucracy and technology) are relevant to my research, at least to a certain extent, but since her study 
focuses specifically on hospital death in the US context, it does not directly resonate with mine, which is about 
the patient’s subjective experience of the end of life. 
~ 8 ~ 
 
autonomy for personhood. One of Lawton’s main conclusions was that, due to changes in 
admission policies (which reflected broader trends in care for terminally ill people), hospices 
have become “enclaves in which a particular type of bodily deterioration and decay is set apart 
from mainstream society” (Lawton 2000: 124). “In doing so,” Lawton argues, “hospices and 
other similar institutions enable certain ideas about ‘living’, personhood and the physically 
bounded body to be symbolically enforced and maintained” (Lawton 2000: 124). This is an 
interesting argument, which my study comments on only indirectly. Lawton’s remarks are 
noteworthy, because while healthcare policies are developed and realized nationally, they are 
framed by universal medical advancements and also by international recommendations in 
regard to palliative care, such as those presented by the WHO (2016). Furthermore, due to 
similar demographic shifts and advances in various diseases, as well as economic challenges, 
healthcare practices and policies exhibit global trends (Yeganeh 2019), and palliative care and 
care for the dying are no exception (Etkind et al. 2017; Kaasa et al. 2018: e589). 
Hockey’s and Lawton’s works have inspired successive ethnographies, for instance, in 
regard to dying in Germany (Eschenbruch 2007; Menzfeld 2017). Lawton’s embodied 
perspective and her concept of an “unbounded body”9 (Lawton 1998, 2000) have been well 
appreciated and developed further, both in regard to dying patients (e.g., Probst et al. 2013; 
Håkanson and Öhlén 2014) and in regard to health and illness in general (e.g., Draper 2003; 
Howarth 2013). The issues of the care place and place of dying have also gained attention from 
several ethnographers (Morris & Thomas [2007] 2016; Broom and Cavenagh 2011). My study 
can be seen as a successor in this line, but bringing forth a new perspective from a country 
which is Western by its economic and political profile yet unique in terms of its historic and 
cultural position between the East and the West (see Butters 2017). This study contributes and 
brings variety to the contemporary academic discussion on death and dying in Western cultures, 
since until now the majority of studies have been produced either in Anglo-American countries 
or in continental European countries like the Netherlands. 
A significant majority of these ethnographies (including those of Hockey and Lawton) are 
about the experiences of palliative care rather than the experiences of the end of life or dying 
per se (e.g., McNamara 2004; Moore et al. 2013). Sociologist and renowned death scholar Allan 
Kellehear (2014) has offered an exception by writing about the inner experiences of dying 
people and concentrating on non-clinical perspectives on the experience of dying. Kellehear 
(2016) has also criticized contemporary death studies for its distorted interest in the medical 
perspective of the dying, in which the focus is on the various kinds of medical sites. While I 
agree with his remark, it could be argued that medicine in general, and medical environments 
in particular, form an undeniable part of most people’s everyday reality—particularly those 
who are seriously ill. Hence, the fact that much of the scholarly work has been concentrating 
                                                 
9 With the term “unbounded body,” Lawton wanted to draw attention to the “literal erosion of the patient’s physical 
boundaries” (Lawton 2000: 128).  
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on the medical aspects of dying people’s lifeworld reflects the actual lived reality. While in this 
ethnography I have recruited most of my research participants from medical sites, the actual 
study focuses on the variety of experiences that my research participants had. Furthermore, as 
I look into the experiential aspects of the end of life, such as those related to body and place, I 
analyze them not merely in regard to palliative care but as facets of the end of life and dying in 
itself. This is possible due to the phenomenological perspective on dying, which emphasizes 
the embodied relationality presented in my work.  
In sociological studies, the concept of relationality is used in regard to interpersonal social 
relations (e.g., Broom and Kirby 2013; Ellis 2013; Broom 2015; Håkanson and Öhlén 2016). I 
use “relationality” in order to refer not only to interpersonal relationships but to various kinds 
of physical, psychological, and spiritual relations one can have with animate and inanimate 
surroundings. Accordingly, this general approach to the research topic situates my study in the 
field of phenomenological anthropology (Desjarlais & Throop 2011) or cultural 
phenomenology (Csordas 1994, 1996, 2011).10 The phenomenological approach to the end of 
life and dying highlights the embodied, sensorial, and intersubjective nature of the subjective 
experience without failing to consider “the ways in which political, social, economic, and 
discursive formations intersect with the operations and felt immediacies of bodies” (Desjarlais 
& Throop 2011: 90). In this study, the latter aspects are included by applying ritual theories to 
the context. 
British anthropologist Andrew Irving offers a phenomenological perspective on 
contemporary dying and living with a life-threatening disease in his latest book, The Art of Life 
and Death (2017). In this ethnographic study, which Irving conducted off and on during a 
period of over twenty years among HIV/AIDS patients in New York, he writes about the variety 
of lived experiences, imaginative lifeworlds, and aesthetic expressions related to dying. Irving 
focuses on the question of time, namely, how people with an HIV/AIDS diagnosis experience 
time in a frame of mortality and finitude in an era of rapid social, moral, and political change 
(Irving 2017: 12). Since “from a phenomenological perspective, time begins and ends with the 
lived body,” his book is also essentially about the body (Irving 2017: 12). Irving reminds us 
that our bodies are always in movement; they are dynamic and ever varied, not only among 
persons, but also during the individual’s life course, in health and in sickness. Irving seeks to 
study such variability in order to better understand “how the body creates the conditions for 
multiple modes of experience and expression” (Irving 2017: 19–20). Instead of theorizing his 
cases extensively, Irving converses with philosophy and the aesthetic material he has acquired 
from the field. In this way, the book attempts to “engage with recent debates in visual, sensory, 
and medical anthropology concerning phenomenological experiences and ways of knowing not 
                                                 
10 Whereas phenomenology has been interpreted and defined in various ways throughout its history, one applicable 
way to define it comes from anthropologists Kalpana Ram and Christopher Houston, who explain that 
“phenomenology is an investigation of how humans perceive, experience, and comprehend the sociable, materially 
assembled world that they inherit at infancy and in which they dwell” (Ram & Houston 2015: 1). 
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just through theory, […] but […] through development of new ethnographic practices that aim 
to open up areas of research concerning the radical shifts in inner expression and aesthetic 
perception that have hitherto been overlooked in anthropology” (Irving 2017: 26). Although 
my way of doing ethnography, including my way of analyzing and manner of writing, differs 
from Irving’s style, I find that we share the same key interests and ways of approaching the 
material. In particular, our works share attention toward embodied experience, situated 
perception, and aesthetics in the sphere of mortality and finitude. 
In summary, most of the ethnographic research on death and dying has to do with either the 
care staff and their practices and perspectives, on one hand, or the experiences of the bereaved, 
on the other (e.g., Wright 2012; Lerer 2015). The dying themselves have been far less studied, 
especially ethnographically (Rier 2000; Lawton 2001). Furthermore, when the dying have been 
studied, the focus has often been on their experiences of care rather than on the experiences of 
the actual process of dying. By integrating both, my research fills a gap. 
1.2 Research questions and the setting 
Research questions 
I started this study with an interest to learn about the experiences, needs, and wishes of hospice 
and palliative patients (see Appendix 1: Research Information). The actual research questions, 
however, were formulated in a processual way in relation to the fieldwork and thus became 
refined over the course of the study. The overarching research question concerns how 
contemporary urban Finns, who have been diagnosed with a terminal illness, experience and 
negotiate their end of life, death, and dying. I was interested in learning how terminally ill 
people orient themselves and how they craft their subjective lifeworld in the vicinity of death. 
The research question was approached ethnographically by studying 21 research participants, 
who were mostly recruited from a hospice home in 2014–2017. During the course of the 
fieldwork, my understanding of the research topic became more nuanced. I realized that while 
I was specifically interested in the experiences of the patients, in order to fully fathom those I 
had to also comprehend the environments in which they were engendered. In this way, over the 
course of the fieldwork, the main research question became more granular, comprising more 
specific sub-questions, whose findings contributed to the primary area of inquiry. 
The first sub-question relates to the way in which the research participants convey their 
experiences; how they talk (or do not talk) about the end of life—or the afterlife, for that matter; 
what kinds of language they use; and what kinds of imageries they have in relation to death and 
dying. The second sub-question has to do with the environment and how the research patients 
are affected by various places and spaces, whether actual or virtual, especially in regard to 
augmenting or diminishing their agency at the end of life. The third sub-question inquires about 
the types of activities hospice and palliative patients engage in, and especially what kinds of 
rituals exist in relation to death and dying in Finland today. 
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The answers to these sub-questions help to build an understanding of the subjective 
experience of the end of life. Answers to the first sub-question, concentrating on what and how 
is communicated, speak to the various attitudes and ways of approaching the end of life, as well 
as fears and hopes related to death and dying. Answers to the second sub-question illuminate 
the way in which various factors, such as the environment, affect and construct the experience 
of dying and how different environments support patients in their negotiations in regard to their 
existential situation. Answers to the third sub-question speak to the various activities and rituals 
in which the patients were engaged, either actively or passively; furthermore, they shed light 
on what kinds of (practical) means dying patients have at their disposal for handling the issue 
of mortality. 
 The common element in all of these sub-questions is that they add to the understanding of 
dying as a strongly relational and mediated experience. It is worth noting here that the kind of 
previous experiences the patients had had during their whole illness trajectory, up to the 
moment I met them, greatly affected the way they experienced their situation at the moment of 
the research. In other words, the research participants’ previous experiences (for instance, with 
medical encounters) impacted the way in which they interpreted their contemporary situation. 
For this reason, I found it important to include in the analysis the research participants’ accounts 
of past moments of care and medical places. 
 In this way, the study describes how there are various ways to receive a terminal prognosis 
and live with it; it explores and analyzes the experiences related to the different spaces and 
places in which patients found themselves after their diagnosis, and how these places affected 
the patients’ experiences of their end of life. In addition to questions relating to spatiality, the 
main body of the work concentrates on the practices and activities around and by palliative 
patients from the perspective of ritual studies. In brief, this study aims to illuminate the various 
kinds of experiences that terminally ill patients have, and to analyze the different kinds of rituals 
and ritualizations that patients engage in along their illness trajectories in proximity to death. 
While the dissertation draws from phenomenological anthropology, it also belongs to the 
field of the study of religion. Within that discipline, the work is situated in the frame of lived 
religion (McGuire 2008; Orsi 2010), which emphasizes the everyday aspects, practices, and 
experiences of religiosity and spirituality. The concept of religion is much debated among 
scholars and there exists a variety of approaches to religion (see Woodhead 2011; Närvä 2020). 
From the perspective of existential crises related to the purpose of life and mortality, religion 
can be seen as one possible cultural system to help people navigate and orient themselves 
through difficult times.11 Per the differences of religion and spirituality, I follow here the 
formulation by scholars of religion Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead, which states that religion 
                                                 
11 Most of my research participants seemed to understand the word ‘religion’ either as a direct reference to the 
Lutheran Church or as “a personal set or institutionalized system of religious attitudes, beliefs, and practices,” thus 
following a traditional dictionary definition (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/religion). 
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“involves subordinating subjective-life to the ‘higher’ authority of transcendent meaning, 
goodness and truth, while [spirituality] invokes the sacred in the cultivation of unique 
subjective-life” (Heelas & Woodhead 2005: 5).12 Approached in this manner, spirituality is 
linked with subjective and often this-worldly goals of life, whereas religion involves a 
transcendent element which inspires one to seek meanings beyond this world (Heelas & 
Woodhead 2005: 6). As systems of orientation, they thus consist of somewhat differing values 
and may lead to different goals. 
 In my initial research proposal, I asked if the Lutheran worldview and language hold a place 
in people’s minds when they encounter a crisis such as terminal diagnosis. This question was 
in the background throughout the research process, but its role somewhat diminished during my 
ethnography. This was due to the reality I encountered with the patients, whose everyday life 
was typically colored by rather physical and concrete concerns, such as the ability to move, eat, 
and breathe, and consequently by the emotions related to these issues. To be sure, explicit 
existential and metaphysical questions surfaced—about the meaning of suffering, for 
instance—and I tackle these as well as other worldview-related aspects along the way. 
However, more space than I initially anticipated is given to analyses of the everyday relations 
that patients had, be they with humans (such as loved ones or care staff), animals (including 
pets), or technical aids (such as the intrathecal drug delivery device, commonly referred to as a 
“pain pump”; Finnish: kipupumppu) (see also Ellis 2013, 2018; Borgstrom et al. 2019).13  
 Furthermore, I will argue that everyday life, just as it is, has an existential value in itself and, 
furthermore, that value only increases as everyday life becomes more challenged and complex. 
In other words, it is not necessary to “talk religion” or “talk philosophy” when touching upon 
existentially and metaphysically meaningful issues but rather the opposite; existential matters 
are often encountered, discussed, and dealt with in terms of everyday, even banal, reality. One 
aim of this study is to give space to description and analysis of these kinds of encounters, in 
order to shed light on the vernacular that is pregnant with metaphysical significance. 
Approaching existential matters from an embodied quotidian perspective is common among 
scholars of lived religion, many of whom draw from phenomenological philosophy (see Knibbe 
& Kuparinen 2020). Similarly, the general theoretical frame of this study, that is, the 
phenomenological anthropology inspired by posthuman thinking, supports this manner of 
reading reality (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2005; Csordas 1997, 2011; Braidotti 2006, 2011, 2013; 
Sharon 2014). 
 While the phenomenological approach is useful when the analysis of the research concerns 
the participants’ perceptions and experiences, including those related to the environment, the 
                                                 
12 It is important to note that this way of approaching the difference between religion and spirituality does not 
coincide with the way in which much of the Christian literature writes about spirituality (see Heelas & Woodhead 
2005: 5). 
13 A drug infusion pump is a method of dispensing medication directly into the patient’s circulatory system, and it 
is controlled by the patient themselves. 
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research profits from ritual theories (Bell [1992] 2009, [1998] 2009; Asad 1993; Schilbrack 
2004) when analyzing the activities in which the research participants were involved. 
Furthermore, in order to grasp the meaning of both subjectifying as well as objectifying 
experiences in the field, the study draws on different aspects of ritual theories: those that 
emphasize the agency of the research participants as well as those which highlight more the 
structuring and disciplining aspect of the rituals. Overall, the phenomenological emphasis 
means that the analysis highlights the embodied14 and embedded15 experiences of the research 
participants. In other words, this study offers an understanding of terminal illness that is built 
from the lived experience of the patient. 
As qualitative research, this study is not intended to be statistically representative, nor can 
claims be made about the extent to which the conclusions may be applied in general to the 
population. Rather, this study is illustrative by its nature; it offers insights into what potentially 
comprises a contemporary death in Finland. 
Parameters of the study in brief 
The research material for the study was gathered during ethnographic fieldwork among 
terminally ill patients in 2014–2017. The ethnographic research methods comprised 
ethnographic interviews and participant observation. I had two research sites, for which I had 
been granted research permissions since receiving approval for the research by the medical 
ethical board of a university hospital.16 One of the research sites was an oncology ward at a 
university hospital, and the other one was a hospice home. In the end, and for reasons I will 
explain in due course, the hospice home, and especially its day hospice unit,17 became the 
primary research site where I spent a great deal of time over the next three years. It should be 
underlined, however, that this is not a study about any particular care place or medical site, nor 
is it about palliative or hospice care per se, but rather, as already stated, it is about people’s 
experiences of their life with a terminal prognosis––and their eventual death.  
 For the first six months of the ethnography, I attended the day hospice weekly; after that I 
had a five-week research period at the hospice ward (divided into two parts) and a four-week 
period at the oncology ward. From there on, I continued visiting the same day hospice group 
with which I had already worked for months and occasionally the hospice home to meet with a 
                                                 
14 Here “embodied” refers to the phenomenological concept of “embodiment,” which goes back to philosopher 
Merleau-Ponty’s ([1945] 2005) understanding of the irreducible fusion of mind and body. For Merleau-Ponty, the 
body was not simply “a vessel controlled by the mind”; instead, he thought that “the mind realizes itself through 
the body” (Williams & Annandale 2014). Therefore, the body actually shapes our perceptions of, and our way of 
being in, the world; this is known as “embodiment.” The phenomenon of embodiment will be discussed throughout 
the book. 
15 Here “embeddedness” refers here to the contextualized and relational understanding of a human experience. 
People and their experiences are viewed as dependent of and situated in a certain geographic and societal 
environment at a certain time with certain economic and cultural influences.  
16 The Coordinating Ethics Committee of the HUS Hospital District granted me research permission in regard to 
the university hospital and the hospice home until 1/1/2017 (record number 242/13/03/00/2013). 
17 Day hospice is an outpatient facility where patients are sent by their doctor’s referral. Patients receive medical 
consultation at the day hospice, and there is a peer group and important psycho-social support available. 
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research participant. After 18 months of fieldwork, my visits grew more seldom but I continued 
to visit the hospice home once or twice a month for about three years altogether. I also kept in 
contact with my existing research participants by phone and occasionally visited them at their 
homes. Due to the natural process of the research participants passing away, the fieldwork 
ended after I ceased to take on new participants. By the end of my ethnography, the research 
included 21 actual participants, of whom fourteen were women and seven were men. 
 The research material comprises 170 pages of transcribed interview material, as well as four 
field diaries with about 350 pages of text. In addition to this, my research participants shared 
some aesthetic materials with me, such as photos, artwork, poems, and other texts that had been 
meaningful for them. Two of my research participants also wrote blogs, which I used in my 
analysis. In addition to the actual research material, I collected ancillary material, which 
includes newspaper articles on hospice and palliative care in Finland, reports from the Social 
and Health Ministry, and so forth. I also attended seminars and conferences on death and dying 
and hospice care. This ancillary material proved important, since it helped me to contextualize 
some of the issues that arose in my research. 
 In addition to these, I gained some perspectives on the topic of death and dying through 
personal experience. During my intense fieldwork period, my mother was suddenly diagnosed 
with terminal lung cancer. She died only four months after her diagnosis. She was never 
assigned to palliative care, and my experience with her provided me with additional insight into 
how one could experience their end of life without palliative care. 
Terminology and the reference techniques  
Terminology 
In this work, the term “terminally ill” is used for referring to a patient who has a terminal 
diagnosis or terminal prognosis. According to the literary review done by Dr. David Hui, 
“terminal diagnosis” and “terminal prognosis” do not have a definitive meaning in the medical 
and nursing sciences; most commonly, the terms refer to a diagnostic situation in which patient 
is expected to live less than 12 months (Hui et al. 2014). A “terminal condition” can be defined 
as one in which “to a reasonable degree of certainty, there can be no restoration of health, and 
which, absent artificial life-prolonging procedures, will inevitably lead to natural death” 
(McCartney & Trau 1990, cited in Hui 2014). The common advice for physicians about the 
correct time to start planning end-of-life care is when “the attending physician would not be 
surprised if the patient dies within the next six to twelve months” (Current Care Guidelines 
2019). However, estimating life expectancy is notoriously difficult, and therefore it is possible 
for a patient to die earlier than predicted or to outlive their life expectancy by months, and at 
times even by years. However, since this research concentrates on the patients’ experiences 
upon learning about their terminal condition, the accuracy of their medical prognosis is of 
interest only from the patient’s experiential perspective, that is, how it may have affected the 
patient’s experiences of their end of life. 
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 Since the term “terminal patient” has become obsolete (Saarto 2020, personal 
communication) I have used the term “palliative patient” when referring to my research 
participants. At times I also use the term “hospice patient,” especially when I talk about 
someone in hospice care. Occasionally, I also use the term “dying patient” which in medical 
language, refers to a patient whose life expectancy is only some days or weeks, a couple of 
months at most (Saarto 2020, personal communication). All of these definitions have the term 
“patient” within them. It is a conscious choice. All of my research participants were technically 
speaking in a patient care relationship with some medical institution and this is also how I 
recruited most of them. Even more importantly, patienthood was a meaningful facet of my 
research participants’ identity and their end-of-life experiences. The term was not therefore 
only an etic categorization given to them by medical institutions but it was also their own emic 
term, which they used when referring to themselves.18 Whether they identified themselves as 
dying patients is a different matter, which I will address in my analysis. Overall, however, the 
study is about the research participants’ experiences as palliative, hospice, or dying patients. 
Other key terms used in this work are palliative care (palliatiivinen hoito), end-of-life care 
(EoLC) (elämän loppuvaiheen hoito, saattohoito), and hospice care (saattohoito). These three 
concepts are intertwined yet different. Historically, the roots of palliative care lie within the 
hospice movement. The principles of hospice philosophy in turn were developed, among others, 
by Cicely Saunders at Saint Christopher’s Hospice in London in the 1960s, whence the hospice 
ideology quickly spread around Anglo-Saxon countries. In 1973, Canadian doctor Balfour 
Mount founded a new unit for terminally ill patients in Montréal. Initially, he thought of naming 
the unit a “hospice,” but since in French the word was already used to describe a nursing home 
for the poor and the destitute, he decided to call it a “palliative care ward” (Pastrana et al. 2008). 
Since the 1970s, the meaning of palliative care has become broader, and in the course of the 
past decades it has been defined in multiple ways. Even today, there exists some debate about 
the definition (see Clark 2019). I rely on the definition given by the World Health Organization: 
Palliative care is an approach that improves the quality of life of patients and their families 
facing the problem associated with life-threatening illness, through the prevention and relief 
of suffering by means of early identification and impeccable assessment and treatment of pain 
and other problems, physical, psychosocial and spiritual. (WHO 2019)  
Palliative care encompasses more than end-of-life care, however, and it actually does not have 
any set duration. It is aimed at individuals who have a serious illness in which a cure or complete 
reversal is no longer possible, and it involves controlling symptoms that have either an insidious 
onset and progression or a rapid onset and progression (Krau 2016). In practice, palliative care  
provides relief from pain and other distressing symptoms; affirms life and regards dying as a 
normal process; intends neither to hasten or postpone death; integrates the psychological and 
spiritual aspects of patient care; offers a support system to help patients live as actively as 
                                                 
18 In the social sciences, emic refers to the subjective perspective and concepts of the researched, while etic refers 
to the perspective and conceptualization of the researcher or, here, those of institutions. 
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possible until death; offers a support system to help the family cope during the patients’ illness 
and in their own bereavement; uses a team approach to address the needs of patients and their 
families, including bereavement counselling, if indicated. (WHO 2019)  
The term end-of-life care describes the kind of palliative care which is offered toward the end 
of life for those patients with a terminal prognosis and life expectancy of less than twelve (or 
six) months. In the international literature, hospice care has a very similar definition as end-of-
life care. However, contrasted to the definition in English, hospice care in Finland refers to the 
care of imminently dying patients with a life expectancy of days or weeks (Current care 
Guidelines 2019) rather than months (Hui et al. 2012). It is generally seen as the last phase of 
palliative care, in which the alleviation of physical, social, psychological, and existential pain 
is the most pronounced feature (Saarto 2017: 7). 
In sum, the terminology is varied and also dynamic. In a literary review article written by 
Hui et al. (2012), there are several possible reasons for the lack of standardized terminology in 
palliative care. Since these aspects seem international enough to affect also the Finnish 
palliative care, I quote him here: 
First, unlike many established disciplines, palliative care is still trying to find its own identity 
within the health care system. Second, the multidisciplinary nature of palliative care means 
that there is a plethora of viewpoints and perspectives from different professional 
organizations. Third, some of the terms such as “palliative care” can be interpreted as a 
philosophy, concept, approach, program, service, specialty, or knowledge domain. The 
pleomorphic nature invites diverse interpretations. Fourth, the sensitive nature of palliative 
care has led to a creative list of euphemisms over time. […] Fifth, significant regional 
variations in the structures and processes of palliative care programs exist. For example, 
“hospice care” in the U.S. involves mostly home care, whereas it represents an inpatient 
home-like setting in Canada and much of Europe. (Hui et al. 2012: 586) 
As an example of the fourth possible reason that Hui et al. mentions, in the 1980s the term 
“terminal care” (terminaalihoito) was widely used in Finland for the care of dying. During the 
following decades, however, it was replaced with the term “hospice care” (saattohoito), and 
terminal care came to be considered insensitive (see the comment in ETENE 2004: 12). When 
going through the most recent professional literature in Finland, it can be noted that nowadays 
the term “end-of-life care” (elämän loppuvaiheen hoito) is preferred over “hospice care.” 
 In addition to the actual differences in the meaning of the terms, there seems to be some 
variance also in the manner in which they are used. According to Bennett et al. (2010), most 
practicing healthcare professionals tend to use the terms “palliative medicine” or “palliative 
care” when referring to their clinical work, whereas “end-of-life care” seems to be more utilized 
by policy makers. In the public discussion in Finland, the term “hospice care” was widely used 
until recently—nowadays experts are using “end-of-life care” or “palliative care.” 19 
                                                 
19 To some extent, it seems to depend on the discipline and the speaker’s position which term—end-of-life care, 
palliative care, or hospice care—is used, and the use of the terms has changed according to the development of the 
field. During the years 2005–2015, there were as many references to hospice care in Finnish (saattohoito, 998 
references in Google Scholar) as palliative care (palliatiivinen hoito, 994 references). Since 2015, there have 
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Furthermore, the professionals within hospice homes understandably talk more often about 
hospice care than palliative care. In regard to the actual care work in the field, these differences 
in semantics may be less significant, yet precise wording is necessary for legal purposes and 
rhetoric is also utilized in administrative guidelines and political agendas. In this way, the words 
used to categorize patients matter greatly. 
The last remark in regard to definitions which I wish to make has to do with the actual verb 
‘to die.’ According to Finnish law, a person is regarded as dead when “all of the brain functions 
have terminated permanently” (Finlex 27/2004, 2§). The definition appears simple, yet when 
the question is scrutinized more carefully, complex ontological and epistemological issues arise 
(DeGrazia 2017). Human death involves important questions in our understanding of what 
constitutes life in general and a human life in particular, such as what is personhood and what 
is the human connection with other life organisms (Kellehear 2008; DeGrazia 2017). 
Ultimately, as Kellehear (2008) remarks, even in the medical or legal profession, the 
determination of death itself is a social and cultural activity.  
The verb ‘to die’ is complex to define. On a cellular level, our bodies are dying throughout 
our lives; in fact, this is necessary for our total organism to thrive (Vainio 2014). The question 
of death is interwoven with the question of life, and the interplay of these two are a continuous 
challenge for the natural scientists (Vainio 2014). When can we say that a person is dying? 
From a medical perspective, the question finds its answer from the body’s physiological 
functions, and thus, in medical literature, the phase of “actively dying” has been defined as “the 
hours and days preceding imminent death during which time the patient’s physiological 
functions wane” (Hui et al. 2014). From philosophical and sociological perspectives, the 
question of dying appears differently, and it is closely connected with given definitions for a 
“human” and a “person”—which ultimately are cultural constructions. For instance, we can 
differentiate a “social death” (Sudnow 1967) from a biological one: the concept of social death 
describes the “ways in which someone is treated as if they were dead or non-existent” 
(Borgstrom 2017). Understood in this way, social death can occur before or after the 
physiological death of a person.  
The idea of social death can be also defined as “series of losses,” such as “a loss of social 
identity, a loss of social connectedness, and losses associated with disintegration of the body” 
(Borgstrom 2017). Hence, the subjective experience of dying contains, and is constructed by, a 
variety of experiences, ranging from physiological to social, emotional, and existential. From a 
psychological or social perspective, the moment when these experiences begins is interpretable 
and highly subjective (Kellehear 2008). On one hand, people may experience themselves as if 
they were dying, whether from a medical perspective they were “actively dying” or not; on the 
                                                 
clearly been more references to palliative care (1,120) than to hospice care (827). For the general public in Finland, 
the term “hospice care” is still more recognizable than “palliative care.” Finnish medical literature prefers the term 
“end-of-life care” over “hospice care” (Saarto 2019, personal communication). 
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other hand, they may be actively dying per the medical definition, yet they may not think of 
themselves as dying (Kellehear 2014: ix).  
My research approaches dying from the first-person perspective. In the account of my 
research participants, these multiple facets (physical, social, psychological, or existential) of 
the end of life are interconnected. This study gives space for the first-person emic accounts and 
definitions of reality told by my research participants, yet as a scholarly work it also profits 
from etic concepts, definitions, and categorizations in order to interpret and deepen the 
understanding of these first-person accounts. 
Reference techniques 
In addition to the literary references, the study refers to my ethnographic research material (i.e., 
mostly the interviews and my field diaries). The interviews are referred to simply by the name 
of the interviewee and the ordinal number of the interview (for example, Aili/4). All of the 
interviewees have pseudonyms.20 The research diaries (D) are referred to by their ordinal 
number and a page number (for example, D2: 16). Most of the time that I spend in the field, I 
did not have my recorder on; instead, I had my notebook on me all the time. In this way, some 
of the conversations ended up in my field diaries rather than on the recorder and in the 
transcribed interviews. When I took notes in the field, I paid very close attention to the wording 
of the research participants; consequently, some research diary references include exact 
quotations from the field. 
 I have translated all of the spoken quotes by my research participants from Finnish into 
English, and included the original Finnish expression only when the wording plays a significant 
role, or when the word choice by my research participant is somehow unusual. I have translated 
into English quotes from textual sources (such as blogs or poems, etc.) shared with me by the 
research participants, but I have included the original text in Finnish in the footnotes, with the 
exception of Inkeri’s written text, since her text was not published (unlike the others) but it was 
a private work of art confined to my use. 
  
                                                 
20 With the exception of the two bloggers, who wrote their blogs with their own names. 
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1.3 Introduction to death and dying in Finland 
Death and dying in Finland 
Finland is a Scandinavian welfare country with a relatively homogeneous population, compared 
to many other European countries (in 2015, only 6.2% of the population was of foreign origin 
(Suomen virallinen tilasto 2015). The country is very sparsely populated, and the population is 
largely concentrated in the south. Of its five and half million inhabitants, more than a million 
live in the Helsinki metropolitan area, where my research mostly concentrated.  
 Church membership in Finland has been traditionally high; still in 2000, more than 85% of 
Finns were members of the Lutheran Church. Although that number has declined over time, the 
strong legacy of the Lutheran Church is still visible, however, in various death-related practices, 
such as funerals, but also in the spiritual care within hospitals, which is most commonly offered 
in the form of Lutheran pastoral care (see Butters 2017). 
 About 54,000 people died in Finland in 2017, and the WHO has estimated that around 30,000 
Finns are in need of palliative care every year, some at the end of their life and others already 
before that. Of these, approximately 40% are cancer patients. (WCPA & WHO 2014.) Finland’s 
public healthcare system is complex and decentralized, and care is delivered in municipal, 
occupational, or private facilities (OECD & WHO 2017). The treatment is provided in either 
primary healthcare (which is often local) or specialized medical care (at hospitals), depending 
on the level of care needed. Due to the tax-financed healthcare system, patients can receive 
even the most specialized cancer care with very little cost. 
Over the past thirty years, Western cultures have seen the beginning of a paradigm shift from 
extreme medicalization characterized by isolation and avoidance of death toward more holistic 
views of both health and healing and death and dying (Lewis [2006] 2011: 135–136; Kubsch et 
al. 2007; Utriainen 2010). In Finland, this shift became visible first in the funding of hospice 
homes run by non-profit private foundations, and then in the dynamic development of integrated 
palliative care in the field of public healthcare. The first national recommendations for hospice 
care in Finland were published in 2010 by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (STM 
2010a).21 In February 2016, the Ministry assigned an expert group with the task of drafting a 
proposal for the provision of palliative care and end-of-life care to ensure equal access to care 
throughout the country (Saarto 2017). These newer recommendations were based on a three-
tier model for providing services at the basic, specialized, and intensive tertiary level of 
palliative care. Further recommendations were published in 2019 in a large report, in which 
recommendations on palliative care as a whole, based on quality criteria, were presented for 
each hospital catchment and district (Saarto & Finne-Soveri 2019). In addition, the latest report 
recommended that systematic basic education and supplementary and specialist training be 
organized for care professionals to address the skills gap in palliative care (Saarto & Finne-
                                                 
21 The first national memorandum about hospice care in Finland was published in 2003 by the National Advisory 
Board on Social Welfare and Health Care Ethics (ETENE 2003). 
~ 20 ~ 
 
Soveri 2019). Related to this, in 2018 a new educational project called EduPal (funded by the 
Ministry of Education and Culture) was launched in order to develop palliative nursing and 
medical education through multi-disciplinary cooperation and working life collaboration (OKM 
2018). 
Since the 1980s, five hospices have been founded in Finland. 22  Since the 2010s, new 
palliative units and wards (with home care teams) have been opened in various hospitals around 
Finland, and palliative education has steadily grown (Saarto 2017; Saarto & Finne-Soveri 
2019). Simultaneously, however, some of the hospice homes have faced serious economic 
challenges. 23  Although the general and geographical availability of palliative care has 
improved, in order to extend an equal level of services to the whole country, further 
improvements are still necessary (Saarto 2017; Saarto & Finne-Soveri 2019). 
Suffering and the care of the dying 
The general objectives of medicine are enhancing and maintaining health, preventing and 
curing diseases, and alleviating suffering (Lääkäriliitto 2019; Hallamaa 2019). Everyday 
medical praxis—and curative medicine by and large—concentrates mainly on the “curing 
diseases,” whereas in palliative care the emphasis is on “alleviating suffering and pain.” The 
challenge is that pain and suffering are understood to be subjective experiences, which cannot 
be so easily verified by quantitative medical tests. While there are various methods for assessing 
pain, 24  assessing suffering can be more confounding. Indeed, understanding and defining 
suffering have become major challenges in the realm of medicine. 
There are numerous ways to define suffering in the medical context (Hänninen 2001). Eric 
Cassell (2004: 32–41), a well-known physician and oft-cited author on suffering, writes that 
bodies do not suffer, but persons do; suffering results not in the body or the psyche, but from a 
complex embodied entanglement of the person’s whole life situation. Suffering happens in 
relation to the body and mind; in social, cultural, physical, and occupational contexts; and in 
one’s transcendent ideas, past histories, plans, dreams, and hopes (Cassell 2004). The 
experience of suffering is subjective yet real, posing a challenge for science. Cassell (2004: 32) 
summarizes his definition by saying that suffering is “the state of severe distress associated with 
events that threaten the intactness of the person.” 
As (at least some degree of) suffering is nearly always associated with the end of life and 
dying, the crucial question in the care of dying people is how—and by whom—this suffering 
                                                 
22 Pirkanmaan hoitokoti in Tampere (1988–), Terhokoti in Helsinki (1988–), Karinakoti in Turku (1994–2019, 
2020–), Koivikkokoti in Hämeenlinna (2002–), and Karjalakoti in Lappeenranta (2011–2014).  
23 For instance, due to economic challenges, Karinakoti, which was run by the Cancer Society of Southwest 
Finland, was closed in 2019. After much political debate in the Turku municipality, the hospice home was reopened 
in 2020, but this time as part of the municipality’s end-of-life care. Terhokoti in Helsinki has also had some 
challenges during the last years (HS 2014) and is undergoing staff reduction consultations as I write this in October 
2020. Privately owned Karjalakoti functioned for only four years.  
24 These include the Visual Analogue Scale (VAS), Numerical Pain Rating Scale (NRS), and Verbal Rating Scale 
(VRS) (see Current Care Guidelines 2017). 
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should be recognized, assessed, and alleviated. Keeping the Physician’s Oath in mind, the 
answer seems clear. Nevertheless, as Cassell has noted (2004: 31–32), while physical pain is 
something that physicians do treat, addressing suffering seems much more difficult in daily 
medical praxis. This is because, as mentioned above, suffering relates to persons (with histories, 
plans, dreams, relationships, etc.) instead of mere physical bodies as locations of diseases. 
Furthermore, Cassell has argued that “the training of physicians, their technical language, their 
diagnostic and therapeutic tools, and the economic forces that have become so dominant in 
medicine all focus on diseases, not patients” (Cassell 2004: 261).  
Cassell reiterates here the classical argument presented in hospice philosophy already 
decades ago relating to the need of holistic care for dying patients. As the official guidelines of 
the Social and Health Ministry of Finland state, good palliative care should meet the patient’s 
physical, psychological, social, spiritual, and existential needs (STM 2010a: 11). This statement 
conveys a metaphysical ideology with a certain kind of ethical understanding of reality and a 
metaphysical understanding of a human as a physical, psychological, social, and spiritual entity.  
The question remains, however, how possible it is to bring and apply these ideals into the 
structures and practices of care. In the course of my ethnography, reflections of this ideology 
were visible in small everyday rituals of hospice, such as greeting the patient. Aili—the research 
participant with whom I had the longest relationship—was very impressed by the custom at the 
hospice home of hugging patients. She said it was the best thing at the day hospice: “The hug 
opens the day when we arrive and at the end of the day it sends us home” (D4: 15). This is one 
example of how experiences of the end of life became constituted via specific (care) practices 
located in certain places. 
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2. THEORETICAL DISCUSSION 
2.1 Relational subjectivity 
Subjectivity, intentionality, and experience 
The study consists of three sections of analysis (Part II, Part III, and Part IV). The first section 
of the analysis (and the second part of the book), The Disrupted Landscape, concentrates on the 
moment of learning about the terminal diagnosis, and subsequently on questions related to 
orienting in a new landscape with death on the horizon. This section also discusses some matters 
concerning the care places where the research participants found themselves. Consequently, the 
first section of the analysis profits from theories that illuminate relational subjectivity and issues 
of spatiality. 
 As mentioned above, at the core of my theoretical and methodological analysis lies the 
notion of embodied subjectivity, which draws from phenomenological (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 
2005; Utriainen 2000; Ihde 2002, 2009), postcolonial (Asad 1993), and posthumanist streams 
of thinking (Braidotti 2006, 2011, 2013; Sharon 2014). In mediated posthumanism, subjectivity 
is seen as generating and realizing itself in dynamic embodied relations with the environment.25 
The human being is not seen as a fixed, bounded entity separate from the external world, but 
rather as constituted through interrelations with the world. This perspective is of great 
importance to this study, since the way in which subjects are understood—that is, how they are 
understood to be constituted—naturally affects the way in which the process of dying is viewed. 
Because of this relational, embodied, and embedded perspective on subjectivity, I pay attention 
to the affective structures, practices, relations, environments, and people around the patients; 
how the patients experience all of the above and how these constitute the end of life; and also 
how patients negotiate their being-in-the-world-of-the-dying. In this way, in terms of theory, 
my study joints the current scholarly discussions on relationality and spatiality in regard to 
dying (Hockey et al. 2010; Ellis 2013, 2018; Christensen & Sandvik 2014; Seebach & 
Willerslev 2018; Borgstrom et al. 2019). 
The dualistic perception of reality in terms of subject/object and interior/exterior has been 
challenged by many during the last decades, one of them being Merleau-Ponty in his book on 
the phenomenology of perception ([1945] 2005). Merleau-Ponty emphasized the bodily 
engagement we have with the world and its effect on our perceptual experience:  
As I contemplate the blue of the sky […] I do not possess it in thought […] it “thinks itself 
within me.” I am the sky itself as it is drawn together and unified, and as it begins to exist for 
itself, my consciousness is saturated with this limitless blue. (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2005: 
249) 
                                                 
25 This view follows philosopher Martin Heidegger’s theory of the human Being as Dasein, that is, “constituted 
by its being in the world, by its engagement with worldly objects” (Sharon 2014: 140). 
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This quote illuminates the way in which people exist in the world, with the world, and of the 
world. This is precisely how I interpreted my research participants’ experiences in their illness 
trajectories. Physical surroundings, medical staff, practices, aesthetics, bureaucracy, and so 
forth are not only structurally informative and socially constitutive for an experience of terminal 
illness, but they also comprise the experience in a sensorial, perceptual, and tactile manner. 
While criticizing the Cartesian dualism of mind and body, which does not respond to our 
experience of the world or of being-in-the-world, Merleau-Ponty claims that meanings are 
engendered in an entangled interconnection of subject and object (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2005). 
This perspective grows in importance when one’s body/mind becomes sick; the intertwining of 
mind, body, and the environment manifests itself in different ways at different stages of the 
illness. 
According to philosopher of technoscience Don Ihde (2009: 9–10), it was John Dewey’s 
pragmatism, however, that was the most successful theory in overcoming the subject/object 
dualism. In pragmatism, the emphasis is on what happens, not what is there. Since the focus 
shifts here from subjects and objects to verbs, we end up studying relationships.26 It is about 
affective relationality constituting situational, transitory, yet dynamic subjects and objects in its 
course of actually happening. The study benefits from Dewey’s ideas especially in regard to the 
aesthetic experiences outlined in Chapter 10. 
The question of “experience”—what an experience is exactly—is a complex one. 
Anthropologist Jason Throop (2003) has pointed out that in regard to the centrality of the 
concept in anthropology, its exact epistemic and ontological definitions have been surprisingly 
little discussed. From a general phenomenological perspective, experience occurs when aspects 
of the world and the self come together in a manner that evokes emotions, ideas, and conscious 
intent in the subject (Dewey [1934] 2005: 36; Throop 2003).27 This is, however, a problematic 
depiction for multiple reasons. First, it suggests a division between the subjective 
(consciousness) and objective (content) elements in the experience. This view was contested 
by William James and others studying experience, and it is problematic in phenomenology in 
general (see Throop 2003). Furthermore, as anthropologist Robert Desjarlais has noted, this 
kind of notion of experience is rooted in the idea of individual agency and reflective 
introspection, which are not always possible (Desjarlais 1994).28 While it is difficult to find a 
precise definition for “experience,” there are a few facets to it which are important to discuss. 
The first of them relates to the previous question of internality (subject) versus exteriority 
(object) and cognitive versus sensorial. In phenomenological theorizing, these categories are 
                                                 
26 In a similar fashion, Heidegger emphasized the question of interconnected, complex, and open-ended being (as 
Dasein) rather than fixed, still existence as subject or object (Sharon 2014: 142). 
27 Dewey writes that “because of the interaction of live creatures and environing conditions,” we are having 
experiences continuously: “Under conditions of resistance and conflict, aspects and elements of the self and the 
world that are implicated in this interaction qualify experience with emotions and ideas so that conscious intent 
emerges” (Dewey [1934] 2005: 36). 
28 For this reason, Desjarlais (1994, 1997), who studied homeless, mentally ill people in Boston in the 1990s, 
described them as “struggling along” rather than as “having experiences.” 
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intertwined, even fused; that is the reason for the emphasis on the embodiedness, 
embeddedness, and relationality of experience. The other essential facet has to do with the 
element of time. In regard to time and experience, Desjarlais and Throop (2011: 88) write: “Our 
existence as humans is temporally structured in such a way that our past experience is always 
retained in a present moment that is feeding forward to anticipate future horizons of 
experience.” The innate understanding of time is present in human experiences. For this reason, 
it is often thought that experience is akin to narration with a certain coherence and timely 
structure (Throop 2003: 233–234). But not all experiences render coherence. Throop (2003) 
distinguishes between the retrospective “ends” (that serve to structure the past lived experience) 
and the projected “ends” that arise in the immediacy of the present moment and which do not 
necessarily ensure experiential coherence. He continues: 
It is indeed in instances where our protentional horizon remains open, unfulfilled and/or 
discordant with an arising moment in the temporal flux that we fail to find our footing in the 
coherence of experience. During these moments there may be perceived breaks and 
disjunctions in our experience of lived temporality. (Throop 2003: 234) 
Many of the moments that I observed with my research participants, or which they told me 
about, had this kind of open, fluctuating, and undetermined quality about them, thus making 
them kind of “vague experiences.” Everyday life was mostly comprised of these kind of 
fractured undefined moments, yet at other times, I was told about clearly definite experiences. 
John Dewey has described the difference of these two by referring to experiences that occur all 
the time (life is constituted by a chain of experiences) and having an experience, which has a 
distinct quality of unity in itself (Dewey [1934] 2005: 36–37). In this study, the aesthetic 
experience that I talk about in the latter part of the dissertation is exactly this second kind, 
considered real experience by Dewey. 
The last notion in regard to the phenomenological understanding of experience relates to 
intention. Intentionality refers to the human mind’s tendency to be directed toward something; 
intent also ties past, present, and future together in regard to experiences. Death challenges 
intentionality, as there is no future to be directed toward. Here I refer especially to the kind of 
intentionality which Merleau-Ponty describes as operative intentionality. This intentionality is 
a kind of pre-reflective embodied relationality that a body has with the world and which 
“produces the natural and antepredicative unity of the world and of our life” (Merleau-Ponty 
[1945] 2005: xx). Operative intentionality is not of or about anything specific; rather, it is the 
relational mode of existence itself (Reuter 1999).  
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Relational living, relational dying 
What lies at the basis of the contemporary perspectives, such as posthumanism, is that human 
experience is seen as “ontologically related to an environment or a world” (Ihde 2009: 23). The 
relationality is not only dynamic but also multidirectional in terms of a process in which all 
participants become transformed. Critical posthumanism takes a step away from the 
anthropocentric worldview by decentering the focus from humans and widening it to include 
various kinds of interrelated environments and relations between human and non-human agents 
(Braidotti 2013). 
 Akin to phenomenological and posthuman perspectives is philosopher Tamar Sharon’s 
(2014: 135–171) theoretical formulation of “mediated posthumanism,” which seeks to assess 
the relationality between human and non-human subjects, and specifically what that 
relationality means for the former. Embodied consciousness and embodied relational 
subjectivity are susceptible to transformation due to changes in the physical body/mind, such 
as its perceptual or kinesthetic capacities (Sharon 2014: 137–139). In other words, changes in 
physical conditions affect the ways in which subjectivity is experienced. 
 Many of my research participants increasingly as time went on lived in close connection 
with medical accessories and equipment (e.g., drugs, an intrathecal drug delivery device, an 
oxygen mask). These physical accessories affected the way in which the patients experienced 
themselves. Further, I interpret these apparatuses or actual medicines as endemic to one’s 
existence. I do not see them merely as tools or means for existing, but rather I understand the 
subject (i.e., the patient) to exist in an ontological relationship with them.29 As Sharon (2014: 
101) puts it: “the human body/self and the construction of external and internal identity rely on 
technology.” Or, as practical theologian Elaine Graham (2004: 27, cited in Sharon 2014: 102) 
writes: “to be human is already to be in a web of relationships, where our humanity can only be 
articulated – iterated – in and through our environment, our tools, our artifacts, and the networks 
of human and non-human life around us.” Studying the contemporary manner of dying seems 
to defend this sort of interpretation of reality. 
The coexistence with medical technology may become more visible toward the end of life. 
In general, technological devices ameliorate the quality of human life: one can see better with 
the help of glasses or move around easier with a help of a cane. Simultaneously, however, 
something in the subject has changed; for example, “an older woman” becomes “an older 
                                                 
29 Philosopher and cognition scientist Andy Clark’s book Natural-born Cyborgs (2003) is one of the earlier studies 
on medically and technologically enhanced humans, in which he writes on an example especially familiar to Finns: 
“Finnish youngsters have dubbed the cell phone ‘kanny,’ which means extension of the hand. The mobile is thus 
both something you use (as you use your hands to write) and something that is part of you. It is like a prosthetic 
limb over which you wield full and flexible control, and on which you eventually come to automatically rely in 
formulating and carrying out your daily goals and projects. Just as you take for granted your ability to use your 
vocal cords to speak to someone in the room beside you, you may take for granted your ability to use your thumbs-
plus-mobile to send text to a distant lover. The phone really did seem to be part of the man, and the Finnish slang 
captures the mood” (Clark 2003: 9).  
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woman with a walker.” Aili, one of my research participants, called her walker her “kaveri” 
(“buddy”) and the young men I met on the oncology ward humorously called their intravenous 
(IV) stands their “morsian” (“bride”).30 When disease advances and the physical condition 
deteriorates, it is often the various biomedical aids that enable existence, admittedly to various 
degrees. Here the processual nature of living and dying becomes most visible. It is thanks to 
strong analgesics (pain relievers), for example, that the person is able to continue being, in the 
simplest sense of the word. For many, however, being equals doing (on body-in-action, see 
Irving 2017: 12), and when finding themselves in a situation where they are no longer able to 
do, they take this as the beginning of the end. Then, the actual dying—or undoing—starts. 
In this way, medical reality mediates being. Biomedicine, including medical technologies, 
becomes part of us, whether we like it or not.31 In this regard, I view medical “technologies of 
the self” (Foucault 1988) as an inescapable element of the subject. Rather than technology being 
merely “supplemental” or an “extension” of a human, the human can be seen more accurately 
as a result of this relationality with technology (Sharon 2014: 101). 32  Humanity can be 
understood as born of the interrelationality between the natural and technological environments, 
as well as between human and non-human others. 
Yet, human-technological relationality, such as that seen in the case of biotechnology, can 
become problematic, as we will see in my research material. In order to avoid a simplistic 
approach to biomedical technology as something either positive or negative (e.g., Delaunay & 
Martins 2015), I find the approach of mediated posthumanism not only ontologically sound but 
also methodologically helpful.33 Of course, medicine and technology were not the only kind of 
mediation that my analysis found from the research material. The approach of mediated 
posthumanism highlights the way in which my research participants experienced their illness, 
end of life, and dying via different kinds of mediations; the mediated nature of the experience 
became apparent also in the personal rituals and further aesthetic engagements that my analysis 
brought up. To summarize, mediated posthumanism equips me with an analytical attitude that 
is less burdened with value judgements, especially in relation to technology. Thus, “nature,” 
“technology,” and “human being” are not seen as different ontic essences but ultimately the 
same (i.e., monism). 
                                                 
30 I interviewed a few young men on the oncology ward, but since it turned out that they were not palliative patients, 
I did not include them in my actual analysis.  
31 Although people may believe that without chemical agents there exists some kind of “authentic” person, on 
closer scrutiny it is rather evident that this is a misconception. Since our being in utero, numerous chemical 
compounds are involved with our existence; we are affected and altered by them—whether in a medicinal way or 
otherwise—throughout our lives. The more that bioscience develops, the more there is an understanding of the 
miniscule biochemical elements of the body, such as DNA. This in turn makes it possible for medicine to ever 
more effectively enhance human capacities. It is the age of the molecular, as noted by Deleuze and Guattari (2016; 
see also Sharon 2014: 113). 
32 Here ‘technology’ can be defined as “the practical application of knowledge especially in a particular area” 
(Merriam-Webster 2020); medical technology can be anything from a plaster cast to modern imaging technology 
such as an MRI.  
33 On technological determinism in medical anthropology, see Timmermans & Berg 2003. 
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The following diagram (Figure 2, which will be elaborated at the end of this chapter) 
introduces the way in which the phenomenological approach and mediated posthumanism 
forms the core of the research: the phenomenological understanding of subjectivity and the 
mediated posthumanism as an approach to comprehend the relational and interdependent 
manner in which the research participants experienced their reality.  
 
Dying and the vulnerable body 
In the center of the experience of illness and death is the body. One way to theoretically perceive 
the dying body is through phenomenological conceptualizations of it as multiple. Whereas there 
are many ways to describe the multiplicity of the body, Ihde (2002) introduces “body one” and 
“body two,” in which body one is the sensory body that perceives, experiences, and senses life 
(the Merleau-Pontian center of the lifeworld) and body two is culturally and environmentally 
shaped and informed (and could also be called the “Foucauldian body”).34 This is not an 
unambiguous distinction, as body one and body two are naturally intertwined. Most of this 
study will concentrate on “body one,” as I focus on the subjective lifeworld of my research 
participants; along the way, however, references will also be made to the “Foucauldian body” 
since most patients were objects of many kinds of physical manipulation which affected them 
in various ways. 
Philosopher Andrew Feenberg (2006) criticizes Ihde’s model for overemphasizing the 
activity of body, as if the direction of intentionality was always from the body as an initial center 
                                                 
34 Ihde’s conceptualization is akin to that of phenomenologist Drew Leder (1992), who wrote about two bodies 
in regard to medicine in his article “A tale of two bodies: The Cartesian corpse and the lived body.” 
Figure 2. Core theoretical frame for the 
research. 
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of action toward the world. 35  Feenberg notes how embodied events and actions are 
multilayered, and they happen through complex communication between the body and the 
lifeworld. However, we can examine the general direction of the activities happening from, for, 
with, and within the body. Consequently, bodily experiences can be analyzed as subjectifying 
or objectifying, which renders the bodily experiences as more or less active or passive. Feenberg 
(2006) does this by adding two more bodies to Ihde’s description of body one and body two—
namely, body three and body four, respectively the “dependent body” and the “extended body.” 
Both the dependent body and the extended body are of great relevance in a situation where the 
normal voluntary and involuntary functions of the body do not work as they did when one was 
healthy. 
Feenberg’s body three, the dependent body, is described in relation to the larger embodied 
being, who invites actions on it by others. Feenberg explains the dependent body through the 
example of a little boy who gets hurt in a football game and cries for help, rendering his 
dependent body as something for adults to take care of: “Inside our dependent body, we attend 
to unexpected sensations we have solicited. Our time horizon shrinks as we no longer control 
or plan the next sensation, yet we remain exquisitely alert” (Feenberg 2006: 190). As Feenberg 
notes, this way of experiencing corporeality often happens in medical situations, and nowadays 
it is actualized almost exclusively as a technological practice: “[W]e are operated on by a whole 
panoply of devices. From the users of tools we become the object of tools” (Feenberg 2006: 
190).  
In this study, I examine how these situations feel for the actual person experiencing them, in 
order to gain a deeper understanding of “our lived first-person experience of our own 
instrumentalized status” (Feenberg 2006: 190). Feenberg differentiates the dependent body 
from the Foucauldian political body positioned in a web of exercised power.36 According to 
Feenberg, the dependent body quite voluntarily invites actions on itself, but at any given 
moment, it can reverse the passivity and take control again. I am not convinced about 
Feenberg’s claim of a reversal in such a simple manner as he suggests. Having entered into an 
embodied relationship with medical authorities, the patient’s situation becomes complex in a 
number of ways. There are different factors at play, not just bodily ones. In order to be able to 
assume the mode of the dependent body, there needs to be trust—not just trust with medical 
personnel, the fellow humans into whose hands we literally commit our bodies, but also trust 
in biomedicine’s epistemic and ethical goals as well as an understanding of the whole existential 
                                                 
35 Feenberg (2006: 189) notes that because of Ihde’s “orientation toward scientific perception and technical 
action,” he focuses too much on “the extension of the senses by scientific instrumentation, computer simulations, 
and virtual reality,” and ultimately this leads Ihde to bypass the passive aspects of the body. 
36 For Foucault, a human body is essentially always also a political body infused in various sorts of practices of 
power: “[…] the body is also directly involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon 
it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs (Foucault 
[1977] 1995: 25). 
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situation in general. I would argue further that power is always an issue here (Turner 1995). As 
Bell (2009: 203) writes (in reference to philosopher Michel Foucault): “the body is the 
‘microphysics’ of the ‘micropolitics’ of power.”37 In the end, some of the things that I learned 
during my fieldwork had to do exactly with this collision between Feenberg’s dependent body 
and the Foucauldian body as a center of practices of power. 
This vulnerable aspect of the body can also be approached from the point of view of self-
identity, as explained by sociologist Anthony Giddens ([1991] 2006). According to Giddens 
([1991] 2006: 52–54), self-identity presumes reflexive awareness, and it is based on “a capacity 
to keep a particular narrative going” (Giddens [1991] 2006: 54). Self-identity is not to be found 
in behavior, nor is it a collection of traits. Rather, “it is the self as reflexively understood by the 
person in terms of her or his biography” (Giddens [1991] 2006: 53). Self-identity is dynamic 
since one has to adapt to and continuously integrate external events into one’s “ongoing ‘story’ 
about the self” (Giddens [1991] 2006: 54). Giddens notes that the “contents” of self-identity—
traits from which biographies are constructed—vary socially and culturally. In “Western” 
advanced capitalism, the autonomous and independent self, including an independent body, is 
highly idealized. Therefore, the change from an independent to a dependent body can cause 
intense crisis in self-identity, leading to “ontological insecurity,” as Giddens puts it ([1991] 
2006: 57–58). All individuals become vulnerable if—or, more accurately, when—their 
competence to continue “bodily self-management” breaks down at some point in life.  
 My analysis will also make a reference to Feenberg’s body four, namely, the extended body. 
Here technical enhancements act as extensions of the body, but instead of focusing on the 
corporeal experience of these sensorial extensions, Feenberg looks at how these extensions 
function as ways to objectify ourselves to others (i.e., what these extensions of the body signal 
to others). As an example, Feenberg (2006: 193) refers to computer usage and, more 
specifically, online communities, which, he claims, are all too often dismissed simply as forms 
of disembodiment. For Feenberg, online communities offer a platform for textual self-
presentation; the used language, images, memes, avatars, and so forth are ways in which people 
can objectify themselves to others. As a parallel to the actual physical extensions, such as 
clothes and accessories, Feenberg writes that “we could be said to ‘wear’ language online in 
something like the sense in which we wear cloths in everyday life. It is a form of virtual 
                                                 
37 In Discipline and Punish, Foucault writes: “Now, the study of this micro-physics presupposes that the power 
exercised on the body is conceived not as a property, but as a strategy, that its effects of domination are attributed 
not to ‘appropriation,’ but to dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, functionings; that one should decipher 
in it a network of relations, constantly in tension, in activity, rather than a privilege that one might possess […]. In 
short this power is exercised rather than possessed. […] Furthermore, this power is not exercised simply as an 
obligation or a prohibition on those who ‘do not have it’; it invests them, is transmitted by them and through them; 
it exerts pressure upon them, just as they themselves, in their struggle against it, resist the grip it has on them. This 
means that these relations go right down into the depths of society […]” (Foucault [1977] 1995: 26–27). In short, 
Foucault saw power as a strategy which is exercised in and spread throughout the various (institutional) relations 
in society, and which affects people’s bodies and behavior in a complex manner. 
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embodiment…” (Feenberg 2006: 193, italics mine). This perspective regarding one’s existence 
becomes helpful when I analyze blog writing as a contemporary ritual around death. 
2.2 Space and emotion 
Landscape: On the question of spatiality  
Due to the emphasis on relationality in my study, questions of space and place become 
important. Spatiality and temporality are essential facets of all human experience.38 Yet, the 
issue of a place becomes utterly important when one’s body starts slowing down and eventually 
hinders spatial bodily movement—and the capacity to change the environment at will. Once 
one’s bodily autonomy becomes severely reduced, dependency on the environment—other 
sentient beings, technology, and materiality, as well as practices and relationships—grows 
considerably. 
I use the word landscape in both a metaphorical and concrete sense in order to refer to 
cultural and personal spaces and places at the end of life and when dying. In this way, the notion 
of landscape works as a factual reference to the various places and situations in which my 
research patients found themselves. I will also occasionally use the notion of deathscape, which 
refers to specific sites and spaces related to death (Maddrell & Sidaway 2010),39 yet to my mind 
the notion of deathscape relates more to the deceased and rituals of remembrance rather than 
the dynamics of living the end of life or the process of dying; thus, here I prefer the dynamic 
notion of landscape.  
Taking a spatial approach to dying implies further questions on materiality; hence, the recent 
interest in spatiality coincides with the current attention to new materialism and affect in the 
study of religion (e.g., Houtman & Meyer 2012; Schaefer 2015; Hutchings 2017), as well as 
with studies of senses and atmospheres in anthropology (Pink 2015; Sumartojo & Pink 2018). 
The “spatial turn” (Warf & Arias 2008) has also affected contemporary nursing science and 
research on care, resulting in a variety of studies concerned with space, such as how the nursing 
environment is experienced aesthetically by patients and nurses (Aaltonen et al. 2016; for a 
literary view on the topic, see Apell & Mattila 2017). In the study of religion, spatial concepts 
of place, space, and landscape have important sociocultural, psychological, and metaphysical 
meanings, and over the last ten years there has been growing interest in the field (Knott 2010).  
                                                 
38 Until recently, the temporality and historicity of social life seem to have attracted researchers’ attention more 
than issues relating to space (Soja 1985; Borch 2002; Casey 2013: 10). However, since the development of human 
geography (Harvey 1969, 1989; Tuan [1977] 2001; Massey 1977, 2005; Soja 1985, 1989; Thrift 2008), there has 
been growing interest in spatiality in the humanities and social sciences (Saarikangas 2006; Pink 2015; Beebe, 
Davis & Gleadle 2012). 
39 The notion of deathscape, which was originally introduced by Lily Kong (1999) in the field of cultural geography 
when studying cemeteries and columbaries as landscapes of death, has been popular in recent spatial studies in 
relation to death and dying (Maddrell & Sidaway 2010: 4). From being first a notion on landscapes and concrete 
geographies, the term has since grown to more broadly become an analytical tool with various applications. In 
their edited publication on deathscapes, Maddrell & Sidaway (2010) summarize their usage of the word as invoking 
“both the places associated with death and for the dead, and how these are imbued with meanings and associations” 
(Maddrell & Sidaway 2010: 4). 
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In regard to the difference between space and a place, the former is often considered as a 
more abstract concept than a place; conversely, a place can be thought of as a specific location 
or a portion of space (Casey 2013: 337–338). In addition to architecture and geography, the 
concept of place has inspired research in relation to memory studies and identity (Perkins & 
Thorns 2011). As a lived location in space, a place is often related to histories and therefore 
also to emotions and affect. This sense of spatiality becomes visible in the stories that my 
research participants shared about the places which they longed for, which they missed, or 
which represented the heart of their hopes and dreams (see Chapter 10). Furthermore, space is 
understood to be an active physical, mental, and social factor, creating not only inner 
experiences (Tuan [1977] 2001) but also social relations and power dynamics (Harvey 1969, 
1989; Lefebvre 1974; Soja 1985). 
Sickness and dying integrate the societal and institutional orders of reality with the most 
private and personal aspects (Lämsä 2013); therefore, when seeking to make sense of patients’ 
experiences, one has to allow both personal and institutional elements to surface. This is the 
reason why my analysis so deeply involves the various aspects of spatiality, be they concrete 
and physical, imagined and mental, or structural and bureaucratic.40 Both critical social analysis 
of space and the phenomenological tradition of studying the spatiality of the human experience 
(such as offered by Chinese-American humanistic geographer Yi-Fu Tuan ([1977] 2001) are of 
great value here. 
As philosopher Henri Lefebvre (1974) points out, both physical location and relationalities 
(e.g., policies, practices, beliefs, attitudes, and people) affect and create different kinds of 
spaces. In this case, the relationships that patients had with their surroundings became crucial 
to their comfort and wellbeing. When the ethnography revealed the importance of these 
relationships, it drove me to inquire how these (care) environments became constructed, and 
how patients ended up in certain care places over others. In reality, this process is directly 
affected by national and local recommendations, policies, and practices in regard to palliative 
care and end-of-life care. Accordingly, learning about care policies and practices became part 
of my dissertation work (see the discussion in Jenkins et al. 2005: 12–13). 
Spatial issues around death have arisen in the recent studies emphasizing the materiality of 
lifeworlds. In an edited volume The Matter of Death: Space, Place and Materiality (2010), 
social historian Ken Worpole and medical sociologist Carol Komaromy looked at the different 
places and spaces for dying, such as nursing homes and hospices, from functional, operational, 
                                                 
40 In regard to physical space, according to the most recent care policy (Act on Elderly Service 2012; THL 2017), 
the care of the elderly and chronically ill is to be (re)located into people’s homes rather than care facilities, 
including elderly homes. Consequently, as the care of the dying should be done “wherever the person has been 
taken care of heretofore” (THL 2016), more people ought to be dying at home. So far, however, this has remained 
an ideal. In reality, approximately 70–80% of dying people move, or are moved, away from their prior living 
environment into a care facility, most often into a ward at the local healthcare center (THL 2016). Moving prior 
to (and sometimes even during) the moment of active dying is often unnecessary from the perspective of care and 
almost always emotionally charged (for both the dying and their loved ones). Nevertheless, it still often happens.  
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and architectural points of view in order to understand how living and dying were made possible 
there. In my study, I put emphasis on understanding how patients themselves related to the 
place in which they were (or had been previously), and the ways in which they connected with 
or disconnected from their surroundings. What does the place of dying mean for the dying 
person—or does it mean anything?41 I listened to the patients about their experiences, wishes, 
hopes, and disillusionment about the places they needed or wanted to be in. Along with actual 
places, there were also virtual spaces and places that held importance, whether they became 
actualized or not (Kapferer & Hobart 2004; Kapferer 2006, 2010). 
Striated and smooth: Analysis of the space and practice 
As mentioned already above, studying the lifeworld of the dying person elicits questions about 
such dichotomies as body/mind or, in relation to space, internal/external. While problematizing 
commonly used binaries is part of the overall theoretical conversation of this study, doing this—
especially in relation to internal/external—also simulates the lifeworld of the dying. Even if we 
were to ontologically deny the dualistic nature of existence, representing the world through 
binaries appears to be tightly bound to the “Western” model of metaphysics and the 
commonplace manner of thinking about reality. In proximity to death, however, the collapse of 
orderly reality—with seemingly self-evident categorizations such as internal/external, 
self/other, and body/mind—seems to be rather typical. How does this happen? How do dying 
people experience themselves in their milieu?  
One way to approach such commonly viewed dichotomies is via the concepts of smooth and 
striated, which were introduced by French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in 
their book Mille Plateaux (1980). Deleuze and Guattari used these concepts in order to describe 
the different ways of elements coming together to form dissimilar spaces. In the natural world, 
for instance, smooth space is described to be the one inhabited by nomads and mariners going 
with the flow of nature, adapting to the weather, whereas striated space is the one conquered by 
farmers, who shape and adapt the land to their needs. Smooth and striated not only depict 
spaces; they can be descriptive for a variety of things, such as materials, technologies, musical 
models, or ways of thinking and doing science. Smooth and striated space are of different 
natures and sometimes even oppositional. Yet, Deleuze and Guattari (2016: 552) emphasize 
that “in fact the two spaces exist only in mixture: smooth space is constantly being translated, 
transversed into a striated space; striated space is constantly reversed, returned to a smooth 
space.” This dynamic and processual aspect of reality is important to keep in mind. 
Deleuze and Guattari were interested in the possible processes that entities are involved in; 
with a conceptual pair such as smooth and striated, we can investigate not what something is 
                                                 
41 This aspect of the study was impacted by the research design and the type of research permission I was given. 
Thus, I did not personally study all of the places I was told about, yet sometimes I was actually present at the place 
at the moment (which the research participants were referring to) and able to make some observations. On many 
occasions, however, the narratives concerned past experiences or future hopes. In sum, I studied people’s 
experiences, wishes, disappointments, and so forth in relation to places and spaces. 
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but “what it does or might do, and how it might affect what other things do and how it might be 
affected by them” (Abrahams 2013: 4). As different modes of spatialization, striated and 
smooth do things; they affect and they are affected, and thus they are useful in regard to the 
analysis of the relations between the medical world and realities of illness. Bringing the idea of 
striated and smooth space into my analysis of the environments of dying people allows insight 
into how different environments construct and compose patients and death in different ways, as 
well as how patients and medical personnel engage in actions which transform the spaces from 
one type into another.42  
Joy and sadness: Spinozian understandings of emotions and power 
When studying the way in which particular relationalities affect the patients’ experiences of 
their end of life, I draw from Baruch Spinoza, an early modern Dutch philosopher (1632–1677), 
who has inspired in the last decades some poststructuralist and posthuman philosophers (e.g., 
Deleuze 2001; Braidotti 2011), as well as some neuroscientists (e.g., Damásio 2003). My 
understanding of Spinoza is affected by Deleuze’s reading of his work, as well as the new 
materialist take on his writings, such as the one developed by posthumanist philosopher Rosi 
Braidotti (2011). 
Spinoza’s theory on emotions offers a sophisticated and useful way of understanding 
people’s emotional experiences. The manner in which he links one’s emotions and one’s ability 
to think and act offers one insightful way to understand the effectiveness and importance of 
emotions in our daily life. Moreover, the way that Spinoza conceptualizes a difference between 
active versus passive emotions enables us to better comprehend their complexity (e.g., how it 
is possible for some to experience joy even in very difficult and sad situations). 
Due to Spinoza’s monism, the connectedness of body and mind is of utmost importance in 
his thinking. In Spinoza’s system (which includes one substance, an infinite number of 
attributes, and finite and infinite modes), a human is defined as a finite mode living in a complex 
web of relationships in an environment filled with other finite modes, be they material or 
immaterial (Pietarinen 1993: 37). Due to conatus, which is a sort of basic vitality or life force 
pertaining to all bodies, every being seeks existence and aims toward active participation in the 
world (Pietarinen 1993: 38–39). Because of the priority of relationality as the basis of human 
life, the idea of affects (or emotions) becomes critical in explaining the workings of this 
relationality. 
Spinoza separates affections (Lat. affectio traditionally translated as “effects”) and affects 
(Lat. affectus traditionally translated as “emotions”) from each other (Lloyd 1996: 72; Deleuze 
                                                 
42 This is not the first time that Deleuze and Guattari’s spatial concepts are employed in a theoretical conversation 
seeking to understand the different contexts and networks that are built around patients in medical environments 
(see, e.g., Walsh 2012a, 2012b; Bleakley 2013). 
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2001, 2007).43 Since we are always already in the world we are subsequently always affected 
by the world—and thus having affections, which can be understood as various kinds of bodily 
states manifested within us. Philosopher Genevieve Lloyd, a contemporary Spinozist, explains, 
“Affectio is a state of the affected body, implying the presence of an affecting one” (Lloyd 1996: 
72). Now, the interesting feature of Spinoza’s theory—and the most important one in regard to 
this study—is the way in which he connects emotions with agency. Spinoza calls affects (or 
emotions) the kind of affections which either increase or diminish our power to act (Ethics, Part 
III, Definition 3, in Spinoza & Parkinson 2000; Lloyd 1996: 72). In short, for Spinoza, affection 
(affectio) is about the embodied relational mode of being in relation to the world and affect or 
emotion (affectus) is a special type of it. There are three main emotions: conatus, which serves 
as a basis for the striving for existence, laetitia (joy), and tristitia (sadness). All other emotions 
are derivatives of the main affects of joy and sadness. For Spinoza, affects or emotions are 
about movement toward either a greater or lesser ability to act and think. The facet of the 
theory that is especially helpful here is the way in which Spinoza explains laetitia and tristitia: 
Spinozian joy increases our capacity to act, whereas sadness respectively decreases our capacity 
to act. These emotions happen in both the body and mind: “Whatever increases or diminishes, 
helps or hinders our body’s power of acting, the idea of the same thing increases or diminishes, 
helps or hinders our mind’s power of thinking” (Ethics, Part III, Proposition 11, in Spinoza & 
Parkinson 2000). In other words, various forms of laetitia increase our inner activity and 
strengthen our sense of connectedness and openness to the world, whereas negative affects of 
tristitia decrease our inner vitality and engagement with the world. Experienced by individuals, 
affects are born from our encounters with the world; conversely, they also influence the way 
we encounter, or are able to encounter, the world. 
Humans do not respond to outer influences in some automatic way. The degree of effect that 
these outer influences can have on us, be they positive or negative, depends on our conatus, the 
innate vitality and affirmative will to exist, to participate in the world, and to be open to life. 
Furthermore, all affects, both joyful and sad, can be experienced either passively as passions 
(Lat. passio) or actively as actions (Lat. actio). Spinoza claims that whenever we have a clear, 
                                                 
43 Here it is important to briefly note the general discussion on affect and emotion which has been ongoing for the 
last twenty years (for instance, in philosophy see Massumi 2002; in the study of religion, see Schaefer 2015; in 
anthropology, see Lutz 2017; in sociology, see von Scheve 2018). The variety of perspectives in relation to the 
different disciplines involved has produced different kinds of understandings of what affect is, and whether it 
should or should not be distinguished from emotion. In recent cultural studies, it is common to see affect as an 
immediate, preconceptual, relational bodily state or “intensities” (Massumi 2002: 27), while emotions are 
identified, conceptualized, and categorized subjective experiences (Paasonen 2017). Furthermore, it is often 
explained that there are no personal feelings or sentiments in Spinozian affect (Massumi 2002). One way to 
differentiate between feelings, emotions, and affect is to relate feelings with the personal and biographical, 
emotions with the social, and affect with the prepersonal (Shouse 2005). In practice, however, affect and emotion 
seem to be intertwined in such a way that it becomes impossible to differentiate them (Paasonen 2017). I could 
easily subscribe to this kind of conceptual differentiation between affect and emotion, yet it does not correspond 
to Spinoza’s original thinking (from which many contemporary scholars have drawn their ideas) (Kristensen 
2016). For the purpose of this work, I will use the concepts of affect and emotion somewhat interchangeably (see 
also Lutz 2017). 
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“adequate” idea of what it is that is affecting us, we respond actively; whenever our 
understanding of the world and the causes affecting us remain hazy and unclear, or 
“inadequate,” we have passions and are able to only react, rather than act within the world 
(Toivoniemi 2015). This means that joy, for instance, is not always active. When the reason for 
joy remains unclear to us, we are experiencing passive joy, but when we gain clarity into the 
causes behind our emotion, it becomes active. There is no active sadness, however. When we 
become aware of the causes of our sadness, and gain a clear understanding of them, the passivity 
of the sadness ceases, but since this understanding increases our power and ability to act and 
think, the emotion starts to generate joy (Carlisle 2011). In this way, in a Spinozian world, it 
should be possible to take the causes of sadness, accept them, and start acting from the basis of 
that acknowledgement. 
It is key to note that for Spinoza, affects as emotions are not strictly about how they feel to 
the subject but rather how they function in regard to the subject’s power of acting (Deleuze 
2007). If we choose to look at emotions in this way, it is possible to analyze the complex 
relationality and interconnectedness of patients with their environment, which so greatly 
impacts the experiences that dying patients have during their last weeks and months (see 
Lawton & Nahemow 1973, cited in Kotilainen 2014). Even though some scholars, such as 
philosopher Brian Massumi (2002: 27–28), situate affect prior to the distinction of negative 
(sadness) or positive (joy), I find the Spinozian theory of negative and positive emotions to be 
useful, since it illuminates the connection that affect has with power: the power to affect and 
the power to be affected, that is, power as potentia or as potesta (Large 2013). Because the 
causes of sadness (illness and imminent death) exist, the important question is how these causes 
affect oneself and one’s power to act and think. The Spinozian perspective equips me with tools 
to analyze people’s situations in regard to increasing or decreasing power. As Deleuze says in 
his lectures on Spinoza in 1978:  
Spinoza doesn’t make up a morality, for a very simply reason: he never asks what we must 
do, he always asks what we are capable of, what’s in our power, ethics is a problem of power, 
never a problem of duty. In this sense Spinoza is profoundly immoral. Regarding the moral 
problem, good and evil, he has a happy nature because he doesn’t even comprehend what this 
means. What he comprehends are good encounters, bad encounters, increases and 
diminutions of power. Thus he makes an ethics and not at all a morality. (Deleuze 2007: n.p.) 
Instead of making allegations or evaluations about things being “good” or “bad” in themselves, 
the Deleuzian take on Spinoza’s ethics allows me to analyze the encounters that patients had 
with their environment in terms of an increase or decrease of their power to act and think. Per 
Deleuze, Spinoza was averse to any philosophical tradition which focused on “meditations on 
death,” since for him philosophy was about life. As Deleuze (2007: n.p.) points out, “death is 
always a bad encounter.”  
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2.3 Theoretical discussion on practices vis-à-vis death and dying  
Ritual perspective on practices at the end of life  
The second part of the analysis (and the third part of the book), Institutional Rituals and 
Practices, starts by focusing on the variety of actions in which the research participants 
engaged; when analyzing actions, ritual studies become an important point of reference. This 
is not only because rituals are a classic way of negotiating death, dying, and mourning, but also 
because by studying practices from a ritual point of view, it is possible to reveal attitudes and 
assumptions which could otherwise remain hidden. There are always some metaphysical 
perspectives embedded in rituals, either implicitly or explicitly, although rituals can 
simultaneously assert and create a world-ordering in their own right (Bell 2009: 195). I find 
ritual practices and ritualizations to be an insightful way of looking at contemporary 
understandings and ideas of death and dying. 
As an anthropological term, “ritual” has multiple definitions (Bell [1992] 2009). While 
anthropological theorizing has produced different understandings of ritual over the decades, a 
common element among them is that either they regard ritual as separate from mental categories 
(as action is separated from thought and belief) or ritual is seen as a type of functional or 
structural mechanism to integrate the thought-action dichotomy (Bell [1992] 2009: 20). My 
understanding of ritual follows the latter. The view of ritual action entwined with thought and 
belief is congruent with phenomenological notions of the inseparable nature of the body/mind. 
Furthermore, as philosopher Mark Johnson has argued, all human understanding and reasoning 
are embodied activities, as we make sense of the world in a corporeal manner, via our bodies 
(Johnson 2007: 279–280). In this way, I see that rituals involve both doing and thinking. 
Here ‘ritual’ can be defined as a (symbolic) activity that aims to organize a participant’s 
social and metaphysical reality by guiding cognition and channeling emotions (applied from 
Snoek 2006: 11). Often ritual is thought to function as a “vehicle for the creation and 
transmission of cultural meaning” (Salhi 2016: 210). In turn, ‘ritualization’ describes the 
process in which a practice transforms into a ritual; in this way, it may refer to a smaller, less-
defined everyday ritual. As scholar of religious studies and renowned ritual theorist Catherine 
Bell writes: “ritualization is a way of acting that is designed and orchestrated to distinguish and 
privilege what is being done in comparison to other, usually more quotidian, activities” (Bell 
[1992] 2009: 74). 
In regard to my study, at the beginning of the project I was interested in learning if there was 
any religious or spiritual rituals around death in contemporary Finland. This proved to more 
complex than I had foreseen, since, to my surprise, finding patients who would even identify 
themselves as dying was not so easy—even amongst the hospice patients. If I had imagined that 
upon learning about their terminal diagnosis people would start preparing for the end of life and 
death, for the most part I was mistaken. Instead, I tended to encounter patients who were 
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continuing to fight for another month, week, or even a day.44 I came to think of this not so much 
as a matter of denial of death (Kübler-Ross [1969] 2009), but rather as an avoidance of death. 
I interpreted this line of thinking and acting as attempts to reinforce life and living as the norm 
and the assumed mode of being. Here, terminal illness appeared as a threat to be fought against. 
In this way, many of the daily efforts were aimed at staying alive, not preparations for dying in 
some particular manner or in some certain place, for example. I began to consider the tenacious 
efforts to stay alive as rituals for avoidance of death. This also led me to analyze medicine from 
a ritual point of view. 
Rituals in regard to healing and mourning are perhaps the most classic anthropological topics 
of study (e.g., Turner 1961, 1970; Kapferer [1987] 1991; Desjarlais 1992, 2016; Csordas 1997; 
Jenkins, Jessen & Steffen 2005). Curing, healing, and mourning as rituals have also been 
studied within contemporary medical institutions. In the recent research conducted by scholars 
from various disciplinary backgrounds, ritual has been understood in multiple ways, at times 
normatively. Ritual has been approached pejoratively as a practice that is empty of meaning in 
regard to medical utility, yet on the other hand rituals have been found to be therapeutically or 
psychologically valuable and thus useful in relation to patient care and the practice of the art of 
medicine (e.g., Elks 1996; Philpin 2002).45 While rituals of care have been studied mostly in 
the field of nursing science (e.g., Walsh & Ford 1989; Woodhead 2002; Wolf 2014), the 
significance of ritual in relation to the placebo effect occupies its own scholarly discussion in 
the fields of medicine and anthropology (Welch 2003; Brody 2010; Kaptchuk 2011). In regard 
to this study, as an anthropologist and scholar of the study of religion I approached the medical 
world as a cultural phenomenon, and I attended to the cultural and social aspects of medical 
practices.  
From the anthropological point of view it could be said that ritual pervades medical practice; 
ritual elements can be found in medicine’s specialized terminology and procedure, and in 
ritualized space; even the apprenticeship of medicine is highly ritualized (Salhi 2016). 
Subsequently, as a site for various kinds of social constructions, including rituals, the medical 
world has been a topic of sociological and anthropological studies for decades (Foucault 1963; 
Glaser & Strauss 1965; Sudnow 1967; Peräkylä 1988, 1989, 1990; Kaptchuk 2011; Costanzo 
& Verghese 2018). Hospital rituals have been studied in sociology, medical anthropology, and 
philosophy (Davis-Floyd 1992; van der Geest 2005; Brody 2010; Kaptchuk 2011), in nursing 
science (Wolf 2014), and even in medical studies (Bosk 1980; Welch 2003). Rituals which have 
to do with the socialization of a person into the role of a patient, for instance, are well known 
                                                 
44 In the introduction to his book The Inner Life of the Dying Person, Kellehear (2011: ix) mentions “the increasing 
number of people who have advanced disease, commonly a spreading cancer, who will not acknowledge to 
themselves any notions of death or dying.” These people may be medically dying but they aspire to be “survivors 
to the end”; they are not dying but living with chronic disease (Kellehear 2011: ix). 
45 On the usefulness versus inutility of rituals in hospitals, see Risse 2014; for a discussion of the ritualized nature 
of evidence-based medicine, see Knott & Franks 2007. Nursing scientist Susan Philpin (2002) also has an 
insightful article on the variety of interpretations given to medical and nursing rituals in the social and nursing 
sciences.  
~ 38 ~ 
 
(Holland 1993; Wicker 1999; Woodhead et al. 2002; Wolf 2014). Medical clinics and 
institutions such as acute care facilities and operating rooms, or hospices and care homes, can 
be anthropologically approached as liminal social sites in which significant transformations and 
rites of passage happen (Davis-Floyd 1992; Gordon 2015). In this way, birthing, curing, 
healing, aging, and dying are interpreted as institutionalized moments shaping various life-cycle 
becomings. 
The entire daily rhythm of the hospital ward is heavily ritualized in terms of communication, 
hierarchical relationships, staff clothing, and so forth (Risse 2014; Lämsä 2013). In the medical 
world, rituals are often related to matters of safety; for instance, the ritualized checklists in the 
operation room are all about following safety protocols, and regular routines in hospital wards 
have been regarded as creating an atmosphere of control and security for patients and caregivers 
alike (Risse 2014: 18). Ritualized and routinized manners of performing medical and nursing 
tasks can alleviate stress and anxiety related to them, and they enable the practitioners to 
perform tasks that otherwise might “provoke emotions of embarrassment, fear, fascination, and 
disgust” (Katz 1981: 345 cited in Philpin 2002: 150). Furthermore, rituals in medical 
surroundings have importance for maintenance of social order, especially in situations of 
ambiguity (Philpin 2002). 
 My decision to call some medical treatments rituals could be critiqued by claiming that by 
doing so, I divert attention away from the medical purpose and intention of the treatment. I 
argue against this. Treating medical practices as rituals does not reduce their medical 
significance; it merely adds another layer of possible cultural, social, psychological, and 
metaphysical meanings attached to them.46 In the following chapters, therefore, I describe how 
in actuality medical practices are never only about medicine (Elks 1996; Tercier 2005; 
Mohammed & Peter 2009; Brody 2010; Wolf 2014; Gordon 2015).47 Since the focus of my 
study revolves around the patient, I studied how certain medical practices functioned as rituals 
and how patients perhaps used them for their own purposes in relation to their existential 
situation.48 In a society where religious doing (i.e., religious rituals) is not necessarily part of 
the prevailing practices, medicine can gain an existential position: medical treatments can 
become rituals that people invest in when seeking solutions for existential troubles (Brody 
2010; Gordon 2015). 
                                                 
46 On medicinal pills as rituals, for example, see Brody 2010. 
47 Some scholars have argued that at times, medical practices are not even about medicine; for instance, medical 
procedures such as resuscitation are not always performed so much as an attempt to save the patient’s life but to 
produce a medically controlled death, which is also easier for the bereaved to accept (Pagie 2010; Mohammed & 
Peter 2009; see also Seale 1998: 79–80). 
48 Although occasionally it did happen, generally the research participants themselves did not talk about their 
activities as “rituals.” However, the way in which they practiced and talked about certain things—such as medicine, 
for instance—revealed ritualization; the practices began to have meanings and values other than those strictly 
related to health. In other words, they began to “organize a participant’s social and metaphysical reality by guiding 
cognition and channeling emotions” (see Snoek 2006: 11). 
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 Medical practices were not the only ritualized practices at the end of life, however. By using 
the perspective of ritual in relation to my research material, I was able to look at various—and 
very different—kinds of practices done for or by terminally ill patients, which implicated some 
social or cultural meaning or value beyond the obvious. These ritual practices, be they medical 
treatment, alternative healing therapy, special food regimens, or vitamin supplements, created 
a kind of virtual—or subjunctive, as some scholars would say (Utriainen 2016, 2020)—reality, 
filled with affective hope. In this hopeful virtuality, transformation (curing and/or healing) 
could happen, and one could free oneself, even if momentarily, from the chaotic presence of 
the terminal illness by seeking some control over the situation (Kapferer 2004, 2006: 671). On 
many occasions, rituals appeared as affective practices seeking to assert agency and used to 
establish control over a situation otherwise perhaps difficult to deal with. Furthermore, rituals 
can have meaningful performative and expressive goals of their own (Tambiah 1968, 1979; 
Bell [1992] 2009: 19–29, [1997] 2009: 131–136). 
Ritual metaphysics 
Death rituals often include explicit statements about the world, the nature of reality, and the 
dying/dead person’s place in it—in other words, death rituals tend to be strongly related to 
metaphysics. Medical practices and rituals that define sickness (versus health) or death (versus 
life) are equally based on some theory about life, including a metaphysical understanding of 
“what is a human.” The question of who gets to define the reality in ritual is, of course, a crucial 
one for the ritual participants. This is connected to issues of agency. 
 In regard to the matter of agency in ritual, philosopher Kevin Schilbrack (2004) makes a 
distinction between philosophical subjects and philosophical objects. Per Schilbrack, the ritual 
participants are mainly in the position of philosophical objects when they are being “inscribed 
with” metaphysical, social, and affective ideals and meanings in the course of the ritual. 
However, as Bell (2009: 191–196) has argued, rituals do not mechanically insert or ascribe 
anything onto ritual participants; rather, when participants adopt meanings during rituals, they 
do it by appropriating, negotiating, and qualifying the ideas and beliefs presented to them, and 
they may also reject and resist the “inscriptions.” Since Schilbrack’s way of using the notions 
of subject and object is somewhat problematic, I suggest that his subject/object categorization 
should not be taken as rigid or mutually exclusive, for in practice one may find oneself in both 
positions simultaneously. Nevertheless, his theory on ritual metaphysics offers insight when 
seeking to understand the relationship of metaphysical thinking and rituals. 
Schilbrack continues by explaining that when the participant is in the position of a 
philosophical subject, as an active subject of experience, the ritual becomes a form of an inquiry 
and a source of knowledge for the participant (Schilbrack 2004: 135). Here Schilbrack follows 
anthropologist Theodore Jennings’ (1982) idea of ritual as a mode of “coming to know”: 
Ritual knowledge is gained through a bodily action which alters the world or the place of the 
ritual participant in the world. This summary statement proposes three interrelated aspects to 
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the way of gaining knowledge in ritual: It is primarily corporeal rather than cerebral, primarily 
active rather than contemplative, primarily transformative rather than speculative. (Jennings 
1982: 115) 
Schilbrack develops Jennings’ idea of the ritual knowledge as primarily corporeal by arguing 
that one can also learn cerebral things, such as “descriptive beliefs” (Schilbrack 2004: 136). In 
other words, ritual can teach participants not only to act differently but also to see differently—
ritual can teach metaphysics.  
 Here I use the term “metaphysics” as referring to the general understanding of the nature of 
reality, much like philosopher Frederick Ferré (1996: 1), to whom “[M]etaphysics is nothing 
more (nor less) than the theory of reality in general.” As such, metaphysical views are 
something that everyone has. Metaphysical thoughts or beliefs do not necessarily form any 
constant or coherent worldview. Instead, people’s metaphysical ideas are often incoherent and 
at times even contradictory (Bell 2009: 184–185). Even if religious metaphysical thinking may 
be only momentary, it can be of great importance for a person, and it can make a meaningful 
contribution for their take on life.  
Thus, even when a metaphysical understanding of the world does not lend itself to a complete 
and holistic “worldview,” metaphysical thoughts are potentially significant when a person is 
creating a narrative of their life, including a narrative of their self-identity (Giddens [1991] 
2006). Moreover, it could be argued that behind every action there is always some sort of 
presupposed metaphysical understanding of reality, even if this is rarely explicitly discussed, 
and despite the fact that it may be ambiguous. In other words, humans orient themselves and 
act according to some understanding of reality, however tenuous or momentary that might be. 
This is what Giddens (1991: 36–37) calls a sense of reality, which is cultivated in seemingly 
minor day-to-day routines that keep the chaos of ontological insecurity at bay. 
Schilbrack notes that by looking at ritual actions from this angle, it is possible to see how 
religions can successfully transform more abstract teachings into concrete form, thus giving 
facticity to their ideology. In addition to explicitly religious rituals, secular ones may also teach 
participants about metaphysics. In these cases, rituals do not really make the person become 
something (i.e., transforming a daughter into a wife), but instead ritual invites the participant to 
realize or acknowledge that they (already) are something; the goal of the ritual is to have the 
participant perceive metaphysical truths “in the flesh” (Schilbrack 2004: 130).49 This can be 
exactly the case with death and dying. Death is very much a kind of necessary existential 
condition, which many of us do not feel to be real; it can be difficult to embody the realization 
                                                 
49 Schilbrack makes a distinction between two kinds of markings that rituals may inscribe the body with. One is 
an inscription that has marks of contingent characteristics, characteristics that permit an alternative, and the other 
has marks of necessary characteristics. Necessary characteristics would be attributes that a person cannot fail to 
display, being “characteristics that apply to human existence as such and which therefore do not permit of an 
alternative” (Schilbrack 2004: 131). When ritual inscribes the participant with marks which represent necessary 
characteristics, it can be seen as an inscription of ritual metaphysics (Schilbrack 2004: 130). 
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of one’s own mortality. Therefore, I propose, some of the rituals around dying actually serve to 
convey to the dying an understanding of their mortality. 
Aesthetics and participatory orientation in the world of the dying 
Although hard to locate at first glance, in the course of the fieldwork I started finding rituals 
and ritualizations which were practiced, initiated, and created by my research participants in 
order to orient toward the end of life and death. Analyzing these rituals forms the third and last 
part of the analysis, Part IV of the book, Personal Rituals and Aesthetics. This section of my 
analysis builds on the previous theories relating to space and ritual metaphysics, for instance, 
but I also utilize a theoretical division of participatory versus causal orientation in order to 
accentuate the difference between these various kinds of rituals in relation to my research 
participants. 
 The kinds of personal rituals in which my research participants were involved reflect the so-
called participatory model of engaging with the world, contrasted against the causal model 
reflected in institutional responses to illness and death. The idea about participatory versus 
causal orientation was initially introduced by anthropologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1923). In 
reality, these orientations are not exclusive or strictly distinct but complementary and 
simultaneously available ways of relating with the world shared by all individuals in all 
cultures. Furthermore, most human actions integrate features from both of these orientations, 
although one is often more predominant and perhaps more culturally evoked. 
Anthropologist Stanley Tambiah (1990) and historian and scholar of religion Wouter 
Hanegraaff (2003) continued to develop this conceptualization. Hanegraaff (2003: 374–375) 
writes that instrumental causality50 is “a spontaneous tendency of the human mind; the tendency 
to suspect things that happen in the world to be result of material causation, and to explain 
events in this manner.” Participation, in turn, is often associated with aesthetic, religious, 
mythical, or magical orientations in the world (Tambiah 1990: 106; Luhrmann 2007; Dawes 
2014: 301). Anthropologist Tanya Luhrmann explains that in (magical) participation, such as 
in the prayer practice of the evangelical Christians whom she studied, “one experiences one’s 
mind as participated in by another awareness, and as affecting that other awareness, that the 
outer world is full of intentional, interactive consciousness” (Luhrmann 2007: 93). For 
Hanegraaff (2003: 374), a participatory experience of reality is something immediate; it is 
“irreducible datum of human experience, which neither permits nor requires further explanation 
but has to be noted simply as a fact.” Hanegraaff sees instrumental causality as a way to explain 
reality (i.e., how the world is independent from our experience of it) and participation more as 
a way to experience reality. It could be claimed, however, that participatory experience also 
involves thinking about the world, as experiencing encompasses processing on multiple levels. 
                                                 
50 Hangraaff (2003: 375) prefers to talk about “instrumental casusality” over “causality” “in order to avoid any 
confusion, for example with what Lévy-Bruhl would refer to as ‘mystical causality’, such as invisible spiritual 
beings or forces believed to cause material events.” 
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Furthermore, instrumental causality can become a mode of living life, not merely thinking about 
life. 
With the help of the notions of instrumental causality and participation, I can clarify the way 
in which the different kinds of actions and practices around a terminal diagnosis relate to each 
other and, further, how they relate to the dominant discourse of biomedicine in contemporary 
society. Instrumental causality is represented by categorizations and a compartmentalization of 
reality, rules, and the methodology of positive science and discursive mathematico-logical 
reasoning (Tambiah 1990: 105). The entire medical world is quite naturally located in this sort 
of orientation, in which instrumental causality, as way to explain reality, has become an 
ideology. The material accoutrements of biomedicine—techno-medical equipment, sterile 
environments, and pharmaceuticals—are all manifestations of trust in the causal way of 
thinking about the world. These biomedical processes create their very own deathscapes, where 
certain kinds of rituals of care are practiced. 
According to Hanegraaff, the victory of causality over participation (or rationality over 
irrationality, science over magic, and so on) is not what is historically unique. Instead, what is 
distinctive is the way in which “this particular ideological system has managed […] to establish 
itself in recent history as the socially dominant symbolic system in western society” 
(Hanegraaff 2003: 375–376).51 The significant point which Hanegraaff makes here (and which 
has been pointed out by others; see Luhrmann 1991) is that a magical (or religious) manner of 
thinking does not exclude the scientific or rational way of thinking. Even when one is 
experiencing things via participation—such as believing in supernatural agencies who are 
participating in the believer’s life at the same time that the believer is participating in the divine 
(see Luhrmann 2007)—there is no reason why the same person could not also rely on a 
scientific explanation of matters. In contemporary Western society, however, where 
instrumental causality is the dominant narrative, offering not only a manner of relating to reality 
but also a manner of living and acting within the world, there is undeniable dissonance between 
this cultural ideology and the spontaneous tendency of (magical) participation.52 One way to 
lessen this dissonance is to practice participation in the form of rituals, by means of which one 
can establish a separate ritual space for the participatory engagement (Utriainen 2020). 
When I set out to do my ethnography, I discovered only scant evidence of explicitly religious 
or even spiritual rituals. What I did find, though, were various other kinds of participatory 
practices marked by metaphysical and existential meaning-making. These practices shared a 
common element: aesthetics. When orienting to the world aesthetically rather than religiously, 
                                                 
51 Hanegraaff adds that it is not for historians to evaluate the truth claims of this ideology (or any ideology, for that 
matter), as “the ideology of instrumental causality may simply be recognized as the dominant ‘narrative’ of 
contemporary western society; and its defenders’ claim of a privileged status compared with other narratives must 
be noted as being itself a part of the narrative” (Hanegraaff 2003: 376). 
52 This dissonance explains the phenomenon of “disenchantment,” which, in other words, is “the pressure exerted 
upon human beings to deny the spontaneous tendency of participation, by accepting the claims of culturally 
established ideology according to which instrumental causality amounts to a worldview capable in principal of 
rationally explaining all aspects of reality” (Hanegraaff 2003: 377). 
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there is no evident epistemological or metaphysical dissonance in regard to the scientific 
worldview. Yet, the creative space saturated with imagination and elicited by aesthetic 
experience allows the existence of religious elements but does not require them. In this space, 
the person is able to participate affectively in the world. Similar aesthetic experiences as what 
happens via the arts can be achieved by participating in a (mythic) landscape or sacred 
geography (Tambiah 1990: 106–107). Whereas Tambiah elaborates on various examples of 
anthropological studies in which nature has a sacred component and a spiritually empowering 
influence on people (whose identities are magically and relationally structured), the experience 
of “participation in nature” is relevant even for today’s urban Finns, as we shall see. 
The imagination and the potentiality that are present in both aesthetics and ritual can be seen 
as a kind of virtuality. This is how anthropologist Bruce Kapferer has interpreted ritual, as a 
site for virtuality, and this view complements the theory of rituals as participatory modes of 
action (Kapferer 2004, 2006). According to Kapferer, in the virtuality of the ritual, the ritual 
participants are able to enhance their potentialities, invite change upon themselves, or practice 
new solutions and change. This perspective helps to elucidate the motives for the personal 
rituals in which my research participants engaged, as well as why those rituals were so 
meaningful for them.  
The word ‘virtual’ refers simultaneously to something fictional and illusory and to 
something with the potential capacity to enhance reality. Various forms of art, (religious) ritual, 
and environmental aesthetics (as in a landscape or even a single element of nature) are 
experiences which enable a creation of virtual space for learning, absorbing, tolerating, and 
even celebrating the tensions and paradoxes of life. In this kind of virtual space—whether 
artistic, ritual, or environmental—things otherwise impossible become possible; through a 
ritual frame we enter the virtual “as if” world of possibilities (Utriainen 2016, 2020). 
I have called this sort of participatory engagement aesthetic experience, since aesthetics 
reflects the one common element in experiences of art, ritual, and landscape or nature (Butters 
2016). Here participation is not just a way of experiencing and sensing reality. It becomes a 
way to reorient oneself by facilitating new, relevant, and metaphysically meaningful 
understandings of one’s personal life situation. Subsequently, aesthetic experience is not only 
sensory but also cognitive; it can shape one’s (metaphysical) understanding of the world. Such 
participatory engagement is an example of the kind of relational processual manner of living 
and dying that I wish to illuminate in this study. 
2.4 Visuals of the theoretical thinking of this work 
Since I draw from many different theoretical sources, I have created a set of diagrams intended 
to clarify the theoretical constellation of my work and how it relates to the various aspects of 
the analysis (see Figures 2, 3, and 4). As seen in Figure 2 above, the overall theoretical approach 
arises from phenomenology and critical mediated posthumanism; whereas the former looks at 
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various intersubjectivities from the embodied phenomenological perspective, the latter offers a 
contemporary perspective, emphasizing relationalities (including non-human actors).  
The overarching research topic can be approached with questions of what happens around 
the dying people, where it happens, and how it happens.53 This approach is represented in Figure 
3. Under “landscape” are the themes related to (actual and virtual) environments, as well as 
relationality and mediatedness. Correspondingly, under the section for “ritual,” there are the 
various activities which the dying patients do themselves, or which are done to them by others—
thereby including both personal, social, and institutional expressions. Finally, the question of 
how is divided into two sections, that of the “institutional” and that of the “personal frame” of 
action, in which different orientations—causal and participatory—are applied. Again, it is 
important to note that these frames of institutional and personal tend to merge and become 
intertwined to some extent, since medicine can become a personal ritual and, for instance, 
existential meaning-making can be also applied to medicine. However, this diagram serves to 
illustrate the main thematic approaches I take toward my research material. 
By adding more theory in relation to body and space in the diagram (see the green circles in 
Figure 4), it is possible to visualize how the various theoretical angles fit together with the 
different themes and the whole of the study. Generally speaking, my research topic is very 
subjective, personal, and even intimate, yet since the personal end-of-life experiences are 
                                                 
53  This “what,” “where,” and “how” approach, developed during the research process, was presented at an 
international Death Studies conference in Bath in 2019 (DDD14).  
Figure 3. Main thematic 
approaches to the research 
material. 
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strongly embedded in institutional care (practices and places), the research touches upon 
institutional and sociopolitical aspects as well. For this reason, I deploy seemingly very 
different kinds of approaches in the research material: the overall approach of phenomenology 
is strengthened by anthropological theories of ritual. This kind of a “tandem approach” ensures 
me with tools to analyze the deeply subjective experience within its societal context (Desjarlais 
& Throop 2011: 95). For instance, the matter of space can be viewed from a socially produced 
angle and from the phenomenological angle of lived space. The Deleuzoguattarian striated can 
be associated with institutional (structuring) aspects of space and practice and the smooth can 
be associated with lived personal space and practice; however, as previously mentioned, these 
categories are never completely separate but in a dynamic relationship with each other. As we 
shall see, smoothings can happen equally in the institutional frame and striated can manifest via 
personal rituals, which structure space and time, for instance. In regard to analysis of the 
multiple body in various kinds of rituals, we can differentiate between the Foucauldian 
disciplined body, which may become objectified within the institutional practices (and thus be 
under Spinozian potestas), and the extended and virtual body empowered by potentia. 
Figure 4. The main approaches to the topic of the study with the applied theories. 
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3. CONTEXT, METHODOLOGY, AND RESEARCH ETHICS 
3.1 Context 
General context for the study 
Especially in the fields of medical anthropology and social studies regarding health and 
illnesses, the proper contextualization of a research is of major importance. In their article on 
methodology in health research, Canadian psychiatrist Marghalara Rashid points out that 
careful contextualization helps to prevent misrepresentation of participants’ meanings and 
purposes (Rashid et al. 2015). Even though the immediate location of the fieldwork sites are 
not specified (for the sake of personal data protection), there are other ways to contextualize 
the study, such as underlying national health policies and practices that influence the ground-
level realities. Moreover, the contextualization is also in line with the very important basic 
observation that the research participants (dying people) so clearly identified themselves as 
patients. 
The meaning of the context for my research participants became evident to me after I started 
the fieldwork. Rather than talking about the terminal condition per se, most of the conversations 
surrounded general issues of being ill. Patients talked about their illness trajectories and their 
attempts to create a sense of their whole experience of being ill. I gathered a few possible 
reasons for patients wanting to talk about being ill so much, rather than anything related to 
dying. First, even when a patient had been referred to palliative care or to hospice, it was 
sometimes difficult for them to accept the finality of the situation. Indeed, quite many were still 
seeking or hoping for a cure, or at least some life-prolonging treatments and solutions. In other 
words, their lived reality was defined more by being ill than by dying. Second, the kind of 
experiences the patients had had during their whole illness trajectory—which varied time wise 
from a few months to several years—affected the way they experienced their situation at the 
moment of the research. Just as life experiences in general shape people and affect their ability 
to handle difficulties, the research participants’ previous experiences with medical encounters 
affected how able they were to interpret their contemporary situation. This does not mean that 
patients did not assert their authority and their own agency in certain situations, but rather that 
during a moment of vulnerability (when one fell ill, for instance), one could easily become 
much more dependent on the environment. Consequently, the significance of the surrounding 
world (e.g., people, places, practices) became pronounced. For this reason, I found it important 
to try to understand the way in which people ended up in certain situations and had certain kinds 
of encounters and experiences with the medical world. 
Contextualization can happen on various levels. On the cultural and historic macro level, 
Finland has a rich death culture with a vast body of folklore and various spiritual practices and 
rituals. While most of these practices belong to history by now, some aspects of the ancient 
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death culture can be still found in Finnish art (music and the fine arts, for example).54 Some 
references to the old, death-related vernacular folk beliefs and imagery seem to exist even 
today; for instance, my research participants talked about experiences of sielulintu, the “soul 
bird” (see Chapter 10). Otherwise, as explained in the first chapter, Finland is a rather secular 
Northern European country with a majority of people belonging to the Lutheran church (73% 
in 2015).55 The most noteworthy features of “Finnish Lutheranism” are related to the societal 
ideal of seeking the common good, trust toward and responsibility of one and other, 
meaningfulness of work (“work as a vocation”), and the importance of equality in the society 
(Ketola et al. 2018: 23–31).56 In general, religious sentiments are considered to be private; in 
regard to religious behavior, Finns could be described as rather passive (Taira 2012: 23; Taira 
2015). Attendance at church ceremonies, for example, is very low––mostly people go to church 
for rites of passage (weddings, funerals, baptisms) and calendar rites such as Christmas. Hence, 
the phrase “belonging without practicing” describes most Finns well (Taira 2012: 23). 
While the cultural and religious background is part of the macro context, another very 
important element is the healthcare system in Finland. The Finnish healthcare system is largely 
publicly funded, which grants everybody the access to healthcare services. 57  However, 
researchers in the field of social and healthcare politics agree that an increasing number of 
neoliberal elements (e.g., the marketization and privatization of healthcare services, 
augmenting individual responsibility in regard to one’s wellbeing, converting patients into 
customers) is taking over Finnish socio-political discourse and decision-making (Hoppania 
2019; Harjunen 2017; Jokinen 2017; Rokkonen & Lehto 2017). Although the political changes 
in Finland may have been more moderate or slower than in other European countries (see 
Julkunen 2017), the political discourse and atmosphere in regard to healthcare have changed in 
Finland since the 1990s, and especially since 2015 (Hellman et al. 2017). 
                                                 
54 The theme of Tuonen joutsen, the “swan of death,” for example, has featured in the work of numerous celebrated 
Finnish artists, such as Jean Sibelius, Akseli Gallen-Kallela, and Eino Leino. 
55 This reflects roughly the time of the fieldwork. The decline in Church membership is notable, however. In 2019, 
only 68.6% of all Finns belonged to the Church (https://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suomen_evankelis-
luterilainen_kirkko#Kirkon_j%C3%A4senet). In Helsinki, the membership percentages are even lower: in 2018, 
only 53% of the inhabitants were members of the Lutheran Church (https://www.hs.fi/kaupunki/art-
2000006076021.html). 
56 Trust in others is implicit also in Finns’ trust in various national institutions; according to a Gallup poll conducted 
in 2019, over 70% of Finns trust the healthcare system either a “fair amount” or a “great deal” (Lääkäriliitto 
2019b). 
57 For instance, in 2020, one chemo- or radiation therapy session costs around €10 and a night in the hospital is 
approximately €20 (https://stm.fi/terveydenhuollon-maksut).  
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This perspective does not dominate my analysis, yet I wish to keep it in mind, as it may 
affect the discourse and practices in the field (Hoppania 2019). On one hand, this refers to the 
general frame of the care of the dying, which mostly takes place within healthcare settings. On 
the other hand, since the efficiency orientation accentuated in neoliberal policy-making 
penetrates the whole society (Eskelinen et al. 2017), it also affects how frailty, illness, and 
inefficiency are understood and experienced. How this kind of atmosphere influences people’s 
illness experiences and how it relates, for instance, to the fear of being a burden to one’s family 
(which came up a few times during my research) are relevant questions to pose, even though it 
was not in the scope of this study to find the answers to them. The following graphic 
representation (Figure 5) depicts the various affective contexts in which the patients’ 
experiences are embedded. 
Figure 5. The micro, meso, and macro contexts which affect patients’ experiences. 
Since I seek to understand the patient’s lived experiences, my analysis happens on the micro 
level. However, because the individual’s experiences are born in relation to, and in dependence 
on, the meso and macro levels of society, I will make some references to those other contextual 
levels throughout the study. As I try to make sense of how these elements intertwine with the 
situated perception and embodied understandings of patients, phenomenological approach 
CULTURE AND SOCIO-ECONOMICS
law, cultural values
NATIONAL NURSING POLICIES 
media
LOCAL PRACTICES
hospitals, hospices, and private sector; 
medical practices and technologies
EVERYDAY SURROUNDINGS 
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helps “to consider the ways in which political, social, economic, and discursive formations 
intersect with the operations and felt immediacies of bodies in a number of sociocultural 
settings” (Desjarlais & Throop 2011: 90).  
Palliative care strategy in Finland 
The national healthcare policies in Finland, such as the Current Care Guidelines 
(Käypähoitosuositus) and local practicalities and practices of various physical care settings, 
directly influence the way in which healthcare, including palliative care, is organized, and hence 
they also affect the way in which people access and experience their care. 
In Finland, there are four general care strategies (see Figure 6), which refer to the primary 
goals and aims of care in relation to cancer treatments (which was the common denominator 
among my research participants): 
 
Figure 6. The four-staged model of care strategies. Current Care Guidelines 2019. Good palliative care 
is included in all of the care strategies (Saarto 2015). 
 
In recent years, there has been much discussion about the early and gradual integration of 
palliative care with the care of life-threatening illnesses (Kaasa et al. 2018; Gomez-Batiste 
2019);59 one reason for this is the increasing number of patients with chronic metastatic cancer. 
This trend is also visible in the Finnish recommendations, which suggest that palliative care 
ought to be offered in combination with the different care strategies (Current Care Guidelines 
2019). In practice, this means that the simple dichotomized division of care into curative versus 
                                                 
58 This model is also found online: https://www.terveyskyla.fi/palliatiivinentalo/palliatiivinen-hoito/hoitolinjat. 
59 Internationally, Kaasa et al. (2018: e591) have proposed a three-fold distinction: curative, life-prolonging, and 
palliative care; at the same time, they emphasize the integration of palliative care with the care of more advanced 
diseases. 
The four-staged model for care strategies58 
Care strategy Primary objectives of care 
Curative treatment Full recovery 
Disease-modifying (life-
prolonging) treatments 
Control the progression of the non-curable primary disease 
and prolong the life span  
Palliative care (ICD-10 code 
Z51.5) 
Alleviate suffering and foster quality of life when the course 
of the disease can no longer be affected 
End-of-life care (ICD-10 code 
Z51.5) 
Palliative care close to imminent death (days or weeks), 
involving care of the dying 
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non-curative does not necessarily correspond to the realities of patients, especially not those 
whose metastatic cancer has become chronic and who live for years with their condition. The 
imbricated relationship between the curative, disease-modifying, palliative, and hospice care 
strategies can be depicted in the following manner (Figure 7): 
Figure 7. Palliative care model for cancer patients. Original diagram by Tiina Saarto (2015). 
However, as professor of oncology and palliative medicine Stein Kaasa notes, for many patients 
and professionals alike, curative care and palliative care continue to represent two different 
cultures and paradigms with differing goals of care (Kaasa et al. 2018).60 In the case of cancer, 
this is sometimes summarized as “tumor-centered” versus “patient-centered” care (see Kaasa 
et al. 2018: e588–e592).61 
  
                                                 
60 The dichotomous perception of palliative/hospice care and curative care is based on the historic roots of 
palliative care. The hospice movement started to develop in the UK and the USA in the 1960s, largely as a counter-
reaction to the medicalization of death (Lewis [2006] 2011: 6). The principles of hospice philosophy developed 
by Saunders quickly spread around Anglo-Saxon countries. Concurrently there appeared other critical studies and 
publications claiming that death had become taboo in modern society and that care of the dying was neglected 
(e.g., Hinton 1964; Glaser & Strauss 1965; Gorer 1965; Kübler-Ross [1969] 2009; Becker 1973; Ariès 1974). 
Thus, the moment was propitious for a larger hospice movement. If hospice was first developed outside of the 
main healthcare systems, within a few decades it became a part of mainstream medicine in the form of palliative 
care and palliative medicine. This mainstream move over the years has not happened without critiques, however. 
At the academic conferences on death and dying that I have attended in the past five years, social scientists and 
nursing professionals from different parts of the world have criticized that contemporary palliative care has become 
too medicalized and gone astray from its original ideals set out by Saunders (see also Randall & Downie 2006). 
This opinion was also expressed by some of the professionals I encountered during the fieldwork. 
61 I could hear echoes of this kind of understanding among the people with whom I did my fieldwork; I will return 
to this later on. 
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Treatments and care in advanced cancer 
In the case of cancer (which all of my research participants had), the single-most important 
factor in the diagnosis is whether the disease is local or advanced with metastasis.62 In the case 
of a local tumor, curative care follows; this aims to destroy all cancerous cells, ideally ending 
with full recovery of the patient. There are nowadays a variety of treatment options. In addition 
to the traditional therapies such as surgery, chemotherapy, and radiation, there are treatments 
in immunotherapy, targeted therapy, hormone therapy, stem cell transplants, and genetic 
precision medicine. All these are often used alongside the more traditional therapies (such as 
chemo). Due to the continuous advancement of cancer research, the discovery of new drugs and 
treatment options has improved general cancer prognoses significantly. Regularly making 
headlines in the media, new medical innovations are a source of much hope for many people. 
At times, however, the sensationalized news of medical breakthroughs create false hope and 
misunderstandings for patients (Janes 2006). 
If cancer has spread widely throughout the body, it becomes much harder to control. 
Metastatic cancer is treated with disease-modifying treatments or, in more advanced cases, 
palliatively. 63  Non-curative disease-modifying treatment “constitutes an interdisciplinary 
treatment effort for patients whose disease is unresponsive to approaches with curative intent 
and involves life-prolonging treatment and palliative care” (Mroueh et al. 2019). Once the 
attending doctor assesses that it is time to make the shift from the curative care strategy to 
disease-modifying care and early integrated palliative care, the protocol is to initiate discussion 
about this with the patient and possible family members (see Figure 7; Lehto 2015).64 This is 
also the time (at the latest) when the Advance Care Planning (ACP) ought to be made by the 
physician in collaboration with the patient. 
ACP is a document that includes various kinds of information relating to end-of-life care, 
such as the record of the care strategy (aims of the care), the treatment plan and medication, 
possible restrictions of the care (such as a do-not-resuscitate order, or DNR), the patient’s 
wishes in regard to their end-of-life care, and the plan for the care location at the time of death 
(Current Care Guidelines 2019).65 When the decision is made to engage in palliative care, it 
                                                 
62 Some research participants also had other illnesses. 
63 The contemporary care policies emphasize the presence of palliative care in all of the care strategies (Saarto 
2015). 
64 Among other prognostic tools, in order to estimate if it is time for the patient to be referred to specialized 
palliative care, the so-called “surprise question” is sometimes asked: “Would you be surprised if this patient dies 
within the next 6–12 months?” In the case of a negative answer, palliative care should be applied (Kaasa et al. 
2018: e608).  
65 According to the Finnish law on patient’s rights (1992/785: 6§), a patient can refuse medical treatments (see 
https://www.valvira.fi/terveydenhuolto/potilaan-asema-ja-oikeudet-oikeudet/potilaan-itsemaaraamisoikeus). In 
regard to restricting care, the doctor is ultimately responsible for making the decision about what is correct and 
timely. 
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ought to be documented in the patient’s records (with ICD10-code Z51.5 – Palliative care).66 
The decision for end-of-life care happens when death is foreseen within the next weeks or days, 
and it contains a promise to organize symptomatic care for the dying and the necessary support 
for them, as well as for family members, during the last weeks of life and after death. The end-
of-life decision always includes a DNR decision; the decision to shift to hospice care also needs 
to be documented in the patient’s records (Lehto 2015; Saarto 2017: 7–8; Lehto et al. 2019). 
In regard to my research participants, all of them received some medical treatment after their 
diagnosis (which was not always non-curative at first). After the curative treatment failed, or 
after the relapse of the disease, the disease-modifying treatment could still benefit from various 
types of chemo, radiation, and hormone therapy. In palliative care, however, the overall aim is 
to treat symptoms and alleviate pain (in regard to which radiation therapy is one possible 
treatment). At this time, it becomes important to carefully discuss the pros and cons of the 
treatment, especially in the case of those therapies which oncology refers to as “aggressive,” 
such as operations or chemotherapy (Hietanen 2016; Tarkkanen et al. 2020). Many 
professionals find these encounters challenging, and sometimes the shared decision-making 
over these matters becomes complex due to communication difficulties and differing 
expectations between the doctor and the patient (Galushko et al. 2012; Tarkkanen et al. 2020). 
Assigning a patient a correct care strategy, including ending potentially harmful treatments, is 
often a challenge for caregivers (Hietanen 2015a, 2016; Tarkkanen et al. 2020).67 International 
and Finnish research literature has shown that that despite recommendations, aggressive cancer 
treatments still tend to be used too widely at the end of life (Rautakorpi, Mäkelä et al. 2017; 
Rautakorpi, Seyednasrollah et al. 2017; Hirvonen et al. 2019).68 Aggressive treatments toward 
the very end of life may deteriorate life quality; furthermore, they increase hospital deaths 
significantly.69 Their use also contrasts with Finland’s national recommendations, according to 
                                                 
66 The dynamic change that has happened in Finland in regard to palliative care is visible in the frequency of usage 
of ICD-code Z51 in patients’ records at Tampere University Hospital, where they increased from under 100 in 
2013 to almost 1000 in 2017 (Lehto et al. 2019).  
67 Communication between doctors and patients in general has progressed a lot since the 1980s, when it was 
common to not even tell the patient that they were actually dying (Seale 1998: 108). However, it continues to be 
a challenging moment for a doctor to share their prognosis assessment with patients, and some still seek to avoid 
it (Lamont & Christakis 2001; Fenton et al. 2018). 
68 According to a recent Finnish study, “20% of the patients received systemic cancer treatment during the last 
month of life. This was in line with another Finnish study where 18% of the patients received IV chemotherapy 
during the last month. The corresponding figures during the last two weeks of life were 18% in this study and 7% 
in the study by Rautakorpi et al. However, in the present study orally given chemotherapy and biological treatments 
were also included, which could explain the higher rate of patients receiving systemic treatment at the EOL” 
(Hirvonen et al. 2019: 5). Furthermore, “In the present study, 29% of the patients received radiotherapy during the 
last month of life and 14% in the last two weeks, respectively. The prevalence of radiotherapy in the present study 
is somewhat higher than in the previous studies. In another Finnish study from 2005 to 2013, the corresponding 
figures were 23% and 12%, respectively” (Hirvonen et al. 2019: 5). 
69 Recent Finnish studies (Rautakorpi, Mäkelä et al. 2017; Rautakorpi, Seyednasrollah et al. 2017) have shown 
that of those receiving chemo or radiation therapy during the last weeks of their life, 40% die in specialized medical 
care. 
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which cancer patients should be provided with the possibility to die in hospice care, whether at 
home or with proper facilities in general healthcare (Saarto 2017). As Hirvonen et al. note: 
The lack of a PC [palliative care] decision or postponing it to the last month of life reflected 
a significantly increased risk for aggressive cancer treatments during the EOL and delayed 
the access to PC services. Early-integrated PC should be offered more systematically to 
ensure timely advanced care planning and access to palliative and EOL care. (Hirvonen et al. 
2019: 6) 
Thus, the early integration of palliative care protects patients from potentially futile diagnostics 
or treatments at the end of life, when holistic care for the dying and the family members could 
instead be provided.70 Care strategies are not merely words on paper. When applied in practice, 
they very concretely guide the kind of medical, psycho-social, and existential care that is offered 
to the patient, and in this way they play an active part in forming the patient’s experience of 
their illness and end of life. 
3.2 Qualitative research method: Ethnography of palliative patients 
Planning the study and seeking the ethical approval 
The fact that there is relatively little qualitative and ethnographic data on how terminally ill 
patients perceive, feel, and think about their situation assured me of the importance of doing 
fieldwork among dying people. Despite the possible emotional challenges that it could bring, 
the ethnographic research approach was needed to elicit the kind of information and perspective 
that I was seeking to apprehend: namely, the embodied experiences of the patients themselves 
(see also Reeves et al. 2008). Furthermore, since I have a background in anthropology and 
previous experience in ethnography, the idea of this method was conceivable. In 
anthropological ethnography, the researcher deals constantly with questions of being at the 
same time an insider and an outsider. An anthropologist’s task is to learn the insider’s emic 
knowledge and then to relate that to the etic knowledge of academic discourse. 71 
Anthropological training equips the researcher with analytical lenses that have the capacity to 
perceive ordinary everyday phenomena as something extraordinary. While studying cultures 
other than one’s own, an anthropologist develops a sensibility to regard one’s own culture as 
something wondrous; previously unquestioned manners of thinking and acting provoke 
questions and become worth studying. As a result, it is common for anthropologists to query 
cultural categories which may normally be taken for granted (Van Dongen & Fainzang 1998; 
Campbell 2011). 
                                                 
70 In the education on palliative medicine, clear emphasis is put on the importance of Advance Care Planning 
(ACP) for every patient, including a proper care strategy designed early on (Saarto 2017: 7–8; Lehto et al. 2019). 
This may also prevent some of the contested situations in which the patients and their families can find themselves.  
71 There are contemporary academic discourses, such as those related to the “ontological turn,” within the fields 
of anthropology and the study of religion in which this rather traditional emic-etic perspective has been strongly 
debated (see Carrithers et al. 2010; Laack 2020).  
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When I first presented the idea for my research at a postgraduate seminar in the Study of 
Religions (in the Department of World Cultures) at the University of Helsinki, many found it 
compelling. But there were some doubts also. For example, a colleague wondered whether 
anyone in such a situation would want to talk to a stranger. This was a valid question, although 
later it proved not to be a problem at all (Hutchinson et al. 1994; Lawton 2001). As discussed 
in our seminar, it was obvious that my study entailed additional ethical questions, which would 
require serious attention and very detailed planning. 
Because I wanted to explore a range of experiences, I thought of recruiting patients from 
different locations (e.g., hospitals, hospices). In order to conduct any research in hospital 
premises, the research plan has to be approved by the university hospital’s ethical board.72 For 
the application to the medical ethical board I also needed a supervisor at the hospital. I was 
fortunate in this regard that professor of palliative medicine Tiina Saarto agreed to supervise 
my study. The process of the ethical approval was complex, since the research plan, along with 
all the other forms, needed to be written in terms of medical research, according to the 
guidelines and criteria created for medical studies.73 The first application did not go through; 
among other things more clarifications were needed to explain the legal protection of the staff 
members. Since this issue proved to be complicated, I decided in my ethnography to reduce to 
a minimum the focus on staff. After filing a new application with the required clarifications, I 
received approval from the ethical board. The research permissions were then sought from the 
oncology ward at the university hospital. The hospice home had already given conditional 
permission (pending the ethical board’s approval), and so therefore I was then ready to proceed 
to the field. 
Ethnographic research methods 
Ethnography is a classical methodological orientation in anthropology and other social 
sciences, which sociologist Martyn Hammersley (2006: 6) defines as “a form of social […] 
research that emphasizes the importance of studying at first hand what people do and say in 
particular contexts.” In anthropology, this has traditionally meant rather lengthy (at least a year) 
fieldwork among the community under the study, often far from one’s home.74 Fieldwork 
commonly involves participant observation and relatively open-ended interviews designed to 
understand people’s experiences and perspectives, and it may be complemented by the study of 
various sorts of official or personal documents (Hammersley 2006). In participant observation, 
                                                 
72 An evaluation from the medical ethical board is required even if the research site is not part of the university 
hospital, but any other medical setting (such as a private clinic, for instance). 
73 The position of research in the social sciences and humanities in regard to medicine and hospital institutions is 
an important topic that requires more discussion (Koenig, Back & LaVera 2003; Gysels, Evans & Higginson 2012; 
Lämsä 2008, 2016). 
74 Anthropological fieldwork has changed greatly over the last thirty years. There has been strong debate during 
recent years about ethnographic methodology itself, especially since ethnographic methods have been embraced 
in various other disciplines (see Hockey & Forsey 2012; Ingold 2014).  
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the researcher seeks to depict and explain people’s actions within their own environment, as 
well as people’s interpretations and understanding of their actions and environment. Research 
subjects 75  are approached holistically, which means that people are always studied as 
contextually (culturally) and historically situated. Ideally the researcher collects data by being 
physically present in the living environment of the research subjects; by participating actively 
in their quotidian life, they can carefully observe the object of research. By its nature, 
ethnographic research mostly applies the hermeneutic interest of knowledge; the purpose is to 
learn how the world is experienced and perceived by the research participants (Hastrup 1995; 
Hammerley & Atkinson 2007). Ethnography as a research approach is especially suitable for 
studies within the realm of phenomenological anthropology that seek to capture the subjective 
embodied understandings of research participants. 
Since the research material is born in the interactive relationship between the researcher and 
the researched, there is neither a need nor epistemological basis to render the researcher 
invisible in the research process (Hockey 1990: 198–199; Hastrup 1995: 45–47; Visser 2017). 
Actually, it is the other way around. For the sake of the validity of the research, the researcher’s 
positioning should be made explicitly open and reflexive; only in this way can there be a critical 
evaluation of the research process and the acquired data. Inspired largely by phenomenology 
(Heidegger [1927] 1962; Husserl [1936] 1954; Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2005), the intersubjective 
nature of knowledge formation is today an essential notion in many intellectual conversations 
within anthropology (Csordas 1994, 2011; Jackson 1996; Knibbe & Versteeg 2008). 
Furthermore, when studying illness and dying, one studies life experiences which are 
fundamentally shared by all humans; they are also shared by every anthropologist or social 
scientist studying these themes. Like the renowned death scholar Douglas Davies has remarked, 
“We are all participants in mortality, not just observers” (see Woodthorpe 2011). This 
commonality is challenged by the difference that the researched is the one in the position of an 
actually dying person; they become the other, living their end of life, whereas for the researcher 
death remains personally remote. 
The shared nature of experiences brings the researcher closer to the researched; regardless 
of all the various cultural differences the researcher may have with the researched, this shared 
human commonality serves as a foundation for mutual understanding (Hastrup 1995: 57). Given 
the especially emotionally charged nature of death research, however, this commonality can 
cause complications, which each researcher needs to encounter and solve in their own manner 
(Hockey 2007; Woodthorpe 2011; Borgstrom & Ellis 2017; Visser 2017). The way in which 
these reflections comprise part of the final research report can vary greatly (Davies 2010: 9–
14). In my case, I will bring forward both my own position and my personal experiences 
                                                 
75 What is called the “research object” in quantitative research traditions is usually depicted as a “research subject” 
or “research participant” in anthropology. This has to do with the epistemological emphasis. In anthropology, 
knowledge formation is interpreted to happen in a sort of collaboration together with the research participants. The 
amount of theoretical conceptualization that the researcher then does by herself varies from study to study.  
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(especially with my mother), which I believe are essential in the process of knowledge 
formation—and thus also the creation of this study. 
Since the methodology was cultivated within anthropology (and in Finland notably also in 
the field of study of religion; see Anttonen 2010), ethnographic methods have become popular 
in various disciplines in the social sciences, but also in education and health research (Rashid 
et al. 2015). Simultaneously, the methods themselves have been modified to suit these new 
contexts of study. Compared to a “traditional” anthropologist who would immerse in the 
research site for a year or two, social ethnographers tend to do much shorter periods in the field. 
For instance, they may spend a few hours per day and a day or two per week in their particular 
locale of interest. This describes well the kind of fieldwork I engaged in myself. In this type of 
fragmented “part-time fieldwork,” the process of material collection is somewhat different. This 
has caused some concerns about the adequacy and the validity of the methods used 
(Hammersley 2006; Ingold 2014), as this kind of fieldwork automatically produces more 
segmented ethnographic knowledge, in which the effects of the larger cultural background may 
not always surface as well as through a more immersive and longer time in the field. 
Furthermore, when the whole fieldwork period is shortened to last months rather than years, 
there is a threat that the perspective may become ahistorical (Hammersley 2006). All of this is 
quite contrary to the anthropological ethnographic project, which can be described as having 
“long-term and open-ended commitment, generous attentiveness, relational depth, and 
sensitivity to context” (Ingold 2014: 384). 
Since my fieldwork took place over several years, I am not particularly concerned about the 
question of ahistoricity. Furthermore, on a personal level, I have sought to create an 
understanding of the research participants’ situations by including their reflections on past 
experiences which had affected them. On a more societal level, my being involved in various 
manners in the field of palliative care and hospice enhanced my understanding of the dynamic 
aspect of the field. By addressing the sociohistorical context in which the study is made, one 
can minimize the inevitable problem of ahistoricity; after all, however carefully one may try to 
contextualize and historicize, an ethnography is always a momentary and situated process of 
capturing a certain social reality. 
In the classical anthropological model, the period of actual immersive fieldwork is followed 
by a so-called distancing period, when the researcher withdraws from the field and starts 
working with and analyzing the research material. If the fieldwork is done in a “part-time” 
manner, the subsequent distancing phase is different. This can complicate the distancing 
process, which often is thought to be both emotionally and intellectually crucial for the 
researcher. Of course, in some areas of research (especially in regard to study of dying), 
complete distancing may be unrealistic (Woodthorpe 2011; Visser 2017). Furthermore, in the 
contemporary digital era of massive globalization, it can be questioned if this sort of clear-cut 
separation from “the field” (wherever it may be) and “the Academy” can be still maintained. 
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At least intellectually and emotionally, if not physically and concretely, the researcher is 
continuously moving between the field (research material) and the Academy (theoretical 
thinking) (Hastrup 1995: 49–60). This also depicts my way of doing research, for it is 
essentially what creates anthropological knowledge (Hastrup 1995: 49–60), and eventually it 
leads to the writing of the actual research report. 
Participant observation and ethnographic interviews 
During the course of the fieldwork, my understanding of the research topic became more 
nuanced. In order to find answers to my research questions, I needed to pay attention not only 
to things that were said and expressed but also to things that remained unexpressed. 
Furthermore, while I was specifically interested in the experiences of the patients, I realized 
that in order to fully fathom them I had to also comprehend the environments in which they 
were engendered. In this way, over the course of the fieldwork some facets of my research 
problem became more salient than others. 
I practiced participant observation throughout my fieldwork in various settings. Following 
the ethical approval, I included only minimal research observations on practices initiated by 
nursing and medical staff; I did not observe physical medical treatments at all. Instead, my 
observations in the medical surroundings were limited to some very general remarks on 
activities, without any specification in regard to the staff, and I deliberately focused my 
attention on the patient, the space, and especially the patient’s relationship with their 
surroundings. 
In the hospice context, I occasionally worked in a similar role as the volunteers of the 
hospice. I engaged in care of the patients, not just my research participants but anyone needing 
assistance. Thus, I was actually participating in the daily life on the hospice ward, and by being 
involved in the everyday activities I learned a lot. In general, the relationality of the medical 
surroundings, including the staff, came up in a significant way in the narratives of the research 
patients; my material thus contains descriptions of the relations between the patients and the 
staff, as narrated by the research participants. 
Interviewing was the other major method of collecting information and seeking to gain an 
understanding of the people researched. I did not, however, pursue the interviews right at the 
beginning of meeting a new research participant; I even hesitated to use the word ‘interview’ 
(Finnish: haastattelu), since it could connote a structured conversation or even a closed 
questionnaire, which I was not conducting. Furthermore, due to the sensitive research topic and 
the fact that my research participants were vulnerable, a slow and considered manner of getting 
to know people was essential in forming a relationship. Yet, this was not the only reason why I 
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did not want to pursue a heavy interview right at the beginning.76 After getting to know people 
better, I felt that they talked to me more about what they really thought instead of saying things 
that they perhaps assumed that I wanted to hear.77 Time wise, therefore, most of my fieldwork 
consisted of “just hanging out” with the research participants, chatting and casually conversing 
with them. There were also the moments when we had an attentive conversation, and sometimes 
I conducted a semi-structured interview with the participants. 
 Using interviews as a primary source of data has been critiqued in the social sciences, and it 
would be indeed naïve to assume that interviews offer some sort of “authentic” or “truthful” 
representation of the interviewee and their reality (Skinner 2012). Narration is always based on 
an interpretation and a chosen version of the past; in actuality, things can happen simultaneously 
whereas when they become narrated they appear in a diachronic manner and people apply 
causes and conditions that may not have been there. In addition to the fact that the interviewee 
may have a number of personal and social reasons to tell their story in a particular manner, the 
researcher makes selections from interviews, and only certain narrations become analyzed and 
included in the research report. The critical perspective on interviews as a research method 
notes the way in which our contemporary society is an “interview society” (Atkinson & 
Silverman 1997, cited in Skinner 2012: 11). The general public is saturated with interviews on 
television, the internet, newspapers, and so on, and they know how to perform in an interview 
(Skinner 2012: 10–12). This becomes especially problematic if the researcher uses interview 
responses uncritically, simply repeating them as the “results.” As anthropologist Jonathan 
Skinner puts it: “We might say, then, that in the interview society, the interview narratives 
sound good, feel good and look good for the interviewer and the interviewee. But this is a 
rehearsed self up for analysis. This is research by repetition rather than insight” (Skinner 2012: 
12).  
Instead of taking narratives as accurate depictions of reality per se, sociologists Jaber 
Gubrium and James Holstein consider interviews to be “reality-constructing, meaning-making 
occasions” (Holstein & Gubrium 1995: 4). They see the interview as “an active encounter,” and 
they emphasize that “researchers should consider the hows of the social process in the interview 
setting as well as the whats of the lived experience in the interview content in their interview 
work” (Holstein & Gubrium 1995: 5). This approach comes close to that of the ethnographic 
                                                 
76 Sometimes I had no option, however. For instance, in the case of the research patient Matti, I met him only once 
and we talked once on the phone. He died soon thereafter. Because of his professional background, he was familiar 
with issues of death and dying, and he invited me to seriously engage the issue. 
77 For instance, in the very beginning of my fieldwork, I was visiting the day hospice group for the first time and 
I introduced myself and my study, saying something like “My name is Maija Butters, and I come from the 
University of Helsinki where I am conducting PhD research in the field of study of religion…” On that first day, 
I heard the word ‘church’ mentioned more than any other day during my fieldwork. Later I realized that this must 
have been because I had introduced myself as a scholar of religion; people had assumed that it was religion I 
wished to hear about, and they were seeking to perform accordingly. After this, I avoided talking about the study 
of religion. Instead, I usually said that I was doing a cultural study on seriously ill people and hospice (see also 
Day 2013). When in the field, I also rarely defined my research participants as “terminally ill,” since not all thought 
of themselves as such.  
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interview, which is a methodologically specific process that includes critical and theoretical 
analysis of both the content of the narration and the actual interview situation. Anthropologists 
Jenny Hockey and Martin Forsey write that ethnographic interviews 
“commit the researcher to understanding the lived experience of the participant/interlocutor 
by asking about and listening closely to the beliefs, the values, the material conditions and 
structural forces that underwrite the socially patterned behaviours of all human beings, along 
with the meanings people attach to these conditions and forces.” (Hockey & Forsey 2012: 83) 
The ethnographer seeks to not only get answers to certain questions but also tries to develop an 
understanding of the various material and immaterial factors shaping and affecting what is told 
and how it is told. Narrations involve stories about lived experiences, which an ethnographer 
emphatically seeks to apprehend. The actual moment of the interview always deserves to be 
analyzed on its own terms as an active encounter, in which the reality is re-presented by the 
interviewer and interviewee together. 
In regard to my actual interviews, I had a general list of themes which I hoped to be able to 
go through at some point with my research participants. The main themes were: 1) illness, 2) 
daily life, 3) relationships, 4) emotions, expectations, 5) worldview, and 6) death and dying (if 
the person seemed able and willing to talk about this). I approached these themes by asking 
various questions relating to them and evoking free conversation (in more detail on this, see 
Appendix 4). In practice, the list worked more as a memory aid for myself and a starter kit for 
the conversation. Since the moments with my research participants varied greatly (depending 
on their emotional, psychological, and physical condition), I practiced active and reflective 
listening and evaluated the situation, keeping their needs in mind. I facilitated the research 
participants to lead the conversation, and I usually avoided bringing up death and dying, since 
I wished to hear the way in which they would initiate the topic. Sometimes, after careful 
consideration, if I felt that the research participant was emotionally open to it, I would initiate 
the conversation about death and dying. Discussions of death varied in their emotional 
character, from very sad and serious to engaging in laughter and joking. I made constant 
assessments of the situation, and I was always ready to shift the conversation elsewhere if 
needed. In the end, however, conversing was only one facet of my relationship with the research 
participants, which comprised attending, caring, and listening. 
3.3 Research ethics  
Studying a vulnerable group of people 
As Lawton (2001: 696) has pointed out, the paucity of (ethnographic) research among 
terminally ill patients is most likely intertwined with the ethical issues related to studying a 
vulnerable group of people (see, however, Krawczyk & Richards 2019). There are some 
discussions suggesting that palliative patients might need to be excluded altogether from 
academic research for being such a vulnerable group of people (Lawton 2001: 696; Pessin et 
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al. 2008: 628). For instance, palliative medicine consultant Fiona Randall and philosopher 
Robert Downie have questioned whether research consent can really be given voluntarily by 
the terminally ill, since due to their vulnerability and increased sense of dependency, they may 
feel coerced to participate in a study (Randall & Downie 1999: 242). They have further 
remarked that the dying patients should enjoy their remaining time “in peace,” in the company 
of their loved ones, rather than being bothered with questionnaires, for instance (Randall & 
Downie 1999: 242). Other possible risks have been mentioned in the research literature, such 
as invasion of privacy due to vulnerability or distress, inclusion of overly personal questions, 
and physical stress associated with the completion of interviews (Pessin et al. 2008: 628). All 
of these are valid concerns, which were considered carefully before and during the ethnography 
(as explained in detail below). 
The critical perspective has been challenged by others who claim it to be patronizing 
(Lawton 2001: 696; Corbin & Morse 2003). Compared to medical trials, for instance, in 
qualitative research the participants retain a considerable degree of control over the research 
process (Corbin & Morse 2003). A study conducted by psychologist Hayley Pessin et al. (2008) 
precisely on the effects of psychosocial research on palliative patients found empirical support 
for the view that research participants can actually benefit from the participation. The study 
also confirmed that palliative patients do practice their agency; for example, they dropped out 
of the research if they found it to be too strenuous for them (Pessin et al. 2008: 630). To make 
an assumption that a person with palliative status is too vulnerable to be part of research is to 
take authority and agency away from the very group it would be best to learn more about. That 
would also imply a practice of control of “what is said, how it is said, or if anything is said at 
all about the topic” (Corbin & Morse 2003: 337). Studying groups of people who are 
economically, physically, socially, ethnically, or sexually marginalized has always been 
important for social sciences such as anthropology or the science of religion, and ethnographic 
research can be seen as a form of politics of recognition (Taylor 1994). There is a great deal of 
research about end-of-life care, as well as public discussion and even debate on how it should 
be organized (on euthanasia, see Jylhänkangas 2013), but seldom are the perspectives of those 
in the core of the discussion brought forward or researched. From an ethical, political, and 
scholarly point of view, it is critical to give a voice to those who are often voiceless. 
In the article “Benefits of Participating in Research Interviews” written by Sally Hutchinson 
et al. (1994) in the field of nursing science, giving a voice to the voiceless and disenfranchised 
was listed as one of the possible positive aspects. The other possible benefits mentioned were 
to provide self-acknowledgement and validation, contribute to a sense of purpose, increase self-
awareness, grant a sense of empowerment, and promote healing (Corbin & Morse 2003: 346; 
Pessin et al. 2008). Of these, having a sense of purpose seemed especially important to many 
of the participants in my research, given what they shared with me. Similarly, in her seminal 
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study On Death and Dying, Elizabeth Kübler-Ross acknowledges how the patients interviewed 
by her research group responded positively: 
The majority of patients welcomed a breakthrough of their defenses, and were relieved when 
they did not have to play a game of superficial conversation when deep down they were so 
troubled with real or unrealistic fears. Many of them reacted to the first meeting as if we had 
opened a floodgate: they poured out all their bottled-up feelings and responded with great 
relief after such a meeting. (Kübler-Ross [1969] 2009: 209) 
A similar response was given by Inkeri, an interviewee who remarked that our meetings had 
“great meaning” for her. She said that it was “energizing” to be able to reflect on things in this 
way, that it was bringing up “the real dimension [of the experience], that there is no pretending 
or making up anything” (Inkeri/2). In general, I experienced that there was a need to be heard 
(Frank 2000). Scholar of qualitative research methods and psychologist Steinar Kvale has 
pointed out that the very act of talking with another person who is genuinely interested in your 
viewpoint can be a rewarding experience (Kvale 1984, cited in Corbin & Morse 2003: 339). 
Some of my research participants explicitly wished to share their story with a wider audience 
and “send their greetings” (Finnish: lähettää terveisiä) to others (most often to the medical 
staff). 
In addition to an augmentation of agency, some research discussions may even have 
therapeutic value for participants (Lawton 2001: 696). This seemed to be the case for some of 
my research participants. One participant, Heidi, exclaimed after our first discussion: “Wow! 
That was a good experience. Somehow so purifying… It was like some sort of religious ritual!” 
(D1: 104). This comment reflects what Hutchinson et al. (1994) have referred to as catharsis, 
one possible reaction to a sensitive interview on an emotionally loaded topic. As nursing science 
scholars Laura Dempsey et al. (2016) note, sensitive topics such as death, dying, loss, and 
bereavement require a sensitive, reflective, and attentive style of interviewing. Although there 
are risks to be taken into account when this sort of study is taking place (such as how to proceed 
if the interviewee has an emotional breakdown), there is no evidence that sensitive interviewing 
causes harm to interviewees (Corbin & Morse 2003; Dempsey et al. 2016). Thus, even though 
researchers may not be counselors, the interview process can become therapeutic for the 
attendants (Holloway & Wheeler 1995, cited in Dempsey et al. 2016).78 At the same time, there 
are always ethical aspects and risks, and this is also true with sensitive interviews when 
researching palliative patients.  
I received very few negative responses when approaching patients. Few declined my 
research request, stating that they had “nothing to say” to me. In regard to negative responses 
during the research process, sometimes patients became emotional, to be sure. While they 
                                                 
78 In regard to the status of the volunteers in the hospice, sociologist Michael R. Leming: “As a stranger who 
provides a ‘listening ear,’ without emotional involvements or professional entanglements, the volunteer can 
support the patient and his or her family members in a way that no other participants in the social network of dying 
can” (Leming 2003: 488).  
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experienced challenging emotions, this usually did not lessen their willingness to be part of the 
research. Only one of the research participants, Susanna, wished to interrupt the research after 
several months of participation. We had had one interview, and she agreed that I could use the 
material that I had collected until then (D4: 21). I never asked her why she wanted to quit, but 
I did get the impression that the complex emotions that my questions brought up were difficult 
for her, and she did not want to go through them in my presence. Such ethical issues need to be 
considered and dealt with thoroughly during the whole research process, starting from the 
research plan and during the ethnography itself, including the final research report. 
Research ethics applied 
The general ethical guidelines and principles regarding the methods of this research follow 
those given by the Finnish National Board on Research Integrity (TENK) (2009) for human 
sciences in Finland.79 The ethical principles can be divided into three areas: 1) respecting the 
autonomy of research subjects; 2) avoiding harm, and 3) privacy and data protection. I will first 
go through these briefly in regard to my research, and then I will continue to explicate those 
ethical aspects of the medical research (also applicable to my research, since I did research in 
medical sites).  
Respecting the autonomy of research subjects  
Participation in the research was completely voluntary. When I was recruiting patients in the 
university hospital and the hospice home, the staff placed announcements about my presence 
on the walls of the facility, explaining that I might approach patients in order to ask about their 
potential interest in the study. All of the participants were well informed about the content and 
implementation of the study, both verbally and in written form. For approval of their 
participation and also to give consent to use their personal data, the research participants were 
asked to sign a research consent form (see Appendix 2). In order to respect the autonomy of the 
researched individuals, I continued to verbally verify the patients’ willingness to continue with 
the research, even after I had a signed research consent form from them.80 I made sure that the 
researched knew that they had right to ask me to leave any given situation at any moment, or to 
interrupt the whole research process, if they so wished.  
Avoiding harm  
Harm that any research might bring about can be related to the three different phases of the 
research: collecting the research material, guarding the material, and the actual research 
                                                 
79 Here the term “human sciences” is used to differentiate research in the social sciences and humanities from 
research in the medical sciences. Medical research applies a different set of ethical guidelines, which are based on 
the Finnish Law Medical Research Act 488/1999. The TENK guidelines were updated in 2019; this study applies 
the older version of the guidelines. 
80 In general, human sciences do not always require written research consent from the research participants (oral 
consent can be sufficient in certain types of research), yet in cases of sensitive topics, vulnerable research groups, 
or institutional settings such as hospitals (all of which applied to my study), it was deemed appropriate to verify 
the voluntary participation and document it well.  
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publications. As explained above, the material collection was planned carefully in the research 
plan, and the ethical approval from the university hospital’s ethical board was applied for and 
granted before the fieldwork. Given the sensitive topic and vulnerability of the research 
participants, extra caution was taken during the material collection. I prepared myself for the 
various possible kinds of situations and reactions that I could encounter at the field. I practiced 
sensibilities continuously in order to evaluate the research situation from the point of view of 
the researched individual, and if I sensed tension or uneasiness, or if the researched participant 
started crying (which happened a few times), I stopped recording (if that was taking place) and 
offered emphatic support. Usually these kinds of difficult moments passed by simply giving 
participants time and space, allowing them to recover without interference. Since my interviews 
were very loosely structured, it meant that the participants could lead the conversation, deciding 
which themes to include and which to leave out, and how fast or slow to proceed with sensitive 
topics. I supported the conversational direction that the interviewees wished to take; sometimes 
I would gently guide the conversation, but the research participants generally played the central 
role by telling their story the way they wished (see Corbin & Morse 2003: 339). All the meetings 
happened on the patients’ terms in relation to the places and moments they chose. 
During the research process, the research material was handled with care and stored 
according to the guidelines stated by TENK.81 In regard to research reports such as articles, 
presentations, and now this dissertation, I have carefully considered the manner in which I write 
and the way I present various details about the field.82 I have practiced respectful writing, 
meaning that I have sought to understand the situation from the research participant’s 
perspective, and I have not disclosed any information which could be interpreted as derogatory 
to any parties involved. However, the results of research may not always please all the 
participants or some parties involved in the research process. From an academic point of view, 
it would be equally unethical not to publish important data out of excessive consideration or 
fear. If I ever encountered a situation in which conflicting interests arose, I sought to do what I 
thought would be most beneficial for my research participants. Furthermore, since the topic of 
death, dying, and the care of the dying can easily trigger a variety of reactions, personal 
memories, or opinions in the public, the whole research process requires extra thoughtfulness 
on the part of the researcher. 
Lastly, in regard to the style of writing, it is notable that different fields of scholarship use 
different styles of writing. The literary and reflexive style of writing is often attributed to 
anthropological and ethnographic texts (Clifford and Marcus 1986). Ethnographic writing is in 
                                                 
81 Paper material was stored in locked archive cabinets in a locked office room at the university and the electric 
material was stored in the university’s safe storage area in password-protected files. 
82 In terms of writing the reports, TENK says: “Researchers should avoid any damage or harm to subjects that may 
be caused by research publications. However, this principle should not prevent the publication of research findings 
that may not be pleasing to subjects in all respects. A researcher’s task is to produce new information without 
having to fear the reaction of authorities or other research subjects. Particularly research concerning the use of 
power and the functioning of social institutions must not be restricted on the grounds that results can have negative 
effects for subjects” (TENK 2009). 
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the details; furthermore, the reflexive dialogue between the ethnographic material, the theories, 
and the author is brought forth since it is a way to construct the argument.  
Privacy and data protection 
The study observes the regulations set out in the Finnish Data Protection Act (1050/2018). It 
protects the privacy of the research participants and those who may appear in the research 
indirectly (for instance, in the speech of the interviewees). The research material, which 
includes information that can be categorized as belonging to the special categories of personal 
data (i.e., religious conviction and health), has been stored throughout the research process in a 
protected place according to the regulations. Upon the completion of the study, all of the 
research material has been stored in the Umpio storage space for sensitive data at the University 
of Helsinki. 
Throughout the research process, I have practiced a high degree of confidentiality in regard 
to the information gained during my ethnographic research. As medical sociologist Benjamin 
Saunders et al. (2015) observes, anonymity is a form of confidentiality; in practice this means 
that the identities of the researched are kept hidden from anyone outside of the research team. 
Since I often recruited the patients with the help of the nursing staff, this aspect of the data 
protection was not always possible. However, I never discussed of the information given by my 
interviewees to the staff, and in my written reports their identities are blurred so that the persons 
are not recognizable. 
Pseudonymization83 in the social sciences is often taken for granted, yet there has also been 
debate about the fact that there are sometimes participants who wish to be recognized, and who 
should be given credit for their input in the research (Boylorn 2012). Especially in the field of 
anthropology and gender studies, it has become common to regard the information produced in 
the research as engendered through the joint effort of the researcher and the research 
participants. Depending on the epistemological stance taken by the researcher, the participants 
can be interpreted as collaborators, thereby earning the right for their names to be mentioned, 
in some cases even as co-authors of the research report (Boylorn 2012). Some of my research 
participants did wish to be presented by their own names, and for some the issue did not 
matter.84 However, because my research design was evaluated by the medical ethical board, for 
whom the identity protection was absolute, I did not seek to negotiate this question any further. 
                                                 
83 There is a debate whether complete anonymization is ever possible in qualitative research (Saunders et al. 2015). 
Usually, however, data can be regarded as anonymous if the identity of a person is not traceable, directly or 
indirectly, in any possible way, not even by combining different pieces of information together. Legally speaking, 
this sort of anonymization is achievable only after the identification codes used in research have been destroyed. 
Since in this research the identification codes and the research consents are saved and stored (in the Umpio storage 
space for sensitive data at the University of Helsinki), all the data in my research report is legally regarded as 
pseudonymized (see https://tietosuoja.fi/en/pseudonymised-and-anonymised-data). 
84 Pseudonyms can be seen as patronizing and as denying the agency from the research participants; yet often the 
researcher is required to anonymize the research material. If an issue, the participants can be called to choose their 
own pseudonyms (Given 2008). I explained the necessity of the pseudonymization practice to everyone, and all 
the research participants agreed with it. 
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The only exception consists of two blog writers, who wrote with their own names and made 
their identities public also in other ways in the media. 
There are a number of technical methods to encrypt identifiable information for the research 
report. The pseudonymization process is a balancing act for the researcher: while on one hand 
one seeks to ensure full protection of the participants’ identities, on the other hand one needs to 
maintain the value and integrity of the data (Saunders et al. 2015). Saunders et al. (2015) have 
identified six categories of data, which are in focus when research needs to modify information 
to guard the identity of the research participant: 1) people’s names, 2) places, 3) religious or 
cultural background, 4) occupation, 5) family relationships, and 6) other potentially identifying 
information. As different studies focus on different research questions, not all studies can follow 
exactly the same procedures; for instance, when studying issues explicitly relating to religion, 
it is impossible to alter information pertaining to that category. In that case, some other set of 
information can be altered more in order to support the lack of identification.  
In regard to this study, all the names of the research participants as well as their family 
members’ names have been altered (with the exception of the bloggers who wrote under their 
own names). Rather than using numbers or other codes for my research participants, I followed 
the standard practice in anthropology and applied pseudonyms for them (Given 2008).85 In 
some cases, I have not mentioned which of my research participants I am talking about. This is 
also a conscious choice, which intends to blur some of the personal information regarding the 
patients. In regard to other personal data, the question of age was somewhat important to my 
study design; in the research report, however, I only give the rough ages of the participants 
(within the range of a decade) instead of revealing their exact ages.  
The question of places is also important. Since one of the specific research interests has to 
do with the issue of place and space, I refer to different places quite a bit. When doing so, 
however, I include only those details critical to my analysis. The living locations of my research 
participants, for instance, were not usually important, and they are not reported. The actual 
research sites are mentioned, but in the text I refer to them as the “hospice home” and the 
“oncology ward.” It is important to emphasize here that many of the participants talked about 
various (other) medical sites and care locations where they had been prior to their current 
situation. When writing about these references embedded in the interview accounts, I use the 
generic terms of “hospital,” “ward,” or “clinic” without any further specification about the exact 
location. It is not of importance in this study, which focuses on the patients’ experiences rather 
than the research sites themselves. This practice also protects the identity of the staff members 
in these various locations. Moreover, to further protect the identity of my participants, I use a 
                                                 
85 Some social studies use numbers to code interviewees, but this solution has never been popular in anthropology, 
probably because the practice can have a depersonalizing effect in regard to the participants (Iphofen 2013: 43). 
Pseudonyms can be seen also as patronizing and as denying the agency of the research participants, yet often the 
researcher is required to anonymize the research material. In that case, the participants themselves can choose their 
own pseudonyms for the study (Given 2008). 
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loose timeline when discussing events and encounters with the patients. In this way, even if the 
place could be identified, the exact times of the meetings are concealed. I may also blur some 
sequences of events in order to enhance anonymity. 
While the question of religious conviction was key for my study, as mentioned previously, 
I was not so interested in the official status of a person (whether they were officially a Lutheran 
or belonged to a Jewish congregation, for example). Instead, I bring up religiosity and 
spirituality as they come up in the interviews—and in those terms. This was certainly one main 
interest in my study, and it needs to be discussed. This can be done when other personal 
information is more blurred.  
Occupation was significant at times. For instance, if a patient had previous experience in 
medicine because of their occupation, it usually affected their perception of their situation. 
Within the limits of data integrity, I have generalized the categories86 (for instance, midwife  
medical profession) and modified some details of the occupational information in such a way 
that they are not traceable. Family relations were also rather crucial in my study, but those are 
mentioned only if they appeared in the conversations in a noteworthy way. When the family 
members are mentioned, details that do not interfere with the analysis are blurred (e.g., sex or 
exact age of children). Lastly, medical diagnosis is an important bit of information that could 
potentially be used to identify a research participant. At times, it did not matter for the research 
what kind of cancer the patient had. In other cases, however, it was fundamental to how the 
patient had experienced themselves, their body, and their illness trajectory. If I needed to alter 
the information or even leave it out altogether for the sake of protecting identities, I did it in 
such a way that it would not compromise the analysis. 
Confidentiality also means that the researcher exercises her sensibilities in regard to the 
kinds of information that have been shared with her. There were things that I learned and things 
that I was told about which never ended up in my research reports. I made a decision to leave 
them out, usually out of courtesy or the need to protect people’s identities. On the other hand, I 
disclose certain things that may be difficult, embarrassing, or uncomfortable to read about. The 
potential discomfort of the reader cannot prevent me as a researcher from writing about matters 
that were true to those who shared them. 
  
                                                 
86 To protect the participants’ identity, I refer to their jobs by utilizing the current version of the International 
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08), from which I apply the abstraction level of sub-major groups. 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Classification_of_Occupations). 
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4. RESEARCH PROCESS, RESEARCH MATERIAL, AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
4.1 Research sites 
Intended and realized research sites 
The original plan was to find research patients at four sites: a day hospice and the actual hospice 
ward, both at the hospice home, and an oncology ward and the palliative care unit of the 
oncology department, both at a university hospital. In the end, patients were recruited mostly 
from the hospice home, and only two patients from the oncology ward were included in the 
final analysis. Furthermore, while I had planned to do similar kinds of ethnography at the 
oncology ward and at the hospice home, for several reasons this turned out to not be possible. 
In some cases this related to simple practicalities; in others it had to do with the nature of the 
care the respective places offer. 
First, patients visited these medical sites with differing intentions. Day hospice offered a 
supportive place to visit regularly, as long as the patient’s condition permitted. The hospice 
ward was sometimes visited to assess medications, but most often it was the place where the 
research participants died. Although sometimes the visits at the hospice ward were short, most 
often they lasted several days. In terms of the research, it was possible to meet the same patient 
several times, first in the day hospice and later on at the hospice ward. Most of the patients who 
came to the oncology ward (with 23 beds) did so for their oncological treatments, such as the 
administration of cytotoxic drugs or radiotherapy; complications such as infections, pain, and 
anemia were also treated there. Because of the acute nature of their medical problems, the time 
spent there was short. Furthermore, it was not always possible for me to verify the status of the 
care strategy of a particular patient. Although I found it easy to make contact with patients on 
the oncology ward, at the hospice home those contacts lasted longer, and therefore it was easier 
to involve them in the research. 
The second main reason for my concentration on the hospice home in the end has to do with 
the nature of the care in these two research sites: the hospice home is by definition for palliative 
and hospice patients and the oncological ward is mostly for acute patients. With 45–50 deaths 
per year, the nature of the care at the oncology ward was mostly curative, at times disease-
modifying, and more rarely palliative. For this reason, most of the patients I met there were not 
palliative patients, the sample I was seeking to recruit. In the end, however, the research sites 
became above all places where I found my research participants, whom I then continued to meet 
in the various locations where they were: at the hospital, at the hospice ward, or at home. 
 The plan to gather additional research participants from the palliative care unit of the 
oncology department at the university hospital was never actualized. It proved to be practically 
challenging to recruit patients there, since they went to the unit only for a brief consultation 
visit, compared to the ward where I was able to become familiar with the patients over time. 
Furthermore, when the research process was in the phase when I could have started this part of 
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the fieldwork, I already had lots of research material gathered, and at that point I had existing 
research patients whom I was continuing to study. There was simply no need for an additional 
fieldwork site. 
In the end, I spent only four weeks at the oncology ward, whereas I visited the hospice home 
regularly over three years. In this way, the hospice home, and especially the day hospice, 
became my primary research site. 
Hospice home 
The hospice in which I ended up doing most of my ethnography consisted of an actual ward 
with approximately 20 patient beds, a day hospice unit (with its own spacious room), and a 
home care team. The yearly utilization rate of the actual ward and the day hospice have 
fluctuated some during the last years. From 2014 to 2017, both the numbers of patients who 
died at the ward and the number of the day hospice visits declined by a few dozen. The time 
that dying patients spent at the hospice ward varied greatly, from hours to several weeks; 
however, the average time was less than 14 days. 
 The actual building in which the hospice was located is designed specifically for hospice 
use. The design largely follows the general architectural ideas of British hospice homes 
(Worpole 2010). The interior of the whole building is circular: the patient rooms are located 
mostly on the southwest side of the building in three wings facing an outdoor patio with flowers, 
whereas the north side is reserved for the staff’s rooms and offices, and for the large day hospice 
gathering room. The passageway connecting the patient rooms and other spaces circles around 
the heart of the hospice, comprised of the kitchen, the common dining area, and a winter garden 
filled with natural light from large skylights. 
The public entrance to the building is on the north side of the building, as it often times is at 
hospices (Worpole 2010: 46). In this way, most of the patient rooms as well as the garden (or 
patio) can be situated facing toward the rising sun and the south and southwest. After entering 
the building, there is a large foyer area with a sofa and a reception desk, connected to an office. 
This type of entrance reminds one more of a hotel than a hospital (Worpole 2010: 46). Patients, 
staff, and visitors enter and exit from the main public door, and there is another entrance for 
staff. Patients who are admitted to the hospice ward usually exit through “the back door,” that 
is, the door of the chapel on the east side of the building, where the mortuary is located. 
In the field, there was a general feeling that the nature of care had changed during the last 
20 years. Some of the medical professionals in the hospice home felt that the care had become 
more medicalized than before (D1: 30–31, 87; D2: 69). A nurse with decades of experience in 
the hospice field was of the opinion that earlier the patients were in better physical condition 
and there was more social interaction with them; the nurse continued that nowadays the 
interaction happens more with family members, and actual patient care has become very 
different from twenty years ago. According to her, due to medical progress, patients lived longer 
than before; they could have multiple problems and severe complications due to their long 
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illness trajectories, which were often accompanied by many treatments. This in turn resulted in 
heavier medication toward the end of life (D1: 30–31, 87). Even though the nature of hospice 
work had changed a lot, the nurse still wanted to emphasize that “this is still hospice care, as 
the care given here is patient-centered, in contrast with hospitals where the care is always 
system-centered” (D1: 30). Another experienced nurse felt that patients have less ability today 
to face the kind of inevitable existential crisis that dying brings to the surface; thus, rather than 
trying to treat the problem via discussion, anxieties and existential crises tend to be quickly 
responded to with drugs (D1: 87). These opinions are based on the personal experiences of 
healthcare professionals, but they also reflect the countercultural nature of the original hospice 
movement and the somewhat ambiguous relationship between the hospice and hospital that still 
seem to prevail in the field (Lewis [2006] 2011: 6). 
In practice, the development of the palliative care system in Finland explains some of these 
changes. Since new palliative units and wards have been opened, the less challenged palliative 
patients can now be treated elsewhere, and the hospice home has become a care location for 
patients who are medically more demanding. Furthermore, like elsewhere in the field of 
healthcare, the emphasis nowadays is on homecare, meaning that more patients seek to be cared 
for at home until their death. 
 These changes in the practices have affected the usage of the space in the hospice home. 
For instance, ALS patients (the most prominent new patient group today) require more space 
due to the various adaptive equipment that they require. This was not taken into account in the 
building’s original floor plan. There is also quite a bit of general traffic in the house. During 
my ethnography, I met students from various educational units, a few reporters, a group of 
documentary filmmakers, and even another researcher at the hospice home. In addition, the 
hospice ward is increasingly used for short-term visits by homecare patients needing to adjust 
their pain medication, for instance. This seems to be an international trend among hospice 
homes, as Worpole (2010: 42) points out: “The one-way door has become a revolving door, 
and to some extent the hospice which was only a short while ago configured as an intimate and 
quietist antechamber to death has become more like a village fête where people come and go…” 
Many of the patients who are admitted to the hospice ward are already in very weak physical 
condition, and thus they have limited ability to enjoy the hospice space. One day I was touring 
the hospice home with a newly admitted couple (the husband was the patient). Both were very 
pleased with the aesthetic details of its decor and decoration, and they remarked how lovely and 
thoughtful everything seemed to be. After a little pause, the wife continued hesitantly: “but all 
of those beautiful couches and nice sitting areas were empty of people, so I guess that means 
that the patients are already in such a bad condition that…” The nurse who was with us 
confirmed: “Yes, it is mostly the family members who get to enjoy all of this.” This led to a 
small silence, but the couple nevertheless concluded that they felt that they would be safe at the 
hospice home (D4: 5–6). 
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When I was at the hospice home, I spent time mostly in the day hospice room and in the 
general areas of the winter garden and common dining space. Once I was familiar with a patient, 
I also visited their room. I hung around the backyard, where some patients would go for a 
smoke, as that was often an excellent moment for a conversation. I ate my lunch or dinner in 
the nurses’ area, which offered some interaction with the staff. In general, I was on good terms 
with all the staff, from the cleaners to the office personnel. 
4.2 Research process 
Fieldwork phase I—the first ten months 
As planned, I first set out to study the day hospice group, which gathered once a week in the 
hospice home. Since at that time I lived a two-hour drive away from the city, this was the most 
convenient and practical way of starting the fieldwork. Getting to know the hospice home via 
the day hospice group felt like a good way to become familiar with both the staff and the 
patients. I did my intense period of ethnography at the hospice and hospital ward during the 
following summer, when my family temporarily moved to the city.  
In the day hospice 
Once I started the fieldwork with the visits to the day hospice group, I continued these visits 
regularly for the next eight months. My role at the day hospice was much like that of the hospice 
volunteers. I wore the same vest as the volunteer workers, but a patch on my chest also gave 
my name and identified me as a “researcher.” I helped with some small practical things, such 
as offering food or clearing the table, but mostly my “job” was to converse with the patients. 
For the first few months, more or less the same five to seven patients, plus one or two volunteers 
and two nurses and I, kept meeting on Tuesdays. Hence, I started calling our group the “Tuesday 
crew.” Majority of the patients were women, a common feature in different kinds of support 
groups, but usually there was also at least one or two men. Sometimes a new member would 
join the group and someone else would die, but there were four members who remained for 
several months. In this way, there was some cohesion and familiar dynamics in the group. Due 
to general changes in the organization of the care, during my fieldwork the time of the Tuesday 
meeting was later changed to Monday and then again to Friday. Concurrently, the total number 
of members in the group diminished. 
During the first spring, I steadily followed six patients: Irma, Rauha, Aili, Oiva, Siru, and 
Taina. Irma and Rauha died first, a few months after the beginning of the research. The other 
four continued to be part of the research for several months, Siru and Aili even for years. I 
continued to visit these patients in the day group, but later I also went to their homes and the 
hospice ward, once they were admitted there. 
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At the hospice ward 
As planned, later on that year I started my fieldwork at the main ward of the hospice. Again, I 
was presented much like the volunteers, and I wore the same orange vest with my name patch. 
In addition to this, the hospice ward had notifications (small posters on the walls) informing 
about the presence of a researcher on the premises. From my previous visits to the day hospice, 
I already knew some of the staff and the volunteer workers; now I met the rest of the staff. I 
was welcomed to the ward very openly overall, but naturally there were differences in the staff’s 
attitudes. Some were curious and open toward my work, whereas others preferred to stay in the 
background without too much of involvement. Throughout my time in the hospice home, I 
maintained close connections and had many insightful conversations with the staff members. 
During the first three weeks of the fieldwork, I stayed on the hospice ward for 6–8 hours at a 
time, at different times of day. Sometimes I stayed very late in the evening, but I never stayed 
overnight. Again, my role was similar to that of a volunteer; I chatted with people, both patients 
and family members, and offered general support and a listening ear to anyone needing it. 
Occasionally, I gave a hand to the nurses if they were busy; I would make beds or help with 
feeding.87 At times, I would sit with a restless patient or talk with the family members. Because 
many of these situations were too acute or too intimate to initiate any questions about 
participating in the research, these experiences are not included in my material. In general, I 
worked under the same ethical guidelines as any other volunteer worker there. Everything that 
I saw or heard was confidential, and only after the patient had signed the research consent would 
I assume my role as a researcher and start making notes or recording conversations. In regard 
to recruiting the patients, I exercised sensitivity and only asked those individuals to join whom 
I felt would be comfortable to talk with me. In practice, it was often the nurses who suggested 
a particular patient to me. Over the following weeks, I started closely working with five 
patients: Eeva, Aurora, Kimmo, Heidi, and Peter.  
I continued occasional visits to the hospice ward throughout the first year, since I wanted to 
keep in touch with my existing research participants. I also maintained contact with my day 
hospice research patients; during the summer break for instance, I would call them by phone 
and at times visit them at their homes. Later on that year, my main field site was the oncology 
ward at the university hospital.88 
On the oncology ward  
During the four weeks I visited the oncology ward, I interviewed eight patients altogether. 
During the morning report, the nurses often suggested some patients that I could approach for 
the research. After word of mouth about my research started circulating on the ward, some 
                                                 
87 My role in the field was very similar to Utriainen’s when she was conducting her ethnography on the role of 
women as caregivers for the dying (Utriainen 1999: 181–186).  
88 Earlier I had met with the head nurse and delivered all the required papers, such as the notifications to the 
oncology ward about my coming. 
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patients approached me, saying that they wanted to participate in the study. Even though some 
of these patients were clearly not receiving palliative care, since they so wished to talk with me 
I did an interview with them. On the oncology ward, I found my relationships with the research 
patients to be more centered around “the interview.” I believe that this was because there was 
less of the kind of informal “hanging out” than at the hospice home, where there were usually 
always some people in the public areas, eating, reading a newspaper, or going outside for a 
smoke. Although I had signed research consent forms and engaged in a number of discussions 
with a total of eight patients on the oncology ward, I actively continued following only two: 
Pekka and Martti. This was because the others, as far as I understood, were not palliative 
patients and thus did not qualify as participants in my study. As far as I knew, Pekka was not 
formally a palliative patient at the time either, but since he told me flat out that he had been 
given only a few months to live, I made the decision to include him in the study. Martti 
introduced the topic of his possible death due to his illness on our very first meeting, so I 
included him in the study also. I kept in contact for a while with some of the others that I had 
met on the oncology ward. I called four of them a few weeks after our initial meeting, and I 
even met with one of them, but afterwards I did not maintain further connection.  
By the end of the first summer, I had 13 research patients that I was following closely. I kept 
going back to the day hospice, and I visited my research participants at the hospice ward. I 
started meeting Pekka and Martti at their homes, since they were no longer in the hospital. 
When our family moved back to the countryside, I kept driving to the city once a week to meet 
with my research participants.89 Simultaneously, however, my mother’s condition had gotten 
worse, and I needed to be with her more. Around the same time, some important research 
participants—Peter, Kimmo, Heidi, and Oiva—died. Since I had been able to meet with all of 
them before that, I felt a sense of closure. Meanwhile, even though I did my best to maintain 
and manage all of my important connections, I felt inadequate, both as a researcher and as a 
daughter. Everything changed when my mother died in the autumn. 
Fieldwork and emotions—intermediate period of six months 
My mother’s death interrupted the course of my fieldwork for a period of six months. It not 
only impacted my emotional state but also the practical situation, since I had to take time off 
from my work to organize several practical matters with her affairs. I knew that some of my 
research patients were close to death, and I felt bad about not being in contact with them. Since 
I was not able to make my way to the weekly meetings of the day hospice group, I called the 
hospice nurse in charge and let her know about my situation. A couple days later, the mail 
brought me a condolences card signed by everyone in the “Tuesday crew”: the patients, the 
nurses, and even the car driver with whom we shared morning coffee in the group. When I 
talked about this later on with the nurses, they told me that the patients in the group had 
                                                 
89 Later on, my family again moved to the city, and my work in the field became much easier. 
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accidentally overheard the reason why I was not attending, and that it had been their idea to 
remember me with a card. This gesture is telling in regard to the kind of relationship I had with 
my research participants. And yet, it also marked a change in the dynamics of our relations. 
I had always considered my relationship with my research participants reciprocal, but my 
personal loss inevitably shifted my position in the constellation vis-à-vis the others even more 
in that direction. The nurses now approached me from their professional position, since in their 
eyes I was a grieving family member. Prior to this, we had been more like colleagues or even 
friends (later on, after the acute phase of grieving was over, the relationship returned to that). 
Patients, on the other hand, were taking a consoling role toward me, as I had become the fragile 
one. This was moving, of course, but I was aware that this could be burdening to the patients. 
In short, rather than being the observing yet empathic professional researcher, I became the 
vulnerable, grieving daughter. It was a strange position for me, and I decided to take some time 
off from the fieldwork. 
Although the situation was rather complex, I believe that my personal experience with my 
mother ultimately deepened my understanding of the research participants. Because of the 
intimate encounters with my mother, it was perhaps easier for me to relate to the general 
physical and emotional distress that advanced cancer can cause (however individual those 
experiences might be). The personal involvement also affected the way in which I saw my 
research overall. Unlike my research participants, my mother was not referred to palliative care. 
This enabled me to see the difference that palliative care can have on a patient’s end of life, 
which in turn reinforced my understanding of the importance of palliative care, especially in 
regard to its accessibility. Furthermore, later involvement in hospice education gave me a larger 
perspective on the state of palliative care in Finland, and I learned that my mother’s situation 
was not so uncommon. I realized that my research group represented a rather specific, and 
perhaps even exceptional, group of dying patients. It is also possible that my experience with 
my mother sensitized me to some of the less successful facets of care, which I was told about 
by my research participants during my fieldwork.  
Three of my research patients—Eeva, Taina, and Pekka—died during my absence from the 
field. This was sad to me, especially since I felt that there had not been proper closure with any 
of them. These kinds of emotional aspects of ethnographic fieldwork have been examined by 
various anthropologists (e.g., Davies & Spencer 2010). It is generally acknowledged that due 
to varying power dynamics, and due to the differing expectations that people who are involved 
in research have, relationships between ethnographers and research participants are always 
multifaceted and emotionally complex (Davies & Spencer 2010).90 Emotional, empathetic 
encounters and recognition of the other person (based on acknowledgment of the differences 
                                                 
90  In particular, as discussed in the conference Wild or Domesticated, sentiments of guilt are common for 
anthropologists. Anthropologist François Bouchetoux (2014) has written about the matter in a very insightful 
manner. 
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and commonalities one has with them) function, however, as the ethical basis for a relationship, 
including those in the field (Smith & Kleinman 2010).91 Hence, being aware of one’s emotional 
state, one’s feelings of responsibility, empathy, and guilt comprise an important and valuable 
facet of the fieldwork (Smith & Kleinman 2010: 173). Ultimately, recognition of the complex 
reciprocities and multileveled nature of the various dynamic relations—both within the field 
and in-between the field, academia, and the personal life of a researcher—is connected to an 
epistemic understanding of the world, in which interconnectedness is accepted as a factual 
feature of reality. 
Although out of reciprocity I occasionally shared some aspects of my private life with my 
research participants, I was careful never to talk about anything that could cause anxiety or 
burden them in any possible way.92 Consequently, I never told them about my mother’s illness. 
When my mother died and the whole Tuesday group learned about it, I decided to be honest 
with them about my feelings. I did not, however, want to burden my research participants with 
my personal life situation, and for the sake of regaining my emotional balance in order to be 
able to work properly in the field, I needed to stay away from the field for some time. I was 
gone for almost six months altogether before I returned to the field. 
From my research participants I had learned that patients did not always share everything 
with their loved ones, and now I learned from my mother that the patient did not always share 
everything with outsiders—be they doctors, therapists, or researchers. In this way I knew that 
there were probably things that my mother did not share with me, and yet I learned things with 
her which I could not have learned with the research participants. Furthermore, since my mother 
was never referred to palliative care, with her I witnessed not only a different kind of care 
trajectory but also a different kind of patient trajectory. This brought me a valuable perspective. 
My mother agreed that I would also write about her, although I think that for her (like for many) 
the topic was a strange and gloomy choice for research. In the end, my involvement in end-of-
life research was perhaps beneficial to her, since I was familiar with some practicalities related 
to advanced cancer, and we could discuss these issues in more detail. 
Fieldwork phase II—the last two years 
When I returned to the field the following spring, I continued to attend the Tuesday meetings 
of day hospice, not every Tuesday but regularly enough to follow my research participants. 
Over the next two years, I gained more research participants: Kirsi, Kristiina, Inkeri, Vivian, 
Helena, and Susanna (the latter dropped out after one year of participation).93 I also started 
following two blogs written by patients with advanced cancer: Marjo-Riitta’s Syöpä tarinoituu 
                                                 
91 Here I refer to “the other” simply as another person. There are various interpretations about what is exactly 
meant with the word ‘Other’ in phenomenology (see Large 1996). 
92 Reciprocity is seen as a prerequisite for doing a sensitive interview (Corbin & Morse 2003: 339). 
93 I met with most of these patients many times, except for Kirsi, whom I only met twice. In addition to these 
research participants, I had signed consents from three other patients in the day hospice; however, those individuals 
died before we ever really got to talk with each other. 
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todeksi and Heikki’s Sairaan rakas elämä. I met both Marjo-Riitta and Heikki later on, and 
they agreed to be part of my study. At this point I was not actively seeking any more research 
participants, since I assessed that the material I was getting was already sufficient. A year later, 
I made an exception and included one more patient, Matti, since there was a wish from his side 
to be part of the study. He was the last participant that I included in the research. Given the 
abundance of the research material, I did not feel the need to return to do further systematic 
fieldwork at the hospice ward or oncology ward. I was following the trajectories of my research 
participants, and if they were assigned to a ward, I kept visiting them there. In this way, over a 
three-to-four-year period I met with my research patients in various locations, such as a nursing 
home, hospital wards, and the hospice ward, of course. Most of my research patients died at the 
hospice home. 
For some patients, it seemed especially important to be able to “contribute still something to 
academic society.”94 Other participants had similar thoughts, but they were framed differently. 
Instead of seeing the research as something scientifically important, they stated that they wished 
to do something beneficial for others who were in a similar situation. In other words, they hoped 
that my research would make a difference in regard to some of the difficulties that they 
themselves had encountered during their illness trajectories. At the same time, the participation 
seemed to bring personal delight; perhaps it added some variety to the sometimes monotonous 
days. Some simply seemed to enjoy the chance to reflect on things with another person. This 
was clearly evident on the hospital ward, where I once even found a line of patients waiting to 
have an interview. Only one participant, Susanna, decided to interrupt her participation after a 
year for personal reasons. 
4.3 Research material and the method of analysis  
Number of research participants 
I had planned to recruit 40 research patients: 20 from the university hospital and 20 from the 
hospice home. As explained above, this plan for recruiting the research participants changed in 
the course of the ethnography.95 It was easy to find willing participants from the research sites. 
Furthermore, when word about my research had gone out to the field, I received three requests 
from people who asked to participate in the research themselves or suggested that their loved 
one might join in. One of these people I had known previously, but two of them came via other 
connections by word of mouth. Since my relationships with many of the research participants 
lasted for months and grew deeper over time, in the end I had an abundance of research material. 
I had underestimated the amount of research material that could be gained from just one 
single participant. During the course of my fieldwork, I received altogether 31 signed research 
consents. Of those, three patients died before I had a chance to talk more with them, six proved 
                                                 
94 This view was also expressed by Kristiina, an academic whom I met several times at her place of care. 
95 This is not unusual for ethnographic studies, rather the opposite; since ethnography deals with complex realities 
with multiple unforeseeable factors, in practice the research plan may need to be modified.  
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to not be palliative patients, and one patient turned out to be otherwise unsuitable for the 
research. In the end, therefore, I had 21 research participants: 14 women and 7 men (for the list 
of the research participants, see Appendix 3). Of those 21, two were recruited from the oncology 
ward, fourteen from the hospice home, three came via common acquaintances, and two via 
blogs. 
Research participants and the research material 
The general criteria for the patients to attend the study were: 1) being over 18 years of age, 2) 
belonging to palliative (including hospice) care, and 3) being able to communicate. In practice, 
it was not always possible for me to verify the patient’s official care strategy (i.e., palliative 
care), but since most of my research participants were recruited from the hospice home, de facto 
they were palliative patients. For the patients themselves, the exact labels and definitions of 
curative, disease-modifying, palliative, and hospice care were somewhat unclear; however, the 
moment when a patient was appointed to hospice care often marked a very significant passage 
for them. 
All of the research participants had been diagnosed with cancer. Some had multiple forms 
of cancer, while others also had additional diseases that complicated their situation. The 
participants were mostly from urban areas in South Finland, although a couple lived in the 
countryside. The ages of the participants varied from 45 (at the moment of the joining the study) 
to 84 years old. All of the researched were native Finns, but socioeconomically their 
backgrounds varied greatly. Among the participants there were, for example, teaching, 
engineering, and cultural professionals; business and administration associate professionals; 
and service workers, drivers, and care workers. Many of the participants were members of the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland but did not consider themselves as religious, or they 
considered themselves to be religious “in a typical Finnish manner.”96 One of my research 
participants described this by saying that: “I am just like the others, I believe a little bit—but 
not really, however” (D1: 93). In addition to members of the Church, and a couple who did not 
belong to any organized religion, my research group otherwise represented a variety of Finnish 
religious traditions: there was one Orthodox (Greek), one Conservative Laestadian, and two 
who came from a Pentecostal background. Furthermore, one participant was an active member 
of a charismatic Christian congregation, and another self-identified as a born-again Christian. 
Although this might suggest a strong presence of religion in my material, interestingly enough, 
in most cases these religious affiliations or denominations did not seem to significantly affect 
their metaphysical interpretations or mental attitudes in regard to death and dying. With the 
exception of three patients (Siru, Martti, and Pekka), I experienced people’s (non-) religious 
views to be dynamic, fluid, versatile, and momentary. 
                                                 
96 See Chapter 3. Teemu Taira (2012: 23) writes that “in terms of beliefs, the Finns are neither very religious nor 
explicitly atheistic”; he also writes that the general religiosity of Finns could be defined as “belonging without 
practicing, since the Church membership is still high in Finland but most people do not practice religion in any 
way” (Taira 2015). 
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Due to various (mostly practical) reasons, I spent much more time with some individuals 
than with others. In the end, my most frequent meetings and lengthiest conversations happened 
with twelve of the research participants (their names are in bold letters in Appendix 3). Many 
of the conversations that I had with the patients were never recorded; some were casual and 
random discussions that did not relate to the study at all, but others involved a moment with the 
patient that became so intimate and delicate that taking notes or starting to record would have 
been inappropriate. At the end of the fieldwork period, I had 51 hours of recorded conversations 
with patients. It was not possible to transcribe all the material; instead, I went through the 
material a few times, making literal transcriptions of most of the interviews, some in their 
entirety and others in relation to specific statements or themes. In addition to making a digital 
recording, with certain patients, such as Kimmo, I preferred to write notes. While my choice of 
documentation depended especially on my assessment of the situation which the researched 
participant was in, it also depended on their general style of communication.97 I had four field 
diaries, three handwritten ones and one digital one, which I would use when at the office. Those 
diaries together contain about 350 pages of text. In addition to this, my research participants 
shared some photos with me (for instance, of places that were important for them). I was also 
given quotes from poems and books that had been meaningful for the patients, and so forth. Of 
the two blogs I was following, I saved the pages and sections that I used in my analysis into 
separate files. Together, all of this material played a part when I was creating a coherent picture 
of the lived reality of my research participants. 
 In addition to the patients, I also talked with staff, especially the nurses, volunteers, and 
priests. A few times I also met with the family members of a patient. I found this to be an 
important gesture, especially if I had spent lots of time with their loved one. I used some of the 
material in the blogs for my analysis, since I had met the authors and they made up part of the 
research.  
Ancillary research material 
In addition to the actual primary research material, I collected ancillary material, which mostly 
comprised general data regarding palliative care and issues relating with the end of life. This 
collection includes newspaper articles, reports, and memorandums by the Social and Health 
Ministry, and so forth. I also attended seminars and conferences on death and dying and hospice 
care, both as an attendee and as an educator.98 In these seminars, I not only met many experts 
in the field but also people with various sorts of experiences and testimonials of end-of-life 
                                                 
97 I did not record my conversations if a participant had, for instance, a very long-winded or rambling way of 
talking, which resulted in lengthy monologues that did not necessarily have much relevance for the research. With 
some of my research participants I had the impression that loneliness, which sometimes had lasted for years, caused 
this sort of reaction toward me and my research. I decided not to record other participants because their expression 
was very short and emotionally inhibited; in these situations I concentrated more on nonverbal communication. 
98 I have given lectures on culturally sensitive care and rituals of death and dying in different religions. 
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care. This helped me to create a general picture of palliative care in the whole of Finland. During 
the years 2016–2017, I attended a special training program for hospice educators, which was 
funded and organized by the Common Responsibility Campaign’s Good Death project.99 The 
group of trainees consisted of palliative doctors and nurses, along with other professionals 
working with various aspects of hospice care all around Finland. I learned also a great deal from 
these meetings, and I heard various perspectives on palliative care in Finland. This ancillary 
material helped me to better understand some issues that had arisen in my research material. I 
learned more about the staff’s perspectives and experiences in regard to end-of-life care, and it 
is likely that this information has also colored my overall understanding of the care situations. 
I found it crucial to talk with experts working in the field, since palliative care has seen a period 
of dynamic change in Finland over the last ten to fifteen years, and even during my research 
project many things changed. 
About the method and process of analysis 
The method of analyzing qualitative research material needs to be in accordance with the 
epistemic underpinnings and theoretical approaches applied in the study as a whole. Since my 
research material was comprised of interview recordings, transcripts, photos, blog texts, and 
other texts, such as quotes by poets, it was not possible to apply one single method of analysis. 
My task was to try to understand how my research participants understood and experienced 
their realities (i.e., double hermeneutics; see Smith & Osborn 2003). The best way to reach this 
understanding was to apply abductive reasoning to my research material. Abductive reasoning 
differs from deductive and inductive reasoning, which are commonly used in scientific 
research. Sociologist of religion Vida Bajc (2012) describes the manner of doing abductive 
ethnography in the following way: 
Ethnography is best suited to the study of multiplicity, complexity, contingency, ambiguity, 
and indeterminacy in ways of living. It allows a researcher to choose for analytic attention 
specific instances of human activity and experience that show potential to illuminate 
conceptual issues and to stumble upon particularities of social life that alter our theoretical 
understandings. Theoretically interesting social activity can be identified using Peircean 
abduction. Rather than following a predetermined set of research questions in the data 
collection process, abductive ethnography embraces serendipity and allows intuition to guide 
the fieldwork. Data analysis begins neither with inductive nor deductive reasoning. By 
temporarily disassociating the data from their context, specific theoretical debates, and the 
experience of data collection in the field, the ethnographer is able to play with the data freely 
and let this process lead to a surprising discovery and insight. This discovery is then 
conceptually articulated through the dialog among the insight, contextualized empirical 
evidence, and theoretical knowledge. (Bajc 2012: 73) 
Abductive reasoning implies that the researcher’s processual thinking moves between the actual 
research data, her own experiential insights from the field, and the theoretical reasoning, leading 
                                                 
99 Known in Finnish as “Yhteisvastuukeräys,” this is a nationwide social movement and annual fundraising 
campaign of the Finnish Lutheran Church (https://www.yhteisvastuu.fi/en/the-common-responsibility-
campaign/). In 2014, one of its objects for fundraising was hospice education.  
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to enriching, heuristic, and continuous knowledge formation. In practice, this required a 
theoretically and emotionally unprejudiced, open frame of mind while gathering the data. 
Although to some extent my initial research questions guided my attention in the field, I 
conducted my ethnography as an anthropologist who brackets her own previous understanding 
and assumptions about reality and seeks to encounter the other with an open mind (Desjarlais 
& Throop 2011). I was not necessarily expecting to find exact answers to the questions I had; 
furthermore, I was prepared to encounter entirely different aspects. 
All of this served to shed light on the issues which were not talked about. Absence is one 
kind of presence. I had a similar insight regarding the doing of things (i.e., rituals). Instead of 
simply remarking that there appeared to be almost no rituals of preparation for death and dying, 
I began to look at existing actions and practices from the point of view of ritual theory. This led 
to the insight that many actions that were done in the proximity of death were actually charged 
with awareness of the coming death. Something that I had not even imagined to look for prior 
to my fieldwork was the theme of aesthetics, which pushed me toward the “surprising discovery 
and insight” that Bajc talks about above. 
I practiced rigorous dialogue between various theoretical approaches and my findings from 
the field; I wrote tentative papers on these themes, which I presented at various academic 
conferences in Finland, Great Britain, and the United States of America.100 I was also seeking 
to find ways to write about emotionally strong encounters and the existential shuddering that I 
witnessed at times; here I leaned mostly on philosophical formulations. While the process of 
analysis was ongoing all the time, from the beginning of the fieldwork, it fluctuated. There were 
moments of total immersion in the field when I sought to merely connect with my research 
participants without too much interpretation, and then at times I withdrew into the theoretical 
research literature in order to make sense of my field experiences. 
Once my fieldwork came to an end and I had all of my interviews, with the transcripts and 
the field diaries and notes in front of me, another kind of analytical phase began. On one hand, 
I already had certain themes and insights in my mind, which I now sought to explicate through 
my research data (see Bajc 2012: 83). Among those were various relationalities of place and 
space (such as nature), death talk, medicine, the body, and aesthetics. Yet, in order to find new 
insights from the conversational material created together with the research participants, I drew 
from the system of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) developed especially by 
psychologist Jonathan A. Smith et al. (Smith & Osborn 2003; Smith et al. 2009).101 The IPA 
                                                 
100 These included Art Approaching Science and Religion in Turku in May 11–13, 2016; the 13th Conference of 
Death, Dying and Disposal (DDD13) in September 2017 at the University of Central Lancashire, UK; and the 
Dying and Bereavement Interest Group of the Society for Medical Anthropology at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Anthropological Association (AAA) in November 2018 in San Jose, California. 
101 The IPA method, which Smith et al. developed in the field of psychology in the 1990s but which has since 
spread to various disciplines in human, social, and health sciences has its theoretical roots in phenomenology, 
hermeneutics, and idiography (Smith et al. 2009). The phenomenological ground of IPA emphasizes the 
exploration of experience on its own terms and the hermeneutics highlights an interpretative approach toward 
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method “is committed to understanding how particular experiential phenomena (an event, 
process or relationship) have been understood from the perspective of particular people in a 
particular context” (Smith et al. 2009: 29), and as such it has been used widely in qualitative 
healthcare research (Biggerstaff & Thompson 2008; Smith & Eatough 2019). Since IPA focuses 
especially on the question of how people ascribe meaning to their experiences in their 
interactions with the environment, it has offered a multifaceted and nuanced understanding of 
how experiences in the realm of healthcare can vary depending on the perspective. Thus, it has 
been “especially suited to studies that aim to relate findings to bio-psycho-social theories that 
dominate current thinking within the healthcare profession” (Biggerstaff & Thompson 2008). 
I applied IPA methods loosely.102 Nonetheless, they describe well the most essential features 
of the process of analyzing the material. I did careful reading and re-reading of the transcripts 
(and other texts relating to the field). I listened to the recorded material in order to remember 
my field experiences. I was looking for recurrent phrases and themes having to do, for instance, 
with the emotions, experiential claims, concerns, and understandings expressed by the research 
participants. I took notes on them and looked for emergent patterns and clusters of themes. I 
also made notes on how patients talked about things, what kinds of choices of expressions and 
words were made, and what other types of communicative modalities may have arisen in certain 
situations. In this way, I proceeded by looking for connections and relationalities between the 
themes that arose: issues relating to (loss of a) authority, shame, hope, trust, structures of time, 
and relationships with the surroundings and medical staff. An important feature of IPA arises 
from the idea of the hermeneutic circle, which concerns the dynamic relationship between the 
part and the whole. The process of analysis is iterative and it requires constant evaluation of the 
relationship of any particular single part (e.g., a word, sentence, interview, or episode) to the 
whole (correspondingly, a sentence in which the word is embedded, complete text, the whole 
research project, or one’s whole life). As Smith et al. (2009: 26) put it: “To understand any 
given part, you look to the whole; to understand the whole, you look to the parts.” In this way, 
the process of analysis contains continuous shifting and refocusing of perspectives. I also 
practiced reflective engagement with the participants’ accounts, as Smith, Larkin, and Flowers 
depict the process: “Inevitably, the analysis is a joint product of the participant and the analyst. 
                                                 
experience. The idiographic approach emphasizes particularity rather than the nomothetic, generalizing tendencies 
of the natural sciences. In short, IPA is “a qualitative research approach committed to the examination of how 
people make sense of their major life experiences” (Smith et al. 2009: 1). As a methodological system, it offers 
detailed guidelines for doing research in a qualitative frame, from the principles of research design and data 
collection to the methods of analysis (see Smith et al. 2009). Many of these methodological tools are akin to those 
traditionally applied by anthropologists and others doing ethnographic research. 
102 Smith et al. (2009) describe a detailed and structured strategy for conducting solid analysis, yet they also remark 
that IPA is not about following some exact steps but utilizing them in a creative manner depending on the material 
and the experience of the researcher (Smith et al. 2009: 80–81). However, the analysis (as described in Smith et 
al. 2009: 81–107) generally comprises the following procedures: reading and rereading the research material; 
initial noting, including descriptive, linguistic, and conceptual comments; developing emergent themes; searching 
for connections across emergent themes; and, finally, looking for patterns across cases. As such, the method of 
analysis resembles thematic analysis in qualitative research. 
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Although the primary concern of IPA is the lived experience of the participant and the meaning 
which the participant makes of that lived experience, the end result is always an account of how 
the analyst thinks the participant is thinking – this is the double hermeneutic” (Smith, Larkin & 
Flowers 2009: 81). 
From an ethnographic point of view, Smith’s IPA method is a systemized depiction of the 
kind of methodological analysis that anthropologists and ethnographers have traditionally done 
with their interview materials. In an ethnographic study, the IPA method can provide only part 
of the analysis, since it handles only the interview material; ethnography itself is a much larger 
endeavor, as I described above in relation to abductive ethnography. In the end, for a scholar of 
culture and religion, inclusion of the larger context and its various affective relationalities to 
the participants’ experiences must be introduced to the analysis, which includes notions from 
all the different micro, meso, and macro levels (see Figure 8.) 
 
Figure 8. The research material, including the ancillary material, in relation to micro, meso, and macro 
levels. 
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The first section of my analysis starts by depicting the ways in which serious illness and the 
threat of imminent death appeared in the landscape of life of my research patients. I will 
describe a variety of emotional responses and reactions, which the diagnoses and prognoses 
caused, and how difficult it often was to talk about death. I will contemplate the meaning of 
space and place for sick and dying patients. The places and structures in which dying patients 
encounter themselves significantly affect the way they experience their end of life. 
In the latter part of this section, I look at how rationales of care practices emerged in my 
research participants’ accounts. Since healthcare policies and practices shaped actual illness 
trajectories and the experiences my research participants had, it is necessary to include some of 
those factors in the analysis. I will look at the medical relationships in which my research 
patients found themselves, and examine some issues relating to communication. At the end of 
the section, I will consider the difference between the hospice and curative medical frames by 
means of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of smooth and striated.  
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5. EMERGING LANDSCAPES OF DEATH 
5.1 Death in the landscape of life 
Death on the horizon  
Wednesday morning the phone rings again, and I recognize the doctor’s number. I know 
already what to expect when I answer the call. The results from the pathologist have arrived, 
and unfortunately my tumor is malignant. I thank them for the information; there is nothing 
else I can think to say or ask.  
Time stops. This very cliché expression turns into truth for me. I feel like I am but without 
really being. Where is the horror handle that I could grasp onto? Where? 
I am calm and in panic at the same time. I go for a walk, and I call my spouse and the father 
of my children, different men. At some point, a restless animal starts moving inside of me, 
and I would like to climb into the train again, to go somewhere, anywhere. Away, away, 
away. 
Anxiety rises like warm water up my legs, filling me slowly. When it has risen to my lungs, 
I cannot breathe anymore—I drown. (Marjo-Riitta, blog post, 12/29/2012)103 
*** 
It was during the chemotherapy, a routine consultation, like one of those when you go and 
see the doctor before going to the treatment. I thought it was just a routine thing. So I went 
there by car. But then… my [tumor] markers were suddenly elevated. And that was a sign 
that the [treatments] were not working. I was not prepared to hear that it was going to be 
chronic, that I would not be cured. And then I heard it. It was told, and then they chucked me 
out. It was one of those half-hour or twenty-minute appointments… And “this is chronic now, 
and you won’t be cured of this”—and out. And then I drove home. Luckily nothing happened, 
because I was not in driving condition at that moment. I really needed to focus, yet I drove 
the wrong way. It was really dangerous to go driving in that situation. (Vivian/2) 
Hearing about a diagnosis of serious illness or a terminal diagnosis can be a dramatic disruption 
in life’s landscape, as something new—and often scary—abruptly appears on the horizon.104 In 
the quote above, after Vivian learned about her cancer being incurable, she literally lost her 
capacity to orient herself in traffic while driving home from the appointment. In Marjo-Riitta’s 
description in her blog, the usual laws of nature seem to disappear, time ceases, perception 
shifts, and the grasp on reality is lost. When death appears on the horizon, it may capture one’s 
                                                 
103 ”Keskiviikko aamuna puhelin soi uudestaan ja tällä kertaa tunnistan jo puhelinnumerosta lääkärin soittavan 
jälleen. Tiedän jo mitä odottaa vastatessani. Patologin vastaukset ovat tulleet ja valitettavasti kasvaimeni on 
pahanlaatuinen. Kiitän tiedosta, mitään muuta en osaakaan sanoa tai kysyä. Aika pysähtyy. Tämä hyvin kliseinen 
ilmaus muuttuu minulle totuudelliseksi. Tunnen olevani kuitenkaan olematta, missä on kauhukahva josta voin 
ottaa kiinni? Missä? Olen rauhallinen ja paniikissa samaan aikaan. Käyn kävelyllä soittamassa miehelleni sekä 
lasteni isälle, eri miehiä nämä. Jossain vaiheessa alkaa joku levoton eläin liikkua sisälläni ja haluaisin taas vain 
junaan, ihan mihin vaan, kun vaan jonnekin. Pois, pois, pois. Ahdistus nousee kuin lämmin vesi pitkin jalkojani 
täyttäen minut hitaasti kokonaan. Kun se on noussut keuhkoihin saakka, en pysty enää hengittämään - hukun.” 
104 In phenomenological discussions since Husserl, the term “horizon” has been used to refer to sensed perception 
happening from a certain embodied and situated standpoint, both in a concrete bodily sense and in a mental or 
cognitive sense (Vessey 2009). The horizon can also be used to depict the cultural and historical situatedness from 
which a person approaches and seeks to apprehend life. 
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attention in such a way that it permeates the perceiver with paralyzing force while everything 
else falls into the background.105 There can be a momentary cut in the sense of relationality 
altogether: Marjo-Riitta describes how terror rises inside of her like water, threatening to drown 
her. She becomes isolated from her usual environment and there is nothing to grasp onto. 
Learning about a terminal condition shakes the core of one’s being and ruptures what Merleau-
Ponty ([1945] 2005: xx) has called operative intentionality; all previous plans and practical 
intentions disappear, and the embodied relation to the world and being itself becomes altered—
and ultimately threatened. Like Marjo-Riitta writes, “I am—but without really being.” 
Vivian was a patient in her fifties whom I had met at the day hospice, and she talked about 
her paralyzing fear almost every time we met. She told me that soon after her initial diagnosis, 
she had seen the image of her death (Vivian/1). “It was like a tsunami that comes and wipes 
everything out,” she described, “like the one in Thailand where so many people died because 
they did not even think to escape from it.” She described to me how at first, when she was in 
the hospice home, the tsunami swept over her every hour; later it happened once a day.106 A 
year after the diagnosis, the tsunami only hit her rarely; yet, there was still no “picture of solace” 
(lohdun kuvaa), she said (Vivian/1). 
When a terminal diagnosis emerges on life’s horizon, it reminds of something theoretically 
acknowledged but perhaps never thought of or seen before. Even though nothing has really 
changed with the world, for most people the world has become a different place. Paradoxically, 
sometimes all that one can think of is some banal detail of everyday life:  
When I went into shock, I tried explaining this [to the doctor]. It was like the priorities 
disappear, and the head is suddenly full of all kinds of things, big and small. And those things 
don’t relate to each other in any way. […] There can be some completely ridiculous things, 
some totally irrelevant things, like happened to me. I thought, there is this bill I need to pay. 
Oh my God, here I go now. I may die anytime in the next few hours, and [all I can think of 
is] that I should have taken care of that bill! (Vivian/2)  
How intensely this rupture happens and what sorts of emotions one experiences depend on 
many factors, such as age, worldview, personality, and one’s life situation in general, as we 
shall see. The interesting thing with a horizon is that even though the vista itself may not change, 
a different view can be gained by changing one’s position. For some of my research patients, 
this moment of learning about their approaching death marked the beginning of an active, new 
positioning in regard to the horizon and landscape of life and death. In contrast, others kept 
insisting on and simply wishing for a change in the horizon itself. 
                                                 
105 Paradoxically, without the background of life one would not even notice the appearance of death. In Husserl’s 
and Merleau-Ponty’s writing, horizon becomes more of a condition or background against which one is able to 
sense the world in the first place. As Merleau-Ponty ([1945] 2005: 78) writes: “I direct my gaze upon a sector of 
the landscape, which comes to life and is disclosed, while the other objects recede into the periphery and become 
dormant, while, however, not ceasing to be there. […] The horizon, then, is what guarantees the identity of the 
object throughout the exploration…” 
106 Vivian was first sent to the hospice ward, as she was in quite bad condition. Her medication was adjusted and 
she was able to return home. After receiving additional treatments from a private hospital and then home care for 
a year, she returned to hospice, first to the day hospice and eventually to the ward where she died. 
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Learning about the diagnosis and entering the medical path 
Many of my research participants (Aili, Eeva, Peter, and Heikki, among others) entered onto 
their medical paths by going to see a doctor for some unusual—or unusually persistent—health 
problem. Some, however, came to learn about their health problems rather accidentally. Taina, 
a pensioner in her sixties, went to see a doctor after her pharmacologist urged her to do so; for 
months she had been buying bottle after bottle of cough syrup for a persistent cough. Only a 
few patients, like Eeva, told me that they had suspected something serious at this early stage. 
For most, the seriousness of their diagnosis was a surprise. A number of patients found it 
difficult to really comprehend and identify with the diagnosis, especially if they did not feel 
very sick yet. The sense of disease sometimes came slowly, and often the seriousness of the 
situation unfolded only gradually.  
 The diagnostic process—from the moment of making the first doctor’s appointment until the 
moment of receiving a diagnosis and the commencement of treatments—can take weeks, or 
even months (e.g., Helena/1; see STM 2010b: 26, 52–53). It has been estimated that more than 
30% of cancers are “harder to suspect,” and their diagnosing often requires multiple 
consultations and various kinds of diagnostic testing, such as laboratory tests and imaging 
technology, all of which takes time (Lyratzopoulos et al. 2014). However, the delays in the 
diagnosis can also be due to the overloaded healthcare system, where the lack of free 
appointment times can lead to an inordinately long wait for consultation.107 On the other hand, 
people may deliberately—although perhaps unconsciously—put off visiting a doctor, even 
when they have a chronic health problem. 
One of those people was Heidi, whom I met several times at the hospice. When I got to know 
her, she was already bedridden, yet otherwise in high spirits. I was actually interviewing her 
roommate when I met her for the first time, upon her arrival at the hospice ward. I had been in 
a pause in the interview with her roommate, and so we started all chatting together. I explained 
who I was and what I was doing, and I asked her if she would like to join the study. She was 
happy to join the research, so I gave her the research information papers and set up a meeting 
for the next day.  
In our first interview, when I asked how she found out about her diagnosis, she laughed 
darkly. She said that she could have gone to see a doctor some ten years before for her intense 
stomach pains. In the end, however, it took several years before she did: 
Heidi: Next month it will be two years since […] I was stretching and yawning and I thought, 
aha, now there is pain in the neck. Of course, I had had neck pains and shoulder trouble, like 
every office worker has. But my neck had never really hurt and then one evening it hurt 
immensely. I continued working for three and half months even after that, however… 
I: Did you go to some tests at that point? 
                                                 
107 For recent statistics describing the waiting times for general healthcare, see 
https://sampo.thl.fi/pivot/prod/fi/avo/hpaasypth01/summary_pthrapo2. 
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Heidi: I did. I went first to see our occupational doctor, who ordered me some X-rays, but 
nothing was showing in them […] I got into the CT scan… and (lowering her voice) the 
fellow said to me, once it had gone through there, the picture, that there seems to be many 
broken bones… (starts whispering) How there can be broken bones…  
At this point in our conversation, Heidi’s voice had become a mixture of whispering and tears. 
This was obviously a painful memory for her, yet, she continued her story. From this moment, 
it took another month before the cause of the fractures was found: a metastatic growth in the 
spine due to advanced cancer. Heidi admitted that she had ignored the early signs of the disease 
(such as the stomach pains) for a number of years. The tumor was several centimeters large 
when it was found, so it was apparent that it had been there for a long time. When Heidi told 
me about this, she cried. When I asked her why she thought she never went to a doctor earlier 
on, she simply noted that “there was always so much to do—life was busy.” Later in our 
conversation, Heidi confessed that this whole thing—the diagnosis and all the sentiments 
around it—was something she seldom had talked about. She continued:  
Based on what I have talked about with some peer patients, it seems quite common, the idea 
that one shouldn’t bother friends and family [with this kind of thing]. Although you ruminate 
on this thing constantly, it is there somewhere in the back of your head. Even if you don’t 
think about it all the time, it is there anyhow. (Heidi/1)  
I concluded that our conversation had offered a rare opportunity for Heidi to express her 
feelings, which she summarized in a seemingly stoic way by saying “Well, nothing to be done. 
There’s no crying over spilled milk.” 
The period after the initial contact with a specialist and the actual final diagnosis and 
commencement of the cancer treatments can be a challenging time for the patient.108 After 
Helena had her tumor operated on, it took another five weeks for her to hear about the results 
from the pathologist. Helena described this waiting period as exasperating (Helena/1). Although 
the quality of public healthcare (especially in regard to cancer) was highly appreciated among 
the research participants, there was also some dissatisfaction related to being able to access it. 
Kimmo, a lung cancer patient in his fifties, once commented on the Finnish healthcare system 
by saying, “Finnish healthcare is great—once you get in. But in order to get there and to start 
receiving proper care, you need to actively ask for information and demand care” (D1: 83). This 
remark reflects Kimmo’s experiences about the communication and information-sharing with 
the doctors. 
With many of my research participants (such as Oiva, Inkeri, and Vivian), the referral to 
palliative or hospice care was given after multiple medical phases, at a point when the disease 
had developed from a treatable cancer into an incurable disease with an expectation of little 
remaining lifespan. After a long illness trajectory including various treatments, the moment of 
                                                 
108  For a news article on this, see https://stm.fi/artikkeli/-/asset_publisher/syopahoidon-aloittamisen-viiveita-
pyritaan-lyhentamaan. About the reasons for the possible delays, see Mäklin & Mäkelä 2008. 
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hospice referral was often described by the research participants as the moment where “nothing 
more could be done.”109 With others (like, for instance, with Matti or my mother), the terminal 
nature of the sickness was clear from the outset and the first moment of the diagnosis; here the 
sudden prognosis came as a complete surprise and terrible shock. Yet, even when one was 
already diagnosed with cancer, and had been perhaps ill already for a while, taking a turn for 
the worse sometimes came as a profound blow “out of the blue”: 
But then it happened that the doctor came to tell me the results of the CT scan. They had 
found some alterations in my lungs which seemed like metastasis. It came totally out of the 
blue to me!110 I had just expected to receive my treatments that day. But then it happened. 
The doctor just swept into the room and said, you won’t receive any treatments today. You 
may have metastasis in the lungs. You can leave now. Go home and we’ll get back to you… 
(laughter) I thought it was somewhat weird […] that now they don’t give any chemotherapy, 
that you can go now! Isn’t this the moment when you should give all the possible 
chemotherapies in the world!?! (Helena/1)111 
Then they called me [to say] that they had gone through my case in the team meeting and that 
indeed all the chemotherapy was now finished for me. That felt so very strange. That was the 
moment when my mom and everybody went into panic. (Helena/1) 
Although receiving news about a serious disease or terminal condition was shocking to 
many, some patients took it more calmly. There are manifold reasons for the different ways of 
reacting to the news. According to a study from 2011, patients’ reactions to “bad news”112 are 
affected not only by the manner in which the news is delivered but also by the patients’ prior 
experiences with the medical system; receiving the news was experienced as a process 
(Schaepe 2011). Another study—a large literary review on the topic—concluded that, in 
addition to the importance placed on psychological support, the patients (and their families) 
found the continuous relationship with the healthcare practitioner of utmost importance for 
being able to feel trust, have confidence, and experience a sense of nonabandonment at the 
moment of learning about their diagnosis (Matthews et al. 2019: 2292). Furthermore, the 
context of a person’s life, such as age and family relationships, naturally affects the way in 
which they handle the situation. This does not mean, however, that older people necessarily 
receive a terminal diagnosis more easily than young people. Sometimes they do. For instance, 
                                                 
109 To raise public’s awareness about hospice care, and specifically to express how hospice is not about ending 
all care, hospices use a common slogan: Kun ei ole enää mitään tehtävissä, on vielä paljon tekemistä (“When 
there is nothing more to be done, a lot remains to do”). See, for example, https://pirkanmaanhoitokoti-fi-
bin.directo.fi/@Bin/10832ab157490e67a7f9c8ab5fd5bd85/1590463204/application/pdf/200008/PirHo_esite-
web.pdf.  
110 As an interesting note on language, here Helena used the Finnish expression puun takaa, that something comes 
“from behind the tree,” which means roughly the same as something coming out of the blue. 
111 Of course, we cannot know the exact exchange of words that took place in the consultation room. As I have 
noted earlier, the patients’ quotes do not present depictions of reality in any objective sense; rather, they 
importantly illustrate the subjectivity of their experience and the subjective manner of interpreting, for instance, 
the communication with medical staff.  
112 In medical literature, bad news comprises information that “results in a cognitive, behavioural, or emotional 
deficit in the person receiving the news that persists for some time after the news is received” (Ptacek & Eberhardt 
1996, cited in Matthews et al. 2019). In common language, a doctor’s bad news tends to be associated with a 
terminal, or at least very serious, diagnosis.  
~ 90 ~ 
 
Aili and Matti—who were between 70–80 years old at the time of their diagnosis—were both 
understanding about their situation (although Matti added that since he had worked practically 
up until his diagnosis, he had missed his “third phase of life”). Yet, older people can also be 
very reluctant to face their mortal condition (e.g., Laakkonen 2005). Simultaneously, as nurses 
in the hospice pointed out to me, young people can be surprisingly brave in their ability to face 
the inescapable (D1: 36). In relation to one’s life context, a factor that seemed to make a 
significant difference in the way that the news was taken was the possible existence of 
dependent family members. For instance, having small children, older parents, or a sick spouse 
who was dependent on the dying person made the thought of passing much more difficult—
and, especially in regard to the children, often excruciatingly painful. My experience and 
impression from the field was that it was not uncommon for a patient to be most worried about 
their loved ones, compared to their own experience of dying. 
In brief, the reactions to a fatal diagnosis were very individual. Even though research has 
found certain elements that affect death anxiety (e.g., see Surall & Steppacher 2018), the 
affecting variables are multiple. Thus, age, gender, religiosity, or culture, for instance, cannot 
alone explain the varieties of reactions. With my research participants, there was one element, 
however, which tended to boost the capacity to receive the news. That was the individual’s 
practical and/or existential understanding of death and dying gained during one’s lifetime. The 
first reactions often seemed to depend on previous experiences related to sickness and, in 
particular, end-of-life care. As we will see in the following cases with Aili and Eeva, this 
culturally learned and individually appropriated capital was connected to practicalities, as well 
as the more spiritual side of the matter; these aspects were essential when people were faced 
with their own mortality. 
Sense of shame and guilt 
Aili was one of my very first research participants at the day hospice. When I met Aili for the 
first time, she had been living with her diagnosis for about six months. She was interested in 
my research and was happy to participate; we met many times during the ethnography, and in 
addition to actual interviews about illness, death, and dying, we enjoyed many conversations 
about life in general.113 
When Aili and I discussed her diagnosis, it became clear to me that she had taken the news 
of her terminal condition in a resigned way. She told me how she had been feeling ill and weak 
for some time already, when one day “the shopping bags became too heavy to carry all of a 
sudden.” After she fell down on the ground, she was taken to the doctor and sent for further 
tests. It took weeks of various kinds of examinations before the cause of the symptoms was 
found. Finally, an endoscopy revealed the tumor. The actual diagnosis as well as the prognosis 
were delivered to her by phone, but she said she knew by then: “I had guessed already. I knew 
                                                 
113 When Aili was first diagnosed, she was given four months to live. Yet, sometimes the prognosis can be wrong. 
Aili survived her cancer and continues to live today, years after the diagnosis. 
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it in me. I knew that, here we go now…” (Aili/1). In addition to the symptoms, all of the 
examinations had convinced Aili—an experienced healthcare practitioner herself—that 
something more essential was wrong with her body. The horizon had started to change, and it 
came into focus with the doctor’s words over the phone. This manner of receiving the news was 
not ethically recommended, yet at that moment any possible lapses in protocol were of minor 
concern to Aili; because of her professional background, she understood the gravity of her 
situation perhaps better than a layperson.114 
Aili felt some sense of guilt in regard to her situation, and this was something that we talked 
about rather often, especially during the first year or so of our interviews. Only after some time 
went by did the guilt ease its grip, and Aili became more forgiving toward herself. The guilt 
was accompanied by a sense of shame, which kept Aili from talking about it in a normal voice. 
Every time she would mention her earlier smoking, she inhaled the word “smoked”:115 
Aili: I have this thing that I have smoked… It was a terrible thing. It was like I did it to myself!  
I: This was your first reaction? 
Aili: Yeah, that I did this by myself, that now I got my share, my pay from what I had done.116 
That I have been one of those slippery, dishonest persons who has acted as a… very good 
[healthcare practitioner] and like the caregiver for the whole family—parents, husband, 
grandchildren—and everybody, and then me, myself, I have done [this so] that my value, my 
value as a human, is gone.  
I had such a tough [attitude] that even if the world would come crumbling down, I should 
carry on (jaksaa). I always demanded a lot from myself. Maybe this was the kind of thing 
that I needed to do in secret… that I needed to reward myself. Quite an odd person. (Aili/1) 
The word “slippery” was swallowed again with a whisper, as if Aili did not even want it to pass 
her lips. She was upset with herself, yet simultaneously she was somehow able to take distance 
from the issue. When telling me how she felt and thought, she clearly referred to that time, not 
the present moment of our conversation. This became evident from the way in which she 
described her feelings and thoughts: “…that I did it myself” instead of saying simply, “I did it 
myself.” She was telling me a narrative from the past.  
Over time, as I got to know Aili better, the more I understood how she felt about this issue. 
I also learned how very difficult it was for her to become dependent on others’ help. In a way, 
Aili appeared as a sort of a national superheroine. First, she had survived World War II and its 
                                                 
114 The Finnish ethical guidelines for doctors state: “The doctor is usually the person who tells the patient about 
the approaching death. A peaceful place and sufficient amount of time are needed, so that the patients can discuss 
with the doctor without any disturbance. Illness and its prognosis should be told in a clear and understandable 
manner. The doctor needs to take into account the patient’s ability to receive information and give him/her enough 
time to internalize the information that is given. It is advisable to arrange another appointment soon thereafter, in 
which the patient can ask further questions that may have arisen” (Lääkärin etiikka 2013: 152, translation mine). 
115 Speaking while inhaling is a peculiar feature of Finnish language (shared by some other, mostly Nordic 
languages). Although not constant, it can happen often, especially in combination with sensations of anxiety, fear, 
uncertainty, and so forth (Eklund 2008: 280–282). 
116 Aili here refers to a Finnish proverb: Paha saa palkkansa (“The evil will get its share”). This has a similar 
meaning as the English saying “What goes around comes around.” 
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bombings in Karelia (once she told me how she needed to take cover behind a chimney wall 
from bullets being fired from a Russian fighter plane). Her family had lost their house and land, 
and they had suffered post-war poverty. From childhood on, she had known much hard work 
and experienced many personal losses. When Aili became an adult, she started working in the 
field of healthcare, taking care of everyone around her. She admitted that in her weakest 
moments during her illness, she sometimes thought to herself, “Haven’t I had my share 
already?” 
Aili’s emotion can be understood through a perspective offered by Giddens, who claims that 
shame is “essentially anxiety about the adequacy of the narrative by means of which the 
individual sustains a coherent biology” (Giddens [1991] 2006: 65). Shame can be a very 
shattering feeling, since it threatens one’s very self-identity, which Giddens ([1991] 2006: 53) 
defines as “the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or his biography.” 
Smoking was not part of Aili’s self-identity, yet now she believed that she was suffering from 
its consequences. 
Aside from Aili’s internal turmoil, she took her situation very pragmatically. Because of her 
professional background, she knew how things would progress, and she shared honest and 
unsentimental conversations about her situation with her children. It seemed plausible that the 
general ease with which Aili faced the idea of death was due to the fact that she had frequently 
encountered it as part of her professional and private history. In other words, one could say that 
her professional and personal involvement with death and dying had given her resources which 
became valuable in a new way at this moment of her life. As one learns to live, one can also 
learn to die. This, I thought, became apparent with patients like Aili. 
Nevertheless, the feelings of shame and guilt overshadowed the affective milieu where Aili 
was learning to bear the new horizon of death, which, according to the doctor’s preliminary 
prognosis, was as near as four months away. As the general expectation of four months became 
four years and still counting, the shadow of the looming death still remained on the horizon but 
did not catch up with her. With time, Aili’s condition changed from acutely terminal to chronic, 
and she needed to find new positionings in relation to death. 
Death shirts for the family  
Aili was not the only patient to tell that they already had a suspicion of being ill. I met Eeva 
during my ethnography at the hospice ward when she was referred there, after chemotherapy 
did not result in any improvement in her lung cancer. She had previously been in home care but 
was now admitted to the ward for a period of adjustment to the palliative medicine. The 
situation remained somewhat “unclear,” she told me (D1: 63): the disease continued to spread 
and cause more symptoms, and it was necessary to continue adjusting medications. Eeva 
explained that the feeling of unclearness she experienced was in relation to time: she knew she 
would die, and the uncertainty about the length of the remaining time felt unsettling to her. 
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 When I first talked with Eeva about her diagnosis, she stated laconically that even before 
going to the doctor she already thought, “Since I’ve smoked, I probably have cancer” (D1: 63). 
Consequently, when she was actually diagnosed with lung cancer, it was a mere confirmation 
of her rather apathetic expectation. For Eeva, cigarette smoking had never caused any 
significant emotional turmoil. Eeva was compliant and very “matter-of-fact” about her 
condition. The hardest thing was not the diagnosis itself but sharing the news with her child and 
their two adult children. Feeling touched, Eeva said to me: “It took me a while before I was 
able to tell them. And then when I did, I had to start consoling them all” (D1: 64).  
Although not to the same extent as Aili, Eeva also had some prior experience of cancer and 
end-of-life care. Some years before, her sister had died and Eeva had stayed with her for the 
two last weeks, first at home and then the last week at the hospital. She told me, “That taught 
me to process these things” (D1: 64). As a Russian Orthodox, she had made a so-called death 
shirt (kuolinpaita) for her sister. In reality, it was a white linen dress with a small collar, open 
at the back. Eeva also made a lace hat, as her sister had lost her hair due to the treatments. Her 
mother had handed this tradition down to her. When Eeva’s mother died, the daughters had 
washed and dressed her in the death shirt. Some years later, Eeva also needed to dress her sister. 
(D1: 65.) Now that her time had come, she prepared the death shirt for herself. In addition to 
the dress, she had also sewn underpants and an undershirt, and she had even knitted socks for 
herself.  
Upon first hearing about the death shirt, I was shy to ask to see it, but later on, after getting 
to know her better, I asked about it. The shirt had first stayed at home but when Eeva’s condition 
was getting worse, she brought it to the hospice ward so that it would be there, ready for her. 
One day she showed it to me. The white linen dress was waiting in a cardboard box, neatly 
folded with knitted white socks on top. By designing and making her own death shirt, she was 
exercising authority over her situation; in a way, she had literally designed her own “death 
style” (Davies 2015). She was managing her own dying and giving it the kind of frame she 
desired.  
Making one’s own death garment is an old Finnish tradition. If women tended to make their 
clothing for the journey to the next world, men would build their own caskets (Pentikäinen 
1990: 69–70). Interestingly, these traditions have been revived during the last decades via 
courses and workshops where people are invited to either build their own caskets or design and 
make their own death garment. 117  Making one’s own “death gear” can be seen as an 
empowering death ritual, where the dying not only think of their death but see it as a part of 
their life’s horizon. In this way, one can design a desired landscape of death; it is one way to 
                                                 
117 See, for instance, https://www.kirkkojakaupunki.fi/-/omalla-tyylilla and 
https://www.studio55.fi/matkailu/article/anneli-67-rakensi-oman-ruumisarkkunsa/129826. The first site informs 
about an exhibition of self-made death shirts, and the latter is an article on a course during which ten people 
(three women and seven men) made their own caskets. This is not very common in Finland, but not unheard of 
either. The article mentions that a German TV interview was done with the course members, since for that 
culture the idea of designing and making one’s own casket seemed exotic.  
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take control of one’s own final moments and even beyond. From a Spinozian point of view, 
here the dying person was able to be affected by and to affect death. Instead of death simply 
happening, Eeva engaged in empowering actions in regard to it. These kinds of rituals give the 
dying the ability to increase their power (potentia) to act in the face of death.  
With Eeva, this active take on her situation was not limited to the death garment. Since the 
diagnosis, she had started to prepare herself in multiple ways. She knew how to do death. She 
talked about death-related matters with the family; after the deaths of her mother and sister, 
Eeva told me (D1: 64–65), they were all used to discussing these things. Of all of my research 
patients, Eeva was perhaps the most accepting about her situation. Here again, I could see how 
practice can teach one to accept death. 
5.2 Trying to think and talk about death  
“Just visiting the hospice home” 
Being admitted to hospice care does not guarantee acceptance of the process of dying. I learned 
this with Peter, whom I met when he was sent to hospice for his worsening physical condition. 
Once he heard about my research, he promised me “a long, good interview,” adding that he had 
“some things to tell!” (D4: 10). We signed the consent form and I accompanied Peter to the 
patio for a cigarette. Peter was thinking aloud about the patients around him on the hospice 
ward, remembering his experiences in the cancer clinic: “There they were, in a row, being all 
grey, next to one another, having given up.” He shook his head, revolted. I asked him what he 
meant when he said that they had “given up.” Peter answered, “Well, like, ready to… die. Let’s 
use that [word] then, as that kind of word exists.” It seemed self-evident that this was not Peter’s 
position. By then, I had learned that Peter had a brain tumor. “It is all about your attitude,” he 
said when I asked him how he was coping with his situation. “It totally depends on your 
attitude,” he reiterated (DI: 43).  
We agreed upon a day for our interview, but when the time came Peter had changed his 
mind; he did not want to speak with me, he said. I had been expecting this kind of reaction from 
the patients, but it actually happened less than I had imagined. A couple of days later, however, 
Peter was again ready to chat with me, and he told me his story. One evening slightly more than 
a year before, Peter had fallen down a few times, and he went to see a doctor. The doctor’s 
initial thought was that there was a nerve problem in his leg, but just to be sure he sent Peter to 
a neurologist for further tests. Before any diagnosis ever came, he began having epileptic 
seizures. These left Peter with a hemiparesis, involving partial paralysis and weakness on the 
left side of his body. All this was terrifying to Peter. In particular, the first epileptic seizure had 
been a very frightening experience for this youthful business man, whose lifestyle, according 
to him, was about “luxury, trendy clothes, nice watches, and fancy restaurants” (D1: 58–59). 
Extensive imaging of his brain led to a clear diagnosis: glioblastoma, an aggressive type of 
brain tumor that offers poor prognosis. Even with proper medical treatment, only 20% of 
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patients survive two years (Mäenpää 2010). It is rare to be able to remove the entire tumor by 
surgery, and even if this is done successfully it usually reappears soon thereafter. Peter did not 
seem to care about these facts; instead, he had decided to survive this. He had had the brain 
surgery, which he talked about very calmly: “A visit to a dentist is scarier than any surgery in 
the brain.” He told me that he was discharged only four days after the surgery. He returned 
home with some paracetamol for his pain, and otherwise he said he was living “just normally” 
(D1: 57–58).  
Peter started to receive chemotherapy, first one kind and—after this did not seem to work—
another kind. Little by little, the situation started to look much worse than Peter had ever dared 
to imagine. Now Peter was in hospice, according to him, to get his “medicines fixed”118 for his 
worsening headaches. His personal goal was to rehabilitate his arm after the hemiparesis.  
Although it was obvious that his cancer was terminal, Peter did not appear to care about or 
agree with the prognosis. This in itself was not unusual. As the medical literature explains, at 
times there is resistance against the diagnosis given by doctors, as patients, for multiple reasons, 
simply cannot be in accord with their medically defined condition (Gramling et al. 2016). Some 
of my research participants persistently claimed that they were given different facts about their 
illness by their previous doctor, and sometimes they asserted that they were not given any 
information at all about their situation. As Gramling et al. (2016: 1423) summarize: 
“communicating about prognosis in advanced cancer is not merely a straightforward exchange 
of information; it is affective and, when it happens, it occurs amid substantial uncertainty, 
confusion, and often terror.” There are several possible reasons for this kind of discrepancy in 
patients’ and doctors’ understandings of the prognosis (Gramling et al. 2016). It is possible that 
the patient has simply not understood what they were told. Sometimes the language used by the 
doctor, or the sense of there being a rush during the consultation, makes it difficult for the 
patient to pose questions which would help to clarify the news. Often patients are in such shock 
that their capacity to absorb detailed information is drastically reduced (much like Vivian, 
explained above). It is also possible that the actual uttered words get transformed into something 
else in the patient’s mind. Finally, of course, memory problems can also be a symptomatic 
feature, especially in the case of brain tumors.  
In Peter’s case, it may have been that his aversion toward bodily weakness fed his 
unwillingness to believe his actual situation. Death and decay were simply not things that 
belonged to his life horizon; he was not a “quitter” but a “man of action,” he said to me (D4: 
11).119 During our interview, Peter repeatedly emphasized the difference between himself and 
the other patients: “As you can see, I am not any average patient, you cannot make me to be the 
                                                 
118 As we will see, I was often told by the patients that they were at the hospice ward “in order to get their meds 
fixed.” I never heard anyone say that they had come there for hospice care—or to die. 
119 In regard to death, Peter’s orientation mirrors the argument of French existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre, who 
claimed that death can never become absorbed into one’s lifeworld: “Death is a pure fact as is birth; it comes to us 
from outside and it transforms us into the outside” (Sartre 1956: 545). For Sartre (1956: 548), death is never part 
of one’s subjectivity but rather the exterior limit of it. 
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median!” (D4: 11). Peter told that he had taken care of his situation quite independently. It all 
depends on your own activity, he assured me many times (D1: 43, 58). To me, it seemed like 
he was not only accentuating his authority over his situation but also differentiating between 
himself and the disease.  
Peter practiced the “separation” also materially. His room on the hospice ward was filled 
with various tokens of his previous life: his iPhone and a large monitor for a computer (but no 
computer), a few empty cigar boxes, expensive-looking sunglasses, and a walking stick with a 
silver handle. These largely unused items created a contrast with their surroundings, the soft 
“homelike” hospice setting. This “hominess” (kodinomaisuus) is the most common adjective 
to describe hospice homes on the internet, both on hospice websites and in other media like 
newspapers. In practice, this “hominess” is pursued by furnishing the hospices with home-like 
furniture (such as sofa sets, book shelves, and art) and by creating various kinds of free areas 
inside the hospice home that patients can roam around. Of course, the “hominess” of the hospice 
environment is a matter of taste, and Peter was seeking an alternative by creating his own space. 
But whether one likes the hospice decor or not, the fact remains that hospice homes are also 
medical environments. By mediating his identity via his personal material symbols, Peter 
wished to separate himself from those whom he thought of as “grey, surrendered dying patients” 
(D1: 43). Peter sought to reinforce his identity with chosen items in order to contrast himself 
with a medically enhanced body; he chose not to be “the man with a walker” but rather “the 
man with a cane with a silver handle.” As the disease progressed, however, it became more 
difficult to maintain this sort of self-identity. 
In relation to being at the hospice home, Peter had a strong opinion: he hated it. When I 
asked what he hated most about the place, he fumed about the quiet and stillness, the fussing 
and pampering: “You should come here when it is nighttime.” He continued: “All I hear is the 
sound of the neighbor’s dental prosthetics, the fizz when he speaks! That’s repulsive! (D4: 11).” 
When I asked Peter what he would do right now if he was not sick, he said that he dreamed of 
being 20 kg less (he was swollen from all the cortisone he had been prescribed), wearing some 
cool clothes and going downtown for a stroll with his cane. Then he would go to a fancy 
restaurant for a nice, proper dinner. Peter had been happy with his previous lifestyle and was 
now disgusted by his present situation. “I would like to be wearing a slightly different kind of 
watch on my wrist than this one!” he said, showing me the hospice alarm (D4: 11). 
According to Peter, the ambiguity surrounding his current situation was the worst. To gain 
some clarity and perhaps some control over his situation, Peter told me that he had gone to a 
private clinic for a CT scan, and he was waiting for the results. When I checked his medical 
records after his death (in the company of a nurse), I found out that the CT scan had not been 
done at a private clinic but at the public cancer clinic as part of his care routine.120 It is 
impossible to say if Peter created his version of the truth consciously or unconsciously. The 
                                                 
120 My research permission authorized me to study the medical records of the research patients. 
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tumor naturally affected the way in which Peter experienced his situation (personality changes 
are commonly described symptoms of gliomas).121 Since I am interested here in Peter’s own 
account and the way he saw, felt, and thought about his situation, I take his words as depicting 
his actual experience. The idea of having some control over the situation and going to the 
private clinic for help made sense in Peter’s lifeworld. 
At the time of our interview, Peter’s biggest problem was his paralyzed arm: “I just want to 
get my arm functioning, then go home and keep working” (D1: 58). Peter had told me about 
his future business plans, which he was eager to continue developing. Peter was very hopeful 
about his recovery; he was “just visiting the hospice home.” He explained to me that his 
detestation toward being at the hospice actually motivated him to get better (D4: 11). He 
speculated about the results of his CT scan, saying that if there was something in the pictures 
he would let them operate again, but if the cancer had spread everywhere, then it may not be so 
wise. It did not seem to occur to him that the doctors perhaps would not want to operate on him 
again. By presenting the situation in this way, Peter perhaps sought to convince both himself 
and me that he was the one calling the shots. 
Few days later, I met Peter again and we shared another cigarette moment on the patio. I had 
learned from the nurses that the results of his CT scan had arrived—and they had confirmed the 
spread of the tumor. I was waiting to see if Peter wanted to bring up the news, but he did not 
mention anything. Instead, he continued to distance himself from the terminal disease by 
othering the patients around him. Peter nodded toward another patient and commented to me, 
when she left the patio, that she was “so in her final [stages]!” Peter told me that at least three 
people had died since he had arrived at the ward. In reality, the number of the deceased at the 
hospice was much higher, but I simply nodded in agreement. (D1: 70–71.) 
After this, we never again spoke about his condition, even though I did see him a few more 
times. We shared a moment for a cigarette, for instance, or just nodded to each other in the 
corridor. When his condition worsened, he stayed away from the public areas and a friend of 
his remained with him until his death. One of our last conversations exemplified his experience 
of the stillness of the ward. We were sitting by the main dining table in the great hall when 
Peter glanced at the antique grandfather clock on the wall. The hands of the clock were showing 
8 o’clock. “Oh, is it so late already?” he asked, surprised. “No, it’s not,” I told him. “That clock 
                                                 
121 The question of whether a feature of one’s personality is really “authentically” a part of the persons’ personality, 
or “merely” the result of a tumor or perhaps medication, is in itself somewhat problematic. First, as I have stated 
above, for me the subject is always constituted by various molecular mediations with the environment, whether 
concrete, physical, and chemical or social, psychological, and spiritual. Secondly, it is difficult to define what 
causes what—so here I am basing my analysis on the encounters I had and the way I experienced them. I am not 
in a position to definitively determine how “authentic” and “truthful” people may have been with me. My 
assumption is that whatever people shared with me, it was true, at least in that moment and for us in that situation. 
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doesn’t run.” The grandfather clock had stopped at some random moment. Hospice time was 
standing still, just like Peter’s experience of it: motionless, liminal, quiet, and static.122 
Later on, I kept thinking about this issue of stillness. The difference between life and death 
often seems to happen in relation to the question of motion. Motion equals life, while stillness 
relates to death. This appeared to be the case for some of the research participants: when their 
physical condition started preventing actual physical movement, forcing patients into stillness, 
many experienced this as signaling the beginning of the end. 
To conclude, Peter chose not to look at death; rather, he kept his eyes on the horizon of life. 
Death did not make up any part of Peter’s ontological world. Even if this was “just” the story 
he preferred to tell himself—or to me—it reveals how death, decay, and physical frailty had no 
place in Peter’s lifeworld. (D1: 57–58.) 
Seeking recovery 
Peter was by no means the only one who had difficulties in accepting his diagnosis—and 
mortality. I would claim that acceptance of a terminal diagnosis was very hard for many of my 
research participants. Nurses at the hospice home recommended that I pay a visit to Kimmo. I 
gathered from the nurses’ comments that they believed he would benefit from chatting with 
someone “from outside.” Kimmo was a tall, quiet-looking man in his fifties. Kimmo had had a 
steady professional life until his diagnosis, and he was a husband and a father of teenage 
children. When I went to introduce myself, I found Kimmo resting on his bed, looking a bit 
shattered. He welcomed me and seemed happy to talk. I found him to be surprisingly open; it 
seemed like our meeting came at a vulnerable moment when he had just faced some difficult 
facts about his situation. He was in the kind of exposed, somewhat confused, and vulnerable 
state that I experienced with some other patients as well. 
Kimmo had been diagnosed with lung cancer a little over a year before. The first signs of 
something being wrong had appeared 18 months earlier, when Kimmo was playing football 
with his friends. He suddenly felt dizzy and could not keep playing. Shortly after that, Kimmo 
fell ill with what seemed to be a very persistent flu. The doctors told him to take it easy and to 
rest. Finally, a few months later, Kimmo was sent for lung X-rays and from there straight to the 
hospital. The diagnosis was a terrible shock. Kimmo had never smoked but instead had led a 
healthy, sportive lifestyle. Hence, according to Kimmo, nothing had prepared him for this kind 
of situation.123  
To Kimmo’s relief, his condition was treatable. He was prescribed targeted therapy, which 
seemed to be very efficient; in just a week, Kimmo told me, all the symptoms had vanished. 
                                                 
122According to Finnish historian Leena Aaltonen (1992: 14–15), in rural Finland before World War I, it was a 
custom to wake with the dying. Everybody was told to be very quiet: “There was supposed to reign complete 
silence around the dying: even the grandfather clock needed to be paused.” 
123 Many patients talked about the causes of their illness, or they demonstrated great interest in understanding why 
they fell ill in the first place. There was often astonishment when someone “who had led a healthy lifestyle” became 
ill. There seems to be a common need to make meaning in situations, which a biologist would explain merely as a 
simple occurrence of life and pure chance. 
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The new scans confirmed that the tumor had shrunk considerably, and Kimmo felt like he had 
conquered the cancer. It was a great summer, Kimmo remembered. One of the highlights was 
a holiday trip, which the family was able to make together. Soon thereafter, however, Kimmo 
became unusually tired again and he had alarming back pain. When he went for new scans, the 
results were devastating: the cancer had spread. Because of his positive experiences with the 
therapy during the last round, Kimmo felt optimistic. He had firm trust in the medicine, and he 
expected to be able to get back to work as soon as the chemotherapy was over. Yet, this time 
everything was different. Unlike before, now the treatments were very heavy, made him feel 
even sicker, and in the end did not diminish the tumor. (D1: 67.)   
Kimmo’s experience and interpretation of his illness and overall existence were strongly 
affected and mediated by medicine. The first time, drugs permeated his being in a positive 
manner, enabling and empowering him to live “normally” and enjoy his life fully. The second 
time around, the therapy turned out to be unsuccessful, and the medically mediated mode of 
being became excruciating. “The chemotherapy sucked all the life out of me,” Kimmo said 
pensively when looking back. “I could feel it draining my muscles. All the power just flew 
away from them” (D1: 68). Kimmo was petrified, for he had always been a very active man. 
He had grown up in the countryside, and as he explained to me, “growing up on a farm means 
using your body for working and moving around” (D1: 72–74). He knew life as embodied 
movement.  
It is possible to think that this was the reason why Kimmo fought back against the cancer 
first and foremost by exercising his body. In the course of the following months, he continued 
to keep himself physically active, even while becoming more frail and suffering from 
intensifying dizziness. As time went by, he said, the headaches became stronger and later a 
tumor was found in his brain. The doctors suggested cranial radiation, which Kimmo agreed to. 
He had made a resolution not to give up; he went to his daily appointments by public 
transportation and on foot. But the cancer wore him out. Soon thereafter, Kimmo collapsed and 
his wife called an ambulance. He was physically wrecked and mentally exhausted. Now he had 
been sent to hospice to gather some strength and “to get his medicines fixed” (D1: 68). 
The visit to the hospice ward was a turning point for Kimmo in many ways. During our first 
meeting, Kimmo said that after being ill for months and meeting a number of doctors and 
specialists, this was the first time that he felt that the doctor actually saw him as a real person, 
as another human (D1: 62).124 During one long night on the ward, Kimmo had an intense 
conversation with one of the nurses. She told me later that her job was to give him “a safe place 
to face his situation.” From what Kimmo told me, this is exactly what had happened that night. 
Until then, Kimmo had held onto the thought that he could manage, that if he just tried hard 
enough he would be okay. He had desperately struggled to remain in control. After his 
                                                 
124 It was rather common to hear patients contrasting their experiences in the hospice home with their previous 
encounters with medical staff. 
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conversation with the nurse, Kimmo started to relax and give in a bit. “I had this realization that 
nothing is eternal,” he told me. “We all die. Maybe I’ll die in six months’ time or maybe I will 
die in only twenty years.” To accept this thought was a huge thing to Kimmo. Yet, at the same 
time he continued to emphasize how his own efforts could make a difference. Kimmo shared 
that it was equally important to understand what one can do about it. He continued, “I can take 
care of this body of mine and I can eat well, but it is not all in my own hands” (D1: 118–119).  
Over time, when I came to know Kimmo a little better, I realized that this tension was a 
characteristic feature of his end of life. Kimmo had two rather contradictory ways of 
approaching and speaking about his situation. On one hand, he was openly looking at his 
deteriorating physical condition and facing the painful idea of death. Paradoxically, Kimmo 
explained that it was actually the heavy medical treatments which had forced him to accept his 
situation; the second round of chemo, and especially the radiation on his head, had put him into 
a “really bad condition.” All this, he said, had “trained” him to understand that not everything 
was in his hands (D1: 117–118). When Kimmo was reflecting on all this, he was teary and had 
a very vulnerable air about him. He was in a lot of emotional distress; he would lament, for 
instance, about not being able to see his children grow up. Yet, on the other hand, part of him 
persisted in a state of disbelief about the terminal nature of his illness. Until the very end, 
Kimmo kept talking about his “recovery” and “progress” of getting better (D1: 122). Later on, 
a nurse told me that until the very end he kept eating protein supplements and trying to recover 
his muscle tone in the gym. He never quite accepted the finality of his situation, and he never 
gave up the idea that he could somehow pull through. In hospice language, his “adaptation 
process” was still undone when he died. 
When Kimmo looked at his horizon, perhaps he saw death, but he chose to look at life. 
Nursing scientist Mirja Sisko Anttonen refers to patients who simply refuse to handle the 
information about a life-threatening disease (2016: 64–65), and who consequently refuse to 
prepare themselves for death (2016: 99). Although for some (like Peter), the denial of the reality 
seemed steadfast, I would however suggest that in most cases the sentiments about the 
possibility of death were complex and fluctuating on a daily basis. Here Kimmo seemed to 
share Sartre’s attitude: “I can neither discover my death nor wait for it nor adopt an attitude 
toward it, for it is that which is revealed as undiscoverable, that which disarms all waiting…” 
(Sartre 1956: 545). In this case, the only possible recourse is to look at life and to keep moving 
in life—just as movement was life for Kimmo. He continued to emphasize his physical exercise, 
which, at the hospice, was reduced to making laps with a walker around the ward. Later on, 
when he was able to return home (where he spent his final days), he continued going to a gym 
for rehabilitation. He also made an effort to eat healthily and well. It felt to me as if he thought 
that because one dies from not eating food, it must follow that one cannot die if one keeps 
eating. This was Kimmo’s way of doing his own death—while death was slowly undoing him. 
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Dying as a project 
Inkeri’s manner of processing the terminal situation was quite unlike any of the others that I 
encountered during my ethnographic research. We met at the day hospice, and very soon 
thereafter it became apparent how she was persistently seeking to understand what was 
happening to her by studying her situation, both in regard to its medical frame but also 
philosophically. For Inkeri, philosophy was entangled with art and sensorial creativity, and thus 
for her, doing art and crafts was a philosophical process. As I will discuss in more detail in 
Chapter 10, creating art was her way of facing death. 
Aside from having a long professional career elsewhere, Inkeri was also an artist who had 
studied psychoanalysis, which was formative to her life philosophy. After Inkeri heard about 
my research, she became very interested in it. During our first actual interview at the hospice 
home, she admitted that my being there made a real difference for her: “Most important to me 
was to get to know the staff and the atmosphere here, and then this thing of yours was, of course, 
extremely interesting. This awoke a huge inspiration in me, that I got this possibility to be 
encountered via [sharing] one’s own story, which is exceptional…” (Inkeri/1). 
In our first interview, Inkeri told me that she had learned about her illness a few years before, 
after suffering from different kinds of symptoms for some time. The lung polyclinic finally 
gave her the bad news: strong suspicion of a malignant tumor in the chest area. “When I left for 
home in some sort of shock,” Inkeri recalled, “I thought that I need to start writing about this 
now, so that I can get through this, even though I am not really a writing type, as I’ve always 
expressed myself via other media.” At that moment, however, Inkeri felt compelled to process 
her situation by writing. On the way home, she went to a bookstore, where it took her “probably 
an hour to choose the right notebook.” She continued: 
When I got home, I certainly did not start writing right away, but it took me about three 
months to figure out how I wanted to cover the notebook! It was its own process. Finally I 
was able to cover the notebook, and I gave it a name, and I have it even now with me, as I 
thought that maybe here I could write in it… (Inkeri/1)  
At this point in our discussion, Inkeri started to search for the notebook in her bag, in order to 
show it to me. The name given to the notebook was actually a sentence that had come out of 
her grandchild’s mouth upon seeing her sick for the first time. After the initial diagnostic 
operation, she had a large bandage on her chest where they had performed an endoscopy, and 
the four-year-old had looked at the bandage and then exclaimed, “It’s good that there is no bone 
showing through, since one could even die from it!” The name of the notebook was “Since one 
could even die from it” (Inkeri/1).125 
This story illuminates Inkeri’s manner of living—and dying. When she learned about her 
terminal condition, it quite naturally shocked her, but immediately she felt like she needed to 
                                                 
125 Later on, about two weeks before she died, Inkeri sent me her notebook. She wished me to use it in my research. 
The notebook was not a diary. It was more like a piece of art, Inkeri’s last artwork made for this world. 
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process the situation in some tangible manner. In the past, she had always done sculpture to 
deal with difficult issues in her life. Material and kinesthetic artwork as methods to process 
were her thing. Once she began feeling ill, she had no energy to do sculpture anymore, and so 
she thought that she would turn to writing. However, after the notebook was covered and 
named—becoming in this way visually and tactilely pleasing to Inkeri—it took four years 
before she was able to actually start. (Inkeri/1.) 
The following years were filled with fluctuating periods of better times when Inkeri was able 
to work in a quasi-normal way and then worse times when she felt sick and was undergoing 
various medical treatments. She had a pneumonectomy (lung removal), and then various 
chemotherapies and other targeted therapies. This led to sick leaves and an early retirement. 
Inkeri said that she had a “complete incapacity” or “unwillingness” to write, until one summer 
she attended a writing retreat with the theme “Write yourself an island”:  
We studied different sorts of mind maps there, and […] when the form [as the physical 
structure of the writing] became clear for me during the course, the island—or rather, in my 
case, an interior palace, a sort of building—then I was able to get the form out, and the content 
was already included. (Inkeri/1) 
Intuitively Inkeri drew the palace on the front page of the notebook and then gave each room 
its own name—those became the themes she needed to process before her death. In this way, 
after creating some concrete shapes for the words, she was able to see what she needed to write. 
She realized that the completely blank pages had been impossible for her to fill in; they were 
too empty, “too chaotic to grasp onto anything,” she said.  
I found this to be an interesting image, since I had learned from my ethnography that 
receiving the terminal diagnosis could result in a chaotic space in which all the previous 
landmarks seem to vanish. If there was nothing familiar to orient to in this new landscape of 
threatening death, one’s intentionality could become shattered and disrupted. As Inkeri 
described it, there was nothing to grasp onto. Here, the notebook itself became something 
tangible, and its structure with titled “rooms” enabled Inkeri to create some order in her 
situation; it made it possible for her to orient in the new landscape of approaching death. Now 
she started slowly to fill the different rooms with lists of words, ideas, memories, and thoughts. 
The appearance of death on the horizon dramatically changed the landscape of life, causing 
various negative emotions—Spinozian sadness—in the research participants. Sadness is always 
a passive emotion in Spinoza’s system, that is, “anything which follows in a person where that 
person is an ‘inadequate’ or partial cause of the thing” (LeBuffe 2015). Passive affects, such as 
the fear and depression caused by sickness and the awareness of the seriousness of the 
prognosis, diminished the patients’ power to act in the world. Yet some patients were able to 
empower themselves in the new situation by applying creative methods and doing what was in 
their power to do. Peter sought to empower himself with material accessories, and Kimmo chose 
healthy food and physical exercise. Eeva sewed her death shirt and made other preparations, 
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whereas Inkeri worked patiently at creating an understanding of her end of life. In this way, 
they all assumed active roles in being a dying patient. Inkeri made it explicit even to the medical 
staff that she was an agent, not a passive object of their medical activities. She told me that she 
had phoned, written, and contacted her medical caregivers: “I have willpower, and I express 
my will that I am a subject [Finnish: subjekti]… I always express my will to the doctors, clearly 
but not aggressively” (Inkeri/1). Unlike Eeva, Inkeri was not submissive. As she said herself, 
she really wanted to live, almost forcefully, yet at the same time she sought understanding and 
a resolution of some sort.  
The difference between these various sorts of activities was that some of them were clearly 
aimed at striving for life and surviving the cancer (sports, enhancing the physical appearance, 
further life prolonging medical regimens), whereas others were aimed more directly toward 
actual death and dying (the death shirt, the notebook). For Inkeri and Eeva, these activities and 
efforts, which they made toward the acceptance of death, seemed to bring them some 
satisfaction. This could be understood in relation to Spinozian joy, since these activities 
empowered them to encounter death on their terms. I will return to these personal forms of 
ritualization in Part IV. 
However, before going into more detailed analysis of the personal rituals, I wish to draw 
attention to the issue of the place of care and dying, since as I have argued, the environment 
was constitutive of one’s experiences.  
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6. PLACES AND NEGOTIATIONS OF CARE 
6.1 Places of care 
Space, movement, and soundscape 
What upsets me is that moving has become so difficult… Would that I could go out to see 
some beautiful nature, or park, flowers, or something like that. Then I could withdraw for a 
moment from the illness. (Vivian/1) 
I always wanted to leave with my boots on, feet straight. [I am] so self-directed, stubborn as 
a devil… I definitely don’t want to be a package that is tossed and turned around in bed. 
(Aili/1) 
I have been so tired, I am really tired… I start being tired of this dying, since one cannot go 
and do anything. It is terrible to fight against one’s nature [which would want to go and do 
things]. This powerlessness and helplessness is terrible. (Aili D4: 30)  
One of the most frequent topics of conversation with the patients concerned diminished 
mobility. Due to pain, dizziness, and/or lack of strength, a patient could no longer leave the 
house (or the hospice ward), or it became extremely challenging. This brought a new set of 
limitations in the form of diminished independence. Furthermore, increased inability to 
continue one’s usual daily activities added to the uncertainty of one’s future, which caused lots 
of frustration, boredom, and tiredness. These issues, which were talked about very often in the 
day hospice group, reminded me of Tuan’s perspective on space. In his phenomenologically 
inspired writings, Tuan equates space with freedom and movement, with a kinesthetic 
experience of having room to move (Tuan [1977] 2001: 12). In regard to place, Tuan ([1977] 
2001: 6) writes, “What begins as undifferentiated space becomes place as we get to know it 
better and endow it with value.” Place is always something experienced and given meaning: 
“Place is security, space is freedom: we are attached to the one and long for the other” (Tuan 
[1977] 2001: 3).126  
The sense of space changes throughout the illness trajectory. It is a commonly shared 
understanding in the hospice world that as a patient’s condition deteriorates and they get closer 
to death, the life circle diminishes in both a very concrete but also more abstract sense. First, 
sickness limits one’s mobility, preventing travel abroad, for instance, or going on hikes or 
walks, swimming, using a bicycle, driving a car (often because of pain medication), and so 
forth. How strongly a patient reacts to these changes and new limitations may depend on their 
previous lifestyle and personality. The further that illness develops and the more that one’s 
physical condition worsens, the more that mobility tends to get restricted. Toward the end, one 
may cease to go outside or go upstairs at home, for example. Slowly, the life circle may shrink 
to one’s bedroom, and eventually to one’s bed. 
                                                 
126 Tuan ([1977] 2001: 6) continues, “Furthermore, if we think of space as that which allows movement, then place 
is pause; each pause in movement makes it possible for location to be transformed into place.” This captures the 
idea of space and place in a fascinating way: life is about movement in space, whereas death freezes us in place. 
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Of course, not all sickness trajectories go like this. There are often fluctuations between 
better and worse phases, and mobility once lost may come back after improving. Some of my 
research patients fiercely resisted their deterioration and the restrictions in their mobility, even 
making larger trips toward the very end of their lives. One traveled several times during her last 
months to an Orthodox monastery that organizes retreats in Northern Karelia, more than 400 
km from her home. Kimmo insisted on keeping mobile even when he was very ill; as previously 
mentioned, he would make laps with his walker when he was at the hospice ward, and after he 
left he started going on walks outside despite being very ill (D1: 68, 109). Siru, a research 
patient from the day hospice, went for a holiday trip to Southern Europe, even though her 
condition was very frail. And Marjo-Riitta traveled to the United States to see her family just a 
couple months prior to her death (Marjo-Riitta/1). 
Movement is easy to equate with life, both symbolically and concretely, whereas stillness 
and quiet remind of death. In Finland, a still winter landscape with frozen trees is traditionally 
associated with it.127 “There is a deathly silence” (on kuolemanhiljaista) is a Finnish saying, 
which indicates a very quiet moment or place. Historian Outi Ampuja (2014: 263), who has 
done research on Finnish soundscapes and writings by the Finnish public on experiences of 
silence, mentions a text in which the author states that witnessing the death of a loved one was 
the quietest moment in their life. Usually, stillness and quiet are experienced in a positive 
manner, and especially when related to nature places like forest, silence is not considered 
threatening or scary but consoling, soothing, and peaceful (Ampuja 2014: 260–265, 269–270). 
My findings mirrored this perception. Research participants such as Kimmo, Matti, and Aili 
talked about the “peace and quiet” of nature as something wonderful. In order to stress this, Aili 
brought me one of her favorite poems (D1: 103). Kysy hiljaisuudelta itseäsi (“Ask from the 
silence about yourself”), by the beloved Finnish poet Helena Anhava (1983), reads at the end 
of the poem:  
Paljoa et tarvitse:     You don’t need a lot: 
hiljaisuuden, luonnon, lähimmäiset,   Silence, nature, loved ones, 
järjestys on tämä      this is the order 
jotta luopuminen helpottuisi   so that giving up would be easier.128 
Although often considered a mere myth, an appreciative attitude toward silence is indeed a 
salient feature in Finnish culture (Ampuja 2014: 264). After all, evaluations of auditory or visual 
experiences are always culturally interpreted (Hartig et al. 2011). 
 My research participants also recognized a distressing kind of silence. It might be that this 
feeling of distress had its roots in the intuitive association of silence with death (see also Lämsä 
2013: 55–56). The quiet experienced on the ward or at home during the hour of the wolf was 
the worst. The silence that abides at night on the hospice ward presented a horrifying experience 
                                                 
127 For instance, old Finnish folk songs as well as poetry make a symbolic equation between death and winter (see, 
e.g., Aaro Hellaakoski’s poem Talven tuomiolla and Eino Leino’s Talvilaulu). 
128 The English translation is mine. Anhava’s poetry has not been translated into English. 
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to Peter, and others also commented on the stillness of the ward in a similar way. I heard both 
patients and nurses saying that in general, nighttime was an especially difficult time on the 
ward, and sometimes patients were scared to fall asleep at night because of the fear of not ever 
waking up again (D1: 137; see also Utriainen 1999: 202). Marjo-Riitta wrote in her blog:  
Sleeplessness is my new companion. During the night, I just simply don’t dare to close my 
eyes. And even if I fall asleep for a short moment, I soon wake up to this choking sensation. 
What is choking me? Is it something that has to do with the illness and the state of my lungs? 
Or is it pure fear and grief? In the evening when I go to sleep, all my dear people come next 
to me. How could I ever close my eyes if there is even the slightest chance that I will not see 
them ever again? I want to look look look.129 (Marjo-Riitta, blog post, 6/13/2013) 
Just a day prior to his death at the hospice, Oiva had noticed that he was falling asleep even 
while eating, and this had terrified him. He had told the nurse that he felt he needed to watch 
himself every moment, just in case he would accidentally die. (D11: 129.) 
Heidi did not find the silence particularly scary, but it was powerful for her and somewhat 
difficult to get used to. She had always had children around her, and now “you get here [the 
hospice ward] and stay here without anybody, accompanied by one’s own thoughts alone” 
(Heidi/2). Silence was intimidating but also somehow fascinating to her. She described to me 
how she could feel kinesthetically, through her bed, the various electronic devices switching on 
and off around the hospice home, and by putting her head on the pillow she could feel the 
electric currents in the house. Within the midst of the silence, she could also hear some beautiful 
music in the evenings and early mornings. Her roommate asked her if she was sure that the 
music had been real. Heidi thought it had been, although now when she was talking about it 
with me, she was not completely sure anymore. In any case, it created an extraordinary 
soundscape. “The music is…” Here Heidi was struggling to find the correct word to describe 
her experience (since the metastasis in her brain had spread, finding words had become 
increasingly difficult for her). “The music thing is quite a… big part of this whole thing… that 
kind of… rather essential, you probably know what I mean,” she added, nodding. Later on, she 
referred to this part of our conversation as the “spiritual talk.” Thus, I concluded that even if 
she was not able to elaborate on the meaning of the experience of the “beautiful music,” it had 
been significant to her—and even existentially meaningful. Heidi’s description shows how she 
experienced that her being was materially mediated on the ward; in the silence she could listen 
to it through her mattress and pillow, while the music, whether it was real or not, was “essential” 
and even “spiritual” for her. (Heidi/2.)130 
                                                 
129 ”Unettomuudesta on tullut uusi kumppanini. Yö on aikaa jolloin en vain uskalla laittaa silmiäni kiinni. Ja jos 
hetkellisesti nukahdankin, herään välittömästi kuristavaan tunteeseen. Mikä minua kuristaa? Onko se jotain 
sairauteen ja keuhkojeni tilaan liittyvää? Vai onko se puhdasta pelkoa ja surua? Illalla nukkumaan käydessäni 
mieleeni ja viereeni tulevat kaikki minulle rakkaat ihmiset. Miten voisinkaan laittaa silmiäni kiinni jos on pieninkin 
mahdollisuus etten näe heitä enää ikinä. Haluan katsoa katsoa katsoa.” 
130 There has traditionally been a connection between quiet and spirituality; in silence one can hear God better 
(Gothóni & Gothóni 2014). 
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In a demonstrable manner, the spatial, sensory, and kinesthetic memories and experiences 
happening in the place of care were very concrete, and thus strongly affective for patients. At 
the same time, the real and unreal, memory and the present, can become entangled and 
inseparable, and the environment can either be consoling or threatening to patients. Overall, 
experiences of spatiality, linked with aspects of mobility and soundscapes, were essential parts 
of the patients’ relational embedded being in their various locations of care. 
Day hospice: “On Tuesdays I have no cancer” 
Day hospice proved to be a very meaningful place for many of my research patients. In the 
midst of the medical contexts and spaces where the patients needed to be, the day hospice—
like any other location where the patients spent time regularly—became a place endowed with 
meaning. Even though they represented quite a range of people in terms of age, social 
background, education, and gender, the patients in the Tuesday crew grew close, forming loose 
but meaningful friendships by sharing intimate time together. This became especially evident 
at those moments when the group members learned that one of them had died. Patients also 
participated in caring for each other with small gestures: one might help another move around 
or remind someone to make an important phone call or take their medicine. Some of the group 
members were also in touch with each other outside of the hospice home, creating crossover 
between the different domains. For example, when the research patient Rauha was moved from 
home care (and day hospice) to the actual hospice ward, it became a custom to go and greet her 
in her room, and if she was well enough she would come to the day hospice room to greet her 
“Tuesday buddies.” 
For many of the research participants, day hospice was their first contact with the hospice 
world. The nurses told me that many patients at first felt terrified upon receiving their referral 
to day hospice. According to a nurse with a long career in hospice work, many react negatively 
in the beginning, thinking that hospice is a gloomy place filled with grieving people, but once 
they actually arrive at the hospice home they get a positive surprise (D2: 61). This claim was 
reiterated by many of my research participants. After the initial shock of getting a referral to a 
hospice, many came to think that it was actually a rather “wonderful place” (D1: 6; D2: 61). 
Every now and then, there was a general discussion among the Tuesday crew on how and why 
the hospice was such a “wonderful” place. One of the patients said that the hospice home was 
“the safest place to come to,” and another added that “it is so relaxed here, one can be just 
oneself” (D4: 19). When I talked about this with Inkeri, she noted that the group spent five 
hours together each time. It was longer than any other (peer) support group she had ever 
attended. According to Inkeri, the atmosphere was respectful but permissive; there were no 
obligations to do or not do something, nor were there any forceful discussion circles where 
people needed to answer or say something. One could participate or not, and the atmosphere 
was free and appreciative, Inkeri explained (D4: 19). In reality, the day hospice was also an 
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institutional space striated by regulative practices, so that being there, as we shall see, was not 
perhaps in the end as “free” as was often talked about. 
The day hospice was also a place to socialize for those who lived alone or whose mobility 
was limited, and simultaneously it offered a break to their caregivers at home. Aili, who greatly 
enjoyed the socializing aspect, summarized her sentiments about hospice by stating, “On 
Tuesdays I have no cancer!” (D2:61). During day hospice, she could forget about the possible 
anxieties related to her illness; it was a social moment that enriched her daily life, she explained 
to me. Furthermore, it was common to hear patients and especially staff talking about the day 
hospice—and the hospice home at large—as a place for “ordinary living and sharing,” not so 
much for dying. This sort of discourse reiterates the common hospice ethos shared by hospices 
around the world, yet it also actively constructs a certain kind of affective frame, or ideal, for 
the dying.131  
There were naturally other kinds of sentiments about the hospice as well. Hospice homes 
make ambivalent spaces, where individuals constantly negotiate living and dying—and the 
paradoxical everydayness and uniqueness of the end of life (Worpole 2010). For some patients, 
such as Peter in the last chapter, the continuous reminder of the coming death encountered via 
other patients; the constant “living the end” caused anxiety and even disgust. Peter also seemed 
somewhat annoyed by the ongoing pampering by the (female) nurses (D4: 11). The hospice 
home is a gendered place where almost all the staff is female. Utriainen, who studied a hospice 
home two decades ago, mentions how male patients appreciated a male nurse by their side, both 
in terms of physical care and otherwise (Utrainen 1999: 217). These ambivalences also become 
visible in the spatial solutions made inside and outside of the hospice building, such as, for 
instance, its entrances and exits which seek to separate the living and dying (Verdeber & 
Refuerzo 2006; Worpole 2010). At its best, however, hospice indeed appeared as a kind of “safe 
haven” that some patients referred to, a place of repose (Tuan [1977] 2001) in the midst of the 
open-ended space of living and dying.  
Where to die? 
An important part of advanced care planning (ACP) is the discussion where the care will 
physically and concretely take place and, eventually, where the patient wishes to die. According 
to international research on the topic, most people wish to die at home, yet some prefer 
institutional locations such as care homes or hospitals—possibly because they live alone or they 
might fear of being a burden to their families (Beccaro et al. 2006; Aaltonen et al. 2010; 
Anttonen 2016: 95). According to a study from 2010, the most frequent place for Finns above 
75 years old to die was a municipal health center (48%); after that, the second-most common 
place was a general hospital (19%), while a private home was only in third place (16%) 
(Aaltonen et al. 2010).  
                                                 
131 If one browses the internet for information on hospices around the world, one finds websites using the following 
slogans: “Hospice is about living fully,” “Hospice is about living not dying,” and “Hospice is a respect for life.” 
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According to reports by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, about 3,000 patients were 
in hospice care in 2012 (just prior to the time of my fieldwork), while the need for care was for 
12,000–13,000 patients.132 This means that in 2012, about 9,000 patients in need of specialized 
(demanding) hospice care were cared for within units of specialized medicine or primary 
healthcare (ETENE 2012: 56). These places may lack knowhow of palliative medicine; 
moreover, these units are architectonically designed for curing and surviving, not dying or the 
care of the dying. This affects the way in which care can be carried out, as well as the way in 
which it is experienced. 
In regard to their wishes about their place of death, many of my research patients opted to 
die on the hospice ward rather than at home, even though the latter was an option provided by 
the hospice team. Sometimes a patient wished to die at home, but when they were closer to the 
actual moment, due to various reasons such as a general feeling of not being able to cope with 
the situation, they chose instead to go to the hospice home. The way in which my research 
participants talked about this revealed their deep feelings of trust toward the hospice home as a 
place. This seemed to be the most significant factor affecting the decision. The professional 
atmosphere gave patients the impression that it was possible to die peacefully in hospice without 
pain (even if that was not always actually possible), and this sense of security created a sense 
of existential safety. Many patients talked about being grateful about the possibility to die in 
the hospice home. One family member told me that she was so happy to be able to tell her mom 
that she had got a place there: “My mom’s eyes lit up and she was so relieved” (D1: 54). 
What seemed to affect patients’ wishes in relation to their final care location was the way in 
which they pictured themselves in relation to their family members. Echoing earlier research 
(Johnson et al. 2007), some of the participants verbalized fear of being a burden to their loved 
ones. I also heard comments about how patients themselves felt stressed about needing to 
perform well and cheer up before the eyes of their loved ones (Heidi D1: 103; Kimmo D1:73, 
117). Heidi was anxious because of the affective misalignment; she felt that her youngest child 
assumed that she was “just like before,” whereas Heidi herself knew that her condition was 
nothing like that (Heidi/2). She suffered due to knowing that she could not perform in the eyes 
of her children in the way she wanted to. At the end, Heidi was practically paralyzed and her 
symptoms were rather difficult to manage at home. According to her wishes, she died in hospice 
with her family close to her. 
Thus, the issue of place can relate to the way in which the dying person wishes to “perform” 
or “picture” their end of life. Losing control over one’s own body was a terrifying thought. The 
existence––or even the possibility––of challenging symptoms, such as breathing difficulties 
and unmanageable pain, scared and worried them. Many were anxious about the actual moment 
of dying, and equally many told me that the hospice had guaranteed to ease their pains, even 
                                                 
132 Due to the recent progress in palliative care in Finland, the situation has improved in many regards since 2012 
(Saarto & Finne-Soveri 2019). 
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promising palliative sedation in the case of extremely difficult symptoms. In this way, hospice 
was seen as a place that supported a safe and dignified manner of dying––including situations 
where one had fear about “losing it.” 
The imagery of a heroic manner of facing illness and death was something that was criticized 
by some. The last time I saw Vivian at the hospice ward, we talked about the difficulty of dying. 
At the time of our meeting, she was very close to death and she openly talked about her fears. 
She told me about a memorial she had read, and described how it had praised the deceased for 
having been so strong and perseverant, meeting their destiny without complaining. Vivian got 
upset and annoyed by this. She felt that this way of talking about and picturing dying 
transformed it into another performance that individuals needed to go through in a certain 
way—in a correct way—in order to not die “wrong.” Reflecting on her own manner of dying, 
Vivian said that unlike the “brave ones,” she had for sure complained. She continued to think 
and then remarked that “there cannot be a right or wrong way of dying” (D4: 28). For a moment, 
we also talked about the “warrior talk” so typical of cancer patients, and how Vivian disliked 
it.133 Vivian was open and verbal about her feelings around the difficulty of dying, but also how 
the hospice home offered her the kind of place where she was able to do it in her way, without 
any need to perform in a certain manner. 
In regard to the issue of place, Kimmo was worried that his children might feel embarrassed 
of him. His anxiety was related to his physical appearance, about which he felt rather disturbed 
(D1: 72–74). As noted above, Kimmo was accustomed to live very physically, first when 
growing up on a farm where work was part of everyday life and then later on when he kept 
himself physically fit through various sports (D1: 72). When I met him on the hospice ward, he 
was wondering if his experience of losing strength and control of his body was similar to what 
his mother had experienced during the end of her life. In her final years she had had a very 
difficult hip fracture and she wasted away slowly (D1: 73–74). His reflections are congruent 
with the idea of earlier experiences in relation to death affecting the way in which patients see 
and interpret their own situation. 
Kimmo fought against physical fragility, and he was determined to be rehabilitated. As 
explained above, he made efforts to remain as independent as possible when he left the ward 
and returned home; to support this, he took long walks and went to the gym (D1: 91). However, 
as Heidi stated, home represented the “normal life,” whereas hospice, even though it supported 
feeling safe and secure, was ultimately about illness and death (D1: 103)—and, in the end, not 
so much about “the normal everyday life” that the slogans advertise. This was a keen difference 
between the perception of those who only came for the day hospice meetings and those who 
had been admitted to the ward. On the ward, the institutional side of the hospice became actual. 
Kimmo was very aware of this. He became moved when he observed that unlike on the hospice 
                                                 
133 It is well known that with illnesses in general, and perhaps especially in the case of cancer, there is a tendency 
to apply rhetoric of war in regard to the disease. Since Susan Sontag’s Illness as Metaphor (1978), many studies 
have been done on this theme. 
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ward, at home one could tangibly touch and be touched by one’s loved ones (D1: 73). We never 
talked about his desired place of dying, and I got the impression that Kimmo had not really 
thought about it either, for he was still keen on getting better. Kimmo ended up dying in an 
emergency room after collapsing on his way home from the gym. 
Pekka, a man in his fifties whom I met on the cancer ward, was given less than six months 
to live after his cancer operation proved to be unsuccessful. Nevertheless, according to him, he 
had never talked about his possible place of dying with his wife or with a doctor.134 When I 
talked with Pekka and his wife about hospice care, they told me that they had not thought about 
“these kinds of things” but took it “one day at a time” (Pekka/2). A couple months later, as 
Pekka’s condition worsened, he made up his mind that he wanted to die at home. Pekka’s wife 
later shared with me that this decision had partially been made because Pekka deeply hated 
hospitals, but also because he wanted to die close to his dog. Pekka was worried that if he went 
to the hospital to die and just disappeared from the dog’s life, the dog would feel abandoned. 
His wife told me that Pekka firmly believed that the dog would understand his leaving by 
witnessing his death. In the end, Pekka died at home. (D4: 32–33.) 
Helena died in a small municipal healthcare center. She had a private room where her family 
could gather, and the palliative team from the nearby university hospital assisted in her care, 
especially in regard to the medication, she explained to me. According to Helena, this was the 
best possible place for her in regard to the location and her family—the healthcare center was 
close to her home, where her children were. The surroundings in the healthcare center were not 
ideal for dying, however. The ward was aimed at rehabilitation and its spaces and activities 
were designed accordingly. Helena’s room was next to the ward’s living room. On the other 
side of the thin wall was a TV with the volume turned up high for the old people who comprised 
the main patient group on the ward. She complained that the TV was turned on in the morning 
and left on until late evening. Helena spent more than two months on the ward before she died. 
(D3: 87.) 
The issue of care places and locations of death is connected to the question of the type of 
care that patients received. Different places offer different kinds of treatments but also care with 
different aims: curative, disease-modifying, or palliative care. Thus, the patients often became 
familiar with various medical sites during their illness trajectories. Accordingly, there were 
multiple moments when the patients needed to hear, talk, and negotiate about their care not only 
with medical staff but also with their family members, and perhaps even with themselves, in 
order to better understand their situation and make better decisions concerning the end of life.  
                                                 
134 While I cannot know for certain that this was indeed the case, the most important point here is that this was 
Pekka’s understanding of the situation. 
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6.2 Negotiations of care 
Negotiations around care 
Talking about the end of life or end-of-life care was not easy for the patients. However, many 
of my research participants did want to discuss their previous experiences and encounters 
within the various medical contexts and places where they had been. It gave me the impression 
that some of these meetings had been onerous, even to the extent that they had colored the 
patients’ whole end-of-life experience. This interpretation is supported by previous research, 
according to which prior experiences with healthcare affect the patient’s current abilities to deal 
with their situation or their prognosis (Schaepe 2011). Especially the moment of receiving the 
bad news—or, rather, the process involved that—has been found to constitute a “key part of 
their illness journey and remembered as significant” (Matthew et al. 2019: 2291).  
 Kimmo spoke a lot about the communication difficulties he had had with some of his 
doctors, and he claimed that the patient has to demand proper information about their condition 
(D1: 121–122). Kimmo explained that as long as the conversation was centered on an X-ray 
picture, for instance, he was given a very detailed analysis of the tumor, but as soon as he asked 
about the practical implications of all of it, the conversation was swiftly concluded. Giving 
another example, Kimmo said that he received proper instructions from his physician on how 
to treat the allergic pimples he got from his cancer medicine, but there was never any actual 
talk about the advanced cancer itself. Kimmo argued that before arriving at the hospice, he had 
never had a decent conversation with a doctor about his terminal condition. Kimmo’s 
experience was probably the reason why he told me that if there was anything that my study 
could convey to medical staff, it was that patients should be given a matter-of-fact explanation 
about their situation and about the possible course of the disease, including its likely prognosis. 
This would make it possible for patients to understand what is happening and to make some 
crucial decisions toward the end of their life. (D1: 121–122.) 
Conversely, Helena felt that there was an abundance of information given to her: 
In the visit, the doctor told in a very detailed manner about the tumor, and what kind of a 
tumor it was—in a very scientific manner—that the tumor was this and that kind. The results 
were not very good for me. They gave me this list, in which there is t for tumor and g for 
grade and m for metastasis, and the classification goes from one to three. […] It was three for 
the tumor; it was big. The grade was three; that is about how fast it can grow. The only one 
that was zero at that point was the metastasis. It did not feel very good, one’s own diagnosis. 
I had read maybe even a bit too much about those [numbers] at that point, online, I mean. It 
was very mechanical. The medical results were brought in, and there were no questions asked 
about how I felt or how I was doing… (Helena /1)  
The medical treatment was also explained in great detail:  
[Then they] started to look at the computer, saying that “since you have this and that kind of 
a tumor, it means that…” And they started to explain that “you will be receiving this and that 
kind of chemotherapy,” and they explained it very carefully by using all the names of the 
medicines and telling that “this influences this way” and… Like, using the medical language. 
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Well, in their own opinion, they probably did great as doctors, since they were explaining 
everything with such care. I guess everybody would not have explained it so well… But of 
course there was no connecting with the person at all. It was just about the quality of the cells 
and so forth. But we humans are all so different. I know many [patients] who really want to 
know all these details very exactly. (Helena/1) 
As Helena points out, people make different kinds of patients, and some benefit considerably 
from a very detailed scientific medical explanation of their condition. What Helena herself 
seemed to miss at the consultation was not medical information but an empathetic encounter 
with the doctor. However, a little later on in our interview, she admitted that she was the kind 
of person who would not have started to open up at the consultation, and that she was not even 
expecting the doctor to have the kind of time to think of the overall wellbeing of the person. 
(Helena/1.) While the expectations and experiences that patients had in regard to their medical 
encounters varied, many research participants agreed that doctors did a great job at explaining 
medical details to their patients. What that information implied in practice, or what it may have 
meant to one’s life, was more unclear. 
Simultaneously, it can be a challenging moment for a doctor to share their prognosis 
assessment with patients, and some may seek to avoid it (Lamont & Christakis 2001; Hietanen 
2015a, 2015b; Fenton et al. 2018). Perhaps because of this, instead of speaking about the actual 
disease and reflecting on what it might mean for the patient, physicians may at times focus on 
medical interventions and treatment details (Henselmans, Laarhoven et al. 2017). If it is difficult 
for a physician to enter into a discussion on ending disease-modifying treatment, it is even 
harder to conduct that discussion in such a manner that the patient actually comprehends it in 
the way intended by the physician (Hietanen 2016). As in the case of Vivian, receiving the 
diagnosis can cause such a shock that one cannot hear, think, or act straight. 
Kimmo’s requests to hear the prognosis early on echoes recent recommendations for 
physicians to bring up the prognosis and speak about it early enough to integrate palliative care 
as part of the care plan (Current Care Guidelines 2019). In this way, the patient also has time 
to think of their priorities and wishes for end-of-life care (Henselmans, Smets et al. 2017). 
Perhaps the best way to ensure successful communication is the cultivation of trust within the 
relationship of doctor and patient (Heyland et al. 2006). For this, there needs to be an existing 
relationship to start with—that is, an ongoing doctor-patient relationship. As it stands now in 
Finland, the system of teaching hospitals engenders care relationships that are constantly 
changing, as patients meet different doctors who are rotating through specialization periods. 
This results in an environment where it can be challenging to develop a trusted connection with 
mutual understanding (Hietanen 2016). 
Patients and their family members suffered from this endlessly changing cycle of doctors 
during their care (D2: 91–92). Kalle Holmberg (2015), a well-known and much-loved Finnish 
movie director and cultural persona, talked about this in his presentation at a hospice seminar.135 
                                                 
135 The Hyvä kuolema on jokaisen oikeus seminar was arranged in Helsinki in autumn 2015. 
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His wife had died a year earlier, and Holmberg noted that during her last months she not only 
met with but was in the actual care of fifteen different doctors. Some of my research patients, 
such as Vivian and Inkeri, had resolved this problem by finding a “trusted doctor.” For Vivian, 
this was her former occupational physician, whereas Inkeri found solace in her old family 
doctor. Just like Holmberg’s wife, Inkeri met with numerous different doctors while undergoing 
tests with more and more findings, especially in the beginning of her illness trajectory. This all 
felt “chaotic” and “terrifying” for her. She was in shock, unable to understand what was really 
happening. Finally, her husband told her to go to meet their family doctor, whom they had 
known for decades. Even though a general practitioner has no particular knowledge about 
specific terminal diseases, both Vivian and Inkeri kept going back to their doctors at different 
points in their illness trajectories in order to gain a fuller understanding of the situation, as they 
put it. For both women, these meetings provided great consolation. They felt as if they were 
being fully heard and seen as humans. Inkeri told me about one meeting with her old doctor: “I 
vividly remember that empowering feeling when he said to me, ‘This is a challenging situation 
but we can manage this. The battle shall begin. I’ll be there with you!’” (Inkeri/1). Inkeri told 
me that she usually avoided the typical cancer rhetoric of war and battle, yet here, on this 
occasion, it felt appropriate. 
He really took my case as his concern. Until then, all of the testing had been so erratic, with 
so many different doctors. Of course, I understand that this is the system, but when I received 
his words… they were just earthshaking… It helped me mentally. I always wanted to 
emphasize the issue of trust, that there needs to be trust, that otherwise one cannot make it 
through this. For a while, I was visiting this cancer support group where I heard horrific 
stories about people’s encounters with their physicians. I needed to protect myself from that. 
(Inkeri/1) 
It is important to note that even when a patient is receiving obstructive or palliative 
treatments (such as pain-relieving radiation therapy), they do not necessarily understand (or 
want to think about) the palliative nature of the care and the aims of those treatments.136 Some 
patients do not understand their terminal condition, even though physicians explicitly 
emphasize the prognosis and carefully explain the situation to them (Gramling et al. 2016; 
Robinson & Jagsi 2016). In general, according to the studies, patients tend to have a more 
optimistic understanding of the situation than their physicians do (Gramling et al. 2016; 
Robinson & Jagsi 2016). My ethnography suggests a similar discrepancy in the way that some 
research subjects viewed their prognosis; in particular, they talked about their palliative 
treatments as if they believed they were getting better—or that they would ultimately even 
become cured—due to them. 
                                                 
136 According to a study conducted in the United States (Weeks et al. 2012), a majority of patients (75%) with 
advanced metastatic cancer receiving palliative chemotherapy believed that the treatment was curative. This does 
not necessarily correlate with Finland, however, where physicians are encouraged to tell about the incurability of 
the cancer when applicable. This must be widely practiced, since some patients have even complained about this 
“constant need to remind” about their condition (Saarto 2020, personal communication). 
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At the same time, some patients keep receiving aggressive treatments until the last weeks of 
their life. While there are somewhat conflicting ideas about why this might be the case, one 
possible perspective became clear when discussing it with a senior oncologist (see also 
Tarkkanen et al. 2020). As it stands in Finnish law (Act on the Status and Rights of Patients 
785/1992, §5–6), a patient must be informed about all possible and available treatment options, 
and the decision about the commencement of any care should be made with mutual 
understanding. This means that, in practice, when curative treatments are discontinued, the 
doctor will discuss the remaining treatment options with their patient. If the disease is very 
advanced, it may not be reasonable to proceed with aggressive or invasive treatments, even if 
they could extend the patient’s remaining time for some weeks or months. This makes sense 
from the doctor’s point of view, as they are familiar with the possible side effects, which can 
be rough and can fill the remaining time with unnecessary suffering. However, even if this is 
what doctors might want to recommend, they nevertheless also have to present the other options 
to the patient. In the experience of the oncologist with whom I talked about this, it is almost 
impossible for a patient not to opt for a medical treatment if one is available. Patients, as well 
as their family members, feel like they ought to do something. Given a lack of anything other 
to do (such as religious rituals), they choose to do medicine. Also, patients may pressure 
physicians by saying, “There must be something you can do about it, right? A new medication 
to try? You don’t suppose that I would just sit and wait for my death!” 
 When Marja-Liisa Laakkonen (2005) studied Advance Care Planning among elderly 
terminally ill in Finland, she had a similar finding: many elderly patients wished to pursue life-
saving treatments, including aggressive forms, even when their prognosis was terminal. Many 
of my research participants (such as Inkeri, Vivian, Peter, Siru, and Helena) also wanted to 
continue aggressive treatments and were willing to try anything that would give them more 
time. In this way, cancer treatments and drugs can become a source of existential hope 
(Tarkkanen et al. 2020). 
Smooth and striated in the care of palliative patients  
One way to understand the dynamics in palliative and hospice care is to look at them from a 
Deleuzoguattarian conceptual of the smooth and the striated.137 The importance of concrete 
emplacement for Deleuze and Guattari comes from their conviction that “where something is 
situated has everything to do with how it is structured” (Casey 2013: 357). For example, in 
regard to voyaging (which Deleuze and Guattari associate with thinking),138 they conclude that 
                                                 
137 The concepts of “striated” and “smooth” go back to the French composer Pierre Boulez, who contrasted striated 
musical forms, such as those based on fixed schemata (e.g., the octave), and smooth forms, which allowed 
irregularity in terms of scales (Deleuze & Guattari 2016: 555; Casey 2013: 357). In A Thousand Plateaus (2016), 
striated and smooth are discussed not only in relation to space but also technology, maritime reality, music, 
mathematics, physics, and aesthetics. The contrast between striated and smooth space coincides with some other 
distinctions that Deleuze & Guattari draw, such as between the nomadic and the sedentary, nomadic science and 
royal science, and the political and politics (Walsh 2012: 55; Lysen & Pisters 2012). 
138 For Deleuze and Guattari, thought and thinking are active and affective ingredients of life (Walsh 2012a: 59).  
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instead of being about quantity of movement, the difference between voyaging smoothly or in 
a striated way is about “the mode of spatialization, the manner of being in space, of being for 
space” (Deleuze & Guattari 2013: 561). 
In regard to care, biomedical practices can be seen as attempts to striate space (Deleuze & 
Guattari 2016: 424–436), that is, to create predicable structures and processes within the chaotic 
smooth space of embodied illnesses (Walsh 2012a, 2012b). In striated space, such as at 
hospitals and clinics in Finland, trajectories of movement are subordinated to points within 
space; that is to say, the patient moves from one point (e.g., doctor, treatment) to another. In 
smooth space, such as in hospice or elder care, the points tend to be subordinated to the 
trajectory of the patient (Casey 2013: 358; Deleuze & Guattari 2016: 556). That is, the services 
and treatments happen around the patient and come to the patient rather than vice versa. In this 
way, smooth space is intensive rather than extensive (Deleuze & Guattari 2016: 557).139 
 However, as a way of doing things or doing space, striation is never complete or completely 
separate from smooth, and there is constant fluctuation and transformation happening between 
the two (Osborne & Rose 2004; Deleuze & Guattari 2016: 552–581). Furthermore, both the 
striated and the smooth are understood as necessary and important; they describe different types 
of processes that are in constant relation to each other.140 These sorts of dynamics can be seen 
as taking place in palliative care. If medicine occupies thinking in striation and a hospital is a 
typical place where striations of medicine are practiced, then the hospice movement—
especially in its early days (see Lewis [2006] 2011: 6)—reflects an attempt to smooth the 
striations of the medicalized care of dying. Instead of moving from one point of treatment to 
another in striated medical space, the patient herself becomes the point of action; hospice is 
centered on the dying body, which tends to undo all organizational boundaries.  
 The smooth space of the dying body and the dying body in smooth space in hospice are both 
occupied by various kinds of intensities and affects. However, some scholars have debated that 
the current form of palliative medicine emphasizes symptom management and quantification 
(see Clark 2002; Randall & Downie 2006), thereby seeking to (re)striate the smooth of the 
                                                 
139 In terms of connections between medical practices and the Deleuzoguattarian conceptualizations of smooth and 
striated, philosopher Brian Walsh (2012a, 2012b) has written on evidence-based medicine (EBM) as an attempt to 
striate both the fluid, unpredictable lived reality of patients and the encounter the doctor has with their patient. 
Professor Emeritus in Medical Humanities Alan Bleakley has analyzed the transition of modern medicine from an 
autonomous profession to a team-based inter-professional practice in terms of smooth and striated spaces within 
hospitals and clinics (Bleakley 2013). Yet, whereas Bleakley examines medical practices from the practitioners’ 
perspective, I am obviously concentrating on the patients’ experiences and movements within the system. Bleakley 
makes some interesting observations, pointing out, for instance, that various smooth spaces in the hospital, such 
as corridors, may offer sites for fruitful encounters in-between various actors and professionals at the hospital, and 
therefore they may become important catalysts for democratic collaboration. These sorts of transitional liminal 
places and instances are also the ones that may become affectively significant for patients. 
140 In spite of the obvious preference for the smooth mode of being in space, Deleuze and Guattari highlight the 
value and necessity of both. Furthermore, the two are in continuous fluctuation and their borderline is always 
shifting; there is no “pure smooth” or “pure striation.” At the end of the chapter “1440: The Smooth and the 
Striated” in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari (2016: 581) write: “Never believe that a smooth space 
will suffice to save us.” 
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hospice. On the other hand, various reactions are continuously surfacing to counterbalance the 
medical striations in the realm of hospice. These include, for instance, the promotion of further 
alternative modes of care, such as touch therapy (Styrman & Torniainen 2018), and new 
ritualizations for the end of life and dying (Carson 2011). 
In this way, it is possible to see the hospice home as a possible smooth space within striated 
medicine, which is another way of seeing the countercultural nature of hospice praxis. Yet, the 
issue is rather complex, as noted above. As we shall see in Chapter 8, at the level of material 
practices, such as eating hours, there was a constant dynamic movement in-between the striation 
of the smooth and the smoothing of the striated at the hospice. The same happened in regard to 
spatiality; through the command of a nurse or a doctor, the informal day hospice became a 
clinic-like space to conduct medical procedures, such as dispensing medications, checking 
vitals, or cleaning and caring for wounds. Alternatively, when the hospice care team entered 
someone’s home, it transformed from a smooth space to a striated area of medical care, although 
in such situations the tension between the two was always present; an alteration in the mode of 
spatialization, in the manner of being in space, was constant. 
The general development of the healthcare policies in Finland (such as opening palliative 
wards within hospitals), as well as some medical and technological developments, have pushed 
hospice into a more striated direction, whereas some other practices may simultaneously open 
up more smooth areas not only within the hospice space but also in hospitals.141 One example 
of the technologies that increase the striation of hospice is the type of work cell phone that was 
used by the staff on the hospice ward. On one hand, these cell phones enabled efficient 
communication among the staff and this probably ameliorated the care in certain ways. On the 
other hand, the fact that people were constantly “on the (striated) grid”—that is, in reach of 
communication but also control—led to interruptions and striations in the immersive and 
intense moments of personal care. The senior nurse who pointed this out to me argued that in 
practice, this has decreased the intimate one-to-one moments with the patients (D1: 87). Yet, it 
was often exactly those loosely structured and informal one-on-one moments—reflecting the 
smooth mode of spatialization—that enabled the kinds of conversations that proved to be 
perhaps the most healing and therapeutic for patients’ emotional and even spiritual wellbeing. 
Kimmo told me that an intense conversation with the night nurse (who was able to attend to his 
concerns at night without interruptions) had dramatically changed his understanding of his 
existential situation. It had greatly affected his ability to accept his situation—even if this 
acceptance was only momentary.  
However, communication technologies like cell phones or tablets cannot simply be labeled 
striations, since for patients they have the power to break spatial boundaries by virtually 
bringing their loved ones close to them. Thus, technology can also help to smooth striations and 
                                                 
141 A good example of smoothings in contemporary hospitals is the presence of various kinds of artwork, such as 
at the New Children’s Hospital in Helsinki, which, in addition to visual art, also has an interesting and soothing 
soundscape created specifically for the hospital (Pohjolainen 2019). 
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create virtuality within the institutional care place. Equally, as we can see from the following 
description, elements such as massage (or touch therapy) and music therapy, which were 
actively practiced at the hospice home, broke the striation at moments and brought more one-
on-one care and haptic experiences for patients and staff alike. 
I was doing my interview with Matti at the hospice home when suddenly there was a knock 
on his door. Two women came in and introduced themselves as musicians: “Would you like to 
hear something? Any particular wishes?” Matti seemed hesitant since we were having the 
interview, but I encouraged him. Matti asked, “Well, would you by any chance have some 
Sibelius?” The women started playing a song by the Finnish composer, one on violin while the 
other one sang. This unexpected moment completely halted everything that was going on in the 
medical space around us. It was as if a new dimension opened up in the hospice room. Since 
the space was rather small and the music was quite vivid, we were completely immersed in the 
sounds of the violin and the singing. “Thank you! That was so beautiful,” Matti said after they 
finished. “Sibelius is always Sibelius,” he said with a sigh. (Matti/1; D2:109.) As we shall see 
in Chapter 10, such smooth interruptions in the form of aesthetics can offer the patient an 
entirely different—and sometimes very insightful—perspective on their situation, which 
usually is organized according to structures of medicalized care.  
Medicalization striates care in relation to time and space by creating more controlled and 
more controllable micro-realities in the otherwise unpredictable process of dying. Such striation 
aims at universality, whereas smoothing is concerned with singularity (Deleuze & Guattari 
2016: 441). Dying processes tend to be as singular and unique as the individual who is dying; 
indeed, a smooth mode of being would also seem to enable smoother dying. Yet, it is not so 
simple. First of all, there are always techniques practiced within the smooth space that aim at 
striation. Ritualization and rituals, for instance, can also be perceived as forms of striation. 
Rituals structure, organize, and systemize reality, especially in moments and places where the 
smooth threatens to disintegrate everything. This is the challenge of the smooth space. In its 
fluidity and unpredictability, “tolerating smooth space requires high tolerance of ambiguity” 
(Bleakley 2013). Second, in the end, both smooth and striated have their place. While it is true 
that the striation of space can facilitate the exercise of power, striated space itself has no inherent 
politics (Osborne & Rose 2004: 218). It would be easy to simply dismiss striation as something 
negative and repressive, and smooth with something positive and liberated, but this was not 
what Deleuze and Guattari meant with their conceptual division. Deleuze and Guattari (2016: 
565) write, “Perhaps we must say that all progress is made by and in striated space but all 
becoming occurs in smooth space” (italics mine). Good palliative and hospice care need striated 
space, including its organization and the benefits received from effective biomedicine; indeed, 
effective pain medicine, for instance, is an essential part of the successful care of the dying. 
Ultimately, dying and death are opposing forces against striations of life in the sense that 
they undo and decompose every bit of order and structure possible. Consequently, the actual 
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process of dying—the “becoming corpse” (Braidotti 2006: 40)142—requires a different kind of 
space and approach, that is, smooth space. In the dynamic process of dying, it is all about the 
trajectory itself, the constant present. From the dying person’s perspective, there is only the 
middle, the milieu, the open space where one is and ceases to be. Striated and smooth 
presuppose each other; they both serve their purposes, and like anywhere in human life, there 
is surely a need for both in the realm of illness and dying as well. In conclusion, rather than 
analyzing and describing the dynamic changes and variations that are happening in modes and 
spaces of care strictly in terms of patient-centeredness on one hand and system-centeredness 
and objectification on the other, using the notions of smooth and striated provide more nuance 
and also more accurate discussion.143 A further interesting thought in regard to hospice is that 
perhaps the hospice movement smooths striated medicine, while in regard to death and dying 
hospice itself tends to seek striation, not necessarily with the help of medicine but rather with 
ritualizations and rituals aimed at creating safety and order for patients’ end of life. 
  
                                                 
142 Although Braidotti’s philosophy shares Heidegger’s general understanding of the subject as interconnected and 
open-ended being, she opposes Heidegger’s emphasis on death and finitude as constitutive of the subject (Braidotti 
2006: 40). To take the mortality or finitude as “the trans-historical horizon for discussions of 'life'” is too narrow 
of a perspective for Braidotti; it is too individualistic and anthropocentric (Braidotti 2006: 39). Before and after an 
individual death, there is life (zoe) “always already there” (Braidotti 2006: 40); thus Braidotti’s “becoming corpse” 
emphasizes the continuous and processual nature of life. 
143 This is not to say that objectification does not happen. Indeed, it surely does in certain places and moments. 
And yet, this is not actually dependent on the striation but can happen anywhere.  
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The third part of the dissertation focuses on the various institutional rituals found in the context 
of dying. In the beginning of the seventh chapter, I will start exploring what kinds of elements 
medical practices involve and what kind of effects they may have when they are studied from 
a ritual perspective. Subsequently, I will continue analyzing how the issues of power, agency, 
and the body are entangled in the research participants’ experiences in regard to the medical 
practices, how techno-medical agency is experienced among patients, and how patients’ bodies 
can be seen simultaneously as disciplined, dependent, and vulnerable.  
In the eight chapter, I turn the analysis toward rituals and ritualizations performed in day 
hospice care. I will describe how seemingly small ritualizations of everyday life can make a 
great difference in a patient’s experience vis-à-vis their (existential) situation and lifeworld, and 
I will show the ways in which death and dying were simultaneously present and absent at the 
hospice. In the end of Part III, I use the concepts of smooth and striated to describe the contested 
practices within the hospice home, which on one hand create a permissive space for dying and 
on the other seek institutional striations to structure living and dying there. 
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7. MEDICAL PRACTICES AS RITUALS  
7.1 Features of medical practices as rituals 
Medicalizing and structuring effects 
Living with advanced cancer is saturated with medicine, which affects not only the length and 
quality of life but also the everyday lived experiences of time, embodiment, and 
interrelationships. The medical regimen often comprises the frame for living, which then tends 
to define a big part of the experience of existence. This can be seen in the following case, when 
I was visiting Pekka at his home. We were sitting by the coffee table, having some sandwiches 
and coffee with his wife while chatting casually. Pekka started telling me: 
Pekka: I took a sleeping pill around midnight and then I woke up around ten o’clock and then 
I was groggy until four or five in the afternoon. You know, it was still affecting me, the 
medicine. I was walking around the house, bouncing off the walls (menin pitkin seiniä). Dang 
it, I was completely out of it! 
I: Do you take them regularly? 
Pekka: No, I take them only as I need them. Last night I did not take one, purposefully, since 
I wanted this day to go a little smoother. So, then I ended up tossing around in bed, half 
asleep, half in coma, for the whole night. I got up around five to read the newspapers… 
I: Is this kind of sleeplessness common? 
Pekka: It usually comes after the [chemo] drip, the worse one. So, they have ordered me 
cortisone. Yeah, cortisone. You know, it cheers you up, it gives you energy and drive! And 
when I quit that, then it goes like a rollercoaster down! So it goes back and forth. 
Wife: The spirits go down like the cow’s tail! The first three days he is like a Duracell bunny, 
totally nervous and talking constantly, non-stop, and “should do this and should do that.” But 
then after those three days, the spirits go totally down. 
Pekka: (grabbing his medical papers and looking at them) Here is something else they ordered 
me, too, the powder for the constipation. (Pekka/2) 
Like for Pekka, drugs caused mixed feelings among the research patients. Yet, at the same time 
they were a major part of daily life and a constant topic of discussion—along with the various 
symptoms. Rauha, an elderly woman who was admitted to the hospice ward for a couple of 
weeks in order to “get her meds fixed,” came to meet the day hospice group, telling, “Finally 
they managed to get the pain away. Oh, it was wonderful!” She continued, “It is amazing how 
much the human being can tolerate poison, if you just think how much I needed to take it before 
the pain was gone.” The nurse playfully scolded her, “Rauha! It is not poison. It’s medicine!” 
Everybody laughed. (D1: 15.) 
The relationship my research patients had with their medicines was distinctive; it was close, 
even intimate. Vivian was very clear and explicit about her relationship with the medicine. On 
our last meeting, just two days before she died, she said to me that they should put a syringe 
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inside of her coffin.144 “In honor of the medicine,” she said, “since it was the medicine that gave 
me time and it was the life-sustaining element in my life” (D4: 29). Medicine was not “just 
medicine”; like Vivian said, it was “the life-sustaining substance” whose effects permeated all 
aspects of life.  
Whether given palliatively or curatively, treatments and drugs easily become biomedical 
rituals (Brody 2010; Gordon 2015). Drugs are taken regularly, or when needed, according to 
prescriptions, while medical treatments such as chemotherapy or radiation are delivered in a 
ritualized manner in the ritual frame of a clinic (Elks 1996). One medical student commented 
on sessions of radiation, saying that going every morning to radiation therapy “does good for 
the patient,” since it’s something to do and keeps one busy. It’s like going to work every 
morning, she said (D4: 12).145 By implying that radiation therapy creates a meaningful program 
for the patient, the student accorded a medical ritual a specific existential significance or 
purpose, as if there was something to look forward to––in the form of the medicine. 
This “looking forward to” aspect of the medical treatments was certainly true of my research 
participants. As long as there were treatments (and it did not seem to matter if the treatments 
were curative or non-curative), there was something to wait for. The feeling that “something 
was being done” meant that there was still hope. Inkeri described her disease trajectory (or 
medical path), which had lasted for about five years at the time of our meeting, by explaining 
how she had asserted her agency at various points by demanding more active treatments. After 
her cancer operation, she first received one kind of chemotherapy, and when that did not help 
her situation, she had another kind of chemo. Subsequently, she received three different types 
of chemotherapy, “one after the other on the list of the Current Care Guidelines,” she described 
to me (Inkeri/1). The treatments worked for a while, until the tumor started growing again. 
Because the last round only gave Inkeri some unfortunate side effects without any medical 
benefit, the treatments were stopped. “After this,” Inkeri told me, “I appealed to the doctors 
really hard, so that they would give me the kind of medicine that helps this illness for real” 
(Inkeri/1). She continued, “One winter evening they called me. I still remember where I was 
when they called. I was on a walk with a friend of mine. They called and told me that they had 
decided to give me one more trial of this chemotherapy, which I had hoped for” (Inkeri/1). The 
way Inkeri described the moment she received the phone call reveals how meaningful this trial 
was for her. The biomedical treatment had become a ritual of hope for Inkeri. 
 Since then, it happened a couple of times that a doctor cancelled or stopped her chemo 
sessions for “no obvious reasons,” according to Inkeri; “although,” she admitted, “of course 
there were all kinds of side effects, even some serious ones” (Inkeri/1). However, Inkeri was 
very persistent and believed still that the benefits outweighed the downsides. In that way, she 
                                                 
144 In Finland, sometimes items of personal value (such as photos, letters, and material belongings) are put inside 
the coffin of the deceased before burial. 
145 Radiation therapy can be prescribed for different periods, from just a few times up to daily sessions for a month 
or so, depending on the nature of care as either palliative, disease-modifying, or curative.  
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continued to receive some more chemo and radiation therapy before arriving at hospice care. 
She told me that the medicine eased her difficult symptoms, but I thought that it certainly gave 
her also hope and time. Inkeri stated clearly to me that she wanted to keep living. “There was 
clearly a strong will to live,” she explained when we talked about her past medical treatments; 
she continued that this will also prevented her from even thinking of death. (Inkeri/1.) In a way, 
it was impossible to commit oneself to both, to seek so hard to live and also to think of death. 
At least for Inkeri, she had to concentrate on one—and it seemed to me that it worked much 
like that for the other research participants as well.  
By giving rhythm to the day, week, and month, medical treatment structures one’s time and 
living—and hence, also, one’s dying. Inkeri discussed this issue by reflecting on the structuring 
effect of her chemotherapy. For Inkeri, this not only concerned the actual chemo day and the 
following ones filled with fatigue and possible nausea, but, like Pekka explained, it was also 
about the cortisone days, when one was filled with energy. In reference to her last chemotherapy 
session, Inkeri said laughingly, “Thursdays are my cortisone days, and as I’m full of vim and 
vigor then, I do all my grocery shopping and fill my cupboards with food” (D2: 21). Cortisone 
affects mood strongly; many patients noted its positive effects, but a comedown was also 
experienced. Kimmo noted that every time his cortisone intake was reduced, he felt like he 
needed to start all over from the beginning (D1: 91).146 Cortisone created cycles of being. 
The downside of the strict scheduling in relation to medical treatments was that one was 
continuously tied to a certain time and place. Pekka commented that he would like to travel 
somewhere, or at least go to the summerhouse, if only there were no ongoing medical tests and 
treatments (Pekka/1). The way one chooses to orient oneself at the end of life defines, to a 
certain extent, what one will do—within the limits of one’s abilities of course. That is to say, if 
one chooses the medically structured end of life, there may be less of an opportunity to engage 
with something or go somewhere else. Ritual striations can be made in many ways, but it is 
difficult to participate in more than one simultaneously. Furthermore, as Inkeri mentioned, it 
might be difficult even to think of death if one is still strongly oriented toward future life.  
The biomedical orientation also leaked into daily language. One day I was talking with Aili 
on the phone, and she was telling me about some new pains she had recently had. Attentively, 
I asked her if she was sure she had all the medicines she needed. As soon as I said that, I realized 
that while I was trying to be compassionate to her, I actually started “talking medicine,” 
expressing empathy via medical discourse. I recognized that I had learned this from the day 
hospice, where news tended to be exchanged through medical talk (about exams, medications, 
blood tests, and so forth), and reactions and emotions were also expressed in these terms. It was 
common for patients, volunteers, and staff alike to start the conversation with a question relating 
to a medical ritual, such as “Did you get your tests results already?” or “How is the new 
                                                 
146 Widely used in the treatment of advanced cancer, cortisone has been proven to reduce fatigue and help with 
appetite loss (Paulsen et al. 2014). 
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medicine for you?” After a while in the field, I had to learn not to reproduce this sort of 
discourse, in order to give patients the chance to begin speaking about anything they wanted 
(not only a medical issue).147 In practice, however, the conversations often did revolve around 
the medical details of being. My research participants were socialized in relation to medicine 
and, like me, they had internalized the medical way of talking and medical way of assessing 
their reality (Hofmann & Svenaeus 2018).  
One significant aspect of medicalization in regard to actual dying was the way in which 
many of my research patients at the hospice home talked about palliative sedation, which refers 
to “the use of medications to induce decreased or absent awareness in order to relieve otherwise 
intractable suffering at the end of life” (Olsen et al. 2010: 949). Especially patients who feared 
suffocation (often due to the location of the tumor) told me that when they had voiced their 
fears at the hospice home, they were promised that in an extreme case they would be sedated. 
At least Aili (D4: 17–18), Taina (D1: 134), and Vivian (D4: 27) talked about this, but it was 
also something that was mentioned in the common conversations in the day hospice (D4: 17–
18). One time in the day hospice, Taina declared in passing but with determination that when it 
was her time, “I will be put to sleep.” The nurse was quick to correct her expression, “you mean 
sedated” (D1: 134). I had an impression that already the promise about palliative sedation 
calmed fearful patients, yet actual sedation did not necessarily happen very often (D1: 37).148 
This was the case with Vivian, for instance; she relied on the knowledge that she could get 
sedation, if necessary, but it turned out that in the end she died peacefully without any need for 
that. 
To summarize, all these various biomedical practices—including the medical discourse, the 
actual treatments, and the drugs, but importantly also the care plans—formed a sort of manual 
for “how-to-live-with-incurable-cancer.”149  As such, biomedicine affected the participant’s 
physical comportment, virtues, skills, disposition, specific emotions, attitudes, and so on. This 
mirrors anthropologist Talal Asad’s (1993) definition of ritual. Similar to Bell’s practice-
oriented view on ritual and Foucault’s idea of technologies of the self on one hand and docile 
bodies on the other, Asad sees ritual as a learning process imbued with complexities of power 
resulting in both potentialities (potentia) and force (potestas). Via such negotiations as 
                                                 
147 I had to teach myself to open a conversation in a purposefully open-ended manner, such as “How is everything?” 
(Mitä sulle kuuluu?) instead of talking directly about the patient’s medical condition. Sometimes I asked patients 
“How are you feeling today” (Miten sä voit tänään?), so that they could tell about their situation from whatever 
perspective and level of intimacy they chose. 
148 A recent study among Finnish nurses shows that palliative sedation is thought to be a very useful tool (although 
it is not practiced very often); however, according to the study, it caused moral distress among nurses who were 
in need of additional education about the method (Nissinen et al. 2019).  
149 In his postcolonial perspective on ritual theory, Asad reminds that the present understanding of ritual as a type 
of behavior or activity was formed only around the turn of the 20th century (around the same time as the modern 
“self” came to be interiorized as an internal consciousness rather than an external display of actions; see Asad 
1993: 26; Mahmood 2001, 2005; Keller 2002: 64–65). Prior to that, ritual was seen as “a script for regulating 
practice,” a manual “including texts to be uttered and instructions on how and by whom, as well as on the 
accompanying actions” (Asad 1993: 26). 
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demanding, consenting to, and resisting treatments or whole care plans, the research 
participants practiced their agency and learned (or perhaps rejected) the inscriptions of the 
ritual. Consequently, they learned to live and to interpret reality accordingly, to speak and to 
act in accordance with the biomedical worldview presented by these rituals. In this way, 
biomedicine became a cultural belief system to some (van der Geest 2005).150 
This is exactly what Schilbrack regards as “metaphysical learning” in the ritual (Schilbrack 
2004). When patients consented to biomedical rituals, they learned to be in alignment with the 
medical reality, and they learned to perform correctly in various ritualized situations (such as 
diagnostic examinations, radiation therapy, and so forth). Learning was not limited to the realm 
of medicine but transferred to other aspects of life as well. As we have seen, patients tended to 
think of themselves, their bodies and minds, their time and their doings, in terms of medicine. 
Medicine colored language and became the topic of conversations; care and feelings of empathy 
could be expressed via actual medicine or by references to it. In this way, the research patients 
participated also in the metaphysical world-ordering of the medical ritual. Furthermore, ritual 
not only conveys certain definitions of reality (as ideologies), but through embodiment it quite 
literally materializes, mediates, and thus also constructs those ideologies “into the flesh” (Bell 
[1992] 2009: 191–193).151 Attending to these kinds of rituals, however, first requires trust. 
The element of trust 
Trust was a regular theme in the conversations I had with the patients, especially on the 
oncology ward. Many patients there, such as Martti, emphasized what great care they had 
received on the oncology ward, and how they trusted Finnish cancer care (Martti/1). Inkeri and 
Helena also talked about the importance of being able to trust their medical caregivers. Helena 
pointed out to me that trusting her doctor freed energy for her, as she did not feel like she needed 
to bear the responsibility for her medical decisions (Helena/1). The trust was not self-evident 
among everyone, though. As mentioned already earlier, Inkeri told me about a patient support 
group that she had attended earlier in her illness trajectory, where there had been a lot of rather 
negative speculation about doctors and different treatment plans (Inkeri/1). Inkeri had stopped 
attending the support group for this reason; she wanted to protect herself from that sort of 
negativity: “I constantly wanted to emphasize the issue of trust, that there needs to be trust, that 
otherwise one cannot make it through this” (Inkeri/1). 
Anthropologist Maurice Bloch (2005) claims that rituals are ultimately about deference, 
which he defines as “acting or speaking in certain ways for reasons which one does not explain 
in terms of personal volition, intention or understanding but in terms of implicit or explicit trust 
in others who one ‘follows’” (Bloch & Kallinen 2017, italics mine). Approached in this way, 
                                                 
150 On the relation and similarities between religion and medicine, see, for instance, Vellenga 2008 and Goldberg 
2007. 
151 Bell (2009: 108) writes that “the purpose of ritualization is to ritualize persons, who deploy schemes of 
ritualization in order to dominate (shift or nuance) other, nonritualized situations to render them more coherent 
with the values of ritualizing schemes and capable of molding perceptions.” 
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rituals can point to sources and objects of faith, trust, and hope, thereby illuminating the kinds 
of connections one seeks to cultivate, especially in times of crisis. Studying rituals may, of 
course, also reveal conflicted and contested ideas about trust in a given situation. One way or 
another, however, some sort of authority is practiced, and trust is cultivated in ritual activities. 
Most of my research participants had strong trust in the medical system at large, but 
specifically also in the power of medicine. Pekka, for instance, explicated his trust in Finnish 
medicine when we were talking about his illness trajectory at the ward. Pekka told that soon 
after a scan had revealed a large mass in his torso, he was scheduled for a cancer operation. The 
surgeon had made an insertion—only to close it again. The cancer had spread everywhere. After 
the operation, when Pekka asked the surgeon how much time he had left, he was told that he 
probably had less than six months to live. During his last months, Pekka underwent a number 
of medical treatments and interventions. He received radiation therapy and three different kinds 
of chemotherapy, and during another operation a biliary drain was inserted in his gallbladder. 
He was taking a number of different drugs, some of which were prescribed to counteract the 
side effects of others. He had blood tests and medical procedures almost weekly, and 
occasionally he had to rush to the emergency room because of a fever or other complications. 
(Pekka/1, Pekka/2.) When I spoke with Pekka about his situation, he confessed that he was not 
overly interested in the medical details of his care planning: “Usually the doctor says his own 
opinion and I say ‘Whatever, it’s all the same for me. Let’s do that.’ I trust that they know better 
than this kind of layman” (Pekka/1). Pekka also referred to the superb level of cancer care and 
cancer research in Finland. 
Pekka fully embodied the given world-ordering of the medicine. However, while believing 
in and living the medical reality, at the same time Pekka also lived in another metaphysical 
frame. As a born-again Christian, Pekka was confident that however his future would unfold, 
ultimately it was all going to be okay, “I have made peace with the upstairs,” he confided 
(Pekka/2). Maybe this played a part in his seemingly relaxed attitude: there was a divine source 
for his ultimate trust. Pekka was able to immerse himself simultaneously in the causal world-
ordering of medicine and the participatory world-ordering of Christian faith.  
Pekka’s trust toward the medical system lasted until the end. When Pekka eventually lost his 
appetite and stopped eating and his state of consciousness became fuzzy, Pekka’s wife 
requested home care. As mentioned earlier, Pekka wished to die at home since he detested 
hospitals and believed it would be easier for his beloved dog. Two days later, Pekka’s wife told 
me, she had to leave the house for something, and her teenager stayed at home (D4: 32–33). At 
first Pekka was reading the newspaper, but then his eyes glazed over and he became 
unresponsive. The son called the home care. When they arrived, they administered some pain 
medicine and started planning for his transfer to the hospital (despite his wishes to die at home). 
The home care called an ambulance, whose emergency medical technicians gave Pekka oxygen 
to ease his breathing. Pekka’s wife was called home. Pekka was very anxious, but as soon as 
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his wife arrived he calmed down. Due to his rapidly deteriorating condition, the medical staff 
decided to keep Pekka at home. He was given some slightly sedative medicine and his wife had 
time to call their closest friends and some nearby relatives to come over to say final farewells. 
At the moment of death, his wife held him and hummed calmingly. “As soon as he was gone, 
the dog started crying and whining. She knew,” Pekka’s wife told me. After Pekka’s death, the 
dog adopted Pekka’s special pillow, which his wife had made him and which he had carried 
with him everywhere during his whole illness trajectory (I had seen it at the hospital). From 
then on, the dog slept always on it, the wife told me. (D4: 32–33.) 
Pekka was able to die at home in complete accord with his wishes. His actual moment of 
death was affected by medicine—as was his whole process of dying. Since he was at home, 
however, his wife was able to provide the ideal context for Pekka’s death. Their closest friends 
and relatives were able to say goodbye to him, much like in the pre-industrial time in Finland, 
when ritual farewells were a general custom (see Pentikäinen 1990: 65–66). Pekka’s dog was 
there with him, just like he had hoped, and his wife attended his death. 
In regard to the cancer care, Pekka gave authority to his doctors by resigning from the 
decision-making. When it came to his death, however, he did not ask the doctor’s opinion but 
was determined. Here he used his agency and he died at home, as he wished, away from the 
hospital.  
From the perspective of a dying person, the challenge of a biomedical ritual frame is that in 
biomedicine, death represents a defeat. Intuitively, medicine’s goal is to sustain life, just like 
Vivian noted when commenting on the importance of medicine to her. Now that palliative 
medicine has become more developed and common, it can be difficult for a patient to reconcile 
the seeming ambiguity and tension between medicine and death. From this subjective 
perspective, many personal rituals can help the patient’s endeavors to understand their situation. 
Personal rituals vis-à-vis dying often attempt to seek control in a chaotic and often frightening 
situation, such as when one receives a terminal diagnosis and encounters the fragility of 
existence (Giddens [1991] 2006: 35–40). These rituals also tend to revolve around the question 
of trust. This is not surprising, since, in addition to Bloch’s references to trust, the connection 
of ritual with belief systems and ideologies is established in many ritual studies (Bell [1992] 
2009: 182–196).  
Contested ritualizations 
From the objectifying perspective, ritual can be seen as a way to impose (elements of) a 
worldview upon its participants (Bell [1992] 2009: 171–191). According to Bell, this process 
of internalization is often interpreted as rather mechanical by nature, with ritual being “a single 
central mechanism for the communication of culture, the internalization of values and the 
individuals’ cognitive perception of a universe that generally fits with these values” (Bell 
[1992] 2009: 176). By contrast, Bell ([1992] 2009: 189–191, 214) stresses that any ideological 
learning that may happen via ritual is always negotiated, and hence consented to or resisted by 
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its participants. While this is true, I would not underestimate the effect of embodied—
sometimes even rather mechanical—practices; learning often happens by becoming 
accustomed to things and doing things in a certain manner. The reflective, critical mind does 
not always play such a great role in the process. 
The process of consenting or resisting can be seen, for instance, in the way that patients 
related to their hospital clothing (Lämsä 2013: 51). 152  Some, like Martti, quite happily 
embraced it; he told me outright that he thought of the hospital clothing as “a ritual” (D3: 35). 
While getting undressed from his normal clothing, he explained, he sort of undressed from his 
normal identity, assuming the identity of a patient in the form of the hospital clothing (D3: 35). 
Martti said that the hospital clothing was a good thing; for him it seemed a relief to give up 
some of his personal identity, responsibility, and authority, in order to be a part of the medical 
ordering of reality—and in order to be cared for. Others (like Peter, for instance) resisted the 
practice, perceiving it as degrading and patronizing. There is always some degree of negotiation 
involved in ritual. Instead of seeing ritual as symbolically or concretely modeling the (social) 
reality for participants to internalize, Bell ([1992] 2009: 195) suggests that essentially ritual 
neither refers to nor symbolizes anything outside of itself; rather, reality gets to be constructed 
and defined within the ritual activity itself. 
Sometimes a patient, as a ritual participant, challenged the medical institutional practices 
and claimed agency for themselves in order to define their own reality by creating an alternative 
frame of action that was more suitable for their own designations. This happened, for instance, 
when Peter refused to be a “hospice patient” and “denied” the role of dying suggested by the 
hospice (Noyes & Clancy 1977; Parker-Oliver 2000), and instead created his alternative 
interpretation and frame of action. Peter felt himself as a visitor in the hospice home where “the 
others” were frail and dying, whereas his aim was to “rehabilitate” himself, “get over this,” and 
“go home and back to business” (D1: 58–59, 70–71). To support this aim (as described already 
above), he furnished his personal space with various items from his work and previous lifestyle. 
Piles of work papers and his computer monitor competed for table space with a hospital sippy 
cup, food trays, and a bedpan (D4: 11). He would engage with his personal items by either 
concretely fingering them or referring to them in his speech. In this manner, Peter sought to 
claim agency over his reality, while via his language he created his own version of the 
metaphysics of life and death. In the permissive atmosphere of the hospice home, Peter sought 
to mediate his being in the way he wanted, which was via his personal apparel rather than via 
hospice-style “soft medicalizations.”153 
                                                 
152 The issue of patient clothing is naturally manifold, and besides the perspective of good hygiene it includes 
matters of equality, anonymity, depersonalization, and control, as discussed in a recent article “Patient Clothing – 
Practical Solution or Means of Imposing Anonymity” written by experts in the field of medicine (Bergbom et al. 
2017; in reference to Finland, see also Topo & Iltanen-Tähkävuori 2010).  
153 Many of the medical facets of care in hospice have been “softened” in comparison to their original medical 
versions. For example, in the hospice home the volunteers may make nice-looking little sachets for their urine 
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 Of course, as in Peter’s case, some patients never conform to the role of a dying person or 
that of a sick person (Parsons 1991; Schipke 2019) with the (pictured) external signs of 
weakness, frailty, and a loss of vitality.154 One example of resistance toward the common (or 
commonly imagined) aesthetics of a “sick person” is found in a text by the Finnish musician 
and author Astrid Swan, who writes about her body before a cancer surgery:  
The day before my surgery I painted my nails orange for courage and had my hair cut and 
dyed into a beautiful blond bob. It was me not wanting to give in to ugly sterile hospital freak-
out. It was me both trying to lie to myself about how scared I was and to maintain control by 
not losing beauty. Because sometimes beautiful things bring peace where chaos resides. I 
made a friend at the hair salon. (Swan 2017) 
Before her mastectomy, the artist sought to practice agency and empower herself with rituals 
of beauty. Although she seems to doubt a bit her ability to do this, since she notes that she is 
“trying to lie” to herself about her situation, I would still say that the actual doing of the ritual 
of beautification (or writing about it, as a virtual reality) was already making a difference. As 
Bell claims, reality is constructed and defined within the ritual activity itself. Ritual practices 
power rather than disguises it: “Ritual is the thing itself. It is power; it acts and it actuates” (Bell 
([1992] 2009: 195). 
7.2 Power, agency, and the body 
Ritual, power, and distributed agency 
Instead of seeing power as something that one can possess, nowadays it is common in the social 
sciences to comprehend power as something that prevails and happens in social customs where 
institutional practices and private bodies come together (James & Hockey 2007: 35).155 Much 
of our present understanding on the ways in which societal power operates owes to Foucault, 
whose broad studies on the histories of mental illness, sexuality, medical perceptions, and penal 
systems have changed the way in which modern people see themselves and the world around 
them. As Bell ([1992] 2009: 202) emphasizes, for Foucault “the body is the ‘microphysics’ of 
                                                 
bags––for the enhancement of dignity. In hospice, patients do not need to wear any institutional clothing, unlike 
on a hospital ward. These are representations of Deleuzoguattarian smoothings, which the patients themselves can 
also promote, contest, or alter through their own actions. 
154 The concept of the sick role was introduced by sociologist Talcott Parsons already in 1951. According to 
Parsons (1991: 294–295), like any social role, the sick role also creates rights and duties. The first right is that one 
has the right to be freed from social obligations, such as work, without any retribution; the second one is the right 
to be cared for. The duties of a sick person are also twofold. Because society regards illness as an undesirable state, 
the patient must wish to get well; secondly, one is expected to seek help from competent professionals and to 
engage in treatment (Noyes & Clancy 1977). Later, Russell Noyes and John Clancy wrote about the importance 
of separating the dying role from the sick role (Noyes & Clancy 1977). Since then, it has been suggested that 
hospices are in a crucial role in socially transforming the sick into the role of dying (Parker-Oliver 2000). The 
understanding of patient roles nowadays accentuates their contextual and fluid nature (Schipke 2019). The most 
recent addition in the conversation proposes a new intermediate role, namely, the chronic sick role constructed by 
the medical system (Schipke 2019). 
155 As Foucault states in the History of Sexuality (1978: 93), “Power is everywhere: not because it embraces 
everything, but because it comes from everywhere. […] Power is not an institution, nor a structure, nor a 
possession. It is the name we give to a complex strategic situation in a particular society.”  
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the micropolitics of power.” Methods and techniques used for “the meticulous power of the 
operations of the body” (Foucault [1977] 1995: 137) include organizations of space (such as 
locating individuals in their own places and creating functional spaces like hospitals and 
hospices) and imposing bodily acts and gestures (Foucault [1977] 1995: 141–156). These 
methods and techniques become visible and are recognizable in various institutional and 
medical practices. According to my research participants, at times these became objectifying.  
The following conversation discloses a medical situation in which the ritualized encounter 
between the physician and the patient failed from the patient’s point of view, causing her 
distress. In fact, it was perhaps exactly the deviation from the ritualized form of a 
communication that engendered this misunderstanding. This is possible since the ritualization 
of a doctor’s consultation can effectively protect both of the participants in the situation, the 
doctor and the patient, since both have their given roles to take refuge in during what can be a 
very challenging encounter. This experience seemed to have been very significant for Vivian, 
since she referred to this event several times during our meetings. It is good to bear in mind that 
this consultation was traumatic to her in every possible way, since it was the moment when she 
learned that her curative treatments would be stopped.  
Vivian: It was a terrible shock that they were going to stop the treatments… (becoming 
emotional) 
I: So you heard it at the clinic? 
Vivian: Yeah… 
I: And then they sent you here, to the hospice? 
Vivian: I was in the doctor’s consultation room. And the doctor told me that the treatment 
will be stopped. I returned to the hospital room. I was going to go to radiation but they 
cancelled it. [The doctor said] it was better to insert a drain and remove the fluids so that I 
could breathe easier. And then the doctor came back to the room where I was, and said to me: 
“Oh, I forgot to mention to you that you won’t be resuscitated. So, that if the heart stops, they 
won’t… like, you will not be… That it is the condition for that… something.” (trying to 
remember what the doctor’s words were exactly) And I imagined there that since I was going 
to the drain insertion, it was likely that my heart will stop. 
I: This was how you heard it? 
Vivian: Of course! That’s how I interpreted it. “Yeah, I forgot to say…” That it was important 
to say that, before I go to the drain insertion, that if the heart stops then I will not be 
resuscitated. And then I will be moved to the hospice home…  
The decision not to resuscitate Vivian, which she refers to, relates to the “do-not-resuscitate” 
(DNR) order that is included in the end-of-life decision (saattohoitopäätös). It had nothing to 
do with the drain insertion, but since Vivian was in shock after hearing the news about her 
situation, she misunderstood the doctor’s words completely. Had the doctor explained this in 
the usual manner in the ritualized frame of the consultation room, this kind of misunderstanding 
would perhaps not have taken place. This is a good example of how rituals in medical 
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surroundings can protect not only the medical staff (e.g., by constructing some professional 
distancing) but also the patient. In the spatially ritualized and organized consultation room in 
the presence of the familiar—and, as we have seen, usually trusted ritual symbols (such as the 
doctor’s white coat)—it might have been easier to receive and process the difficult news. 
Indeed, according to the previous research, the single concrete element that was found to have 
great importance in the way how patients received bad news was for the delivery of the news 
to happen “in a quiet, private room with sufficient time so that the HCP [healthcare 
professional] did not appear rushed” (Matthews et al. 2019: 2292). For Vivian, however, this 
encounter was not only about a misunderstanding in communication, but also about an 
experience of objectification.  
 Based on the conversations with my research patients, objectifying attitudes and practices—
including gaps in communication—were generally tolerated to some extent, especially when 
the care was still curative. At that time, the medical task of curing was regarded as so valuable 
that communications skills were not always thought of as a priority.156 This is not to say that 
patients did not encounter excellent care with a course in specialized medicine; on the contrary, 
the quality of cancer care, for instance, was greatly praised by my research participants (such 
as Martti, Helena, and Inkeri). But neither does it mean that patients did not suffer from possible 
objectifying encounters either. Along their illness trajectory, patients longed for supportive and 
caring encounters with medical staff, as the case of the trusted doctors demonstrated. However, 
especially at the moment of a terminal prognosis, the encounter with medical staff becomes 
significant in an entirely different manner. While the (unrealistic) hope for a cure sometimes 
continued to exist for my research participants, the hope to be heard and seen, to be cared for 
and respected, now became even more important. 
Rituals abound with questions related to trust, power, and agency. Simply put, agency can 
be defined as “the ability to transform the world” (Sax 2006: 474). Following the logic of a 
relational subject, rather than seeing agency as strictly subjective it should be understood as 
something distributed among various human and non-human actors alike (Gell 1998; Latour 
2005: Enfield 2017). In regard to ritual agency, anthropologist William Sax points out that 
agency is distributed in networks among persons, institutions, and practices—including rituals 
(Sax 2006: 477–476). Subsequently, various aspects of medicine—its practices, discourse, 
human and non-human actors, and spaces—can be seen as empowered with distributed agency.  
From the angle of critical theory, Asad argues that subject and agent should not be coupled 
in an unproblematized manner (Asad 1993: 11). Asad does not claim that a person can lack 
agency; instead, he questions the traditional understanding of subjectivity in general. Humans 
are not self-constitutive. As Asad puts it, social relations, language, and the body’s materiality 
shape the person in such a way that “few would claim that the human agent is sovereign, 
                                                 
156 Helena, for instance, mentioned that she did not have huge expectations for the doctor to be so empathetic 
regarding her psychological wellbeing; instead, she described the meetings as “very efficient,” and for her it was 
fine like that. She had other avenues of emotional support. 
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although post-Enlightenment moral theory insists that she ought to be autonomous” (Asad 
1993: 10). In this way, Asad promotes a notion of agency in which, as anthropologist Mary 
Keller puts it, “power is not located in the individual consciousness of an ‘agent’ but rather in 
systems that authorize discourses and in disciplinary practices such as are found in religious 
traditions” (Keller 2002: 64, italics mine). It could be—and has been—argued that in today’s 
world, medicine practices a somewhat similar authority as religion in this regard (Turner 1995: 
35–36). Medical science tells us what the healthy—and good—lifestyle is, not only by defining 
praxis but also by creating discourse and attitudes around it, at times taking a moral tone (for 
instance, in relation to smoking). 
In sum, there was a certain amount of agency in the ritualized practices themselves, which 
at times ended up affecting the patient’s experience in a remarkable manner. However, even 
more tangible was the relation between the patient’s body and the medical rituals, which will 
be looked at next. 
Body, illness, and techno-medical agency 
For Bell, Asad, and Foucault alike, the key notion in rituals and power is the body. Subsequent 
to the work of these authors, our bodies have become increasingly posthuman. By 
differentiating between a postmodern and a posthuman body, it is possible to explore how 
biotechnology has affected people’s actual physical reality and the embodied being-in-the-
world, not only in how things are perceived but also in the actual way people exist. In the realm 
of medicine, medical technologies both shape the lived experience of illness and affect the way 
people understand themselves and their bodies (Hofmann & Svenaeus 2018). 157  The 
intertwined connection of self-image, illness, and the aspects of medicine becomes evident in 
Helena’s narrative. She told me about the moment when she learned that the tumor in her 
chest—now removed by the surgery—had been over ten centimeters in diameter: 
How was it even true? I somehow felt shame. Learning about it caused different kinds of 
emotions in me, but mostly shame. Like, how is it possible that one has a ten-centimeter 
tumor in them and one doesn’t even notice it!?! (Helena/1)  
The surgery had revealed something about Helena which she had not been aware of before. The 
details about the tumor changed the way in which she thought of herself. Upon hearing the 
news, Helena felt estranged from her own body and even ashamed of the things it was doing 
without her awareness. 
                                                 
157 In their insightful article, philosophers of medicine Bjørn Hofmann and Fredrik Svenaeus (2018) analyze the 
shaping effects of technologies on the experience of illness in an interesting manner. They show how technology 
and its applications can easily become part of—or even replace—the experience of illness. They also note how 
technology changes bodily self-conceptions in illness. Hofmann and Svenaeus (2018) also point out that people 
are more inclined to assess their life situation on the basis of medical criteria. This is not surprising when one is 
sick with cancer, but as I noted above, the pervasiveness of medical language in communication in general is 
nevertheless remarkable. 
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As we have already seen earlier, shame can make up part of the illness experience in various 
ways. The feelings of shame can be understood in terms of Giddens’ concepts of bodily self-
management and self-identity. As Giddens writes, “The regularised control of the body is a 
fundamental means whereby a biography of self-identity is maintained,” while shame is 
“essentially anxiety about the adequacy of the narrative by means of which the individual 
sustains a coherent biology” (Giddens [1991] 2006: 56–57, 65). In other words, when one’s 
bodily self-management becomes fractured or is revealed to be a mere illusion, it threatens 
one’s self-identity and ontological security, and it may result in feelings of shame. One’s 
physical reality is not what one believed it to be. Here medical technologies (for instance in the 
form of diagnostics) can have significant agency. 
 In Helena’s case, both the illness itself and the medical technologies involved in her care 
affected her whole existence and the lived experience of it. Over the course of time, during her 
illness trajectory, Helena started to feel that she had “lost” her own body. When I asked her 
what she meant by that, she explained: 
The most concrete thing at first was, of course, the loss of the breast [in surgery], but that 
wasn’t so big of a deal for me. […] But then… First it was the chemotherapy and the 
cortisones which cause many to gain weight. I was one of those. And then, when one is very 
sick, one moves quite little… There are many factors. One does less sports, the drugs lead to 
weight gain, and there is the comfort-eating. […] 
All of this was going on and when the adjuvant hormonal drug therapy started, I was getting 
fatter before one’s eyes… The body felt alien since the weight gain… and then there were 
those pains… Those pains… Everything changed. I could not fit into my old clothes anymore, 
but I did not feel like buying any clothes either; I did not want to go to the store, to those 
fittings rooms…  
It was like my body became this strange blob; from the neck down it was like some blub, 
something completely alien, which I did not even want to get to know. The connection 
[between mind and body] was broken. But since a human being is a whole and one cannot 
separate body and mind… This was a terribly big thing. (Helena/1) 
After this description, Helena proceeded to tell me about the unpleasant sensations of hot waves 
she had, related to the early menopause caused by her medical treatments. 
The posthuman perspective questions the autonomy of the subject more than earlier 
postmodern theories, which have remained human-centered (Sharon 2014). In posthuman 
thought, the intentionality of various technologies is understood to be as significant as human 
intentionality—they guide our understanding of the world in a remarkable way. Accordingly, 
medical biotechnology, including diagnostics and actual therapeutics such as various kinds of 
drugs or radiation therapy, constitute medicine but also our medical selves. As we have seen, 
medicine and medical devices became physically and intimately fused with the bodies of the 
research participants. When Eeva finally received a drug infusion pump (or “pain pump”) about 
four weeks before she died, she felt as if her whole existence changed for the better. Since her 
pains were now lessened, it was easier to eat and swallow—and just simply be. Her embodied 
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reality changed drastically. She told me that it was not just about her body, as her whole state 
of mind became different; according to her, this was thanks to the pain pump. (D1: 139.) 
What is important to note here is that with their “artifactual intentionalities” (Sharon 2014: 
146), various types of medical technology, such as imaging technologies, not only reveal things 
about the body but also construct it, bringing information that was otherwise unknown. For 
example, computer imaging or other forms of diagnostics produced representations of reality 
that sometimes contrasted with the lived, embodied reality of the patients themselves. Vivian 
considered herself rather knowledgeable and conscious of her body and whatever was going on 
with it, but with cancer her trust in her embodied sense of reality collapsed totally: 
It has been quite weird… I have always thought that I could trust my own sensations. 
Especially since I have been such a sportive person who knows her own body. That one is 
able… When the first round of chemotherapy was over, I felt myself completely healthy. And 
I believed I was going back to work. I felt myself so alive, something I had not felt for a long 
time. But the disease was there in the background, even though I did not know about it. It was 
so contradictory then, that the whole sensation was so completely erroneous. The cancer had 
advanced, even though I felt myself healthy. (Vivian/2) 
Vivian learned about her real situation only after the CT scan revealed that the chemotherapy 
had not worked and her cancer had spread.  
Different aspects of medication together comprise the agential force of medicine, which 
constituted the patients’ everyday being. For example, some of my research participants 
suffered from the kinds of side effects of the drugs and treatments, which considerably affected 
their everyday life (D1: 68, 74; D2: 19, 21). Vivian, on the other hand, told that she had felt 
great during her chemotherapy (Vivian/2). At times, it was difficult—if not impossible—to 
discern which physical effects were caused by the illness itself and what was a side effect from 
the medicine; however, these effects together could become so heavy that the patient 
momentarily thought of death as an easier option than life.  
At one point in his illness trajectory, Martti was in very rough shape; he could not even eat 
by himself but was fed with a tube in the hospital. Later, he described, “At that moment the 
world became a very thin place” (D2: 79, 100). This was the moment when he thought of giving 
up. Martti overcame this worst moment, however, and recovered. My mother also started to 
talk about death as a relief during the most difficult moments of her illness. In the end, of course, 
it is difficult to estimate whether it was the illness or the medical treatments that fatigued the 
patient the most; it could have possibly been a combination of both (Lawrence et al. 2004).158 
However, the fatigue that is associated with cancer and its treatments tended to be a common 
topic of conversation among the hospice nurses and also among the patients, for instance, in the 
day hospice group (D2: 78). 159 For example, Taina talked about depression, apathy, and her 
                                                 
158 On the multifactorial causes of fatigue, see Bower 2014. 
159 While I cannot make estimations from a clinical point of view about the possible psychological states which 
my participants had, they did talk about fatigue (väsymys) a lot, and they tended to lump various kinds of emotions 
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inability to get anything done mostly as a physical reality, while Aili proclaimed that it is not 
just physical but also psychological: “When the dark moment comes at some point, then it 
becomes difficult. There comes the feeling ‘what for?’” At one point in her illness trajectory, 
Aili was clearly distressed and even hoped for death, so she could “just sleep away one night” 
(D1: 107–108).160 
One obvious facet of the human body, which was not commented on very much in the field, 
is that of sexuality. Perhaps because I did not actively pursuit this theme, it rarely surfaced in 
the discussions with my research participants—Helena and Heikki were exceptions in this 
regard. With Heikki, the topic came up in reference to the issue of an orchiectomy (see Chapter 
9), whereas Helena openly mourned for her previous embodied reality: the loss of her sexuality 
and her well-functioning, fit body. The “lost body” was something that others also commented 
on by expressing sadness over their diminished physical capacities. This came up especially 
with men, such as Oiva and Kimmo, who had led physically and sportively active lives (D1: 8, 
74; D4: 5), but on multiple occasions women such as Aili commented as well on their lost 
physical abilities (D1: 108). 
In regard to her grief about her “lost body,” Helena felt that since she had cancer, there was 
no room for any other complaints, such as menopause: “One was supposed to be ever grateful 
for simply being alive” (Helena/1). In Helena’s experience, the materiality of cancer and the 
physical changes and losses it wrought were not among the topics of conversation that her peer 
patients engaged in. Furthermore, Helena thought that the frail and changing body of an aging 
woman was taboo in the society which valued youthful health so highly (Helena/1). Indeed, the 
aging female body can be seen as the archetypal vulnerable body (Oksala 2013). 
The disciplined, dependent, and vulnerable body 
When my mother received her diagnosis of advanced lung cancer, she was referred to various 
medical treatments. First, she underwent one round of chemotherapy, and when that proved to 
not have the desired treatment response, she started an intense period of daily radiotherapy. One 
day she commented on her therapy, where she had been that morning, by complaining that her 
body “was not able to obey” the nurses. By this, she referred to her body not staying in the 
necessary position on the table, in alignment with the radiation beams. She sounded almost 
guilty that she had not been able to perform correctly for the ritual of radiation therapy.  
                                                 
under that term. It is acknowledged that “cancer-related fatigue might have physical, mental, and emotional 
manifestations, including generalized weakness, diminished concentration or attention, decreased motivation or 
interest to engage in usual activities, and emotional liability”; furthermore, “although cancer-related fatigue shares 
some characteristics with depression […], patients experience fatigue as a distinct and central symptom that 
impairs mood and functional abilities” (Bower 2014). I do not suggest any diagnosis here, but I simply reiterate 
what was told to me in the field. 
160 “To sleep away” (nukkua pois), comparable to the English expression “to pass away,” is probably the most 
used euphemism in Finnish for dying. 
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One’s exact body position is regarded as extremely important in radiation therapy for the 
sake of the actual efficiency of the treatment, but also for protecting the patient from any 
possible adverse side effects.161 To ameliorate the precise positioning of the patient’s body, 
various kinds of immobilization devices are used, such as masks and body molds, depending 
on the location of the tumor to be irradiated. A common procedure is to make tattoo marks on 
the skin to outline the treatment field, although some of the newer technologies no longer 
require this (Moser et al. 2020). From the patient’s subjective perspective, it is understandable 
that a highly technological radiation therapy associated with cancer can be a frightening and 
anxiety-causing experience. This is well recognized in the field of oncology. Certain elements, 
such as the use of immobilization devices, have been found to be a possible cause of severe 
anxiety for patients (Clover et al. 2011; Mullaney et al. 2012). Furthermore, worry about the 
treatment equipment, the general difficulty to tolerate the overall treatment experience, or 
feelings of isolation or claustrophobia within the treatment room have all been shown to be 
significant factors to increase patient-reported situational anxiety levels (Mullaney et al. 2016). 
 Without overlooking the medical significance of radiation therapy or underestimating the 
importance of the exact placement of the radiation beams, and thus the precise position of the 
patient, I wish to draw attention to some of the underlying relational dynamics in the treatment 
situation. This is important since (as discussed in Chapter 2) once the patient has entered a 
medical relationship—with staff members, the place, the treatment plan, etc.—these various 
affective relationalities commence to affect the patient’s everyday life in a remarkable manner.  
 As we have seen, during their illness trajectories, the patients learned to talk and “do 
medicine” by becoming socialized into the medical world-ordering. One aspect of the 
socialization has to do with the appropriate medical language; another aspect involves the 
learned correct physical comportment. My mother’s comment about her “disobedient body” 
echoes Foucault’s description of power that displays itself in small, everyday practices, 
operating via ritualization.162 When learning to behave according to medical expectations, the 
patient’s body tends to become a docile body; Foucault (1995: 136) describes “the body as an 
object and target of power […] that is manipulated, shaped, trained, which obeys, responds, 
becomes skillful and increases its forces.”163 This kind of training can happen in the embodied 
disciplinary practice of a ritual (Asad 1993: 33).  
Now, from the medical and clinical point of view, it is of course crucial that a patient learns 
to perform in the required manner, depending on the situation and the medical task. To be 
successful, the medical examination and procedure simply need the patient’s body to behave in 
                                                 
161 See OncoLink Team. (2020). 
162 Power itself is not “good” or “bad.” From a Spinozian point of view, it always has both qualities, that of force 
(potestas) and of potentiality (pontentia). As discussed in Chapter 2, per Foucault, power is more of a strategy than 
something possessed; furthermore, power is everywhere in the discourses and practices of the society (Foucault 
[1977] 1995: 26–27).  
163 In particular, Foucault analyzes the formation of the disciplined docile body in the army and elementary schools, 
but the same comprehension of the body is also developed in relation to therapeutic environments (such as a 
hospital) and the economic system of capitalism (Foucault 1995: 138–139; Schwan & Shapiro 2011: 100). 
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a particular way. At times, this comportment can be difficult for the patient to achieve, due to 
such reasons as physical incapacity, pain, or fear. The emotional situation may become further 
complicated when the patient, like my mother, clearly understands the importance of the correct 
behavior yet is unable to perform in the prescribed way. With time and practice, however, 
patients adapt to the new ways of doing things (within their personal limits, of course) and start 
gradually embodying new skills. Medical encounters are always constructed from various 
perspectives coming together; there are as many perspectives as there are actors. The 
perspectives are not reducible to each other but bring forth their own embodied information 
about the situation. 
From the point of view of ritual theory, medical encounters can be approached as a ritualized 
process with various actors. Bell’s conception of ritualization clarifies how in these processes, 
small gestures and ways of doing things unobtrusively transform and solidify behavior and 
responses into correct and appropriate ways of doing things (Bell [1992] 2009: 109). A 
medically disciplined body thus learns via ritualizations to respond correctly to various inputs—
such as radiation therapy. At this point, the patient’s body is becoming not only Foucault’s 
docile, disciplined body but also the dependent body, per Feenberg (2006). 
As explained in Chapter 2, Feenberg’s analytical model of the dependent body describes 
embodied being, which invites actions on the body by others. Patients are by definition in a 
dependent position; according to Merriam-Webster, ‘patient’ is defined not only as “an 
individual awaiting or under medical care and treatment” but also as “one that is acted upon.”164 
Feenberg depicts this act of inviting as voluntary and something that can be switched on or off. 
To a certain extent that applies here, but I would suggest that the situation may be much more 
nuanced and complicated. The moment a person surrenders their body to be in a dependent 
position, the issues of power and agency become significant elements in the relationship. Once 
the relationship is charged with an issue of power, the nature of the relationship inevitably 
changes. A dependent body is essentially vulnerable; in addition, relations with a vulnerable 
body are always a matter of ethics. Furthermore, because of the power practiced in the 
relationship, a dependent body may not necessarily be able to exit the situation that easily. To 
assume otherwise would be to argue for the idea of an autonomous independent self (capable 
of complete sovereignty), which is an abstraction that fails to realize itself—especially in the 
context of (terminal) illness. To expect the patient to act as an independent subject in their 
relationship with medical authorities contradicts the whole concept of patienthood, which is 
based on the very relationality between the two (the sick person and the caring agent).  
Vulnerability can be seen as a universal element of a human body. Philosopher Judith Butler 
(2004: 31) writes that we all share “common human vulnerability, one that emerges with life 
itself.” Instead of understanding vulnerability as a result of the relationality of the human being 
(as seen in the case of Feenberg’s dependent body), for Butler vulnerability is an ontological 
                                                 
164 Retrieved from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/patient. 
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human state, “a condition of being laid bare from the start and with which we cannot argue” 
(Butler 2004: 31). In a similar fashion, social scientist Tiina Vaittinen (2015: 104) writes that 
the human body is “internally and persistently vulnerable to life itself: to aging and decay and, 
ultimately, to death. This corporeal vulnerability is part and parcel of our very embodiment, 
and there is nothing dramatic about it. It is just life.”165 
The following story by Heidi illuminates well the vulnerability of the dependent body. This 
account was told to me in our first actual meeting at the hospice ward, when, as usual, I had 
initiated the conversation by asking a little bit about her background, how the diagnosis was 
discovered, and so forth. Heidi embarked by telling me her story. At some point in the diagnosis 
process, a colonoscopy was necessary in order to determine what was wrong with her. By this 
time, Heidi had been suffering from severe abdominal pains and had difficulty defecating. She 
shared that she had needed to go to the toilet up to 70 times a day, and naturally she was very 
sore. She was told that the colonoscopy would last about half an hour. Because of her pain, 
Heidi asked about the possibility of some kind of anesthesia. The healthcare practitioner 
answered that the procedure was usually done without anesthetics. Heidi surrendered to what 
needed to be done, thinking, “You do as it best suits you.” Heidi did not want to make a fuss 
about it, she said. In the end, however, it took an hour and forty-five minutes to complete the 
whole colonoscopy. “An hour and forty-five!” Heidi repeated, “And then they even changed 
doctors while doing it. And all that without any medication. That was like…” At this point, 
Heidi started breathing heavily: “It was so excruciating… It was not fun. Afterwards, everybody 
had already left. Even the cleaners had left, except for one cleaner who was waiting…” For a 
moment, I could not make sense of Heidi’s words but then she continued, telling me that the 
cleaner had made some comment about her sitting there on the toilet seat. Heidi could not talk 
anymore; she was just crying silently. (Heidi/1.) 
The procedure had been traumatic, but the result made the situation even worse, a large 
malignant tumor. Heidi got emotional when she described to me how the doctor had shown the 
tumor on the screen: “I can still see it in front of my eyes… that thing… inside of me… It was 
sixteen centimeters long. I knew at once that this was it.” Heidi had done her Googling by then, 
having already suspected the worst. Nonetheless, it was a great shock. (Heidi/1.) 
Heidi’s experience was extreme in many ways. Her cancer turned out to be very serious and 
already very progressed once it was found, and indeed the colonoscopy was a necessary 
diagnostic tool to find it. Medically speaking, the procedure was required. The use of two 
different doctors also suggests that the examination was challenging. Yet none of this lessens 
the meaningfulness of Heidi’s own subjective experience of the situation. The fact that she did 
not ask for analgesics during the procedure after it turned out to take longer than anticipated 
                                                 
165 Vaittinen (2015) notes that in modern times, notions of the body and vulnerability have been largely excluded 
from political discourse as they oppose the political ideal of the autonomous subject. Simultaneously, the 
vulnerable body is easily seen as effeminate, whereas the autonomous political subject continues to be associated 
with masculinity, which has led to a conception of the vulnerable body as an apolitical body. 
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even though she clearly suffered from the pain shows how difficult it can be for a dependent 
body to reclaim agency.  
I would also draw attention to the technologically mediated state of being in the situation 
described by Heidi. In this particular colonoscopy, the patient was laying on her left side, naked 
from the waist down, with the doctor(s) and nurse(s) behind her. A flexible tube, a colonoscope, 
was inserted into the rectal cavity in order to project the interior of the colon onto a screen via 
a tiny video camera. The live image of the colon, now showing on the computer screen, became 
the object of the medical gaze. Heidi’s existence was mediated jointly via her own body and 
the technology, which in that moment had become part of her. The patient’s being was 
simultaneously both dissected and distanced, as well as invaded and magnified with the 
digitalized imaging technique and medical machinery of the colonoscopy.  
As we have seen, for patients, technological agencies can have multiple effects. Some are 
empowering and enabling, whereas others can be disempowering, at times even humiliating.166 
Reconciliation of the patient’s subjective needs and the prerequisites of the medical 
technologies may be very challenging at times. It might be that in some situations it is not even 
possible. What becomes obvious from Heidi’s account, however, is that a dependent body is 
always a vulnerable body entangled in complex material relationalities fueled with potentia and 
potestas. 
This memory that Heidi shared with me was part of her illness trajectory. It was probably 
also painful because it marked the moment when her life’s landscape changed dramatically. As 
I have explained earlier, Heidi had postponed her initial visit to the doctor for a very long time. 
Although explicitly Heidi denied any sentiments of regret, I quietly suspected that part of her 
pain was traceable to this issue. Still, Heidi was the one research participant who compared our 
discussion to a religious ritual. After we had had our conversation and we were stopping the 
interview, Heidi’s eyes lit up and she said: “Wow! That was a good experience. Somehow so 
purifying… It was like some sort of religious ritual!” (D1: 104). It sounded that the act of talking 
about her difficult memories gave her some relief.  
  
                                                 
166  A recent study on emotional predictors on bowel screening shows that many patients experience fear, 
embarrassment, and disgust to such a degree that it may cause avoidance of the procedure (Reynolds et al. 2018). 
In regard to women’s pelvic examinations, apart from physical discomfort, patients have reported experiencing 
feelings of shame, fear, and humiliation (see Yanikkerem et al. 2009). 
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8. LEARNING TO DIE IN THE HOSPICE HOME  
8.1 Encountering the hospice home 
The day hospice 
When I visited the day hospice for the first time, I was surprised by the uneventfulness of the 
program, even though I had been kind of warned about this before starting my fieldwork. Prior 
to starting the fieldwork, I asked the chief doctor of the hospice what usually happened at the 
day hospice, and they had bluntly replied to me, “Nothing.” This is what I also thought at first, 
but after spending some months at meetings and following various patients, my understanding 
of the day hospice changed considerably. 
The morning started when the driver of the hospice home brought the “Tuesday crew” to the 
facility with his special van, which was equipped for wheelchairs and so forth. With time, I 
learned that these morning encounters with the driver were already meaningful: during the drive 
patients exchanged their latest news with him. When the van arrived in front of the main door, 
the day hospice staff (including me, when I was visiting) would go to the hall to greet all the 
patients. Each patient was welcomed with a hug by the staff and volunteer(s). The day hospice 
team was comprised of two nurses, and one or two volunteers who regularly assisted with the 
daily practical arrangements, such as serving food and making the table ready.  
The welcome hug was a clear ritual that reflected the hospice ethos. One Tuesday there was 
norovirus going around the ward, so physical contact was not recommended. The staff 
introduced a substitute for hugs, a greeting ritual in sign language of crossing one’s arms over 
one’s chest and smiling at the other. If the hugging ritual had not played an important role, 
creating an alternative would not have been necessary. Indeed, the welcome hug sought to 
embody one of the core values in hospice philosophy: seeing—and thus validating—the whole 
person rather than just the patient. 
After settling in, everybody enjoyed a small breakfast together (a cup of coffee, a homemade 
bun, or a bowl of porridge) while sitting together by the big dining table, which filled the main 
part of the day hospice room. Everyone—patients and staff members alike, including the driver 
and I—sat together, exchanging the latest news. The nurse kindly but matter-of-factly asked 
everyone about their health and condition, and the following discussion tended to revolve 
around the latest development of the illnesses and their various physical symptoms. I was 
somewhat surprised about the directness of the communication, but this was perhaps an 
intentional way to dispel any possible awkwardness or embarrassment related to various aspects 
of the patients’ illnesses and symptoms. Although I never heard anybody ever commenting on 
it, sometimes it struck me how openly various medical details were expected to be discussed 
(for instance, specific symptoms or various physiological aspects of the illnesses). I wondered 
if anyone ever felt appalled by this. When I asked about people’s reactions to the day hospice 
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in general, I was told that occasionally someone left the group, because seeing all the sick 
patients was “too depressing” (D1: 31). 
Even with this “permission to be weak,” most of the time patients held themselves together 
remarkably well throughout the day. At times, however, when a patient received bad news about 
their situation, the pain was just too much (be it physical or spiritual), or if they were simply 
too tired from it all, they would break down in tears. These moments revealed a sense of 
helplessness that affected everyone in the room. Most strikingly, it touched the other patients, 
who perhaps recognized similar feelings in themselves. 
Every Tuesday the nurse made sure that she spent a private moment with each of the patients, 
thus guaranteeing that there was proper space and time for an intimate, one-on-one 
conversation. In this way, patients were able to voice their worries and questions, and when 
needed the nurse would consult the other nurse or call the doctor for help. She checked 
everybody’s medication and made sure that each of the patients had everything under control 
for the week to come; any possible appointments with a social worker, physiotherapist, or 
oncologist, or visits to laboratories, X-rays, and so forth were talked about and confirmed. The 
nurse served as a mental and social support person, as well as a kind of outsourced memory aid 
for the patients. 
After breakfast, some went for a cigarette while others retired to comfortable armchairs and 
a sofa located by large windows. When it was winter, it was customary to check the weather 
and to follow the little birds flying in and out of the bushes outside. There were daily 
newspapers on the coffee table, and often the talk followed current news. The topics could be 
anything, ranging from the most mundane everyday issues to cultural and political analysis of 
recent events. Books were one of the most popular topics of conversation, reflecting a reading 
hobby shared by some staff members and several patients. Books and their authors were 
discussed, and books were also exchanged and loaned. If someone had been traveling abroad 
(often it was one of the volunteers), it was a shared pleasure to hear of their trip and perhaps 
see some photos. Symptoms and various issues related to the patients’ illnesses often came up, 
the latest laboratory results were exchanged, and news on tumor imaging and so forth were 
shared. It was very notable, however, that even if sickness and all sorts of medical issues were 
discussed regularly, death and dying were rarely mentioned. In general, everyone shared 
whatever they felt like sharing, but it was also perfectly fine to withdraw into a more quiet space 
and just passively follow the conversation. 
Research participants such as Aili and Inkeri commented to me how meaningful these 
moments of sharing were. I understood this to be partially because of the physically limited life 
that many were forced to lead. Even if travel was physically still possible, sickness often caused 
a serious decline in a patient’s income, and economic limitations made any extra expenses 
impossible for many. Hearing stories by others opened windows onto worlds that were off-
limits to many patients in their current life situation. Aili talked about this often; she mentioned 
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a number of times how much she enjoyed hearing people tell about their lives, families, travels, 
and experiences (D4: 16). Aili was also an avid reader and she repeated time after time, “Books 
have kept me alive” (D2: 30, 79). Especially after needing to give up her community garden, 
books and reading occupied Aili’s days (see more in Chapter 10). 
One of the major rituals during the morning hours was Bella’s visit. Bella was a big and 
lively rough collie with a red scarf around her neck. Her master Patrick brought Bella to the 
hospice every Tuesday since his daughter’s death in the early 2010s. Patrick kept returning, 
hoping that Bella might bring some joy to some patients. For the Tuesday crew, Bella had 
become an essential part of the day’s program; she was a much-awaited guest for whom the 
“dog persons” kept special treats in their bags. 
Food and common shared meals were an essential part of the day. The day hospice was 
arranged around three different meals that were served there: breakfast upon arrival, lunch at 
noon, and afternoon coffee around 2 pm before the ride back home. At lunch, everyone gathered 
around the big table again and shared the meal. I often heard patients wondering how food 
tasted so much better when it was enjoyed together. I also noticed the staff members discreetly 
following how everyone was doing with their meals. A healthy appetite or complete lack of one 
could reveal things about a patient’s physical—and mental—state. 
After lunch, some patients went for a little rest in the side room, where there were two beds 
for the use of the day hospice. Some made a little walk around the hospice home and sat for a 
moment in the winter garden, or they went outside if the weather permitted. Somebody might 
have medical foot care or a hairdresser at the neighboring nursing home, and sometimes a 
masseuse would give a patient a special treatment.167 Occasionally a singer and music therapist 
would visit the group. A couple times per year, the day hospice organized a little excursion, for 
instance, to a nearby park. These were luxurious additions to otherwise ordinary days, and they 
were much appreciated by everyone. 
Day hospice in general gave an impression of a free and patient-centered space. The hospice 
home, however, is an institutional place with its own ritualizations seeking to structure and 
striate time and space. If in medical rituals (such as diagnostics and treatments) the issue of 
power becomes tangible in the manipulation of the body, in other types of institutional practices 
and rituals the power practices can be more subtle (even if they continue to manipulate the 
body). Here is a description from my field diary: 
I had suggested to the Tuesday crew that everyone could bring with them some photos to share 
with the group. After the breakfast Rauha stayed at the dining table, with a face like “aren’t we 
gonna look at the photos now?” I gently asked the others if they had brought any photos. Soon 
everybody joined the table, and they all looked really interested, even those ones who had no 
photos with them. […] At one point, we—all women—started talking about babies and birthing. 
It was an unexpected moment; the atmosphere became intense and intimate. We were right in the 
                                                 
167 Often times such extra services were given on a volunteer basis or, in the case of masseuses, with the aid of a 
specifically assigned donation. 
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middle of it when we were suddenly interrupted. There was some other program planned for the 
group. We needed to get up and leave right away. (D4: 8) 
The ritualized moment to look at photos,168 which had created an unforeseen space for deep 
conversation, was brought to a halt without advance warning. The institutional space of hospice 
was seemingly smooth and loosely structured, but in reality, like any institution, it was still 
structured and ritualized––and even contested at moments. I learned rather quickly that the day 
rhythm was carefully laid out, and any external or additional program that threatened the usual 
schedule was not necessarily welcomed. Furthermore, certain activities seemed more important 
than others; for instance, a medical procedure––such as measuring blood pressure––seemed to 
have priority over a conversation (D1: 13; D4: 9). If hospice smooths the striations of the 
hospital, there are always some institutional elements which seek to striate the hospice. 
Ritualization of the ordinariness 
Ordinariness and uneventfulness were features that made the time spent in day hospice so 
valuable for many of the patients. It took me a while to reach this conclusion, for at first I found 
the “nothingness” merely dull and boring, and I assumed that the patients would agree. After 
talking about this discreetly with some of the research participants, one or two indeed expressed 
eagerness for more “program” (D4: 6), but in the end, after having followed different patients 
for years, I came to understand that the uneventfulness was actually gratifying and soothing for 
most of them. Ordinary, everyday things, which had previously been taken for granted, had 
now become a valuable rarity for them.  
This is understandable when considering the general trajectory of illness. When the terminal 
illness advanced, there tended to be more kinds of symptoms (e.g., pain, nausea, dizziness, 
insomnia, severe constipation or constant diarrhea, neuropathy, breathlessness).169 When the 
physical capacity to live diminished and symptoms shadowed daily life, many expressed 
missing most “the little things of ordinary life,” such as being able to enjoy one’s meal, going 
for a walk, or even just being outside and feeling the wind in one’s face. In this light, the 
statement “the hospice home is the safest place to come to” becomes more nuanced. Existential 
insecurity and fear of the coming death became constant partners for the patients—even if they 
were not explicitly spoken about aloud. This is what sociologist Arthur W. Frank (2001: 355) 
refers to when he writes about suffering with no words: “Suffering is the unspeakable, as 
opposed to what can be spoken; it is what remains concealed, impossible to reveal; it remains 
in darkness, eluding illumination; and it is dread, beyond what is tangible even if hurtful.” 
When ordinary everyday life becomes scarcity and the small daily details of life are no longer 
self-evident, they may gain importance beyond the trivial. Details matter in a new way, and old 
                                                 
168 See Quartier 2010 on looking at photos as a modern deathbed ritual. 
169 To make it clear, I am not offering any estimations about the possible prevalence of any symptom in particular; 
instead, I am merely referring to the experiences of my research participants, who do not represent a statistic 
sample population. 
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everyday routines may become ritualized, as they remind of life as it used to be, that is, life 
without the threat of imminent death.170 While food and eating per se may already be ritualized 
(Marshall 2005), food can gain additional significance and connotations after one becomes ill 
(McInerney 1992; Ellis 2018). Some of my research patients told me about ritualized gatherings 
around food—explicitly relating to farewells. Soon after Eeva received her terminal prognosis, 
she invited her best friends to her house for a meal. She cooked them a traditional Finnish meal 
and for desert they enjoyed some cake. “We settled around the meal,” she described the 
farewells to me (D1: 77–78). Inkeri, on the other hand, organized special meals with her friends 
and family only a few days before she died (Inkeri/4). In addition to the meals, Inkeri had made 
a special gift infused with memories of their friendship, and she had decorated the table with 
some pictures and items from their common journey. “All the decorations and the food, it 
somehow embodied and brought to life our years-long friendship and the connection between 
us,” she described. “It was a big fulfilment to say goodbye to the best friend… there was a sense 
of farewell there” (Inkeri/4). 
In the day hospice, the moments of gathering to eat were ritualized through a myriad of small 
gestures, mostly initiated by the staff yet happily joined in by the patients. One ritualization 
started with the setting of the table. In addition to the usual plates and silverware, the setting 
was characterized with specially folded napkins, usually done by one of the volunteers. Soon 
the folding art became a topic of conversation and source of common admiration, as patients 
started paying attention to the different styles and attempted themselves to learn new ways of 
folding. Some patients did not even wish to use the napkin but slipped it into their bag instead. 
Another feature underlying the ritualization was the timing. It was remarkable how exact the 
schedule for the lunch was. Even if patients were engaged in deep conversation, which could 
appear to be emotionally significant, “the invitation” to the table was firm. This caused a sense 
of irritation at moments, and it forced me to reflect on why it was so important to follow the 
schedule so precisely. In addition to the obvious “let’s eat when the food is warm” logic (which 
was not the common practice elsewhere in the hospice home, such as on the ward, where eating 
happened depending on the patient’s wishes and needs), I believe that the gatherings around the 
table structured the day and the group in a necessary way. In terms of striated and smooth space, 
in general, being in day hospice was free and loose—manifesting smooth space; conversely, 
the strict eating hour created coherence, not only for the time spent together but also the group 
overall. It was a gesture of striation by the staff to organize time and space in this manner. This 
was the only moment that everybody from the group was together, whereas at other times of 
the day people could withdraw in smaller groups into different areas to chat or even to be alone.  
In general, food symbolizes life; it gives us energy and provides continuity (Marshall 2005). 
Eating together and sharing meals comprise perhaps the most ancient ritual of all—the Last 
                                                 
170 The importance of small everyday gestures was recently brought up in a French study on a palliative care unit, 
which showed how seemingly banal and insignificant expressions become meaningful in palliative care (Drillaud 
et al. 2020). 
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Supper and Thanksgiving dinner are classic examples (Mintz & Du Bois 2002). Furthermore, 
food represents connection and interrelatedness in multiple ways, including an embodied 
connection with the earth (and various lifeforms in the world) where the food comes from and 
a social connection with the others with whom one shares the meal. A common comment heard 
at the food table was that eating was essentially different when shared and done together. It can 
be said that sharing a meal embodies one of the most basic and common rites marking social 
inclusion and exclusion in communities. Therefore, if suffering, as Frank (2001: 355) states, is 
essentially about disconnection, about an absence and experience of oneself “on the other side 
of life as it should be,” then sharing a meal functions as a kind of antidote for suffering, as it is 
all about connecting and relating. 
Day hospice exemplified other types of connection as well. Many hospice and palliative 
patients live in some form of exclusion due to their physical, psychological, and (often) 
economic situations. A couple of my research patients (Kimmo in D1: 74; Helena/1) remarked 
on how little public talk there was about the economic strain of a serious illness. In some 
families the level of income crashed, affecting the daily life of the whole family. Poverty or low 
income in itself may be a causal effect for social isolation and the sense of belonging (Stewart 
et al. 2009; Eckhard 2018).171 Furthermore, low income and a life-threatening illness together 
can lead to serious loneliness. This can be alleviated by common meeting places, such as the 
day hospice, which offered patients moments to relate to and to feel related to the outside world. 
It was a chance to “be taken care of,” to relax, to seek information from the specialists, and to 
chat with peers—all in a safe environment. 
The presence of the volunteers in the hospice home made it easier to create the atmosphere 
of “everyday life,” as there was nearly always someone to talk to—not a fellow patient or staff 
member but just an “ordinary person” representing “ordinary life.” Chatting with volunteers 
brought a fresh breeze of the outside world and a little change of scenery to the patients, as Aili 
remarked to me many times. Ordinary life is about movement—in contrast to the sedentary life 
of illness—and day hospice offered a window onto a mode of being that was no longer available 
to patients. This, in turn, facilitated an atmosphere of hope. 
8.2 The smoothing presence of death  
When death sneaks into words 
It surprised me how little talk there was about death and dying in the day hospice.172 After all, 
that was the common denominator for everyone to be there, with the exception of the staff and 
volunteers. Aili (D4: 14–15) once commented on this phenomenon as well. She believed it was 
                                                 
171  This was discussed widely in Finland in autumn 2018, when Helsingin Sanomat, the country’s largest 
newspaper, published a large survey based on letters by the public on the subject of poverty, including its 
consequences in people’s lives (HS 2019). 
172 Utriainen (1999: 189–190) also remarked on the invisibility of the death in the hospice home where she did her 
ethnography; death and dying were segregated even within the hospice space.  
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actually a good thing that there was not so much talk about death and dying, for otherwise there 
would be a need to have all kinds of discussions about the afterlife and, consequently, about 
religious matters. For Aili, that kind of thing felt awkward. Even though Aili respected the 
Lutheran Church, she was not religious; this came out in her way of talking about the Church, 
but she also directly said it to me (Aili/2). She did not believe in the afterlife; instead, she talked 
about her “cells dying and then going to cycle around” (Aili/2). She expressed to me that 
sometimes she felt like she needed to censor what she said in the day hospice, as there were 
some people who were more religious than her, and she did not wish to offend anybody with 
her views (D4: 14–15). 
Even if it was not explicitly talked about, the thought of death was still present. According 
to Aili, “it [the thought of death] is in the back of everyone’s mind and we share it by not talking 
about it” (D4: 17). I remember some isolated incidents in the day hospice group when we were 
all talking something about the hospice home and then someone blurted out something like 
“Well, that’s why we’re all here, that we…” The person never finished their sentence, and it 
was just left hanging. Death was not often talked about, and for the most part it was not seen 
either, but occasionally it still sneaked into the day hospice conversations. 
After I had been part of the Tuesday crew for a little more than three months, one of the 
original members of the group, a very elderly lady called Irma, was taken to the hospice ward 
because her condition was deteriorating. The group continued to gather on Tuesdays, and 
someone always went to visit Irma in her room. This was followed by subdued talk about her 
condition among the day group. One particular Tuesday, Siru came back from Irma’s room and 
told everyone: “Irma was very tired. She had had a very bad night, lots of pains… She is totally 
ready to go.” Someone commented: “Yeah, she has talked about it even publicly that she is 
ready to leave from here” (D1: 24). Irma was caught in the middle of living and dying. 
Humorously, she had even commented on her lunch by saying that “the food tastes so good 
while waiting for death!” (D1: 28). 
About a month later, when Irma was still on the ward, a new member named Taina had 
joined the Tuesday group. Siru visited Irma again, and upon returning to the day hospice room 
she repeated Irma’s wish with some anguish in her voice: “She really would like to leave 
already!” As Taina did not know Irma, she unthinkingly assumed, “Ah, I see, she would like to 
go back home already.” Siru looked perplexed as she corrected Taina, “No… I mean, she would 
like to… like to sleep away entirely.” After Siru carefully uttered these words, an awkward 
silence fell in the room. Taina seemed sincerely surprised by what Siru had said, as if taken 
aback that someone was actually dying in the hospice home. I could not help the impression 
that she had not really grasped where she was.173 (D1: 32.) 
                                                 
173 After I got to know Taina better, I understood that she lived her end of life very actively and never really 
conformed to the role of a dying patient. 
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It took another two weeks before Irma finally died. Since her death happened the night before 
the Tuesday meeting, the following morning everybody in the day hospice was talking about 
her passing. Irma’s daughter came to thank the Tuesday crew, and there was almost “a satisfied 
humming,” as I wrote in my diary, about the fact that Irma had finally “departed” (D1: 33). 
Everyone was saying “she was so ready to go!” Referring to her actual dying, someone even 
remarked, “It went on a bit too long” (D1: 33). It seemed like there was an unspoken but 
common perception of an ideal timing for death, as it was unanimously agreed that Irma’s 
waiting had simply gone overtime; it had taken too long.  
This was also one of the rare occasions in which I heard patients talking about euthanasia.174 
Toward the end of the day, people once more started to talk about Irma’s death. Again, as if to 
affirm that it was a good thing that she had died, it was repeated how much she had “wanted to 
go,” and that “actually she had been wanting that already for two months!” In the midst of the 
discussion, someone started pondering: “I wonder if one can affect that [the timing of death].” 
The conversation shifted to focus on this question. Someone answered, “I don’t know,” and 
another one added, “I suppose not.” Finally, somebody engaged the topic: “It is uncanny that 
even if one wants [to pass] away, there is no way to effect that. One cannot really oneself effect 
that at all.” Another patient nodded: “Yes, here I can understand the positive viewpoint on 
euthanasia.” Others joined the discussion with approving tones: “Yeah, if one wants to go!” In 
the end, someone revealed that Irma had actually asked her daughter to give her “some kind of 
an injection,” to which the daughter had only answered, “Oh mom, I wish I could!” This in turn 
prompted Taina to ask, “Yes, why not? We help suffering animals, don’t we? We put an end to 
their sufferings if there is no more sense in anything…” (D1: 34). 
This conversation gave me the impetus to ask later on from the staff if this sort of talk was 
common among patients, and if anybody had ever actually requested euthanasia.175 One of the 
nurses who had worked in the hospice home for decades told me that such talk was infrequent, 
and it was rare to hear concrete requests about euthanasia. “It is almost surprising,” she thought, 
“given the condition of some” (D1: 34–35). The nurse did acknowledge that especially when 
the patient’s condition rapidly worsens and they become immobile, it is not uncommon to hear 
wishes like “Oh, I wish I would get away already,” yet she firmly believed that this was not a 
genuine death wish but rather a somber expression of feelings of despair or shame, perhaps, or 
a fear of becoming helpless and being in need of constant assistance. The nurse asserted that 
these feelings subside after some time.  
                                                 
174 There were two other moments during my fieldwork when the issue of euthanasia naturally arose. The first 
happened with Pekka, who told me that he had thought of euthanasia but since it was not possible in Finland he 
had “prepared himself” (Pekka/1). He never did anything for real, but apparently he had made preparations for 
taking his own life; I heard that he had kept an “injection” for this purpose. Another discussion about euthanasia 
was with Aili, who talked about it on the basis of her professional and personal experiences around death. She 
believed that it should be allowed in certain situations. (Aili/2) 
175 It should be noted that around this time, the topic of euthanasia was very much discussed in the Finnish media, 
and there was an organized citizens’ initiative for its legalization. The initiative officially started collecting names 
in 2016, and it was brought to Parliament in 2017. The proposal was never approved, however.  
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Irma’s death was the first shared death experience in the Tuesday group when I was there. It 
was meaningful for everyone. It opened up—and even forced—the space to encounter the 
salient mortality that was silently present everywhere in the hospice home. A week later, when 
we gathered again with the group, there was a need to bring some positive closure to Irma’s 
passing. Siru commented on her death by noting what a beautiful smile Irma had had on her 
face after her death. “She must have met her late husband,” Siru murmured, “she looked so 
young and beautiful, all the wrinkles were gone!” After this, Siru repeated how good it was that 
“she finally got away, as she wanted it so badly.” Others mostly remained silent, but confirmed 
that Irma’s smile had always been very beautiful indeed. (D1: 38.) 
Smoothings and striations at the hospice home 
Whether death was spoken or unspoken, visible or invisible, it surely formed a major part of 
the hospice home’s daily reality. A concrete reminder of this came one afternoon during the 
coffee hour. We were all sitting by the dining table when through the glass windows to the 
corridor we saw two staff members pushing a bed with somebody on it. We knew that it was a 
corpse, as a sheet covered the body from the top of the head to the feet. The conversation and 
all motion around the table abruptly stopped. In solemn silence, our eyes followed the cadaver’s 
passage toward the chapel where bodies were kept in cold storage before transfer to the funeral 
home. Even with the sheet, we could see that the body was being pushed feet first, following 
custom. One foot poked out with a colorful, homemade wool sock. Instantaneously, at the sight 
of something so ordinary and familiar, the anonymous body was transformed into a person—
perhaps someone we knew, a friend even. After we lost sight of the passing bed, someone broke 
the silence by saying: “That surely gives pause…” The coffee hour continued in pensive silence, 
exactly as Aili had framed it: the thought of death was shared by everyone—in silence. 
From a Deleuzoguattarian point of view, these sorts of small interruptions smoothed the 
striated space of orderly routines and ritualized practices around which any institution, 
including the hospice home, revolves. In the hospice environment, this kind of smoothing was 
tolerated and allowed, and even invited sometimes. Smoothing effects can be even called for 
by spatial arrangements, such as (wild) gardens, and by facilitating loosely organized events 
like parties (such as birthdays or even marriages). In these spaces and moments, life and death 
are allowed to happen in a less controlled manner. 
On the other hand, there were small ritualizations at the hospice home which worked in a 
striating manner to counter the intimidating effect of the smoothing. When the patients in the 
Tuesday crew started to form friendships with each other and inter-group cohesion grew, the 
nurse took the initiative to commemorate the passing of the members by lighting a candle on 
the dining table during the afternoon coffee. “For the memory of Irma,” she would say, lighting 
the candle. There was no need for any further ritual; in its simplicity, the lit candle fulfilled the 
purpose. By having the candle on the dining table, it was as if the dead person was present with 
the group. In addition to commemoration, this practice worked as a gentle but effective 
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reminder to everyone about their own coming death. Furthermore, lighting a candle was already 
an existing part of the hospice home’s rituals: a candle was lit in the lounge every time someone 
passed on the ward.  
Although rather minor in itself, this gesture was one among many in the hospice home which 
essentially reflected awareness about mortality. Even if death was not necessarily talked about 
out loud, there was nonetheless a possibility for pondering death and dying, which happened 
discreetly via these small ritualizations and reminders. 
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In the last part of my analysis, I will move from institutional rituals to an exploration of the 
personal rituals practiced by my research participants. Personal rituals in this regard may be 
divided between ones that seek to avoid death and dying and ones that clearly prepare the patient 
for their coming death. In addition, some ritualized practices, such as writing, may push the 
thought of death further out onto the horizon while simultaneously preparing the writer for the 
inevitable. Following Kapferer’s interpretation of virtuality, I will look at these practices as 
creations of ritual virtuality, which offer participants possibilities to reorient and learn new ways 
to handle their situation. Furthermore, various personal rituals can be seen as ways to enhance 
one’s own agency over the challenging existential situation. 
 Rituals and other participatory practices, especially those involving nature and the arts, can 
prove to be important channels for augmenting potentiality and thereby increasing Spinozian 
joy. The latter half of Part IV thus concentrates on various sorts of participatory practices, such 
as religion and aesthetics, in relation to approaching death. In particular, I examine the role of 
aesthetics as a significant tool for my research participants in their process of seeking to 
understand and come to terms with their existential situation. To this end, I elaborate on the 
way in which aesthetics can offer therapeutic tools for handling the crisis caused by terminal 
prognosis and, furthermore, I show how aesthetics permits but does not force metaphysical 
imagination and meaning-making.   
~ 155 ~ 
 
9. PERSONAL RITUALS 
9.1 Rituals for avoidance of death 
Enhancing life and the body 
When the thought of death or the idea of one’s tangible dying was something too difficult to 
grasp, patients engaged in numerous small ritualizations and actual rituals, which helped them 
to reinforce their ties with life, and thus avoid (the thought of) death. Like we can see in the 
following quote from my research diary, these activities often focused on the very physical and 
concrete premises of life. This is what I had written in my diary about my mother: 
Soon after mother had received the news [about her terminal cancer], the first thing she did 
was to buy an enormous amount of outdoor plants. There were pots on the ground and pots 
hanging from the edge of the roof, blooming flowers everywhere in the yard. Living flowers 
which needed attending care. Upon hearing the terminal news, she needed to nurture life and 
beauty. (D4: 10)  
These ritualizations and rituals were built upon various life-strengthening acts, elements, or 
symbols that aimed to reinforce connections to life in a physical, social, or more abstract sense. 
They functioned as consolidating one’s subjectivity and one’s relations to the world—hence, 
these sort of ritualizations can be also called “rituals for avoidance of death.” This does not 
mean that patients were always engaged in them by thinking consciously or unconsciously that 
they would actually escape their death; rather, at times these ritualizations were simply 
expressing one’s aspiration to immerse with life (as contrasted with death). At other times, these 
rituals seemed to reflect certain beliefs, such as “as long as I eat I cannot die” or “as long as I 
continue physical exercise, my body will stay strong and I cannot die.” In general, I interpret 
these personal ritual practices as a participatory mode of being, in contrast to the causal 
orientation to reality perhaps best described in terms of medicine and medical rituals. 
Many of these participatory rituals revolved around the body. Whether that meant doing 
sports or applying make-up, they served as a kind of antidote for the threatening disintegration 
brought on by terminal illness. As mentioned earlier, Kimmo, for instance, believed that if he 
kept on eating healthily and continued to work out, his body simply could not fail him and he 
would not die. In one way, of course, Kimmo accepted the fact that he might die, and he had 
taken care of practical matters like organizing his economic reality (e.g., banking, insurance 
papers) and transferring things over to his wife (D1: 74). On the other hand, he had a hard time 
believing that he was actually dying. The whole time I knew him—the last three months of his 
life—it became very clear that instead of looking at death, his eyes were set on life and on the 
idea of recovery. Accordingly, he was convinced of the importance of self-care (D1: 118–119, 
122). When on the hospice ward, he ate substantial portions of food. This was striking, since 
often my research participants—even when they were taking cortisone, which enhances 
appetite—clearly ate less than normal (see also Orell-Kotikangas 2015). Kimmo commented 
on this a few times by stating that he was trying to regain his stamina and physical energy, and 
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that he believed it was important to eat well to recover. As noted above, Kimmo applied himself 
to physical exercise with similar devotion. Even when on the hospice ward, he did rounds with 
his walker, in order to stay fit. After he went into home care, he kept going to the gym, despite 
warnings by the medical staff. He believed that by exercising he would regain his strength and 
thereby recover (D1: 109, 122). 
Physical exercise and various sorts of bodily activities came up regularly in the discussions 
with patients. Among others, Oiva, Aili, Kimmo, Matti, Helena, and Heidi talked about how 
they had enjoyed various bodily activities, and hence a certain sense of freedom, prior to their 
illnesses. Embodied living in the form of such hobbies as sailing, having a summerhouse, 
gardening, running, swimming, and skiing had positively affected many by bringing them 
(Spinozian) joy; it had increased their quality of life by begetting a sense of strength and 
increased capacity of movement and life (D1: 8, 72–74; D2: 6–7; Matti/1). 
My mother also believed that as long as one kept oneself “physically together,” everything 
was all right. She believed that it was important to get up out of bed every morning, dress nicely, 
and apply some make-up—in other words, keep her physical appearance under control. 
Giddens’ notion of the “regularized control of the body” is helpful here; it illuminates well how 
crucial control of the body became for some of the patients. It was through these small everyday 
ritualizations (i.e., Giddens’ regularized control) that some patients sought to keep their 
“biography of self-identity” coherent, and thus kept the ontological insecurity at bay (Giddens 
[1991] 2006: 56–65). 
Whether the enhancement of the body relates to the need to sustain bodily coherence, achieve 
a feeling that one is “at least trying,” or combat the experience of hopelessness after the medical 
treatments had failed to improve the situation, the market has recognized a niche here. Kimmo 
told me that once when he was at the hospital, a man poked his head in the doorway and asked 
him to come out of the room into the corridor—apparently the hospital had banned this 
individual from entering patients’ rooms. When they were standing in the corridor, the man told 
Kimmo that even if the doctors offered him no more hope, the situation was not doomed. Just 
like a certain well-known Finnish artist, the man had explained, Kimmo could also be cured 
with alternative medicine that used mistletoe as its main ingredient (D1: 83). When Kimmo told 
me about this, he seemed simultaneously amused about the range of possible therapies but also 
somewhat upset about those taking advantage of patients’ despair. Even if Kimmo did not seem 
to believe in the mistletoe, he had nevertheless saved and kept the leaflet.  
The body as the site of virtuality 
Attempting to maintain the self-identity as coherent in order to enhance ontological security is 
one way to approach the small ritualizations of consuming special foods, supplements, and so 
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forth. Yet another perspective is offered by Kapferer’s (2004, 2006, 2010) theorization on ritual 
virtuality,176 which complements the interpretation of rituals as participatory modes of action.  
Discussing Bruce Kapferer’s virtuality in regard to time, anthropologist Don Handelman 
(2013: 36) describes how ritual virtuality is engendered by concentrating on the “continuous 
present” or “presentness of the present.” which slows down the flow of time by intensifying it. 
According to Handelman, this is the space in which rituals happen. One way to create—or to 
enhance—the presentness of the present is to immerse in bodily sensations and relational 
kinesthetic experiences. This is largely what happens in many rituals, including the embodied 
practices that my research participants engaged in.  
Kapferer bases his understanding of the virtual on the philosophy of Susanne Langer and, in 
particular, Deleuze and Guattari. Although Langer’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of 
virtuality differ in many ways, they share the understanding that the virtual is essentially a 
dimension of the real.177 In other words, the virtual is understood to be no less real than what 
the actual is; rather, actuality and virtuality are both facets of reality yet different. 178 
Furthermore, the virtual dimension of the real is vital for actuality, because of the potentialities 
that virtuality holds. In other words, the virtual precedes possibility; it can be seen as creating 
the conditions for possibility.179 
Kapferer (2004, 2006) sees ritual as one kind of virtual reality in which ritual participants 
can seek to enhance their potentialities, invite change upon themselves, or practice new 
solutions and change. Kapferer (2006: 673) calls the virtual of ritual a kind of “phantasmagoric 
space” that “allows all kinds of potentialities of human experience to take shape.” It is at once 
a construction, a self-contained imaginal space, but simultaneously a construction that “enables 
participants to break free from the constraints or determinations of everyday life” (Kapferer 
2006: 673).  
Applying this theory to the rituals of make-up and physical exercise, I would argue that here 
the body itself becomes a locus of the virtual of ritual. By enhancing one’s (dying and 
                                                 
176  Kapferer (1997, 2004, 2006) applies the notion of virtuality to a rather “conventional ritual” (in an 
anthropological sense). He is critical toward Bell’s understanding of ritual; according to him, her theorizations 
borrow too much from theories that do not relate to rituals at all (e.g., Bourdieu’s (1991) practice theory; Kapferer 
2004: 36–37). Despite this, I am convinced of the usefulness of his idea of virtuality for my study, even if I apply 
it here to not-so-conventionally defined rituals, which are plentiful in my ethnography. 
177 One way to think of the relationship between the actual and the virtual is to see how “scientific technology 
creates a virtual opening in actuality” (Kapferer 2006: 675). For instance, an MRI is able to illuminate an aspect 
of actual reality which otherwise might not be grasped. Actuality is available to representations but “in excess of 
any attempt to represent it” (Kapferer 2006: 676). However, via the help of scientific technologies, we can 
“descend into actuality within which certain dimensions of the chaotic flux of actuality are suspended or slowed 
down—the virtualizing process—so as to facilitate the examination and manipulation of aspects of actuality” 
(Kapferer 2006: 675). 
178 The relationship and possible subordination of the actual and the virtual differ among the various readers of 
Deleuze, and Handelman’s view on this differs from Kapferer’s understanding (see Handelman 2013). I need to 
leave out the philosophical fine-tuning and further speculation on these here, since my primary aim is to offer 
concepts that can illuminate my ethnography (not vice versa). I take the liberty to enlighten them only as much as 
needed for my analysis. 
179 This reading of virtuality also echoes Utriainen’s understanding of the ritual subjunctive (2016, 2020). 
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weakening) body with aesthetics of vitality and youth—both being apparent features in make-
up and fitness imaginaries—the dying subject is inventing and inviting more potentialities for 
themselves. The body becomes the point of an embodied aesthetic experiment, a ritual site in 
itself, in which—and for which—one seeks to create new possibilities of life. This is done by 
invoking the lost vitality or fitness, applying and implementing those symbols and elements of 
youth, life, and regeneration which our culture recognizes and values, and through them 
creating the potentiality for strengthening one’s life. There is always the possibility that one 
may not “make it”—in this case, survive cancer—but if one does not even try to create space 
for the possibility of recovery, possible healing, and vitality, then the likelihood of “losing the 
battle” is ever greater. 
Subjects create the ritual virtuality filled with potentia with whatever tools and means there 
are available in the given cultural context. It may happen via participation in a traditional 
healing ritual, such as seen among the Sinhalese in Kapferer’s study of Sri Lanka, or it may 
happen via other kinds of ritualizations which invite healing. One may consume mistletoe, 
apply a strict exercise regime, take medication, or visit a contemporary Western healer. 
Ritual virtuality at the healer’s house  
Similar to Kimmo, some of the other research patients lived the end of their life in an ambiguous 
state, simultaneously knowing that they were approaching death yet unable to face it. Oiva, for 
instance, had been seriously ill for about fifteen years, and as a day hospice patient he knew 
that his death was approaching. Yet, when toward the very end of his life he was admitted to 
the hospice ward and his organs started to fail, he felt bewilderment and disbelief: “I was 
prepared that I will die from this, but still… It surprises me how… since I have no pains even…” 
(Oiva/2). Oiva’s body was not in pain—not all dying patients experience it—and this made it 
harder for him to believe that the end of life could be near. Sometimes this simultaneous 
“knowing and not knowing” was mixed with strong emotions of fear, and at times, this led to 
patients engaging in alternative actions. This was the case with Vivian, for example, who 
refused to listen to the doctors who told her that nothing more could be done about her tumor. 
Instead, she went to a private hospital to continue her treatments. “I came to the conclusion that 
I don’t want to die yet […] I am not ready to leave… or to die,” she explained to me (Vivian/1).  
Like many of my research participants, my mother also trusted and believed in medicine, 
but in the end she unexpectedly turned to an alternative and very unorthodox treatment. After 
her diagnosis, she received one series of chemotherapy, and when that did not prove effective 
she subsequently continued with radiation therapy. During the last weeks of her life, the locus 
of her trust shifted. From a friend she learned about a traditional healer who lived an hour’s 
driving away. At that point the medicine did not offer any further hope (she had not been offered 
any palliative consultation), and hence there was absolutely “nothing to lose.” On the contrary, 
the healer represented hope. This avenue offered my mother a way to gain some power—or 
potentia—over the situation, for with the healer one could at least invite change. In Kapferer’s 
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words, in the virtual space of ritual (such as with this healer), “participants can reimagine (and 
redirect and reorient themselves) into the everyday circumstances of life” (Kapferer 2004: 47). 
For my mother, the healer provided an opportunity to create a new understanding and 
interpretation of her situation. 
I accompanied my mother to meet the healer (D4: 12). I had somewhat mixed feelings about 
the situation, yet I hoped that the healer would be psychologically skilled and in that way could 
perhaps relieve my mother’s anxiety.180 Of course, I was also curious to meet the healer because 
of my academic background; I was keen to see how the healer worked. Finally, if not most 
importantly, I did not want my mother to go alone, as I did not quite trust her driving anymore. 
My mother was not unique in her willingness to try out another kind of treatment than 
biomedicine, although compared to some other countries Finland seems to rate rather 
moderately in its use of complementary and alternative therapy (CAM). According to an 
international study, 27% of all of cancer patients in Finland in 1980–2004 used CAM (Horneber 
et al. 2012).181 While a recent study suggests that CAM use has decreased since 2008 in Finland 
(Vuolanto et al. 2020), it tends to be more prevalent in cases of advanced illness (Truant et al. 
2013).182 
The healer’s information on the Google Maps page simply called her a “masseuse,” whereas 
her business card said “healer” (parantaja), with no further explanation of her style of 
healing.183 According to a recent study conducted in Finland, the most commonly used form of 
CAM includes various biological therapies, such as herbal remedies and nutritional and dietary 
supplements (Vuolanto et al. 2020). This was also my ethnographic experience, since most of 
my research participants were taking at least some type of herbal medicine or vitamin 
supplement. According to an earlier study published in Finland in 2002, when asked about their 
reasons for using CAM, most cancer patients reported restoring their hope in the future and 
doing as much as they could for themselves (Salmenperä 2002). These results reflect a need for 
                                                 
180 Having worked as a masseuse for the Hospice of Santa Cruz County in California, I knew from my own 
experience how helpful therapeutic touch could be during the last weeks and days of someone’s life. Furthermore, 
as part of my experience with hospice in the USA, I had met various alternative therapists, many of whom were 
emotionally skilled in working with people with a high level of stress and trauma. 
181 According to the Finnish Science barometer, 34% of Finns believe that practitioners of alternative medicine 
possess some skills and knowledge which practitioners of biomedicine do not have. On the other hand, trust in 
medicine, and especially in cancer studies, is very high among Finns (Tiedebarometri 2019). There is very little 
studied information about the prevalence and experiences of CAM among cancer patients in Finland (Vuolanto et 
al. 2018). 
182 Since 2000, around 50% of cancer patients around the world have used complementary and alternative medicine 
(CAM) at some point in their illness trajectories (Horneber et al. 2012). The differences between the various 
countries and between different time periods can be great: in general, the use of CAM has increased since 2000 
and, especially in North America, various alternative therapies have been very common among cancer patients 
(Horneber et al. 2012; Salamonsen 2013). 
183 The National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine in the USA classifies CAM into five main 
categories: 1) alternative medical systems, such as traditional Chinese medicine or Ayurveda; 2) mind-body 
interventions, such as meditation, prayer, healing, or support groups; 3) biologically based therapies, such as herbs, 
dietary supplements, or vitamins; 4) manipulation and body-based methods, such as massage, chiropractics, or 
osteopathy; and 5) energy therapies, such as Qi Gong and Reiki (Molassiotis 2005). 
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self-empowerment and agency practice. Based on my earlier experience in the hospice field, 
alternative therapies mostly supported the physical, psychological, and emotional wellbeing of 
patients, in contrast to offering actual cures for diseases. For this reason, I was surprised to learn 
that this healer explicitly used rhetoric about curing rather than caring. Truant et al. (2013) 
confirm, however, that some patients with advanced cancer use CAM to improve their chances 
for a cure. These patients believe, or hope, that alternative therapies could actually fight against 
the disease (for instance, by shrinking the tumor and enhancing the body’s immune response). 
For others, the value of alternative and complementary therapies lay in their non-curative 
benefits, such as improving wellbeing and feeling healthier, promoting relaxation and reducing 
stress, boosting energy, improving quality of life, and management of symptoms and treatment 
side effects. Some reported using CAM to address unmet emotional, psychological, and 
spiritual needs, and also to feel that they had done everything possible to fight their cancer and 
to improve a sense of control over their illness (Truant et al. 2013). In my mother’s case, I could 
specifically see her need for the latter. Doctors kept telling her that nothing could be done about 
the tumor, but she felt like she had to do something. The need to do something was similarly 
great among nearly all of the patients I met—this may be one reason why rituals are potentially 
so significant at the end of one’s life. Here the ritual becomes a viable possibility to exercise 
one’s agency. 
The healer’s office was at her home in the countryside. While my mother entered the 
treatment room with the healer, I stayed in the waiting room outside. There were binders filled 
with magazine articles and various testimonials about healings done by this particular healer. I 
scanned them and was surprised to find that most dealt with very concrete health issues, such 
as migraines, spinal disc injuries, or nerve damage, which, according to the testimonials, 
biomedical doctors and conventional physiotherapists had not been able to fix. Unlike I had 
expected, the testimonials did not talk about psychological, emotional, or spiritual healing.184 
When my mother came out of the treatment room, she told me that the healer had wished 
that my mother would have come earlier, since now the situation was very difficult to work 
with. She had talked about water veins under my parent’s house as a likely cause of my mother’s 
condition,185  and she recommended changing the position of her bed so that the harmful 
emanations coming from the water would not be so great. When I asked my mother what the 
actual treatment included, she told me that it had been just like massage. I realized that the 
“division of labor” between holistic healers and biomedical healers did not fall into the “soft” 
versus “hard” approach or the psychological (or soul) versus physical (or body) approach. The 
                                                 
184 Scholars of religion, such as Tuija Hovi (2012) and Outi Pohjanheimo (2018), have pointed out that services of 
various kinds of spiritual healers are sought after equally in the cases of physical illnesses as in other types of 
social, psychological, spiritual, or even economic troubles.  
185 Since then I have learned that the folk theory of harmful earth radiation and water veins was very common in 
Finland around the 1970s, actually dating back to 1932 when Baron Gustav von Pohl claimed in Germany that 
cancer was caused by harmful earth radiation and water veins underneath people’s houses 
(https://swissharmony.com/what-are-water-veins/research-on-water-veins/).  
~ 161 ~ 
 
matter was much more complex than I had envisaged. However, when the phenomenon was 
approached from the point of view of virtuality, it made more sense. The whole healing ritual 
appeared as an attempt to build an alternate ontology, a sort of new construction or alternative 
ordering of reality. When we drove away from the healer’s house, I heard my mother saying 
quietly, as if to herself, that maybe it would work and maybe the tumor would disappear (D2: 
62). The possibility for a different reality had at least been created—it was there to grasp onto 
now. It was easier for my mother to dwell in the virtuality of the ritual than in the dreadful 
unknown of the actuality of her imminent death. 
The embodied rituals described up until this point have all been concentrated on the body, 
but there were also other kinds of ritualizations that were not directly about the body. One of 
them was about writing. 
9.2 Writing as a negotiation about life and death  
“Writing for life” 
Writing is a testimony on being alive. Two of my research participants, Heikki and Marjo-
Riitta, actively maintained blogs, both of which had been started only after learning about their 
diagnosis.186 Heikki, who had been encouraged to do it by a friend, told me that writing the 
blog was one way to learn how to handle the situation, and it was also a good way to keep a 
record of everything that was happening (Heikki/1). In addition, there was a more societal 
motivation behind Heikki’s writing. Prior to getting ill, he had had some prejudices about the 
quality of healthcare, but now he wished to share how brilliant Finnish specialized medicine 
really was. Of course, Heikki added, not all the aspects of the care had been perfect; he wished 
that some improvement could happen in regard to certain attitudes (Heikki/1). He had noticed, 
for instance, that an orchiectomy (surgery to remove one or both testicles) was recommended 
rather routinely to him and offered without much discussion about alternatives. By writing 
openly about such issues, Heikki wished to support others in a similar situation—and, according 
to the feedback he had received on his blog, he had succeeded in doing in this.187 
Heikki began writing his blog (Sairaan rakas elämä, “Sick beloved life”) when he was first 
diagnosed in 2014. Since then, he has survived two severe cancers, lymphoma and leukemia, 
and he still continues the blog (as late as 2019). Creativity had always been part of Heikki’s 
life, yet prior to cancer it had mostly taken the form of visual arts and painting. With blogging, 
Heikki found the writer in himself. Over the course of time, writing became a sort of “mode of 
living and a way to process things” (Heikki/3), and even a way to survive:  
Many may wonder about how often I update this blog. Writing anchors me into life. My dad’s 
former neighbor used to do running even though he did not like it per se, but he thought it 
                                                 
186 Since these two blogged publicly with their own names, I refer to them here in that way.  
187 This discussion in the blog led to an invitation to participate in a discussion program on national public radio 
concerning sexuality and aging men (Jorma Hietaneva, “Miesten tunti: Seksuaalisuus ei ole iästä kiinni,” April 27, 
2015).  
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was necessary for his health. “I run for my life,” he used to say. I think I will start using a 
new slogan: “I write for my life.” (Heikki, blog entry “I’m writing for my life,” 8/31/2016) 
Heikki tended to update his blog very frequently. During the most active years, he blogged 
several times per day, and after the active phase of cancer was over, he has continued blogging 
almost daily. In one of our discussions, Heikki explained his need for blogging in the following 
manner:  
Heikki: It’s like with my paintings. I never wanted to paint works that just pile up in the 
corners of the room. In the same way, I did not want to write just to the drawer. 
I: So, for you the communication is the most important? 
Heikki: Yes, I feel that I exist via people. If there were no other humans, I would be nothing. 
Because everything we have has been given to us by others. Without them we would be just 
shallow bodies. I live when I am in interaction with others. This [blogging] is one way to 
achieve that. (Heikki/3) 
 The support that Heikki felt coming from his readers was significant to him. Even though 
Heikki had supporting family around him, the cheering messages he received from his readers 
were vital; he said that he felt as if his readers were carrying him through the hard times 
(Heikki/3). In this way, Heikki’s connection with the actual blog writing, as well as with his 
readers, was rather concrete; his existence was mediated via the internet. This reflects 
Feenberg’s claims about online communities as forms of “virtual embodiment” (Feenberg 
2006: 193): instead of being expressions of disembodiment, the online presentations of 
ourselves are part of us. At least for Heikki, his blog seemed to be a form of his “extended 
body” (Feenberg 2006). Furthermore, writing itself became a ritual, which helped him to get 
through the worst moments.  
 Writing (or narrating in general) has been regarded as therapeutic in itself, yet writing is an 
activity which easily becomes ritualized (see Kellogg 1999).188 Autobiographical writing about 
various chronic—and at times terminal—illnesses has been trending (especially in the USA) 
since the 1980s (on “autopathographies,” see Couser 1997).189 In the 2000s, much of this kind 
of autopathographic writing moved online and became blogs (Sofka 2012). Nowadays, medical 
staff may even recommend patients to write publicly about their experiences of serious illness. 
                                                 
188 Since Arthur Kleinman’s Illness Narratives (1988) and Frank’s The Wounded Storyteller (1995), there has been 
a movement within the study of medicine, namely, “narrative medicine,” which emphasizes the importance of 
narration by patients and empathic listening by physicians. 
189 As a reason for this, Thomas Couser, an emeritus professor of English (and the founder of the Disability Studies 
Program at Hofstra University), has speculated that since medical efficacy has increased, diseases and the sense 
of illness have become anomalies, unnatural states of body/mind; as events in one’s life course that are noteworthy, 
they are narratable (Couser 1997: 9). Couser (1997: 9–11) also notes that simultaneously with the triumph of 
scientific technological medicine there has been increasing dissatisfaction and distrust among the public toward 
the medical establishment in the US. In the wake of the patients’ rights movement in the US in the 1970s, patients 
have started to challenge and resist medical authority. Understandably, this tendency has only increased since the 
internet has made self-diagnosis more possible. Additionally, since medical practices are often seen as alienating 
and objectifying (Couser 1997: 10), there are now more attempts to reclaim one’s own voice. 
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It is not only the therapeutic and possibly empowering effect that writing can have for the 
writers themselves, but especially in regard to death and dying some believe that blogging can 
create a positive societal shift of perception regarding the end of life (see Recuber 2017).190 
“I write my day” 
For Heikki, the ritual of writing kept him anchored in life. For others, such as Inkeri and Marjo-
Riitta, writing served as more of an existential inquiry about life and death—a study about 
living in the liminal space of a terminal illness. The name of Marjo-Riitta’s blog was 
particularly telling: Syöpä tarinoituu todeksi, “Cancer narrates itself into reality.” Words were 
not just letters on the screen for Marjo-Riitta; rather, they had the potency to create reality and 
render things possible. Writing for Marjo-Riitta was exactly the kind of virtuality described by 
Kapferer, a space in which one can reorient and redirect oneself, and where one can make, or 
imagine, things to become (more) real. 
Marjo-Riitta was a mother of three in her forties; her youngest was only four when she was 
diagnosed. When I met her, three months before she died, we talked about the meaning of social 
media to her. Facebook, and especially the closed Facebook page for women with breast cancer, 
meant a lot, and it was an important source of support. Marjo-Riitta said that she preferred 
social media over a conventional support group, such as those organized by cancer 
organizations. She had gone to one once, but that was not her thing: “I just don’t get anything 
out of that kind of rambling conversation over coffee. I need something more substantial and 
goal oriented” (Marjo-Riitta/1). “On Facebook, you can always pick and choose what to read,” 
she added. Another very significant way to process everything came to Marjo-Riitta in the form 
of the documentary series Avec Tastula, in which she was asked to participate by the nationally 
well-known journalist Maarit Tastula.191 In time, the production of the documentary became so 
therapeutic that she felt she did not need any formal therapy. Long before the documentary, 
however, already in 2012, Marjo-Riitta had started to write her blog. 
Before engaging in writing, Marjo-Riitta had been reading other women’s blogs about breast 
cancer, and she felt that such blogs were useful for analyzing and organizing one’s own 
experience, especially the chaos one was going through (Ressler et al. 2012). In addition to 
creating a sort of mental coherence about all that is happening when one falls suddenly ill, 
blogging can also effectively shape one’s daily rhythm and time at the moment of serious illness 
when the usual everyday routines are missing (Stage 2014). Cancer blogs were not only 
informative, Marjo-Riitta explained, but they made you realize that you were not alone; they 
created a sense of community (Marjo-Riitta/1) (see also Stavrositu 2014). Furthermore, the 
manner in which these blogs framed the illness process was an important aspect for Marjo-
                                                 
190 While there has been considerable scholarly discussion in the media on the visibility of death, the media does 
not necessarily cover issues of everyday vulnerability and “ordinary deaths.” 
191 In the end, the documentary had two parts. The first part was filmed in 2014 (YLE 1, aired 12/12/2014) when 
no one knew for sure how Marjo-Riitta’s cancer was going to advance, while the second part was filmed in the 
last weeks of Marjo-Riitta’s life and aired only after her death (YLE 1, 4/17/2017). 
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Riitta. In the beginning, just after the diagnosis, since one was not able to foresee any future, 
everything seemed so gloomy and scary. In that situation, reading about other people’s 
experiences gave some shape to the future, and she was able to envisage some possible 
scenarios for herself, Marjo-Riitta explained. The online sphere offered a range of possible 
worlds, akin to Kapferer’s ritual virtuality. According to Marjo-Riitta, this represents a crucial 
moment in the illness trajectory, in particular the moment when one first receives the diagnosis 
about a serious illness and is then sent home with sick leave. To be at home alone with a life-
threatening diagnosis was not easy, especially since the waiting time for doctor’s appointments 
and various procedures could be weeks. (Marjo-Riitta/1.) 
Since Marjo-Riitta loved writing, she decided to start her own blog. Interestingly, she also 
noted that not just writing was significant, but especially writing publicly: “It was an intriguing 
thought that anybody could read my texts” (Marjo-Riitta/1). Echoing Feenberg’s description of 
the extended body, she was not only practicing her agency via writing but by writing on her 
terms she also moderated how she might be objectified by others. Marjo-Riitta also recognized 
that her blog stood out from many, or at least she drew this from comments made by her readers: 
There are sisters192 who actually come to me in some public events and thank me for the 
documentary and for the blog. I’ve been told that they have gotten the most comfort and 
consolation from my blog, over all other blogs, or anything for that matter. […] They tell that 
[via reading my blog] they have been able to get ahold of their own emotions and situation, 
and that they’ve somehow come to understand what’s happening to them. 
Also, there is this battle rhetoric that you have to fight and be the most positive person: “Go, 
go! Don’t give up!” I find that world repugnant, as it starts so literally at that moment when 
you learn that you have cancer. Everybody comes telling you, “You gotta fight now and stay 
positive!” For fuck’s sake, if you get the flu you are not told by everyone to “keep a positive 
attitude!” And what it does, what kind of effect this kind of attitude has, is that then one is 
even less able to encounter these sorts of difficult things and emotions, which one gets terribly 
a lot after being diagnosed with cancer. As if one should then frantically try to ward off all 
that is negative, because one should not be somber… (Marjo-Riitta/1) 
We continued the discussion and thought together that perhaps this kind of reaction was actually 
a way to avoid facing the suffering other by totally bypassing the issue with insistent comments 
such as “keep fighting.” To talk and to hear about suffering was not easy, Marjo-Riitta reflected, 
but in her blog she wanted to be able to express exactly how she felt, describing her experiences 
honestly, however harrowing they might be.193 
Marjo-Riitta offered a multifaceted analysis of her own existential situation, and often she 
examined her lifeworld specifically in relation to words and language. Language and writing 
formed a space in which she was able to practice her understanding of herself and her situation; 
thus, writing became the virtual place where she brought together the elements she needed in 
                                                 
192 Among breast cancer patients, it is customary for women to call each another “sisters.” 
193 After beginning her blog, Marjo-Riitta had been invited to contribute to a publication on logotherapy regarding 
suffering and death. This text (“Elämän sietämätön hauraus,” Karhunen 2015) was based on her blog writing, and 
it also comprised an edited version of her final assignment for her logotherapy studies.  
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order to work with herself within the painful situation. It was also the space in which Marjo-
Riitta was able to take refuge. By writing, she sought to create a space of/for hope and beauty; 
writing enabled a new and personal relationship with her illness, and perhaps with the coming 
death: 
I don’t care to hear… I’m not able to hear anything more about my blood, my liver, my bones, 
my lungs, nothing, nothing at all. If I don’t hear about them, is everything then fine?  
If I write my day to start in such a way that there are no examinations whatsoever at all, will 
I then be happy for just one single day? Would everything be different if I could be safe even 
in my dreams, in my sleep? 
Sun, my friend, help me to write about beautiful things. I can write myself exactly the kind 
of day I want. Look, a tree. Look, a bird. Look, a human. 194  (Marjo-Riitta, blog post 
3/24/2014)  
In her writing, Marjo-Riitta reflected on the relationship of words and thought in relation to her 
illness: 
The one thing that I am not always able to think of calmly is the existing spread in my spine, 
that is, the metastasis in my vertebrae. I always refer to it somehow unconcernedly. With a 
few words. In a subordinate clause. I am not yet able to face this subject properly. And what 
about my newest companion then, the bone marrow spread. With that, it’s beeping even more 
busily. I am not able to think whole thoughts or write full sentences. 
I always wish to change the subject. Spine and bone marrow are fatal places. Especially the 
spine. Here I come against the limits of my thinking, the wall stands up and I don’t have the 
force to climb over it.  
And I don’t need to, yet. It is the least I could do now, the climbing. I will surely learn in its 
time what lies behind that wall.195 (Marjo-Riitta, blog post 12/30/2014) 
In the end, Marjo-Riitta also wrote about the space where words ceased to be:  
I continue writing. In my own way. 
One thing that affects my writing is that the more I spend time on my own, the less I have words.  
                                                 
194 ”Minä en nyt haluaisi jaksaisi haluaisi kuulla verestäni, maksastani, luistani, keuhkoistani mitään en yhtään 
mitään. Jos en kuule niistä onko silloin kaikki hyvin? Jos kirjoitan päiväni alkamaan siten ettei mitään 
tutkimuksia olekaan, saanko olla yhden päivän ainoastaan onnellinen? 
Olisiko silloin kaikki toisin jos edes unessani olisin turvassa, elämä olisi turvallinen? 
Aurinko, ystäväni, auta minua kirjoittamaan kauniista asioista. Minä voin kirjoittaa itselleni juuri 
sellaisen päivän kuin haluan: 
Katso – puu. 
Katso – lintu.  
Katso – ihminen.” 
195 ”Se mihin en aina osaa suhtautua rauhallisesti on tämä minun olemassa oleva selkärangan levinneisyys, siis 
etäpesäkkeet nikamissa. Viittaan tähän aina jotenkin puolihuolimattomasti. Muutamalla sanalla. Sivulauseessa. En 
pysty vieläkään kohtaamaan tätä aihetta kunnolla. Entä ihan uusin kumppanini, luuydinlevinneisyys. Sen kanssa 
vasta tuuttaakin varattua. En pysty ajattelemaan kokonaisia ajatuksia, kirjoittamaan ehjiä lauseita. 
Haluan aina vaihtaa puheenaihetta. Selkäranka ja luuydin ovat paikkoina niin kohtalokkaita. Varsinkin selkäranka. 
Ajattelun rajani tulevat vastaan, nousee seinä pystyyn enkä jaksa kiivetä sen yli. 
Eihän minun vielä tarvitsekaan. Koska vähiten kiivetä jaksaisin. Saan sitten aikanaan varmasti tietää mitä kaikkea 
sen seinän takana on.” 
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The world beyond the words is a beautiful experience. 
There is nothing to be afraid of.196 (Marjo-Riitta, blog post 12/12/2014) 
As a ritualized practice during terminal illness, blog writing can be interpreted as a way to create 
and strengthen connections with people and with the world at large—and ultimately with life 
itself (Olson 2007).197 Blog writing is not a diary-like self-expression or monologue, but rather 
a reciprocal communication, often concretely so, where readers engage in a dialogue with the 
writer by leaving comments. By writing a blog, one can strengthen the social bonds one has—
or wishes to have—with the world. At times, writing for Marjo-Riitta became a corporeal 
exercise for living. Yet, simultaneously at such moments, as described above, it appeared as a 
mental exercise for dying. Hence, the ritualizations aiming to avoid death and the ritualizations 
of preparation for death were not as exclusive as they may sound. Patients may have wished for 
the former but nonetheless prepared for the latter, at least on some level of their psyche. 
9.3 Rituals of preparation for death 
Tying up loose ends 
British sociologist and death scholar Tony Walter ([1994] 2002) has said that in today’s 
Western secularized world, it is psychological counseling that people wish for themselves in 
the vicinity of death and dying, not religious rituals.198 Personalized counseling and different 
kinds of peer support groups are indeed modern ways to manage crises, but I witnessed people 
also needing to do other things than just talking. No matter from what perspective one looks at 
it, approaching death is always significant, and merely “sitting and waiting for death” (as 
someone put it; D4: 31) without doing anything (about it) seems atypical for people.  
 In regard to contemporary post-mortem rituals, Walter (1996a, 1996b) notes that they tend 
to revolve around various aspects of the end of life instead of the afterlife. My ethnographic 
experience is analogous with this: rituals of preparation for death were mostly about this life 
and the ending of it rather than death or afterlife. However, because of the finality of death, 
concrete preparations for leaving this world (such as writing a will or planning details for one’s 
funeral) were often not mere practicalities requiring attention; they easily became ritualized 
practices for the acceptance of death. 
The practical preparations which I witnessed among my research participants fell mostly 
into the following categories: financial arrangements, sorting of materials and possessions, 
sharing knowhow and necessary practical information about the household, and funeral 
planning. At first I did not necessarily think of these as rituals, but after spending more time in 
                                                 
196 ”Jatkan kirjoittamista. Omalla tavallani. Yksi asia mikä kirjoittamiseeni vaikuttaa on se, että mitä enemmän 
olen omassa rauhassani, sen vähemmän minulla on sanoja. Elämä sanojen tuolla puolen on kaunis kokemus. Siinä 
ei ole mitään pelättävää.” 
197 A recent article on blogs about terminally illness demonstrates how blogs were used for construction of a 
postself for the dying blogger. This construction happened through the writing of bloggers themselves but also by 
the bereaved, who continued their relationships with the deceased via these blogs (Schilderink & Venbrux 2019). 
198 In Finland, psychoanalyst Pirkko Siltala (among others) has written about the importance of psychotherapy for 
dying patients already from the 1980s on (Siltala 1985). 
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the field with my research participants, and also with my mother, I came to realize that 
performing these practices was intertwined with other meanings than just the most obvious 
ones. These practices were framed by the awareness of death. This awareness constituted 
another layer of meaning in the practices, which were now also about farewells, either between 
the dying and their loved ones or between the dying and their life in general (places, memories, 
pets, etc.). Moreover, these activities often appeared to comprise a kind of a threshold or goal 
post, a significant point to cross in one’s terminal path. Performing these activities created the 
space in which one could somehow come to terms with the imminent death—or at least come 
closer to an acceptance of it. Thus, these concrete deeds served as rituals with potential 
ramifications and innuendos which were not immediately obvious.  
Kimmo, among others, had made arrangements involving his finances. Furthermore, he told 
that he had taught his spouse to take care of the practicalities in their household which had 
previously been under his domain (D1: 74). In families of two adults, information about 
insurances, mortgages, and so forth was discussed and new responsibilities were shared. At 
times, these things were extremely practical, such as teaching about the heating system of the 
house or how to back up the trailer to get firewood (D3: 13). Eeva and Oiva talked at length 
about sorting their possessions and getting rid of unnecessary stuff. This was especially a 
concern for Eeva, as she did not want to leave it to her child to sort out her belongings (D1: 76–
79). Aili had designed her whole funeral program, including the text for her obituary and the 
hymns she wished to be sung during the service (D2: 31). Shifting thinking away from one’s 
next treatment or a new drug trial to funeral planning marked a significant change in the final 
days. 
Sometimes the change was expressed in more mundane terms, albeit not less significantly. 
Oiva was an artist in his seventies with a rich life history, and he continued to express a 
Spinozian sense of joy and curiosity about life, even during his very last weeks and days. As 
mentioned above, the embodied experience of dying was somehow a surprising experience to 
Oiva. Even though he had been suffering from cancer and other illnesses for a long time, he 
was still intensely connected with life, and his deteriorating body seemed to truly astonish him. 
A couple weeks before his death, he told me that he had passed a sleepless night because he 
had been doing some thinking. The day before, he had noticed in the newspaper an obituary for 
an artist colleague. This prompted him to give up his fast sports car and pass it on to his son. 
To formalize this decision, he had sent an email to that effect. Based on our conversations over 
the eight months I had known Oiva, I knew that he loved that car a great deal, and even though 
he had not been able to drive it for a long time he had still not surrendered it. Now he finally 
did. I saw this gesture as a meaningful symbolic act: giving the car away was for him a clear 
sign of resignation from life, something that he was willing to do only at the very end. (D1: 
115.) 
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At times, the preparation seemed to involve ritualized grieving over a previously deceased 
loved one or a fellow patient at the hospice home. Sometimes my research participants in the 
day hospice started spontaneously talking about the funerals of their beloved. For me these 
moments signaled that the person had started to shift in their orientation. Witnessing the passing 
of fellow patients served as a sort of preparatory practice, as seen with the memorial candle in 
the day hospice room. Although Eeva had already prepared for her death in numerous ways 
(e.g., sorting her things, making her death shirt), she “rehearsed” through the passing of her 
fellow patients. She spent several weeks on the hospice ward before her death, and so she had 
had time to create some close connections with a couple of patients; even at the end of her life, 
she formed short yet meaningful friendships. With one, she had agreed that they would attend 
each other’s memorial services, whoever would die first. (D1: 104–105.) When the friend died 
before Eeva, she felt sad at the loss. On the day of the funeral, when I phoned her, she tried to 
be stoic: “I am trying to be like on any other day. This [death] is part of this house, isn’t it?” 
(D1: 123). Attending the service was important to Eeva, and she was happy to have a beautiful 
white rose to put on her friend’s coffin. The simple ceremony was held at the hospice home, 
and it included only the blessing of the body. Since she did not witness the actual burying of 
the coffin (I presume that the coffin was sent to the crematorium), Eeva felt that the ceremony 
had been incomplete (D1: 124–125). This, in turn, prompted Eeva to plan her own funeral in 
more detail. A few days later, she told me that she had completed a set of papers concerning 
the logistics for her own funeral. (D1: 126.)  
A visit to the funeral home  
My mother did not talk about her future or the approaching death, and it was actually difficult 
to talk about the situation with her at all. This suddenly changed about a week before she died. 
We were in a car shop buying new winter tires, waiting in the lounge while the mechanic was 
putting them on. Unexpectedly, my mother asked me if I knew if it was possible to be buried 
without a coffin. I was surprised about her choice of conversation topic, since I had been hoping 
to talk about these sorts of things but until then it had seemed impossible. I answered that I was 
not sure but we could find out.199 From there, the conversation went into various details of her 
funeral, such as the newspaper obituary, in regard to which she had a specific wish. After we 
left, I drove us downtown by the river. Walking was getting harder for her, but since it was a 
very beautiful and sunny day and the autumn trees were at the height of their beauty, we thought 
of making a little walk. We parked the car, and by chance I noticed a funeral home just around 
the corner. I pointed it out to my mother, and together we decided to drop in. 
                                                 
199 There is no legal obstacle to burying a body without a coffin in Finland, but since it is difficult to move a 
body without one, it follows that burials without coffin are very rare 
(https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/ajantasa/2003/20030457). The coffin does not need to be made of wood, though. In 
order to hasten decomposition, cardboard and like materials are also used. However, since in practice the coffin 
needs to be strong for transportation, most people still use a conventional wood one. Furthermore, crematoriums 
require bodies to be in a coffin (http://www.krematorio.fi/fi/tuhkaus/tietoa-tuhkauksesta; personal 
communication with an officer of The Finnish Cremation Foundation, 11/22/2017).  
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As we entered the funeral home, a neat-looking man in a suit came to serve us. “We came 
to choose a coffin for me,” my mother told him bluntly. Without blinking, the funeral director 
guided us to sit down on comfortable chairs around a small, round table. He served us coffee, 
juice, and cookies, and then brought all the binders from which my mother could choose a 
coffin and death clothes to her liking. The funeral director answered her questions in a 
restrained, quiet manner, and helped my mother to make her choices. After deciding on the 
coffin and the clothing, we went to look at the different kinds of urns on the shelves. My mother 
chose a decomposable clay urn with a painted picture of a boat sailing toward the horizon. The 
funeral director wrote down all the details on a sheet of paper. Everything was done respectfully 
and in a quiet, yet matter-of-fact manner which shielded my mother—I thought—from possible 
painful emotions underneath this important moment. At one point, my mother asked the funeral 
director if it was unusual to have the actual client themselves ordering their coffin and so forth. 
Rather expressionlessly the funeral director told us that actually it was not, and every now and 
then they had people buying their own funeral arrangements. The whole experience was 
significant for both of us. Until that moment, there had been no discussion of any of the details 
relating to her imminent death—and now we were at the heart of the matter. 
When we left the funeral home, I felt that things had changed. We had somehow officially 
acknowledged that she was dying. She had acknowledged that she was dying. I felt that our 
visit to the funeral home—however unplanned it had been—was a ritualized preparation for her 
dying. The formal and subdued personal service by the funeral director made the moment unlike 
any ordinary shopping experience. This moment embodied Kapferer’s interpretation of ritual 
as a kind of virtuality in which ritual participants can invite change for themselves or practice 
new solutions and transformation. The space at the funeral home enabled the thought of death 
to be approached and exercised. The possibility of becoming a corpse was invited into actuality 
via the virtual ritual practice. 
Death cleaning as a practice of agency 
I learned one powerful example of preparation for death with Kirsi when she invited me to her 
home one late summer afternoon. As mentioned in the prologue, Kirsi had been diagnosed with 
lung cancer already years before. She had gone through a pneumonectomy (lung removal), and 
ever since she had been on disease-modifying medication. Because of her severe prognosis, she 
had been referred to the hospice earlier, and she had been attending the day hospice group 
already for a long time. Sitting at her kitchen table, we had a lengthy interview and conversation 
concerning her extensive illness trajectory and its effects on her life. Being severely ill for so 
long had changed Kirsi’s social life completely, and now she suffered from rather severe 
loneliness. She talked about the loneliness openly, but it was also tangible; she seemed to have 
an immense need to talk and share. As a solution for her loneliness, she had found writing. She 
attended a therapeutic writing course, which turned out to be a critical method of self-healing 
for her. (Kirsi/1; D4: 29.) 
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What impressed me the most about Kirsi was actually her home. After our conversation, she 
showed me around her three-room apartment. While we were sitting in the kitchen I had not 
noticed anything unusual, but as soon as we entered the living room I realized that her house 
was nearly empty. The apartment almost looked like it had been robbed, or that she was in the 
middle of moving; most of her things, including the furniture, had already been taken. The 
living room was practically empty. When I made a comment about this, Kirsi just laughed. She 
had started her “death cleaning,” she said. In practice, this meant sorting her stuff and giving 
her property away.200 Kirsi appeared to be still in quite good condition, so I was a little surprised 
about her determination in regard to the “preparation,” which essentially had to do with sparing 
her only child the need to deal with all of her stuff after her death. In the end, Kirsi lived for 
well over a year after our meeting. (D4: 29.) 
While Kirsi’s example was extreme, it was not unusual for patients to perform some sort of 
cleaning after their diagnosis. For instance, Eeva talked about organizing her stuff a number of 
times during the few months I knew her (D1: 76–78, 88, 138). She told me that right after she 
learned about her diagnosis, she started a big cleaning and organizing (suursiivous) of her home: 
“I started to throw stuff away, to empty the closets, and to take some clothes to recycling. I had 
quite the whim to do it” (D1: 76). As stated earlier, it seemed to be easier to do something rather 
than just merely sit on the news. 
Eeva told me that she had already burned her diaries years before, and now she was going 
through all the other stuff. “I am content that I have been able to get rid of all the stuff that does 
not mean anything to anybody else,” she noted practically. I asked her, “But those things have 
mattered to you?” She answered, “They meant something a long time ago. But it is so long ago, 
those emotional ties are now long gone.” At this point, there was just a sense of relief in letting 
go of everything. (D1: 77–78.) A little later in our conversation, Eeva started wondering if she 
was somehow cold-hearted, since she did not have any sentimental feelings about getting rid of 
her things. Even her brother had commented to her that she did not need to act so cool, to which 
Eeva had simply stated that she was not acting: “I just know what is going to happen here” (D1: 
88). As noted earlier, Eeva’s approach to her death was practical and calm. And while she 
mentioned a similar motive to do her death cleaning as Kirsi—namely, that she did not want 
her only child to have to go through all her stuff—it occurred to me that it was also maybe a 
matter of privacy. The way in which Eeva told me that she wanted to “tear into pieces some old 
papers” made me think that this was perhaps a way for her to practice agency; the material stuff 
mediated her subjectivity, and perhaps there were parts of herself that she did not wish to reveal 
                                                 
200 Since the Swedish 83-year-old artist Margareta Magnusson published her book Döstädning: Ingen sorglig 
historia (2017), released in English as The Gentle Art of Swedish Death Cleaning (2018), the concept of “Swedish 
Death Cleaning” has become known around the world. A few years before Magnusson’s book, the much-loved 
Finnish poet Eeva Kilpi published her poem collection called Kuolinsiivous (“Death Cleaning,” 2012). I do not 
think it a coincidence that both of these authors addressing the issue are women (even though for Eeva Kilpi the 
“death cleaning” functions more metaphorically). Both of them write, albeit in a very different manner, about 
living while remembering death’s presence. It is noteworthy that among my research participants, only women 
spoke about cleaning and organizing the house as something to do before death.  
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to others (D1: 88). Taking care of one’s own death cleaning can be seen as an act of authority 
over one’s mediated being—as well as one’s dying subjectivity. Furthermore, tearing and 
burning are not just simple gestures of “throwing things away”; they can be seen as signifying 
a more symbolic manner of letting go. When something gets disposed of, there is more room 
for other things. 
Even though I do not want to read any more meanings into the death cleaning than what 
there might actually be, a scholar of religion should note the age-old connection between 
cleaning and religious purification (Douglas [1966] 2002). From this angle, death cleaning 
concretely resembles a spiritual cleansing, purifying gesture. Furthermore, cleaning is 
meaningful on different levels: hygienically, organizationally, symbolically, and spiritually. As 
anthropologists have shown, rituals and ritualizations around death and dying are multiple and 
culturally rich and varied (Metcalf & Huntington 1991; Davies 2017), yet at times they may 
share surprising similarities. The practicies described here illuminate the less studied 
perspective of the preparatory rituals of dying, thereby bringing into view some contemporary 
individualized and secularized variations of death rituals. 
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10. PARTICIPATION, AESTHETICS, AND METAPHYSICAL IMAGINATION 
10.1 Religion as participatory experience  
Religious and spiritual orientations 
In the course of my ethnography, I encountered a few patients for whom religion or a spiritual 
orientation to life was particularly strong, and they drew from spiritual sources throughout their 
lives. For most of my research patients, however, their religious views were somewhat fluid, 
and religion or spirituality did not seem to significantly affect their everyday life, not even prior 
to death. If the theme of religion did not come up on its own, I usually asked about it at some 
point in my relationship with the interviewees.  
In regard to religion, Aili often reiterated that she respected the Church (meaning the Finnish 
Evangelical Lutheran Church) for what she considered it had done for the sake of Finland, but 
she did not really care for its actual religious teaching (Aili/2; D1: 19). Aili’s attitude toward 
the Church represents the majority view in Finland: the societal work that parishes do in Finland 
is well appreciated among most of the Finns (Ketola et al. 2016: 219). In regard to faith, 
according to Gallup Ecclesiastica, a survey study concerning the religious beliefs of Finns 
published every five years, 52% of the population “believe in God,” but only 33% “as taught 
in Christianity” (Ketola et al. 2018: 43). Even though Aili did not consider herself a believer, 
there seemed to be something reassuring in the Christian customs: “It is clear that for me, the 
religion is not… it isn’t any rescue… but when things go really badly, then one can fold the 
hands into a prayer at night” (Aili/2). Aili referred to the “folding of the hands” several times 
during our conversations, usually when she was contrasting her way of believing with that of 
the Church: “My faith is different. I fold my hands and then there is some kind of a connection” 
(D1: 19). I took this to mean that there was something consoling in the embodied praying 
gesture, which she had learned from her mother (Aili/2). It was as if the religious mode (her 
very own mode) was activated or turned on by this ritualized gesture, although conceptually 
Aili was not interested in religion.201 On the other hand, she never referred to an actual moment 
when she would have made a prayer. The ritual gesture of prayer can be interpreted as a creation 
of the kind of ritual space in which consolation and reorientation were made possible. 
Aili did have some experiences of supernatural things, however. One day in the day hospice 
group we started talking about the old Finnish spiritual traditions of the “bird of the dead” 
(kalmalintu) and the “soul bird” (sielulintu).202 Actually, many group members had experienced 
something unusual and special, perhaps supernatural, in regard to birds and death. Aili told that 
even though she did not usually believe in “these kinds of things,” she had had an experience 
                                                 
201 On embodied religious activities among older Orthodox women in Finland, see Kupari 2016. 
202 The kalmalintu refers to a bird that foretells approaching death, whereas the sielulintu can be seen as a 
manifestation of the soul of the deceased, which visits grieving family members (Pentikäinen 1990: 63; Holmberg 
1915: 14; see also Butters 2017). Both of these are part of pre-Christian religiosity in Finland. Furthermore, the 
imagined connection between death or dead with birds seems universal; there is evidence of death-related folklore 
about birds worldwide (Moreman 2014).  
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with a small wagtail just after her husband died. This little bird came to her for three or four 
days in a row when she was in her community garden plot. The bird just stayed around, hanging 
out there with her in the garden—as if it was coming to greet her from the otherworld; indeed, 
the “soul bird” (sielulintu) is traditionally understood as a manifestation of the soul of the 
deceased (Honko et al. 1993: 610). This experience had deeply impressed Aili, since she talked 
about it to others and me every now and then (D1: 2; D2: 116–117). She said that she had never 
believed in “anything like that,” but after this bird had come to her she started thinking that 
“something must be out there” (D1: 2). As we shall see, nature in various aspects was the main 
source of solace for Aili, and it was the place where she believed she would end up after her 
death. Furthermore, as we shall see, birds also came up in other stories as especially meaningful 
creatures relating to death. 
If Aili respected the Church, Peter told me flat out that he despised it. He did not believe in 
God, yet he admitted that it was possible that there was “something more out there” (D1: 59). 
He told me that he was interested in Judaism. Kimmo, in his turn, told me that he had had a 
Christian upbringing, which had left him with Christian values (D1: 119–120). He felt that his 
faith was “somewhere in the background of everything,” guiding him especially in regard to 
ethics. He had never had any supernatural experiences, he said, but continued pensively that 
“having one could have been exciting” (D1: 120). Eeva belonged to the Orthodox Church but 
she defined herself as “hardly spiritual.” When we discussed this, she reminded me that in the 
“old days,” when she was a child, being Orthodox was something not to talk about. This had to 
do with Finnish history and World War II with the Russians (which caused numerous Finns to 
change their faith from Orthodox to Lutheran Christianity). More recently, she told me, she had 
taken a couple of her friends to the Uspenski Cathedral in Helsinki, and she realized that now 
she was able to feel proud of her beautiful church and the splendid singing there (D1: 93). As 
for her actual religious faith, however, Eeva was not quite sure. The priest had visited her a few 
times when she was on the hospice ward, but, according to Eeva, they just talked about this and 
that, nothing personal nor spiritual. She admitted that she thought about spiritual things quite a 
bit, but nothing was certain. In the end, she summarized her religiosity by saying, “I am just 
like the others. I believe a little bit—but not really, however” (D1: 93). 
For most, their religious denomination (or lack of one) did not seem to affect their everyday 
life, not even in the face of death—although for some (as we shall see), their spiritual views 
probably affected their general approach to life as well as death. When I first met Oiva, he told 
me right away that he believed in God: “Not the way in which the Church teaches,” he clarified, 
but “it is clear that God is everywhere.” Oiva described himself as “a pantheist” (this was his 
exact own wording): “I should not maybe say this out loud but it feels like a good idea to me 
that God is part of everything” (D1: 12). For Oiva, God seemed almost more like a natural fact 
than a matter of religious belief. He also told me that he had had two near-death experiences 
earlier in his life; he had even seen a tunnel of light, which had been inviting to him. Due to 
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these experiences, Oiva said that he did not fear death; he knew there was a place, or “perhaps 
not a place—that sounds too limited—rather a state or mode of being, which is close to nirvana, 
or something” (D1: 12). About a month before Oiva died, when his condition had deteriorated 
quite a bit, he reiterated that he had no fear. He said that he knew that no medications would 
help him anymore: “There is even a certain sense of destiny here. I feel myself like some sort 
of Native American, to rise up to that high mountain and then dive down from there, and that 
would be the end of it. I am not scared. I am not scared at all” (Oiva/1). 
Supernatural experiences and the question of afterlife 
Similar to Aili, Taina also had had some experiences about the felt presence of a dead relative. 
The first time happened the night her husband was dying at the hospice home. Her husband had 
appeared to her grandchildren, who were around ten years old at the time: 
It was interesting, the children had gone to sleep at home, and when their mother returned 
home [from the hospice] early in the morning and was about to tell them that “your 
grandfather has…” They interrupted her and said “Yes, we know” He came and told us 
already!” Can you believe that!? Guess who got goose pumps about this! (Taina/1) 
Taina continued by reiterating how amazed the whole family had been about this, but then she 
added that actually she had had her very own experience about her husband’s presence after his 
death: 
One evening before going to sleep, I was standing by his picture and I was looking at him 
and thinking by myself about everything that we could have experienced together had he not 
died… I was fully awake and everything, when suddenly I heard his voice in my head saying. 
“Milla [the granddaughter] is not doing well.” And I thought to myself that how come she 
isn’t well, I had just seen her that day. The following morning my daughter called me and 
told that Milla had a 40 C fever! But I already knew that she was ill. These kind of things… 
You can think I’m nuts but I have no explanation for these things! (Taina/1.) 
Since Taina had had these “hints” of the afterlife or otherworld, I asked her if they had affected 
her understanding of the afterlife. She said that they probably had, “Even though I would not 
admit or confess it!” Taina elaborated that she had accepted that “this is it,” but she was open 
to the possibility that there was something more: “I have told my children that [after my death] 
I will come and talk to them whenever I have something I need to tell. But I’ve said to them 
also that if I have nothing to say then I won’t come!” Taina laughed and added, “Just in case!”203 
In regard to religion, Taina explained to me that sometimes she did do some “chatting” with 
God and asked for forgiveness, but she never went to church and did not find their services very 
important to her. (Taina/1.) 
 Taina’s views, both on religion and the afterlife, were rather typical among my research 
participants. I did not always ask about the afterlife (especially in those cases in which the 
                                                 
203 According to Ketola et al. (2018), 33% of Finns believe that it is possible to feel a connection with the dead. 
Such experiences have been studied by scholar of religion Markku Siltala, whose dissertation on “post-death 
contacts” (PDC) was defended at the University of Helsinki in 2019.  
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patient did not think of themselves as dying and the whole issue of death was not discussed). 
When the topic arose, it often appeared as something which one did not necessarily believe in, 
yet often the person added that “perhaps there is something more.” Kimmo, who believed in 
God, said that one cannot know anything yet one can hope: “I hope that what I’ve learned at 
home would come true, that I would meet some diseased relatives and be with them” (D1: 
119). 204  According to Gallup Ecclesiastica, the majority of Finns (71%) agree with the 
statement that “nobody knows what happens after death” (Ketola et al. 2018: 47). This was also 
the most common sentiment among my research participants. As Oiva explained to me, there 
was no point in speculating on metaphysical questions since there were no answers to those 
anyhow (Oiva/2). The only thing one can do, he added, was to have trust; one should not worry 
about mundane details but rather realize what kind of mystery the human is. This kind of trust 
was extremely relieving, Oiva assured me, just a week before he died. (Oiva/2.) 
 According to Gallup Ecclesiastica, almost half of all Finns (49%) believe that “there is 
something after death but I don’t know what” whereas 39% agree that “death is the end” (Ketola 
et al. 2018: 47). Even though its survey suggests that many Finns believe that death is the end, 
I did not commonly hear my research participants sharing that view. In terms of thinking of 
total finitude, perhaps “the end” as some sort of non-existence became challenging in the 
proximity of death. It was more typical for me to hear vague views, such as “perhaps there is 
something out there” or “we can never know what happens after death.” For Matti, death was 
“the deep sleep” (Matti/1). Aili and Heidi believed that one will return to the “greater cycle of 
nature and the universe” (Aili/2, Heidi/2). This idea can be interpreted in multiple ways, 
emphasizing the ever-continuing cycles of life and the existence of some sort of eternity, or it 
can be seen as emphasizing the end of one’s personal life (or possibly both). This view mirrors 
the 27% of people who in a Gallup poll agreed with the statement that after death “we blend 
back into the universe” (Ketola et al. 2018). In sum, a range of views came up in the discussions 
with the research participants. Just like with Taina, at times one could have several, even 
mutually contradictory ideas about the afterlife and a possible otherworld. Furthermore, the 
fluctuating nature of the views was evident. For instance, Taina commented to me that “for the 
time being” she was content with the idea of the non-existence of an afterlife, implying that at 
some point there might come a moment when she would need to rethink her ideas. 
Religion as participation 
Religion and spirituality represent a good example of the participatory manner of orienting to 
reality, which can be seen as contrasting with scientifically oriented medical causality (see 
Chapter 2). In practice, it seemed that most patients’ religious views were so fluid and flexible 
that they never caused any serious dissonance in their daily lives. Sometimes, however, their 
views contested quotidian reality. One patient for whom religion played a crucial role was Siru, 
                                                 
204 Kimmo’s perspective does not reflect the teachings of Christianity about the afterlife, yet it seems rather 
common.  
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a member of a charismatic Christian congregation whom I met in the day hospice. Siru regularly 
attended various kinds of spiritual services and healing sessions where miracles reportedly 
happened (D1: 95). Siru seemed to be constantly negotiating both a causal and a participatory 
orientation to reality; her trust in her doctors changed from steadfast to suspicious, depending 
on the practitioner and the phase of her illness, yet her trust in God was absolute until the very 
end (D1: 95–96; D2: 18, 121). Even when cancer spread everywhere in her body, including her 
brain, she believed in the possibility of a miracle—that she would not die from the cancer. It 
was as if she simultaneously lived in two parallel universes; she faithfully followed various—
at times very heavy—medical treatments and cancer therapies, and at the same time she 
participated in evangelical healing sessions, having equal belief in their efficacy. While 
attending a healing led by a well-known North American preacher visiting Helsinki, she 
experienced “sensations of warmth” in her lungs (where she had metastasis). To Siru, this was 
a sign of a miracle. According to her, the next time she was checked the tumor had indeed 
shrunk from 4 cm to 1.8 cm (D1: 95). 
In addition to miraculous healing experiences, Siru experienced her spiritual practice as 
deeply affective. In our conversations, she described how she was filled with “light, peace, and 
a soft sensation” while she was praying (Siru/3), and she had strong dreams and visions. One 
of these happened during a service in church:  
I had my hands in front of me like this (hands together, forming a cup), and the Lord placed 
a silver bird into my hands. It had wings like this and there was a hole in the middle of the 
bird. I asked the Lord, “Why there is a hole?” He put a white candle into the hole and He lit 
it and He said, “Let it burn as long as you feel like it.” I let it burn and then I blew it out, and 
I placed it into my heart. What a wonderful peace! These are real revelations, you know. 
(Siru/3)  
The kinds of visions that Siru had were aesthetically very pleasing, and they seemed to comfort 
her greatly. Siru was not shy to share her experiences in the day hospice group. I never heard 
anyone making any deprecating comments about her convictions; on the contrary, some (as 
Vivian noted) perhaps hoped that they could have similar faith themselves. Occasionally, 
though, Siru’s visionary personality caused some baffling moments. One Tuesday before 
Christmas, during a small concert in the day hospice room where one of the volunteers was 
performing a few Christmas songs, Siru—who was sitting right in front of the singer, facing 
her—suddenly closed her eyes and placed her hands on her knees, palms up, as if in a gesture 
of receiving blessings. After the songs were over, Siru announced that she had had a vision: the 
singer had had two white pigeons on her shoulders, and behind her there stood a big, white 
angel. The singer had radiated divine light. After sharing her vision with everyone, Siru went 
and hugged the singer, who looked a little perplexed yet glad. Someone in the group laughed 
mildly, whereas others only smiled. Siru herself seemed empowered for the rest of the day. (D2: 
83.) 
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A few weeks after Siru’s vision, the Tuesday group received two new members, and there 
was a new spark in the conversation of the group. Patients were talking about the moment when 
they heard about their diagnoses and the importance of the consulting doctor at that moment, 
and then the conversation shifted to the acceptance of the prognosis. One person speculated that 
perhaps she had not quite fully accepted yet that she would die (D2: 92–93), whereupon another 
said that there seems to be various phases in the acceptance process. The conversation went on 
until at some point Siru stated, “I don’t believe that I will die.” For most of us, this was not an 
unusual comment from her, since she had often told us that she believed in a healing miracle. 
The new member of the group, however, a woman in her early fifties, commented, “Well, that 
must be one way to go about it… And surely one’s own attitude affects the situation…” After 
a little pause, she continued hesitantly, “Or do you mean that you really don’t believe that you 
will die?” “That’s what I mean. I won’t die,” Siru answered, without any hesitation in her voice, 
“I will not give up” (D2: 93). These moments disclosed the dissonance that existed between her 
religious conviction and the general scientific world-ordering shared by most of the members 
in the day hospice group. 
Another example of such a disjuncture happened with my mother and her sudden visits to 
the healer, whose epistemological lens was strongly magical. I was personally surprised to see 
how quickly one could move from a scientific worldview to a magical frame. At times of severe 
existential crises like imminent death, the social pressure to follow the causal scientific 
orientation becomes practically meaningless. In Siru’s case, the explanation of the world shared 
in her evangelical circle already differed from the dominant narrative of instrumental causality. 
When there was a strong sense of hopelessness without any source of succor, even those whom 
I did not find to be drawn to magical modes of thinking could find them reasonable and 
potentially functional. Of course, not everyone was able to find solace from such alternatives.  
Religion as failed participation 
Vivian felt let down by religion. Since she had told me earlier that she belonged to the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church, I asked what Christianity meant for her. “It would be just 
wonderful if I could get some consolation there,” she answered and started sobbing, “But I 
can’t.” She mentioned Siru from the Tuesday crew: “She is so strong in her belief. I long for 
some alleviation from the anxiety that I have, and I am open to anything” (Vivian/2).  
Vivian said that she had always been very rational in regard to possible life crises. In her 
work, she had been accustomed to solving challenging situations by using various kinds of 
project tools, such as SWOT analysis (focusing on strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and 
threats); she told me that she had actually used these in her personal life, in order to find 
solutions and ways to get through difficult times. Now, faced with her end of life—“the worse-
case scenario,” she called it—she found these tools useless (Vivian/2). During the earlier phases 
of her illness, nature walks helped her: “When I get to see some beautiful nature, or a park or 
flowers, something like that, then momentarily I can free myself from the illness” (Vivian/2). 
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When I asked Vivian what exactly she was able to free herself from, her answer was the constant 
sense of anxiety: “I would not think of the illness but observe nature, and somehow take it in 
me. At home, I am with my thoughts but while I am out in nature I pay attention to that 
environment around me” (Vivian/2). Outdoor nature quite literally gave her space outside of 
herself; for a moment, her existence was mediated more via the surrounding environment than 
via her wasting body. Aesthetics provided momentary relief from the anxiety and fear that 
burdened her so heavily (Vivian/1; Vivian/2; Vivian/3). When we had this discussion about 
nature for the first time, Vivian continued to analyze her situation by telling me how she had 
tried different methods to ease her anxiety, but seeing a psychologist or taking antidepressants 
did not really work for her. It was the combination of sports—“endorphins,” as Vivian put it—
and nature that helped her the best. After becoming ill and needing to forget about “sweaty 
sports,” only nature was left. 
Vivian continued to seek solace from religion, and she talked regularly with the hospice 
priest. She told me about a book that the priest had given her to read: 
I am still in the middle of it but I am having some problems with it. He [the author] says that 
all the troubles will bring something good… And that God has given us all these troubles, 
which are planned for us with love… I have a hard time accepting his way of thinking. I feel 
that is… (Vivian/1) 
At this point, Vivian started to cry and I turned off my recorder. It seemed like this particular 
text only gave her more grief, instead of comfort. As the illness progressed, Vivian became 
increasingly fearful. In one of our conversations, about a month prior to her death, Vivian burst 
out: 
I am just so full of fear! That is the thing. When I’ve got so much time to think, I have so 
many different emotions, negative emotions… disappointment… frustration… But at this 
moment, it is the fear. How dreadful this end will be. That is on the surface now, since my 
condition has worsened… It is the most prevalent of all of the emotions. (Vivian/2) 
Vivian was in need of distraction from her fear, yet at this point she no longer able to go outside, 
and the other possible sources of solace failed her. The last time I saw Vivian was only two 
days before she died (D4: 27–29). I went to see her at the hospice home, where she was now 
staying with her mother. Vivian knew that she was dying soon. Her body was swollen and the 
tumor in her upper torso made her breathing laborious, yet she was lucid and fully conscious. 
At this point, the more abstract feelings of dread had dissipated, and the only thing she feared 
was suffocation. She was at ease, however, since the nurses had reassured her about the option 
of sedation if it came to that. It seemed to me that in the end, her fears subsided before sensations 
of awe in regard to her physical dying body. She commented on this to me by describing how 
odd it felt that her legs had “stopped obeying” her and that she could not even recognize her 
face in the mirror, since everything just looked so swollen and she had lost her features.  
At this point, she was declining all visitors, and I felt privileged to be with her. I thanked her 
for participating in my research, and I said that I believed it took some courage to share all those 
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difficult emotions she had experienced. Vivian was surprised to think of herself as courageous: 
“I have never imagined that there could be anyone as fearful as me, I am so fearful!” she 
confessed. In the end, she died peacefully, without any need of sedation. 
Everyone had different tools at their disposal to work with their existential situation. 
Reflecting the results of Gallup Ecclesiastica in regard to the variety of Finns’ attitudes toward 
religion and death, religion or some form of spirituality brought comfort and consolation to 
some of my research participants, whereas others could not find solace from religion even after 
trying quite hard. For many, religion did not really play any major role. Participatory tendencies, 
however, manifest in many ways and find various kinds of representations—not only religious 
ones. Furthermore, not all participatory orientations are in dissonance with the hegemonic 
cultural ideology of instrumental causality. As Hanegraaff (2003: 377) observes, one of the 
least contradictory ways of being in participatory relationship with the world is that offered by 
the arts. I would argue that nature offers another one. 
10.2 Nature as participatory experience 
Nature as therapeutic landscape 
Nature205  seemed to feed participatory experiences of various sorts. For Vivian, aesthetic 
experiences in nature offered therapeutic breaks from her illness and anxiety, but some of my 
research participants also found aesthetics to be philosophically, metaphysically, and even 
spiritually inspiring. Nature features aesthetic elements of rhythm and movement but also quiet 
and stillness, which serve as allegories for time, and which resonate in various ways with hope, 
grief, and anxiety. In my research material, the stillness and silence associated with nature were 
considered restoring and healing. This was evident in the manner in which people talked about 
their nature trips, summerhouses, or significant moments experienced in natural surroundings. 
For instance, Kimmo told me that after his diagnosis he discovered nature in a completely new 
way, different than he had known it growing up as a rural farmer’s son. Nature had then been a 
source of income—it had instrumental value—but now it was a source of awe. Kimmo 
described to me how he would sit outside in his yard after a sauna and just watch the birds in 
the summer evening. A quiet moment spent in admiration of nature was a new experience for 
him, he said (D1: 82).206 
The healing and restorative effect of nature has been an avid topic of research in various 
disciplines during the last decades (Nilsson et al. 2011; Kaipainen & Rosenquist 2013; 
Tyrväinen et al. 2014; Tyrväinen et al. 2019). Since the 1990s, new studies have arisen around 
the notion of “therapeutic landscapes” (originally coined by Wilbert Gesler in 1992), in which 
                                                 
205 Here the concept of nature (luonto) is used as it came out in the participants’ speech. 
206 In a Finnish study on the connection between nature and silence, the latter has been explained in terms of small 
sounds and voices. In other words, silence is never absolute; rather, it makes it possible to “hear better” (Ampuja 
2014: 263). This articulation of silence also permits spiritual or existential interpretations. In stillness, one may 
listen to oneself or hear God better (Gothóni & Gothóni 2014). 
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the physical and mental health effects of different landscapes and environments are taken under 
analysis (Gesler 2009; 2005). The following account told to me by Helena exemplifies the 
notion of the therapeutic landscape.  
Helena’s previous apartment had had huge windows opening onto a forest: “There was 
nothing else to see but nature, nothing but trees. I took all the curtains away so that there would 
be nothing obscuring the view. It was an insanely enchanting view at any time of the year” 
(Helena/1). She told me that during the worst bouts of pain and discomfort, when she could do 
nothing but lay on the bed, she stared out of the window for hours: “I felt like there was always 
something to see, in the clouds or in the trees and leaves. It was really the salvation of salvations 
for me” (Helena/1). Much like Vivian, Helena explained that perceptually immersing herself in 
nature offered moments that were free from pain and anxiety. Helena considered her ability to 
“plunge” into the landscape in this way as a special “skill” (Helena/1). 
The discussion on the healing effects of nature goes back to the so-called biophilia 
hypothesis, which can be described as “the passionate love of life and of all that is alive” 
(Fromm 1973). Biologist Edward O. Wilson (1984) proposed that the human tendency to focus 
on and affiliate with nature and other life forms has, in part, a genetic basis, whereas the 
Encyclopedia Britannica defines ‘biophilia’ as the “idea that humans possess an innate 
tendency to seek connections with nature and other forms of life” (Rogers 2018, italics mine). 
The word ‘connections’ is the key here. I find that many of the special moments referred to in 
my ethnography are about seeking connection, whether it is with nature, other sentient beings, 
or supernatural agents or forces. In regard to aesthetics, I propose that the experienced 
enchantment of nature (or with nature) has to do with the smooth and chaotic but lively 
movement that is present everywhere in the natural world. By providing a contrast to striated 
order and predictability, nature reveals random, unpredicted spaces for hope. 
Participatory experiences with nature 
Aili spoke about nature with enthusiasm. In her speech, she often linked nature to her identity 
as a Karelian evacuee and a daughter of a farmer, who grew up in the countryside. Aili construed 
nature and her relationship to it in a different manner from Helena; for Aili it was not so much 
about beautiful sceneries or therapeutic landscapes but about physical involvement with nature, 
especially with soil.  
The idea of biophilia describes Aili’s relationship with nature quite well, since for her the 
significance of nature was expressed in references to the embodied experience of connectedness 
and intertwined relationality. For more than thirty years before her diagnosis, Aili had cultivated 
a small plot in a local community garden. This plot had become even more important after her 
husband’s death and the need to give up their summerhouse, an old farm in the countryside. In 
our conversation at the hospice home, Aili analyzed her relationship with nature by saying that 
nature for her was foremost about land—farming it and growing food in it. This was her blood 
heritage, she said: 
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Somehow, the soil and the field… That’s where it all comes from. Farming and nature are 
such important things. One grows into it. For my father, rye bread was so important, and it 
had to come from one’s own land. He was a farmer. The best picture [I have]… He had a 
beautiful pair of horses, so wonderful… and when I reflect on it, that thirty hectares every 
autumn with that pair of horses and a single plow… when I come to think of it, it was like 
doing a service to God. Although there was no longer one’s own land, which remained [on 
the other side of the border] and he never stopped missing it, there was, however, a plot of 
Finnish independent field. It was so important in my family—did I tell you about this? When 
I asked my mom what she thought after the Winter War, [she said], “at least, we were left 
with a piece of this land… and this land is terribly important, important to father.” And the 
grain… There he wanders around [in the fields] with a sheaf of grain in his hand… (Aili’s 
voice cracks) Nature is important. There is no way around it. (Aili/1) 
In Aili’s narration, nature was inseparably bound with Finnishness and independence, and her 
memories of the lost home in Karelia were a part of that. Nature as land was about livelihood 
and family, generations and history; it was not only about Aili’s personal connection with 
farming and gardening but also the connection with past and future generations.207 Aili noted 
that her and her husband’s relationships with nature were different, since for him nature was 
primarily about forests, trees, and birds, whereas for her it was about “the field and crop and all 
that where the bread comes from” (Aili/1). One spring I visited Aili at her home (D4: 15), and 
once again we ended up talking about farming and gardening. Aili told me that the whole idea 
of community gardening, which had given her so much pleasure, had actually started with a 
suggestion by her child. In the first years, it was something that she did together with her child, 
and later on she had her grandchildren with her:  
They were sleeping in their prams under the cotton cloth, I had coffee in a thermos and a book 
with me, and when I got tired I would sit in a rattan chair and read. It was a kind of a 
community; everybody came there. It was like a way of life. The granny with the neighboring 
plot even came there with her walker until she died. (D4: 16) 
As Aili had told me how important springtime and the new growth in nature was to her, I asked 
what spring looked like to her now. Aili’s answer was blunt: “It doesn’t look like anything. It 
does not feel anything” (D4: 17). When I tried to dig a bit more into what she meant by this, 
she interrupted me and huffed:  
It [nature] does not matter. It does not have a meaning any longer! I do see all that. I have 
seen those liverworts there, and that blooming bird cherry over there on the other side [of the 
yard], but it does not mean anything any longer, because I am not inside of it anymore (mä 
en ole enää sen sisällä). (D4: 17) 
This was an unusual expression in Finnish: “inside of it.” One might ask, how can you be 
“inside of nature”? When Aili said this, however, it made sense. For Aili, looking outside her 
window and seeing nature only seemed to cause pain, as it reminded of her personal loss. Since 
                                                 
207 Similar descriptions of the importance of nature for Finnish farmers can be found in the anthology Kirjoituksia 
maan sydämeltä (Nirkko et al. 2004), which is based on material received in a writing competition organized by 
the Finnish Literary Society and targeted at Finnish farmers (past and present) in regard to their relationship with 
land and nature. 
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she was not able to feel part of nature or participate, since she could not actively do anything 
to create in it and with it, she inevitably felt like an outsider. When I asked her about this, she 
said that that was exactly how she felt, “like an outsider” (D4: 17). The same discussion was 
reiterated at other times when Aili referred to the outside by saying that “it is green nature out 
there indeed, yet it does not concern me anymore” (D2: 27). When Aili had to give up her plot, 
she not only lost the land and her deeply felt existential connection with the world, but she also 
lost the way in which she wanted to live and exist in the world, which was something she had 
shared with her grandchildren.208 Aili remarked on this by noting that since she had always 
been such an active “doer,” working and caring for others as well as for her garden plot, being 
unable to attend in this way had destroyed a big part of her identity (D2: 17). 
Aili’s relationship with nature also affected her ideas about how her funeral should be done 
(D2: 31). The first part of the ritual, the actual blessing of the body, was to be performed in the 
church, in accord with the traditional Lutheran liturgy. She did not want to be buried in the 
graveyard, however; as she had discussed with her child, she wished to have her ashes put into 
the soil of their country home. As if to explain why she wanted to be buried in nature rather 
than in a graveyard, one day Aili brought to the day hospice photos of her favorite landscapes. 
One was of a forest with a sacred juniper tree and another one was of a blue sky with great 
white cumulus clouds hanging heavily on the horizon beyond the fields. There was a photo of 
a beautiful forest pond and another of morning dew on a clear, still lake. The pictures were 
aesthetically so powerful that it was almost possible to smell the scents and feel the shimmering 
summer light emanating from them. When I commented on this to Aili, she admitted that she 
also felt the photos on her skin. She said that every now and then, she would look at these 
photos, and she would sense them in her body. Aili proceeded to reminisce how she used to 
make bread from the grain she and her husband grew, and how that process of bread making 
was so embodied in her. She recalled the different phases of the process which she had learned 
when just a young girl, the physical labor in the harvesting and how it made her feel strong even 
when she was only twelve years old. (D4: 26.) If nature and earth were embodied in Aili’s 
memories as a part of her, she also wanted to be part of the soil, after her death, to literally 
become one with it. 
Nature had also been very important to Matti, a retired science professional who was facing 
death after a quick onset of metastatic cancer. Because of his career, he had dealt with death 
and serious diseases, and he had a rather materialistic, practical, and stoic attitude toward death. 
For him, there was nothing enigmatic about it. Furthermore, when Matti’s wife had passed away 
few years before, it had taught him about the “practicalities around dying,” as he put it. Matti 
                                                 
208 This detail came up when Aili told me about one particularly difficult moment. Some time after she had already 
given up the garden plot, her youngest granddaughter came to her and asked, “Granny, when are we going to the 
field again?” This question encapsulated so many painful facts about Aili’s existential situation at that moment 
that she almost broke down in front of her granddaughter (D4: 17). 
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stated that he was not scared at all; he trusted fully in the capacity of medicine to ease his 
passing in such a way that he could be free of pain. (Matti/1.) 
Reflecting back on his life, Matti concluded that he had enjoyed life immensely. Family and 
work had both played important part in his life—but it was the work that had been a great source 
of inspiration for him. Matti did not believe in God, although he was interested in metaphysical 
issues and had read rather widely his whole life. “Buddhism is perhaps closest to my 
worldview,” he contemplated when we discussed this subject (Matti/1). Even if religion was 
not directly pertinent to Matti, he said that he believed “without a doubt” in the existence of 
something “sacred.” When I asked what he would consider sacred, Matti answered without 
hesitation, “The birth of a child” (Matti/1). He had witnessed the births of both his children: 
It was, once and for all, a touching and arresting experience; the moment when the baby 
comes out, it touches… and the first scream. It is just miraculous. (Matti/1) 
When one is able to witness the birth of a child, to witness the beginning of a new life, it is 
so big of a thing that I believe one cannot really be prepared for it, and one cannot really 
understand it, until one experiences it oneself. It is so total, something that pierces the whole 
soul. It is surprising how strong the experience is. An all-encompassing experience 
(totaalikokemus), something that goes into other dimensions (svääreihin menevä kokemus)… 
(Matti/2)  
The miracle of the beginning of life—and now, as Matti noted, the end of it—was a source of 
awe for a scholar who had dedicated his life to studying the boundaries between life and death. 
In addition to the formation of life, Matti found certain nature experiences to be sacred. One of 
them which had been especially memorable happened when Matti was on a long kayak trip on 
a large lake in northeastern Finland: 
We had kayaked already some 80 kilometers and we decided to have a little break right there, 
in the middle of the open water. I laid down on my back in the bottom of the kayak, and there 
was the opening of the kayak where you exit the seat. For a long moment I was looking out 
from that hole at the sky and those clouds, and I listened to the sounds of the water. That was 
something that stuck in my mind. Very strong… It was an audiovisual experience with a little 
swinging of the kayak, a very physical experience. I could have stared at that sky forever with 
the clouds passing by. (Matti/1) 
On his travels abroad, Matti found a piece of artwork209 that simulated the same kind of 
experience of awe at the sky: 
In New York, in the Modern Art Museum of Long Island City (MoMA PS1), there is a room 
where one sits and the walls go like this slightly in a cone shape up, and there is a square-
shaped opening in the ceiling, and people sit there and look at that sky. That has a little bit of 
the same… The artist wanted that we would perceive the sky in a more concrete manner… 
We don’t usually look at [the sky] so much. (Matti/1) 
                                                 
209 This artwork Meeting (1980), made by James Turrell, is a specifically proportioned chamber with an aperture 
in the ceiling that is open to the sky. Following the one he did at the MoMA, Turrell created a series of various 
skyspaces around the world. 
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Matti continued by saying that these kinds of experiences are just examples of the sacred, which 
can be found in many places: “Life has numerous kinds of such spontaneous experiences,” he 
added. (Matti/1.) 
Matti elaborated on his kayak story by adding that for him, the appreciation and delight of life 
culminated in moments like that, “since life is not always that great.” The significance of these 
kinds of sacred moments increased with time, he said (Matti/2). Since Matti had studied 
astronomy, I asked him if this sort of experience of the wonders of life had something to do 
with his work as a scientist, to which he answered: 
Matti: Yes, I think so. If I think of these merely as visual experiences, when I look at the 
starry sky there is the visual experience of points twinkling in various colors and in various 
shapes. In the microscope, the visual constellation may be very similar. They are both linked 
with the certain mystery. We know that there are so many things which we know nothing 
about; our knowledge perhaps never reaches there. We can speak of the universe and its 
unfathomable complexity, and the unknown creates the mystery in it. 
I: Is it perhaps exactly this exploration of that unknown which has attracted you in science?  
Figure 9. James Turrell, 
Meeting, 1980-86/2016, at 
MoMA PS1. Photo: Pablo 
Enriquez/MoMA 
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Matti: Yes! It has been exactly the burning drive to seek, and the great joy of finding the truth. 
Even if it was only the truth of some small sample, the pointing out some biological detail, 
that revealing of the truth brings a great joy. (Matti/2) 
Science was another form of nature to Matti, and it had its own form of aesthetics. For Matti, 
the experience of participation happened both via aesthetic affective experiences (such as 
witnessing the birth of a child or having a strong experience in nature) and via scientific thinking 
and breakthroughs. 
Books and other virtual spaces of hope 
Aili needed the kinesthetic sensation of being involved with nature, whereas Helena was able 
to create her connection to nature by visual means. For her, merely the sight of nature felt 
therapeutic (Helena/1). In both cases, however, we can see the importance of the sense of 
connection, that is, the sense of belonging and being part of something bigger than one’s own 
body. This represents one form of a virtual space, which can serve as an impetus for hope and 
a sense of belonging in moments of crises.  
Virtual spaces can also be engendered upon hearing of other people’s experiences: Aili often 
remarked on how she enjoyed hearing about different travel places around the world, and that 
she experienced and “lived” the stories that the others—mostly volunteer workers—shared in 
the day hospice (D4: 16). Similarly, one’s own memories about specific places could become 
a source of comfort and consolation. In the day hospital group, this aspect came up whenever 
there were Karelian evacuees in the group. I witnessed this with Aili but also other Karelians, 
such as Oiva and Irma, and even with some volunteers with Karelian background. Whereas the 
“lost Karelia” has become a representation of nostalgia and romanticized ideals of Finnishness, 
among the evacuees and their families it is commonly acknowledged that the actual area lost to 
the Soviet Union in World War II was among the most beautiful and fertile regions in Finland 
(Raivo 2007). Thus, particularly in regard to the land of Karelia, nostalgic memories of the past 
are significantly entangled with “vanished beauty” and grief. 
When Aili lost her community garden and her embodied connection with nature, she found 
another source of consolation and hope—books. During her whole life Aili had read a lot, but 
after becoming ill her connection with books grew deeper and even essential to her everyday 
reality. “Books have kept me alive,” she reiterated a number of times (D2: 30, 79). Books 
became a sort of safe haven for Aili, taking her places where she could no longer physically go. 
In this way, books literally extended her experience of existence; if her existence used to be 
mediated via—and nourished by—nature, now it became mediated via books. Books were also 
a way to process the coming death; in this sense they served as the (ritual) virtual space in which 
one could practice new solutions and reorient oneself. Every now and then, Aili would come to 
me with a special poem or a quote from a book that she had been reading. “This is how I think 
about it,” Aili said to me one day, and showed me a page from a novel with a few underlined 
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sentences. In this instance, after being asked about it by his grandson, the grandfather of the 
novel was thinking about death: 
The world is nothing else, it is just what it looks like. This I have learned, and beyond that, 
there is nothing. […] When one is dead, one sees nothing, no darkness; one does not even 
hear the silence. When one is old, one gets what it takes, that one’s got to try to live one’s 
only life as a human. With death and loss one pays for the time, so fleeting that nothing much 
came of it. That is a high price to pay for an unsellable item. One cannot tell that to a child, 
nor should one. 
“You don’t need to think of death. It is in vain. You play and invent something to do, and at 
night, we will set the nets. I sit in the back, and you row, since you row so well. In the 
morning, we will go and try the nets; we may get a good catch. Your life is so long that you 
cannot even realize it. It is summer after summer in a chain without end. When in the autumn 
one ends, far behind the black, plowed fields, the high snow piles, the crusted spring snow, 
and birch leaf sprouts, already the blue light of summer shimmers, again and again. It won’t 
dim, it won’t burn out,” grandfather said.210 (Pentti Lassila, Armain aika, 134–135) 
When reading these lines, Aili said, she felt that the author was expressing her views about life 
and death. Without trying to know what exactly Aili’s thought process was around this, one 
could nevertheless see that there was a kind of double story here. One was the grandfather’s 
rather nihilist account of what happens after death, “One sees nothing, no darkness; one does 
not even hear the silence.” On the other hand, there were the delightful moments with loved 
ones, the eternal cycling of the seasons and generations—life goes on. However Aili interpreted 
these lines, this account illuminates how for her the participation was not merely a way of 
experiencing and sensing the reality, it was also a significant way to reorient oneself by 
facilitating a new, relevant, and even metaphysically meaningful understanding of one’s 
personal life situation. In my study, I have called this sort of participatory engagement aesthetic 
experience, since “aesthetics” represents the common element in all the experiences of art, 
ritual, and landscape or nature which my research participants told me about (Butters 2016).  
10.3 Aesthetics as participatory experience 
Aesthetics and aesthetic experience 
When orienting aesthetically to the world, there is no evident epistemological or metaphysical 
dissonance (with scientific orientation), yet aesthetic experience evokes creative space 
(Kapferer’s ritual virtuality), saturated by imagination, in which a person is able to participate 
                                                 
210 ”Maailma ei ole mitään muuta, se on vain se, miltä se näyttää, sen minä olen oppinut, eikä sen takana ole 
mitään. […] Kun on kuollut, ei näe mitään, ei pimeyttä, ei kuule edes hiljaisuutta. Vanhana tajuaa, mitä se maksaa, 
että sai yrittää ihmisenä elää ainoan elämänsä. Saa kuolemalla ja häviämisellä maksaa siitä lyhyestä ajasta, josta 
ei paljon mitään ehtinyt tulla. Se on korkea hinta epäkurantista tavarasta. Sitä ei voi lapselle sanoa, eikä pidä sanoa. 
– Sinun ei tarvitse kuolemaa miettiä, se on turhaa. Leiki sinä ja keksi tekemistä, ja illalla lasketaan yhdessä verkot. 
Minä perässä, ja sinä soudat, koska sinä soudat niin hyvin. Aamulla käydään kokemassa verkot, voidaan saada 
hyvä saalis. Sinun elämäsi on niin pitkä, ettet sinä osaa sitä edes käsittää. Se on kesiä kesien jälkeen ketjuna, jolla 
ei ole loppua. Kun yksi päättyy syksyyn, etäällä mustien kynnöspeltojen, korkeiden kinosten, keväthankien ja 
koivun hiirenkorvien takana kajastaa jo kesän sininen valo, uudestaan ja uudestaan, se ei himmene, ei se sammu, 
isoisä sanoi.” (Pentti Lassila, Armain aika 134–135.) 
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affectively with the world. Aesthetics is not always about beauty, and in regard to nature, for 
instance, it can actually take rather cruel and somber forms. The following account by Heidi 
was the one that pushed me toward thinking of the meaning of aesthetics for my research 
participants, especially in relation to metaphysical thinking. We had had a long conversation, 
which remained our last, because soon after this meeting Heidi became unable to communicate 
verbally. At this point, Heidi was bedbound and very fragile, yet still alert in her mind. I was 
just about to leave from our meeting when she suddenly called me back: “There is something I 
still want to share with you,” she said, “just in case, we don’t… you know.” She did not need 
to finish the sentence, since I understood what she meant. Heidi began telling about an incident 
which had occurred already months before her condition worsened. I hastened to turn on my 
recorder: 
I was babysitting my grandson at my house and I was just putting him down for a nap when 
I heard this sound from the front yard. A rustle of some kind. The dog was alerted by the 
noise also, so we went downstairs to see what was going on… There was an accipiter… a 
hawk, which was eating a blackbird, right there in my front yard!  
Heidi had taken some pictures of the scene with her phone and now she was showing them to 
me. Then she continued:  
When my son arrived an hour later or so, he looked [at the yard] and asked in awe, “What on 
earth has happened?” You see, there were black feathers all over on the white yard, there was 
snow, you see. They were there for many months, those black feathers, and pieces of bones 
and the head and everything.  
I thought by myself that… and at that point, it actually palliated me greatly that I imagine that 
I am myself that blackbird that the hawk comes to eat… that I am going along into the cycle 
of nature. It felt very… I felt good, it felt like a gentle thought. […] It made some sort of an 
indelible impression on me, indeed, this scene. (Heidi/2) 
After telling this, Heidi went on explaining how nature, and especially birds, had become very 
meaningful to her as she had gotten older. 
There listening to Heidi, I sensed that she was sharing a very meaningful memory. The story 
seemed to involve a sort of turning point or revelation for Heidi. By looking at the dying 
blackbird, she had understood that she would die from her cancer—yet it was all fine, as this 
meant that she was part of nature, part of the universe, and that was where she would return. 
There was an obvious analogue between her and the bird. Like many cancer patients, she 
perhaps had experienced the tumor as something that was attacking her. Nonetheless, I 
wondered why this particular incident was so important to her that she had made a point of 
sharing it with me, literally as her very last words. 
The philosopher of aesthetics Ronald Hepburn (2004: 127) writes that aesthetic scenes may 
sometimes be experienced as “revealing something fundamental (and no doubt grim) about how 
things really, or ultimately, are.” In Heidi’s case, her experience was both apt and poignant in 
terms of “how things ultimately are.” Despite being “grim,” as Hepburn puts it, Heidi’s 
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experience was described in a way that did not include any negativity—rather quite the 
opposite. The experience was “palliating” to her, and the idea of returning to nature—perhaps 
curiously so—was “gentle.” Reflecting on Hepburn’s words and Heidi’s story, I started to 
realize that I had heard similar accounts from other research patients in which an aesthetic 
experience had led to a realization about their existential situation. Some of these experiences 
were actively sought after (for instance, by means of reading poetry or a novel, like in Aili’s 
case), but they also occurred quite randomly and by chance, causing deep impressions. As seen 
above, nature was a major source for these impressions, yet these moments were inspired by a 
variety of sources: visual arts, music, literature, and even dreams and visions. 
This sort of aesthetic appreciation infused with metaphysical realizations is something that 
Hepburn (2004: 127) calls “metaphysical imagination.” Since it was precisely with the help of 
these experiences that some of my research patients were able to not only make sense of their 
existential situation but also create their personal metaphysics, I have called this “metaphysical 
meaning-making” (Butters 2016). Patients did not always find a certain meaning in these 
experiences, but they could at least imagine and think about metaphysically meaningful things, 
and that was what made all the difference. 
In the context of aesthetics, imagination functions as the virtuality (Kapferer 2006), since 
the word ‘virtual’ refers simultaneously to something fictional and illusory as well as to 
something with the potential capacity to enrich and enhance reality. Different forms of art, as 
well as (religious) ritual and environmental aesthetics (as in a landscape or a single element of 
nature) enable the creation of virtual space for learning, absorbing, tolerating, and even 
celebrating tensions and paradoxes of life. In the virtual space enhanced by art, ritual, or nature, 
things otherwise impossible become possible; through the ritual frame, one enters a virtual “as 
if” world of possibilities. Wherever the element of aesthetics was present, it seemed to work as 
the mediation through which time, life events, emotions, and types of affect were reorganized 
in a creative, meaningful manner. Here, the human “experiencer” was not just “ontologically 
related to an environment or to a world” (Ihde 2009: 23) but also aesthetically so. 
Dewey ([1934] 2005: 222) defined art as “a quality of doing and of what is done.” Seen in 
this way, art is a quality that can be found in various places and acts, and this is how my research 
participants tended to refer to art as well. Some never talked explicitly about “art,” but simply 
made references to certain novels or poems, for instance, which had caused them to engage in 
metaphysical thinking in regard to their situation with a terminal illness. Like medicine, 
aesthetics was co-constitutive to patient’s identities, which they were constantly adjusting in 
relation to their environment. For instance, my mother spent a weekend at our summerhouse, 
making a point of listening to all of her jazz LPs. In addition to the music (which she loved), 
the act of listening was intertwined with her memories, and, in fact, with her whole life history. 
All of the records related to certain points in her life, so listening to them was like going through 
a photo album with some of her most important moments. Aesthetics can facilitate ritualized 
~ 189 ~ 
 
remembering, which in turn can aid in constituting the new identity of a dying person; 
contemplating the personal history that leads to the present moment may provide a certain order 
to the often chaotic situation of illness (see also Quartier 2010). Ritualized remembering makes 
the concept of time more tangible, and it may facilitate the thought of the end of life. It is also 
an effective way of saying goodbye to people, places, and times in one’s life. 
Metaphysical meaning-making and aesthetics 
Based on the phenomenological understanding of human experience, I suggest that it is 
precisely the corporeality and sensoriality of aesthetics that makes it so powerful and able to 
bring insight, not just affectively but also cognitively.211 This view was apparent in many of the 
accounts I heard, but Martti’s story shows well how his entire body was affected by the aesthetic 
experience. 
Martti was a former teaching professional in his sixties, whom I met on the oncology ward. 
The first time I interviewed Martti, we talked about his sentiments surrounding his diagnosis. I 
was asking how it had affected him, his corporeality, and… “And mortality?” Martti finished 
my question and launched into a story. In the very beginning, when his cancer diagnosis was 
not yet confirmed but strongly suspected, he was driving to the hospital for an ultrasound. This 
test was going to be telling in regard to his diagnosis, and thus it was a very important 
appointment. While sitting in his car, Martti was listening to a radio show on classical music. 
John Tavener’s “Eternal Memory” (1991) came on the air and, all of a sudden, Martti had a 
strange experience.212 Upon hearing Tavener’s music, he had a vision. The music permeated 
his being and “went deep into the soul” as he explained, transporting him “into heavenly 
spheres” (Martti/1; Martti/2). Instead of sitting in the car, he saw himself outside in a beautiful 
green landscape, standing there in the green pastures with still waters. “It made me feel very 
good,” Martti explained. He continued that while being there, he realized that it was all okay, 
that “this afterlife isn’t such a bad alternative to this world. I have seen this already for sixty 
years, so this is okay” (Martti/1). The vision was perplexing in its vividness, Martti concluded, 
and thus it made a strong impact on him; indeed, it seemed to color his whole illness experience, 
pacifying and consoling him. He kept referring to it numerous times over the years I knew him. 
The experience was powerful, he explained, because ever since that moment he knew that “there 
was nothing to worry about. I was either going to be cured—or, if not, I was going to be with 
God. There were only two alternatives—and they were both good ones” (Martti/2).  
 Martti believed in God, and he was part of the Lutheran revival movement of Conservative 
Laestadianism. Given his conviction, it was perhaps not surprising that he felt so confident. 
                                                 
211 My perspective has been influenced by Mark Johnson’s book The Meaning of the Body (2007), in which he 
argues for the theory of the embodiment of human mind and meaning. He claims that as the mind emerges from 
and co-evolves with the body, all human meaning, understanding, and reasoning are embodied activities. Among 
the various embodied experiences, Johnson stresses the importance of aesthetics for human understanding and 
cognition (Johnson & Lakoff 1999; Johnson 2007). 
212 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ENiwvkU5yZM.  
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However, it was neither the word of God nor prayer that induced his vision. Instead, it was 
music, an auditory aesthetic experience, which engendered the aesthetic experience in the form 
of a revelation of paradise. Later on in our conversation, Martti connected his vision with the 
famous passage in Psalms: “He makes me lie down in green pastures. He leads me beside still 
waters; he restores my soul” (Psalm 23:2–3). Martti’s account exemplifies how a sensory 
experience served as fuel for a spiritual epiphany, and how meaning-making can happen 
through the intertwined aesthetic connection of the inner (subjective) reality and outer 
(objective) reality. 
 Compared to medicine, aesthetics offered an alternative affective environment in which one 
could weigh and contemplate one’s situation. In contrast to medical rituals, in which “things 
were done to the body,” in the personal rituals described in the previous chapter the body 
became more of an active subject of experience. Through engagement with aesthetics, the body 
as an active subject seeks to make sense of its experiences on its own terms. In this way, both 
ritual activities and aesthetics can become forms of inquiry and a source of knowledge about the 
world (Jennings 1982; Schilbrack 2004: 135). In personal rituals such as writing, the ritual itself 
becomes an open inquiry about the way things are (Raposa 2004: 123), and realizations happen 
via the body of the ritual participant.213  
If Martti was impressed by music and a vision, Oiva found inspiration from scenery in the 
real world. I had learned to appreciate Oiva’s creative outlook on life; he always seemed excited 
about something, and his life story (which he loved to share) was filled with the most incredible 
endeavors and colorful events. Now, however, Oiva was slowing down, losing his mobility and 
vision. Even after being told that it was probably only a matter of days, being severely ill and 
so close to death, he was still happy to talk and share his thoughts with me. During our last 
meeting we were talking about his funeral wishes, when he was suddenly taken by a memory 
of his wife’s funeral some years before (Oiva/2). “Now this image came to my mind. Of that 
situation,” Oiva started after a small pause. Oiva’s wife had been cremated, and Oiva went to 
pick up the urn with his son in order to have it buried in the cemetery. Oiva continued speaking, 
but then the pace of his speech slowed: “There were only me, my son, and that cemetery worker 
who showed us the place. […] The picture that stayed here (pointing with an index finger to his 
temple) was that… When…” Oiva was getting very emotional and he could barely continue 
talking, “When my son was born…” Oiva now began openly crying, and I consoled him by 
                                                 
213 Many artists throughout the ages have described moments of epiphany. For example, Virginia Woolf wrote 
about “special moments of being,” moments that clearly stand out from the usual state of “non-being,” by which 
Woolf means our unconscious manner of drifting through life (see Tuohimaa 2004: 88–89). Woolf sees that there 
is a meaningful tapestry behind the ordinary, and she calls the whole world “a work of art.” The moment when 
one is capable of recognizing this is the exceptional moment (Tuohimaa 2004: 88–98). While her description is 
not very different from mystic accounts, Woolf very clearly states that for her it is not a matter of God but life 
itself as art. Hence, aesthetics and the aesthetic attitude can be akin to spirituality or religion, yet different, since 
aesthetics lacks moral or dogmatic claims (Krohn 1965: 72). This sort of appreciation toward even the simplest 
forms of life can be found in some of the special moments that my research participants shared with me. 
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putting my hand on his shoulder. In the eight months I had known him, I had never seen him 
emotional like this. After a while he continued talking: 
My wife was carrying the baby like this in her arms, bringing him home… Now, there was 
the son carrying his mother in his arms… in the same size package… It was a very touching 
image (näky) and a metaphorical image, so later at home, as soon as I got home, I drew a 
picture of it. (Oiva/2) 
Oiva told that he had never shared this intimate, symbolic drawing with his son. This memory, 
involving the most beloved persons in Oiva’s life, had taken the form of a mental picture, which 
he had used for the creation of an art piece. His aesthetic vision had captured the cycle of birth 
and death, literally depicting the metaphysical condition of our existence. I believe that this was 
one reason why Oiva shared the memory with me, right then, on his own deathbed. 
 Although we had met numerous times, Oiva seldom got very emotional. Because this time 
it was different, toward the end of our conversation I asked him if the end of life had led him to 
give up on many things. He answered, “Hell no! There’s no point in giving in before the fact!” 
(Oiva/2). If it was not typical before for Oiva to dwell in the thoughts of his coming dying too 
much, now it seemed that by sharing the affective memory about his wife’s funeral, he was 
seeking to make sense of his own mortality. Through aesthetics, which here appeared as a 
mental (virtual) image and a created art work, humans can make and experience meaning 
(Johnson 2007: 209). 
Living and dying as art 
Much like Oiva, Inkeri also displayed a rather passionate approach to life, but unlike him, she 
extended her attending curiosity to death and dying as well. I have earlier referred to her writing 
project regarding her diagnosis (Chapter Five), but prior to this Inkeri used to do sculpting, in 
which she combined metaphysical thinking and philosophy with tangible artwork. When Inkeri 
explained her creations to me the first time, I could not quite understand what she meant by her 
“projects,” but once I visited her home and saw the actual pieces of furniture that she had built 
as part of the “castle of her mind,” I started to understand what she had been talking about. The 
most important events and beliefs of her life (e.g., the birth of her child, her spiritual thinking) 
were symbolized and built in the solid form of furniture and embedded in the detailed 
decoration of her home. Inkeri actually referred to her home as her “private mythology,” and 
as such, it was “a very important place” (Inkeri/2). 
Inkeri defined herself as a spiritual person interested in mysticism. The way in which form 
and content, material and immaterial, and ultimately life and death came together was 
something that interested her greatly. She called this the “philosophy of the ‘AND.’” “It is about 
this AND that, always, the polarities come together” (Inkeri/1).  
Inkeri’s “everyday art” became evident to me when she invited me for lunch one day at her 
home. Everything from the food and the wine, the desert, the setting of the table, even the colors 
of the napkins—all of it—was carefully planned and designed. It was more than just a lunch. 
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Since it was clear that Inkeri was near the end, sharing a meal and some wine was an occasion 
that we both definitely recognized as special. Before I left, Inkeri gave me a gift of fine sand, 
which she had collected from a holy place on one of her travels, and three small votive candles. 
She did not comment on or provide any guidance with her gift, but I gathered that it was meant 
for a special occasion during which I would remember her. 
During the lunch, we talked about Inkeri’s final project, which was not merely a notebook 
but a kind of a blueprint that essentially represented her life—and her death. The layout of the 
contents was arranged in the form of a house instead of a traditional list-like table of contents. 
A timeline ran through the mid-section, and the surrounding sections represented her home both 
literally (as I was able to testify, having visited her house) and symbolically, since in fact she 










Art & art pieces 
PAST LIFE 
Stuff, letters, pictures 
Anxiety and burdens 
Multiplicity 
Is it all just going to vanish? 
HERE AND NOW 
Loved ones 
Friends 
Terminal illness  
Care plans 
GATE TO THE COMING 
Plans and dreams (treatments!) 
Testament 







A hut of a hermit 
Sleep, rest, dreams 
Books 
BALCONY 
Plants & the miracle of growth 
Morning glory, herbs 
 
 
Inkeri was excited to share her writing project with me. This is how in her notebook she 
described our working together:  
In addition to the good nurses and volunteer workers, there was a special surprise waiting for 
me in the hospice home: Right at the first time there was also a researcher, Maija Butters, a 
cultural anthropologist, who presented herself and told that she was doing a doctoral 
dissertation on palliative patients and their worldview and their emotions in regard to facing 
death. Already our first meeting aroused joy in me, and excitement to share my experiences 
and to become a part of her research sample. […]  
Being a part of this study has brought a completely new dimension to the hospice home, since 
in this way it becomes about something more than just about unidentified fear and anxiety for 
the expected hospice care. Exactly through those research interviews, I have gotten new tools 
to encounter and approach the “inevitable”—the end of the journey on this earth. (Inkeri, 
Since one could even die from it, p. 13) 
                                                 
214 I have taken the liberty of simplifying her model a little bit. All the “room” names (the main sections) are as in 
Inkeri’s notebook, but for the sake of anonymity I left out a few of the contents of the boxes. Inkeri sent me the 
whole notebook prior to her death, and she gave me permission to use it as well as any other materials (such as 
pictures) that she had given me. I had the impression that she was quite pleased that her artwork would make it 
into my study.  
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Once Inkeri was able to start writing about her situation, she took a title to work on every 
day. The hardest title to engage with was in the section called “Gate to the coming” (in italics). 
About six weeks before she died, she was able to get to the final part, “Last Frame.” Inkeri went 
to the National Library of Finland in order to write there. The library had just been renovated, 
and she sent me a text message commenting on how gorgeous the environment was, and how 
wonderful it felt to be able to be there writing. Even at the risk of putting words into her mouth, 
I asked her in my text reply if she would describe the environment as “sublime.” She wrote me 
back, “Yes! That is exactly what it is!” This is what she wrote under the title “Last Frame” on 
that day: 
The “image” of this title got its impetus in a park, where I was sitting with Tuija on a bench 
out there and we talked about something related to funerals. There was a flower bench close 
by and there were blue irises growing there. There I got a vision of my own “frame” for my 
last journey, that is, a revelation of my own funeral. The symbol would be “my shape of” 
cross with a golden center where my monogram would go. The actual limbs of the cross 
would be made of the blue flowerings of IRISES. The vision has since sharpened, and many 
of the details are filled now with “wishes” which I would like to express to my loved ones 
“in time.”  
Writing about this has proven to be difficult, however. It has also become a difficult topic to 
speak about, and I have not expressed my thoughts to really anyone else than to Tuija during 
our writings retreats. Last autumn, when I got the referral to the care of hospice’s home team, 
I got even more impetus to keep this idea (with its wish-list) hidden. It felt that if I tell about 
it, it [death] will happen right on the spot! (Inkeri, Since one could even die from it, p. 23) 
The Last Frame referred quite literally to Inkeri’s funeral (i.e., to her personal last ritual frame). 
Inkeri wanted to plan every concrete detail involved with it, in order to personalize the ritual to 
her liking. Inkeri felt that the surroundings of the National Library, where she was penning the 
text, eased the difficulty of writing. It was simpler there to find the words to express herself: 
This place [the National Library; see Figures 10 and 11] is nothing less than a solemn stage 
to express something that is constantly in one’s mind but which is so difficult to “pronounce.” 
Here one is able to catch again the sensation that some guidance directs the way things 
happen, and everything that happens is a definite part of this story. Hearing the inner voice 
and following its guidance will make things happen exactly the way they are supposed to. 
(Inkeri, Since one could even die from it, p. 24) 
After this, Inkeri goes on describing in great detail how the “last frame” ought to be done: a 
flowing arrangement with a sculpted middle part, which Inkeri had already made. She guides 
her florist friend on how to make the final frame correctly, and then adds:  
The IRIS cross would go beautifully on top of the coffin. I would like it if the flower cross 
would be then taken along to the memorial and put on the table as kind of a sign of my 
presence. For flowers I wish that everyone who wants to brings a single white flower which 
would then cover my coffin; also those flowers could be gathered and brought to the memorial 
as decorations. In this way the mere coffin, decorated with a cross made of “earth dust,” 
would start its journey toward the crematorium. (Inkeri, Since one could even die from it, p. 
25)  
~ 194 ~ 
 
After writing all this, Inkeri continues for few more pages with additional details for the funeral, 
including the music she wished for and a guest list of people whom she would like to invite.  
It becomes clear from Inkeri’s text that it was challenging to start and keep writing about the 
situation. Much like with Marjo-Riitta with her blog (see Chapter 9), writing seemed to make 
it all more real and could even cause things (i.e., death) to happen. Here the ritualized manner 
of writing in the special frame of the National Library eased the difficulty and supported her. 
Being able to write her booklet, she was able to process her situation. In other words, by doing 
this project, which described not only her sentiments about her situation but memories of the 
past and ideas and thoughts about life in general, as well as plans for the future (for the coming 
funeral), Inkeri was able to assume the task of making preparations. 
 As noted on multiple occasions in this study, ritual often functions as an attempt to control 
and striate the randomness aspects of life. Inkeri’s careful efforts to manage all of the details 
relating to her funeral can be seen as comprising attempts to take control over her own mortality. 
As she had emphasized during her whole illness trajectory, she wished to practice her agency 
until the very end—and extend it even after that. In the text, she makes a wish that the iris-cross 
would be taken along to the memorial and put on the table as “kind of a sign of my presence.” 
By carefully designing various symbolic details of the funeral, she “owned” her death and gave 
Figures 10 and 11. The National Library, Helsinki. Photos: Maija Butters. 
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it her identity; she even managed to declare her agency and assert her presence in the memorial 
in the form of the iris-cross.  
 Overall, writing was Inkeri’s manner of practicing acceptance. It was not just the act of 
writing, however, but the whole project—which included the decoration of the booklet, the 
process of naming it, and in the end the fact of sharing it with me, and her family and friends—
that was necessary for Inkeri to feel “ready.” The booklet itself was not just a notebook or a 
private diary but Inkeri’s last artwork, which she wanted to share with others. 
 When Inkeri approached death, she was moved to the hospice ward. She called me, and I 
promised to go and see her later on that day. In a few hours, however, she called me back and 
told me that she felt very tired and was thinking of getting some sleep, so I should come only 
the following day. That night Inkeri died. The next morning, I drove to the hospice home to 
learn that she had just passed. Since the staff knew that we had been close, they asked me if I 
wished to help in washing her (the family members had already been asked but they were not 
able to come). It was my reciprocal gift to Inkeri, I thought. Afterwards we put her back in bed 
for her family to say their final goodbyes. We found one of her beautiful silk scarfs, blue like 
her beloved irises, to put around her neck. There was a bouquet of colorful tulips and a white 
candle on the table. It was perfectly serene and beautiful, exactly the way Inkeri would have 
wished, with “beauty before all.”  
 In the lives of my research participants, aesthetics was a way to enjoy life and to enhance 
and enrich everyday reality. Yet, as seen with research patients such as Helena, Martti, Aili, 
and Inkeri, aesthetics can also transform into ritualized practices by means of which one can 
think about and work with reality. Ultimately, aesthetics can become practices to enhance one’s 
authority and agency in a situation where other ways to create change are diminished. 
 Aesthetics—art, nature, and ritualized practices in relation to one’s body, for instance—
played a significant role in patients’ lives. Here Inkeri’s account exemplifies exceptionally well 
what kind of asset an aesthetic orientation to the world can be for a person. In a way, her 
everyday reality was a constant performance in which she created herself and her surroundings 
(to the extent that it was possible) according to her wishes and needs. Inkeri’s enthusiasm to 
also study death and dying (by attending some of the same seminars and conferences that I did, 
for instance) was not always understood by everyone in the day hospice group. For Vivian, it 
was a horrifying idea that one should have death as their hobby, as she put it when commenting 
on Inkeri’s interest in dying (Vivian/2). But for Inkeri, this was an empowering thing to do, to 
learn and to assert authority over her own situation. 
There is a specific reason why I have written so extensively about the various sorts of 
aesthetic moments and engagements that my research participants had—whether they were 
people with artistic tendencies or people without any special connection to the arts. Of all of 
the accounts that I heard from my research participants, the ones involving aesthetics were the 
most affective and empowering for the patients themselves in regard to their emotional and 
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existential challenges. Research participants such as Kimmo, Heidi, and Vivian told me about 
hard moments during their illness trajectories, including fears and anxieties, which had 
threatened their self-identity and caused depression. To counterbalance these experiences, 
many sought things that would help them—help them feel better, help them relieve their 
anxiety, and perhaps help them come to terms with their situation. Even if one had a relatively 
unproblematic attitude toward death and dying, as Eeva and Aili seemed to have, there was still 
often a need to achieve understanding about the approaching death or to seek some sort of 
closure around one’s ending life. Personal rituals and ritualizations, as well as aesthetic 
engagements and experiences with the world, offered the research participants that kind of relief 
and palliative help. And at times, they induced metaphysical or existential insights about one’s 
situation, which could be grim but simultaneously reassuring. Art and nature gave practical 
tools to the patients to work with their feelings of loss and closure. As a mode of participation, 
aesthetics offered “phantasmagoric space” (Kapferer 2006) in which one could reorient and re-
structure oneself (Williams & Boyd 1993, 2006). Ultimately, aesthetic creative practices 
brought to patients Spinozian laetitia and potentia—joy and capability—which increased their 
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11. DISCUSSION 
11.1 Summary of the research questions and overview of the analysis 
Summary of the research questions 
In this research, I have studied how a small, defined group of Finnish palliative patients215 
approached their end of life after being diagnosed with serious illness leading to death. My 
overarching research question asked how contemporary urban Finns who have been diagnosed 
with a terminal illness experience and negotiate their end of life, death, and dying. Further 
research questions had to do with language, environment, and practices around death and dying. 
The first sub-questions asked how palliative patients talk about the end of life, what kind of 
language they use, and what kinds of imageries they have in relation to death and dying. The 
second one inquired how the research patients were affected by both actual and virtual places 
and spaces, especially in regard to augmenting or diminishing their agency at the end of life. 
Finally, the study explored what happens around patients once they are in palliative and/or 
hospice care, and especially what kinds of rituals exist in relation to death and dying in Finland 
today.Overall, I wanted to understand the experience of being seriously ill and facing death, 
how my research patients oriented in the vicinity of death, how they negotiated their end of life, 
and what kinds of tools they had in their use to handle their situation.  
 In order to find answers to my research questions, I conducted fieldwork among palliative 
patients for four years in 2014–2017. Due to the complexity and subtlety of my research theme, 
it was methodologically necessary to immerse in the field and spend time with the research 
patients by discussing, conversing, and listening to their accounts instead of simply doing a 
series of structured interviews. 
 Through an ethnographic approach which emphasizes lived experiences and subjective 
interpretations of reality, I have built an understanding about the everyday life of my research 
patients, including the variety of relationships which these patients had at the end of their illness 
trajectories, and how these constructed and affected their end of life. The phenomenological 
approach used in this study highlights the embodied and embedded aspects of human 
experience, not merely in regard to the social reality but also in relation to materiality, time, 
and space. Furthermore, introducing critical mediated posthumanism as well as Bell’s ritual 
theory into the phenomenological analysis enabled an examination of aspects of cultural 
processes, which at times involved distributed agencies via technologies and medical practices 
as rituals. 
 By combining two different kinds of approaches in the research material—phenomenology, 
on one hand, and critical mediated posthumanism and ritual theory, on the other—it was 
possible to gain a fuller, more informed understanding of the possible experiences of dying in 
                                                 
215 The research group represented a very specific sample, since almost all of the participants were patients in a 
hospice home. This is not the case for all dying Finns.  
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contemporary Finland. This kind of “tandem approach,” which combines another analytical 
perspective with phenomenological analysis, is common in contemporary anthropology. In a 
study such as mine, which is mostly constructed around the phenomenological analysis of 
subjective experiences, the critical perspective offered by mediated posthumanism and the 
anthropological theories of ritual illuminate the larger social and cultural structures and 
dynamics involved in these situations. As Desjarlais & Throop (2011: 95) point out, “analytic 
approaches that do not consider the place of the subjective or intersubjective, or of experience 
or consciousness, in cultural or political realities are missing out on something.”  
Overview of the theoretical analysis 
I based my analysis on the conceptual understanding of a patient as a relationally constituted 
and mediated subject, living and dying in an affective relationship with their surroundings. Due 
to the embodied and embedded nature of subjectivity, I paid close attention to various affective 
structures, practices, and environments, as well as the human and non-human relations in which 
the patient was involved. Through the discussions, interviews, and my ethnographic 
observations, I started to slowly build answers to my original research questions, which became 
more nuanced as time went on. I formed my analysis around three themes which emerged from 
my research material. The first relates to issues of place and space in a concrete and 
metaphorical sense (Part II); the second one relates to institutional rituals (Part III) ; and the last 
theme concentrates on personal rituals and the meaning of aesthetics as participatory practice 
(Part IV). These different sections benefited from different theoretical tools. Even if I have 
utilized various theoretical approaches, my analysis remains on the micro level; this was a 
conscious choice affected by my overall phenomenological orientation to the research. 
To apprehend the emotional, social, and physical situations in which my research patients 
found themselves—and which intertwined and affected their experiences, hopes, and fears—a 
multifarious analysis was necessary. Typically, phenomenological analysis focuses on the lived 
body (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2005), that is, the sensory body, which perceives, experiences, 
and senses life—and, in this case, also death. By carefully listening to what my research 
participants said and how things were expressed, I was able to learn about their embodied 
perceptions, interpretations, and understandings of situations. When analyzing the spatial 
issues, which arose in the discussions with the research participants, I profited from Tuan’s 
phenomenological perspective on space and place, and how people related both to the various 
spaces they encountered during their illness trajectories and to those places and spaces they 
longed for. By adding the posthumanist perspective to the analysis, I was able to look at how 
different materialities in various places affected the patients, and how the material environment 
as well as biomedical practices became constitutive of their experiences, and at times very 
concretely mediated their end of life. Furthermore, ritual theories illuminated well how the lived 
body became also the culturally, socially, and environmentally shaped “Foucauldian” body, 
which moved along the care trajectories, encountered medical staff, and received medical 
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treatments. The embodied experiences can be analyzed as objectifying or subjectifying, thus 
making the body a multiplicity; this becomes particularly salient and tangible in terms of what 
Feenberg (2006) calls the dependent body and extended body. In this way, it was possible to 
distinguish different positions of the patients’ multiple bodies, and how these various 
positionings affected their experiences of the end of life. In actuality, one can be a little bit of 
everything (subject, object, vulnerable, empowered, etc.) even in a single situation, and thus 
these categories exhibit dynamic crossover. However, keeping the multiplicity of the body in 
mind makes it possible to form a fuller and more nuanced understanding of a dying patient’s 
lifeworld. 
Throughout the study I refer to Spinoza’s theory of emotions (in the way in which recent 
philosophers and new materialists have read him), in which he links the main emotions of 
laetitia (joy) and tristitia (sadness) to the human capacity to act and think: joy increases one’s 
ability to act, whereas sadness decreases it. Spinozian monism accords well with philosophical 
approaches that emphasize relationality and the embodied materiality of human experience. 
Through the Spinozian manner of interpreting affective situations via joy and sadness, one can 
approach a situation in terms of its effects; in this way, the specific situations that my research 
participants encountered could be gauged in terms of whether they caused an increased or 
decreased ability for them to think and act. The Spinozian manner of seeing power as twofold—
potentia as empowering and potestas as restricting and controlling—illuminate well the double 
nature and twofold possibility of every encounter. I was interested in finding ways in which 
palliative patients were empowered in the face of death in order to achieve as much authority 
over their dying process as possible. 
When discussing about rituals involved at the end of life and dying, it was possible to 
separate institutional (often objectifying) rituals, which were imposed on palliative patients by 
various care locations, and personal (often subjectifying) rituals, which were initiated and 
practiced by the patients themselves. In regard to the institutional rituals related to the processes 
of living the end of life and dying, I employed especially the ritual theory by Bell, who sees 
rituals as processes in which power relations and interpretations of reality are rehearsed, 
imposed, negotiated, and, at times, contested. In terms of analyzing personal rituals and 
ritualization, I profited from the theorizations by Asad, Kapferer, and Schilbrack, who all—in 
their own ways—emphasize rituals as ways to learn and adopt thinking and performing in life 
(and death). Furthermore, from a societal and structural point of view, rituals can be perceived 
as Deleuzoguattarian striations seeking to organize chaotic, smooth phenomena, such as dying. 
How rituals worked for the patients themselves depended greatly on the authority and agency 
in the ritual. Thus, who “owns the ritual” became an important question. Again, it is possible 
to utilize the Spinozian concepts of potentia and potestas; those rituals and ritualizations which 
supported the dying to augment their authority over the situation, thus bringing them potentia, 
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were the most useful. But when rituals were designed first and foremost to serve some other 
actor in the situation, rather than the patient, their effects could become more challenging. 
 Somewhat similar to the conceptualization of striated and smooth by Deleuze and Guattari 
is the classical division of causality and participation used and developed by anthropologists 
for nearly a century. The difference between these conceptualizations is that striation and 
smooth describe overlapping and ever-changing dynamics of almost any imaginable process in 
reality, whereas causality and participation function as more strictly defined ways to “orient 
toward the world” (Tambiah 1990), or even “tendencies of the human mind” (Hanegraaff 2003). 
Thus, the latter conceptualization seems to be psychological, describing subjective orientations 
to the world instead of describing reality per se; hence, it can be seen as very different from 
more philosophical accounts of how reality works, such as presented by Deleuze and Guattari. 
The disjunction between these perspectives does not need to pose a problem, however. As 
discussed above, the analysis has a “tandem approach,” in which the (traditionally regarded) 
subjective phenomenological perspective is studied together with the (traditionally regarded) 
objective perspective in the form of ritual theories and the critical mediated posthumanism. 
Furthermore, the separation of the subject (inner) and the object (outer) echoes the kind of 
dualistic approach which this study deems impossible—both the phenomenological and 
posthuman approaches agree on this. 
The conceptualization of causality and participation described different kinds of orientation 
among the research participants in relation to their end of life; causal orientations emphasized 
medical interventions whereas participatory orientations were concerned with various activities 
that for the patient brought about a sense of connection. Many meaningful activities related to 
hope and a sense of completion could be defined as participatory by their nature. One of those 
was aesthetics, which proved a meaningful tool to negotiate issues of the end of life, death, and 
dying. 
11.2 Research findings 
Key findings 
Regarding my overarching research question of how terminally ill Finns experience and 
negotiate their end of life, death, and dying, I have found that the experiences of my research 
participants were strongly mediated via medicine first and foremost, but negotiations also 
happened through personal rituals and aesthetic expressions. This answers also the first sub-
question about what kinds of language and imageries were used when research participants 
talked about mortality; medical language was used in order to handle issues regarding the end 
of life. The moment of death, if mentioned at all, was often talked about in medical terms (in 
terms of sedation, for instance). Most of the practices in which the research participants engaged 
at this point were related to medicine (i.e., various kinds of medical treatments, check-ups, 
laboratory visits, tests) and, of course, pharmaceuticals, which composed an important element 
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of the end of life for many. The whole illness trajectory, with its various medical encounters, 
strongly affected the way in which the research participants felt about their current situation, 
and how empowered they felt in regard to it. 
 The next sub-question concerned the importance of the environment for my research 
participants—if place mattered and how different spaces and places affected them at their end 
of life. The findings regarding this are strongly intertwined with the other findings about 
language and rituals. The meaning of a place—whether actual or virtual—was linked with the 
place’s perceived ability to either augment or diminish the patient’s (sense of) agency in regard 
to their attempts to negotiate their end of life. Some places, such as summerhouses or certain 
nature spots, were empowering and existentially meaningful in themselves, and thereby 
enabling and facilitating personal meaning-making processes in the face of death. In turn, the 
relationships and encounters that the research participants had with their various care places 
were experienced as either empowering or disempowering. Perhaps it was not surprising that 
in those places in which the patients had experienced themselves as seen and heard as whole 
persons with their wishes and worries, they had felt safe and more able to negotiate and face 
their challenging situation. What was striking, however, was the way in which past negative 
encounters in medical surroundings had a long-lasting and disempowering effect on the 
research participants in regard to their present sense of safety and experience of agency. The 
vulnerabilities that illness brings are not merely physical but also psychological, social, and 
deeply emotional, and they seem to greatly affect the way in which seriously ill patients 
encounter their surroundings. 
The medical mediations that I found, both in regard to language and practices, were actually 
often about the extension of life, that is, about survival rather than death and dying per se. 
However, medicine was not the only means by which the end of life and dying became mediated 
and negotiated. Certain research participants created personal practices—rituals and 
ritualizations—some of which actually helped to approach death and dying in an empowered 
manner, whereas others were aimed more at avoiding death and averting dying. I have classified 
these accordingly as rituals for preparation for death, on one hand, and rituals for avoidance of 
death, on the other. This responds to the last of my sub-questions related to possible rituals at 
the end of life. It was through these rituals and ritualizations that patients were able to 
negotiate—to think about, to handle, and to concretely act in—their situation and the pending 
future. Especially those rituals and practices which engaged aesthetics in one form or another 
became meaningful and even powerful tools to comprehend the end of life and find solace in 
it.  
Next I will continue to a more detailed explanation of the findings of the study, of which the 
first has to with the embodiment of existential concerns. 
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Embodied experience of existential concerns  
In terms of receiving and accepting information about serious, life-threatening illness and their 
approaching death, my research participants had very different aptitudes and tools at their 
disposal to deal with their situation. Some were barely able to talk about it, whereas others—
albeit a minority—seemed more prepared and better equipped to encounter what was coming. 
Although the way in which people take the news about having a terminal condition is very 
individual, in my material one factor appeared to make a difference: this was the patients’ 
previous exposure to various facets of serious illness, death, and dying. Profiting from previous 
experience indicates that one can learn to die; some of my research patients had more resources 
than others when it came time to “do” death. That said, my analysis nonetheless demonstrates 
a general difficulty shared by both the patients and the medical staff in facing the news about 
the end of life: it proved to be hard to talk and hear about death and dying. There were obstacles 
in terms of language and communication, and mental imageries and representations relating to 
death and dying were very limited. One could say that there remained a shortage of cultural 
models for and of dying. Often, the only language that was readily available in regard to the 
end of life was that of medicine—yet with medical language it was difficult to talk about 
sentiments and meanings, that is, the existential aspect of dying. 
In the international guidelines for palliative and hospice care, the most commonly reiterated 
definition explains palliative (or hospice) care as holistic care meeting the patient’s physical, 
psychological, social, and existential (or spiritual) needs (WHO 2019). Of these different 
aspects of palliative care, in recent years existential (or spiritual) care has been discussed more 
widely—for instance, in the professional literature—and it has become an object of further 
research and development in the field (Gijsberts et al. 2019).216 When investigating what kinds 
of hopes, wishes, and needs the palliative patients had, I came to a realization about the 
materiality and embodiedness of existentiality. The existential matters that related to hope and 
approaching death, for instance, were seldom talked about in a direct manner, but they were 
nevertheless expressed and addressed in various ways in the discussions. Hence, when Vivian 
talked at length about the restrictions of her physical condition, or she was remembering some 
unpleasant encounter with a healthcare practitioner, for instance, those moments often revealed 
a variety of sentiments, such as fear and anxiety related to her existential condition, which she 
would not have talked about directly. As Helena described, bodily symptoms had psychological 
(or spiritual) ramifications which at times caused lots of existential grief, anxiety, and even 
anger. Existential matters did not exist in isolation from the rest of the patient; living and dying 
did not divide itself into the categorizations of “physical, psychological, social, and spiritual,” 
but instead the sense of existence, as well as the sense of losing one’s existence, was constituted 
                                                 
216 For instance, the European Association for Palliative Care (EAPC) founded a Spiritual Care Taskforce in 2010, 
which aims to enhance research on the topic of spiritual care and ameliorate staff competence and confidence in 
this area (Gijsberts et al. 2019). 
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by all of these aspects at once. This is what Johnson (2007) refers to when he says that human 
meaning is embodied; social, emotional, and existential impressions and affects permeate the 
lived body and become embodied meanings. On a practical level, talking about everyday 
nuisances, such as a troublesome tummy, was easier than tackling questions about the possible 
eternity of the soul—even if, in the end, behind both concerns was the anxiety about the coming 
death. 
The existential aspect of care is understood to be integral for palliative care, and thus it is 
something that ought to be addressed. It follows that the first challenge here is to recognize 
when a patient is expressing existential anxiety, fear, or feelings of meaninglessness, for 
instance. Based on my research analysis, I would claim that these issues are not necessarily 
expressed by means of spiritual, philosophical, or even psychological language; rather, 
references to embodied relational challenges that patients encounter in their materially mediated 
everyday life become easily infused with existential worries and concerns. If Heidi’s account 
about her experiences during a colonoscopy, for instance, is reviewed from this ankle, it 
becomes easier to understand why she was so impacted by it. Her experience not only concerned 
her hurting body but was about an encounter that affected her whole existence, causing anxiety 
and a sense of being devastated. Listening to patients’ accounts thus granted the recognition 
that existential anxieties deserve.  
Concerning the explicit hopes and wishes of palliative patients, these mostly had to do with 
hopes for a cure (i.e., not to die) and wishes to live longer and spend more time with one’s 
family (especially children or grandchildren). The most explicitly expressed need was that of 
being physically cared for at the end of life and at the moment of death; patients needed to be 
reassured that one could die without pain or having to suffocate to death. However, beneath 
these very concrete and sensible—although, at times, impossible—wishes (such as the wish not 
to die) were various kinds of existential sentiments and aspirations that were not necessarily 
expressed openly but which surfaced in the long discussions, and also became revealed in the 
ritualized actions that my research patients engaged in. 
Rituals at the end of life 
Institutional and medical rituals 
Based on my research material, I discerned two different types of rituals in which my research 
participants were involved; one comprised the various institutional rituals and the other the so-
called personal rituals. As explained in the beginning of this study, there are various kinds of 
ritualized practices or actual rituals in various medical settings, be they hospitals, clinics, or 
hospices. By analyzing medical treatments from the perspective of ritual theories, it became 
possible to understand what an intimately essential and constitutive element medicine was in 
the patients’ end of life. Following the theoretical insights of Bell, Asad, and Foucault on rituals 
as forms of embodied learning and adaptation intertwined with issues of power, I have shown 
how patients align themselves with techno-medical realities of illness. Biomedical treatments, 
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including actual medications and drugs, and encounters, such as consultations with staff, 
generated rhythm and structure in the amorphous daily life of a sick patient. As mentioned 
above, medicine also offered a language to talk about one’s situation and a means to picture 
what was going on. At times, medical treatments came to denote such existential matters such 
as hope. Treatments and medication could become rituals of and for hope; indeed, for some 
patients, as long as there was some medical intervention or procedure to look forward to, there 
remained hope. This was due to the strong trust that patients felt toward biomedical science and 
specialized cancer care in Finland. In the end, as Bloch claims, rituals are about deference, 
about “the trust in others that one follows” (Bloch & Kallinen 2017: 88). Through ritualized 
medical practices, patients not only learned to align their comportment with medicine but also 
to adapt the medical worldview as a form of metaphysical thinking. Medicine co-constituted 
patients in multiple manners; it became physically and molecularly part of the patient’s 
body/mind as well as their identity. 
Often medicine and biomedical technology functioned as an empowering and enabling 
element, which granted enhanced agency to the patients and even helped some of their wishes 
to be fulfilled. For instance, Vivian felt that medicine had given her “extra-time,” for which she 
was ever grateful. At other times, however, biomedical practices disempowered the patient and 
caused a sense of self-alienation. Medical technologies also challenged the patient’s self-
identity, revealing things in one’s body which one had not previously been aware of. With their 
“artifactual intentionalities,” various types of medical technology, such as imaging 
technologies, not only revealed things about the body but also constructed it by cumulating 
information that was otherwise unknown. However, while Sharon (2014: 146) has proposed 
that the final representation of reality is produced by the technologies themselves (converting 
the virtual to real), my research material speaks only of situations in which there was always a 
human subject making interpretations of the representations produced by technologies for the 
patient. The descriptions, definitions, and interpretations of reality were negotiated and 
communicated in a multidirectional manner. 
Analyzing the effects of medical technologies, be they empowering or disempowering, 
exposes the interdependent nature of human existence. The relations that the patients had during 
their illness trajectory, whether with human or non-human elements, were meaningful exactly 
for this reason; they were part of the patients’ embodied realities and co-constituted their actual 
existence, that is, their living and dying. If we understand agency as an ability to transform the 
world, as Sax (2006: 474) suggests, then it follows that medicine—seen as ritual, which 
expresses, practices, and performs agency—has this transformative ability as well. From the 
perspective of a patient, these transformations were empowering and, at times, disempowering. 
Some medical practices, or the ways in which they are realized, can end up objectifying patients. 
According to my research material, possible objectifying practices were overlooked when there 
was still some hope for a definitive cure, but the practices became more problematic when a 
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patient knew (or suspected) that their treatments were not about curing but management of a 
terminal condition. In some cases, encounters with medical staff seemed to color the patient’s 
experience of their end of life, for better or worse.  
Day hospice, which became my main actual research site, was also a kind of medical 
environment. Part of the ritualizations happening in the day hospice related to medical 
activities, such as consultations with a doctor, but many were built around ordinary, everyday 
activities, such as eating. Among the terminally ill patients, the small moments of everyday life 
became precious, almost celebrated, and thus easily ritualized instances, as the shared lunch 
moments in the day hospice demonstrated. Furthermore, ordinariness and uneventfulness made 
the space safe for patients whose daily lives had otherwise changed considerably and now 
included various biomedical procedures.  
In a way, the day hospice represented a mixture of Deleuzoguattarian smoothness, 
exemplified in the open spaces of the hospice home, where patients could wander around, and 
institutional striations, which were exemplified by structuring rituals. On one hand, it could be 
argued that by creating striated order and rhythm for the nebulous time of illness full of 
unknowns, these ritualizations supported and protected the challenged or fragile self-identities 
of those who were terminally ill. On the other hand, rituals are also practices of power, which 
did not always serve every patient’s interests. In the narratives of my research participants, 
however, the hospice home represented a safe place to be at the most vulnerable moment of 
their life. Research participants expressed that the hospice home and the day hospice enabled 
moments of relief and comfort, and one felt looked after and cared for. Even if the presence of 
death was less visible in the common conversations than I had expected, it seemed to silently 
permeate the patients’ minds, as Aili pointed out. Yet, it was still possible to talk about death; 
questions and worries about death and dying were heard and addressed, as happened in 
Kimmo’s long conversation with the night nurse. To conclude, I would say that as a physical 
place and an ideological concept (spread in media, for instance), hospice permits contemporary 
Finns to practice thinking about death and dying in addition to the actual practice of dying. It 
enables a conceptual and discursive alternative for the ubiquitous techno-medical frame of 
biomedicine. In other words, it constructs a contemporary model for dying and offers some 
adaptable imagery about the end of life, which otherwise seems so absent in contemporary 
society. 
Personal rituals  
Medical rituals have been studied rather widely in anthropological research, but the kind of 
personal rituals and ritualizations that I encountered with my research participants have gained 
less attention in the studies of death and dying people. Based on my analysis, I have categorized 
these personal rituals into those which aim to keep death at bay (death avoidance rituals) and 
those which are clearly aimed at preparing for death (death preparatory rituals). Some practices 
had elements of both, but often one could label the activity as one or the other. 
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Many of the avoidance rituals sought to enhance the body. The dying subject would invent 
and invite more potentialities with the goal of protecting oneself—or even preventing oneself 
from dying. The body became the locus of an aesthetic experiment, a ritual site in itself, through 
which research participants (such as Kimmo with his sports) sought to create new possibilities 
of life. Complementary and alternative medicine also worked in this manner by creating a 
virtual ritual space for enhancing life. Furthermore, an alternative healing ritual could also 
become an attempt to build an alternate ontology, a sort of new ordering of reality, in which the 
patient was able to regain some control over their situation. Healthy food, sports, and different 
types of beauty aids were used in order to enhance the powers of the body. All of these personal 
rituals and ritualizations can be interpreted as attempts to increase one’s own authority and 
agency over the situation. In addition, some of these rituals offered the possibility to apprehend 
new metaphysical ways of thinking about oneself and the illness, even if it meant shifting into 
a new epistemological type of reasoning, such as magic. At times of severe existential crisis, 
like imminent death, the social pressure to follow the causal scientific orientation becomes 
practically meaningless. Furthermore, per Giddens, we can see how such activities and practices 
also functioned as efforts to protect one’s self-identity in the face of approaching death and the 
disintegration which it brings about. 
The ritual of writing was very different from rituals concentrating on the body. As seen with 
Marjo-Riitta, writing in general—and especially writing a blog—was a powerful tool to process 
one’s situation and claim authority. Both reading and writing proved to be very important for 
those research participants who engaged in them. As Aili stated multiple times, reading was 
experienced as a salvation and as an essential tool for survival in moments of crisis. Reading 
and writing could function both as a ritual of avoidance or ritual as preparation. Most often they 
featured a sort of negotiation about the situation and one’s possibilities; one could also learn to 
adapt and accept their situation by reading and writing about it. For Marjo-Riitta, writing was 
a way to generate the virtual ritual space in which she could create the kind of deathscape she 
wished.  
 Some of the practices I encountered among my research patients were clearly aimed at 
preparing for one’s death and dying. Often the death preparatory rituals were very practical and 
concerned with this-worldly issues; they were about “tying up loose ends,” such as arranging 
one’s economics or re-dividing the responsibilities in the household. Some level of acceptance, 
or at least recognition of the approaching death, preceded these practices. Since speaking—and, 
at times, even thinking—about the coming death was difficult, and consequently rare, the 
moment when it actually happened (for instance, in relation to funeral planning) was 
exceptional, and thus became easily ritualized. In my research material, funeral planning was 
this type of preparatory practice, which opened a framed space to encounter one’s own mortality 
and talk about it. Some of the preparatory rituals were empowering for the dying. For instance, 
the designing and making of a death shirt literally asserted agency in relation to one’s death and 
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the ability to design one’s own deathscape. The ritual of death cleaning seemed to function 
simultaneously as a practical preparation for death as well as a way to organize, go through, 
and also say goodbye to one’s life history. Giving up important material items could also turn 
out to be a significant moment for the dying, attesting to acknowledgement of the approaching 
death and even extending one’s agency beyond the moment of death. 
Religion, nature, and aesthetics as empowering mediations 
In addition to various personal rituals and ritualized activities, I encountered other activities 
reflecting the participatory orientation to the world, which contrasted with the instrumental 
causality represented by biomedicine. Based on my research analysis, religion and spirituality, 
nature, and various forms of aesthetics offered powerful tools and practical mediations for 
patients to orient themselves after a prognosis of terminal illness. Religion and spirituality 
represent a classic participatory model of relating with the world, which can be in a conflicting 
relationship with the scientific, causal manner of reasoning and approaching reality that 
dominates the Western secular societies (Hanegraaff 2003). With most of my research 
participants, however, their possible religious denominations did not seem to greatly affect their 
everyday life, not even in the face of death. Most of the religiosity seemed so fluid and flexible 
that it did not appear to cause any dissonance with the scientific explanation of the world. 
Instead, many stated that they were not religious, even while admitting “perhaps something 
more is out there.” 
Yet, there were a few participants for whom religious questions did matter. Religion 
functioned as a profound source of support and hope for some patients, such as Siru, whereas 
for others, like Vivian, it was a disappointment. In addition to the strong affects caused by 
religion, some research participants, such as Inkeri and Oiva, expressed their spirituality in a 
very loose and creative manner, mixing spiritual and philosophical understandings of the world 
with their art.  
Rather than relating to religion per se, or talking about religious or transcendent matters, my 
research participants described and talked about deeply affective and special aesthetic moments 
that were intense enough to cause metaphysical realizations—epiphanies even—in regard to 
their existential situation. Some had these sorts of special experiences spontaneously by looking 
at nature scenery, for example, while for others these experiences were induced by specific 
types of engagement, such as listening to music or reading poetry. Since the experiences varied 
so much, it took me a while to realize that the common element in all these various special 
moments was aesthetics. For instance, when Heidi saw the hawk eat the blackbird, it made her 
realize her own mortality and place in the universe. Martti heard a piece of classical music from 
the car radio, which gave him a vision of Paradise, whereas Aili found fortification of her 
philosophical understanding of life and death through avid reading. Whether it happened in 
nature or through the arts, it was the encounter with aesthetics that engendered transformative 
affective experiences, which brought metaphysical meaning and led to acceptance of such 
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existential matters as one’s approaching death. Hence, I have called these sorts of participatory 
engagements aesthetic experiences with the potentiality to induce metaphysical imagination 
and meaning-making (Butters 2016).  
Aesthetics also functioned as a tool to process memories and tie up one’s life, and thus make 
meaning of the life one had lived. Looking through old photos or at old artwork, or listening to 
a record collection, like my mother did, are all aesthetic experiences that helped the patients to 
reach some conclusion. Wherever the element of aesthetics was present, it seemed to work as 
the mediation through which time, life events, various kinds of emotions and cognitive 
aspirations were reorganized in a creative, meaningful manner. Here, the human experience 
was not only ontologically related to the world (Ihde 2009: 23) but also aesthetically so. Based 
on my analysis, for my research participants it was easier to relate to special moments that 
engendered metaphysical thinking via the concept of aesthetics rather than religion. In a 
Western secular society, aesthetics is a culturally more acceptable—and perhaps in some ways 
more accessible—manner to practice participation and metaphysical thinking (Hanegraaff 
2003: 377). 
With the help of the Deleuzoguattarian conceptualization of smooth and striated, the analysis 
showed how both medicine and aesthetics can work as striations creating and promoting 
patterns of security and rhythm in life and death. Based on my analysis, the difference between 
these two kinds of striations was that, unlike in the case of medicine, through aesthetics or other 
kinds of participatory practices my research participants were able to discover and create some 
metaphysical meaning and find existential consolation in the face of death. Of all of the 
accounts that I heard from my research participants, the ones involving aesthetics were the most 
affective and empowering for the patients themselves in regard to their emotional and 
existential challenges. Whether spontaneous and accidental, or cultivated and sought after, 
aesthetic experiences enabled metaphysical imagination and meaning-making, which brought 
great consolation and relief.  
The Deleuzoguattarian smoothing through ritual, art, and nature opened up new spaces for 
hope and change. Such openings can be seen as Kapferer’s phantasmagorical space, which 
invites participants to break free from the constraints or determinations of everyday life by 
enabling possibilities and potentialities (Kapferer 2006: 673). In other words, these spaces or 
moments become a form of virtuality, a sort of enhanced facet of actuality. Furthermore, 
aesthetics and aesthetic experiences transformed relations and enhanced potentia. Relations to 
life, death, and the world were renewed, and this was an empowering experience. Some of the 
research participants understood their end of life as a kind of final art project. By approaching 
death in this kind of creative manner, some realized the kind of deathscape for themselves that 
they wished, and thus they claimed authority over their own death. 
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11.3 Contributions, limitations, and prospects 
Contributions of the study 
Since this study combines different approaches to the theme of death and dying, it also 
contributes to various academic discussions in such fields as death studies and ritual studies, as 
well as the study of (lived) religion and palliative research.  
 Within the field of death studies, this research reveals the experiences of the dying people 
themselves, an important perspective that has been less studied in comparison to the experiences 
of caregivers or the bereaved. By examining the patients’ embodied and embedded experiences 
not only in relation to the medical context but also in regard to other quotidian elements which 
comprised their end of life, the work integrates previously often separated research approaches, 
such as those focusing on questions of (medical) care, on one hand, and those concerning the 
existential aspects of the dying process, on the other. This kind of integrated approach allows 
one to see how different aspects of the end of life affect each other and are in a dynamic mutual 
relationship.  
 Furthermore, this work joins research done during recent years that emphasizes the 
relationality of care and dying (Broom and Kirby 2013; Ellis 2013, 2018; van Hout et al. 2015; 
Håkanson & Öhlén 2016; Vähäkangas & Saarelainen 2019). Akin to sociologist Julie Ellis’ 
(2013) academic focus on the everyday aspect of dying, my research shows how small, 
quotidian realities and practices form the core experiences of the dying. Studying families with 
a terminally ill family member, Ellis has noted how “‘the big matter of death’ was lived through 
mundane material things and everyday routines” (2013: 261–262). This everyday aspect of the 
end of life and dying has been somewhat overlooked in the earlier studies, which have often 
emphasized death and dying either as medical phenomena (Kellehear 2016) or as something 
spiritually extraordinary with emotional “work to be done,” as Ellis puts it (2013: 252). My 
analysis agrees with and further illuminates Ellis’ view on how existentially and spiritually 
significant aspects (those which Ellis refers to as the assumed “big matter”) of dying are 
interlaced with material, day-to-day realities and experiences. Whereas recent sociological 
studies have underlined the importance of social relations (with other humans) at the end of life 
(see, e.g., Broom and Kirby 2013; Håkanson & Öhlén 2016), theologians Auli Vähäkangas and 
Suvi-Maria Saarelainen (2019) have written about “relational theology,” by which they seek to 
highlight the importance of the patient’s personal relations with both human and divine others 
for maintaining hope. What I have introduced to this conversation is how the relational 
mediated aspect of human experience shapes the end of life and dying in manifold ways. Some 
of the mediations, including medicine, have been discussed in earlier studies in the field of 
medical anthropology (see, e.g., Davis-Floyd 1992; van der Geest 2005; Brody 2010), but my 
work brings to light other kinds of mediations, such as those of personal rituals and 
ritualizations, which the earlier research has not discussed. 
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 Studying death rituals as forms of social adaptation or as ways to conquer death and ensure 
the continuity of life is nothing unusual in anthropology; however, studying death rituals from 
the perspective of the dying person—as is done in this work—is rare (see Engelke 2019). Thus, 
this research contributes to the study of death rituals overall. More specifically, the way in 
which this study has approached death rituals as means of corporeal, emotional, and even 
metaphysical learning about the end of life and death opens a new perspective on death rituals. 
The elaboration of both institutional and personal death rituals in this study enriches the 
understanding of how one can adopt and learn ways of thinking, doing, and being with terminal 
illness and imminent death via ritual practices. Furthermore, the categorization of death 
avoidance rituals on one hand and death preparatory rituals on the other elaborates on death 
rituals in a novel manner. 
In terms of the theoretical discussions in the field of the study of religion, this work amplifies 
the classical discussion on participation (Lévy-Bruhl 1923; Tambiah 1990; Hanegraaff 2003; 
Luhrmann 2007; Dawes 2014). Here, the participation became manifested especially in the 
personal rituals of the research patients, many of which involved aesthetics in one form or 
another. Perhaps this was the most intriguing empirical finding of my work: my research 
participants related to aesthetics over religion or spirituality when finding solace and 
metaphysical meaning at the end of life. Although art and religion share common elements, it 
was fascinating how many of the research participants seemed to separate these two, even 
purposefully selecting aesthetic elements over religious ones as meaningful and soothing. This 
could suggest that in comparison to religion and spirituality, aesthetics—like art and nature—
is for contemporary Finns a more attractive and malleable way to seek existential meaning. I 
believe that this is an important question for the study of religion to investigate in more detail 
in the future. 
While there has been interest toward various sorts of alternative healing practices on the 
borderline of religion and medicine (see McGuire 2008; Rowbottom 2014), there are scant 
studies of lived religion concerning people with acute, chronic, or life-threatening illnesses, 
especially from the biomedical frame. The phenomenological first-person perspective of my 
work is typical, yet the research material is exceptional in the study of lived religion. 
Subsequently, this work opens new avenues by illuminating the way in which terminally ill 
patients embodied and lived through their existential challenges in the frame of quotidian life. 
Exploring the ways in which terminally ill patients negotiate and deal with death and dying in 
biomedically saturated everyday life increases our understanding of the contemporary 
intertwinings of medicine, an embodied sense of reality, and metaphysical meaning-making.  
 This question of the existential aspect of terminal illness brings me to the last facet of the 
possible contributions of the research findings. As mentioned previously, in palliative research 
there has been increased interest and a need to understand the existential dimension of palliative 
care (Gijsberts et al. 2019). However, it still often seems vague what exactly those existential 
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matters are, how they appear in palliative care, and how they should be taken into consideration 
in practice (Boston et al. 2011; Gijsberts et al. 2019; Drillaud et al. 2020). Instead of those 
manifesting in abstract spiritual or religious ideas, practices, or language, my work 
demonstrates how existential issues arise in and are mediated by various kinds of quotidian 
settings and embodied situations, and how existential anxieties are frequently entangled with 
practical and concrete matters. In practice, these anxieties or issues were not always necessarily 
recognized as “existential,” since existential matters are generally considered to comprise 
something more abstract and transcendent (Drillaud et al. 2020).  
 The kinds of existential care which proved to be empowering—and thus meaningful—to 
patients seemed to involve various sorts of relationalities, whether with other human or non-
human companions, or with nature and artistic expressions. This finding accords with 
anthropologist Frédérique Drillaud’s recent study from France, which concludes that the 
existential dimension “appears to reside in the connections between individuals, the 
relationships and interaction of all those present in the PCU [palliative care unit]” (Drillaud et 
al. 2020: 12).217 Our studies find further agreement on the significance of creative, aesthetic, 
and sensorial activities to enhance the wellbeing of the palliative patients, but also how they 
represent actual forms of existential or spiritual care. Drillaud et al. (2020) note that given the 
prominence of the themes of “sensoriality” and “imagination” as existential elements in the 
field, and the lack of corresponding theoretical data on them, they deserve to be studied further. 
This is exactly what my study has done. Through theoretization, I have shown how the 
potentialities and virtualities facilitated by art, ritual, and other forms of aesthetics alleviate 
existential anxieties and enable patients to practice being with the idea of death and dying, and 
eventually even practice learning to die. It would be ideal if not just palliative care but also 
palliative research began considering the existential or spiritual aspects of care in this more 
nuanced, embodied, and concrete way. This would perhaps lead to new insights within the 
realm of research and new innovations in regard to actual care. 
Critical view of the research process 
In qualitative research such as mine, it is not unusual that the actual ethnographic process differs 
from the original plan to some extent, and even the research questions may be redefined once 
the reality in the field is revealed. While my research questions remained the same (only 
becoming more nuanced), the research process did not proceed according to my original plan. 
I had hoped to do ethnography in various care locations, observing the care staff as well, but 
this proved to be difficult to arrange, due to ethical reasons such as privacy. In addition, the 
events in my private life (i.e., my mother’s diagnosis and death) altered the course of the 
ethnography to some extent. Concerning the content of the research, this led the study to focus 
                                                 
217 Drillaud et al. (2020) studied the expressions of the existential dimension in a palliatice care unit (PCU) in 
France, but they included only one actual patient in the research; all the other participants were staff members. 
Thus, although their research material included both observations and interviews, in regard to the patients their 
analysis was mostly based on observations. 
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more strictly on the patients’ understanding and interpretations of their circumstances. I did 
converse with the staff at times, but since they were included in the scope of my ethically 
approved research plan only minimally and I was unable to do proper ethnographic observation 
of the care situations, their presence in the study is minimal and their approach has been largely 
omitted from the analysis. In this way, the study ended up concerning the lived reality of the 
patients more closely than I had initially anticipated. The same phenomenon concerns the 
relative lack of presence of family members (or significant others) in the research. Since I 
emphasize the importance of relationality, it would have perhaps made sense to include family 
members more in the research. This would have broadened the perspectives, but it could have 
also affected the way in which the patients themselves opened up to me. As explained in the 
beginning, sometimes meeting a stranger who is an outsider to the family dynamics and not a 
medical professional can be helpful for patients. It can enable them to express frustrations that 
they do not wish to air in front of their loved ones. In the end, these shortcomings shaped my 
study, but in terms of the main focus—that is, understanding the way in which the research 
participants lived their end of life and experienced their dying—I do not believe that they 
negatively impacted the final findings. 
A major influence on the whole research process was my mother’s death only a few months 
after I had started my ethnography. Time wise, her diagnosis coincided in an unfortunate 
manner with my fieldwork; as soon as I began forming closer relationships with the research 
participants, I had to take some time off. In addition to the mere logistics and the time lost in 
the research, witnessing my mother’s illness trajectory and experiencing her death affected me 
emotionally, of course. Even before her death, I started feeling as if I was suddenly experiencing 
everything I had been studying about—from the inside. I became sensitized to everything I 
witnessed, and this could be interpreted as a biased position for a researcher. However, being 
an insider is a sought-after position in the practice of anthropology; the whole point of 
anthropological ethnography is to render the researcher as an insider in order to gain a more 
accurate understanding of the research subject’s experiences. Although I could never become 
an insider in the full sense of the word, since I was not ill or dying, I joined the group of people 
who mourned and experienced something personal in relation to death and dying. The trick was 
how to return from the field and from the insider position, to reassume the position of the critical 
researcher. Thanks to my supervisors, who not only supported me through my hardship but also 
helped me to sharpen my analytical voice after my personal experiences and immersion in the 
field, I was able to better differentiate the emic and etic in my research material. 
Limitations of the study 
The limitations in this study relate to its research methods, analysis, and chosen theories. As 
explained in the beginning, there were specific reasons why I chose ethnography as the research 
method. Different methods produce different kinds of data, and as an ethnographic study, this 
work reflects the reality of a very specific and small group of people. The fact that all of my 
~ 214 ~ 
 
research participants were diagnosed with cancer naturally affected the analysis. Most of my 
research participants were hospice patients, which also makes them a specific type of group of 
dying individuals in Finland. Most Finns die at a general healthcare center (Forma et al. 2018), 
and the accessibility of palliative care in Finland varies greatly and is not yet in reach of 
everyone (Saarto & Finne-Soveri 2019).218 Consequently, a weakness of the study is that it 
provides a narrow representation of possible death trajectories. While the prevalence of cancer 
patients in ethnographic research is a direct reflection of the prevalence of cancer patients in 
hospices, there is a need to conduct research on other palliative patient groups, such as those 
suffering from cardiovascular diseases or dementia. Also, there is very little information about 
the experiences of people who die in other places than hospice. This is an area of study that 
requires further development in Finland. 
 Another point that I wish to make in relation to my research method has to do with the 
theoretization of the research material and the ethnographic reporting. Even if it is reasonable 
to claim that the ethnographic approach enables the research subjects to have their voice heard, 
that is only one facet of ethnographic reporting. As pointed out by several anthropologists (see 
Lutz 2017), writing about research subjects always involves some degree of typifying when the 
subjects are rendered into exemplars of the research (Lutz 2017: 185). Furthermore, intense 
theorizing can lead to a kind of depersonalization of the subjects, in which personal contexts 
can become overlooked or neglected (Beatty 2010, cited in Lutz 2017). This poses a dilemma 
for every ethnographer: how to write in such a manner that the text is scientifically sound and 
theoretically insightful, yet simultaneously faithful to the ambiguous nature of reality that 
escapes categorizations, thus being “true” to the people that it talks about. While I have applied 
various theoretical conceptualizations to my analysis, I have given space to the descriptions in 
the field, in which I have sought to unwrap the encounters with my research participants in a 
conscientious manner. I can only hope that my choices do justice to my research participants 
and their experiences.  
 In terms of the methods of analysis, while I followed the general ideas of IPA, I did not apply 
any software while doing it. I found that my research material was too heterogeneous by its 
nature, varying from interviews to field notes and field diaries, including also various kinds of 
texts such as blogs, to be proportionately analyzed in such a mechanical manner. In addition, I 
found that much of the information that I received from the actual interviews or general 
encounters with the research participants was gathered by attending to the whole situation, not 
only the words that were spoken. In addition to the actual uttered words, it was about how things 
were said and when, what was not said, and other things that were happening at the moment. 
Here the importance of the research notes and diaries became highlighted. That said, using a 
software program would have certainly revealed prevalences of some concepts and themes in 
                                                 
218 An example of another kind of death was written about in Helsingin Sanomat, when reporter Katri Kallionpää 
described her father’s dying process without palliative care (Kallionpää 2018a, 2018b). 
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the interviews; therefore, using a software program for the analysis could have produced an 
additional layer of information.  
 In terms of the theoretical conceptualizations, the range of my approaches could be regarded 
as problematic. One could also ask, for example, how a theory of emotions from the 17th century 
is still relevant today and, furthermore, how that can be combined with contemporary 
anthropological ritual theories or with posthuman perspectives, since all of these are associated 
with their own theoretical discussions and schools of thought. There are a couple of ways to 
respond to this. First, the different theoretizations operate on different levels of analysis (micro, 
meso, or meta level), and thus they produce different angles on the topic—which was my 
intended aim. Some conceptualizations (e.g., such as embodied subjectivity) help us to 
understand how things are experienced from the first-person perspective, whereas some others 
(e.g., certain ritual theories) illuminate corporeal experiences from a structural and societal 
perspective. 
Second, there is actually a common ground between all of the approaches that I have applied, 
which, I believe, allows their combination. The conceptualizations used in this work share in 
their ontological and epistemological basis; they all highlight the processual and non-dual 
nature of reality with emphasis on materiality and embodiedness. In addition, they share an 
understanding of subject as essentially relational and interdependent; there is a certain 
recognition of the affectivity of the environment and relationships in which we live. This kind 
of shared general understanding of reality facilitates the application of these particular 
theoretical views from various and differing intellectual traditions. While I agree that I could 
have operated with much less theory, the dissertation would not have produced the type of 
integrated approach to the research topic, which was my intellectual aspiration. 
11.4 Conclusion 
End of life and dying mediated by medicine, rituals, and aesthetics 
This research has produced an analysis of various possible ways to live the end of life and to 
die in contemporary Finland. A common element found in all the accounts of the research 
participants was how mediated both living and dying tend to be. The relationship with 
biomedicine was the most pronounced type that surfaced from the research material; it affected 
the experience of the end of life in myriad ways. Medical spaces and places, practices and 
treatments, and biotechnological features were present in every phase of the illness trajectory, 
including the actual death. Thus, biomedicine was part of everyday life in a most concrete and 
intimate manner, both physically but also mentally. My research participants referred to 
themselves as patients, and they talked about themselves and their condition in medical 
language. But as we have seen, the end of life was also mediated by various participatory 
practices, such as religion, art, and nature, many of which revolved around interconnectedness. 
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Overall, a participatory orientation to reality emphasizes relationality and reflects the relational 
ontology of a human.  
My theoretical approach of phenomenology flavored with critical mediated posthumanism 
brought about analysis of the nuanced ways in which the research participants lived and died 
via mediations. In the course of the participatory practices that I explored, subjectivity was 
constituted by multiple affective relations with other beings in various places and spaces. In 
terms of the relational nature of (especially post)human existence and mediated posthuman 
corporeality, patients experienced their surroundings in a tangible manner—almost as 
extensions of their bodies. In line with the theory of mediated posthumanism, which does not 
see the human being as a fixed, bounded entity separate from the external world but rather as 
constituted through interrelations with the world, I argue that the significance of one’s milieu 
is even more salient toward the end of life. The lifeworld of a terminally ill patient becomes 
increasingly dependent on and framed in terms of medicine, various technological supports, 
and ontological relationality with the environment in general. In sum, the phenomenological 
approach illuminates the processual nature of living and dying that is affected, experienced, and 
expressed via multiple mediations, which can be environmental, practice-related, material, 
social, aesthetic, and so on. 
Practical implications and final words 
The embodied relationality and the mediated nature of the patients’ experiences which this 
study has illuminated have certain implications for practical care work among palliative 
patients, and as we have seen, they also evoke ideas for possible further research. First, this 
study has clearly shown the significance of the environment of palliative and hospice care for 
the wellbeing of the patients and also those close to them. Since the surroundings affect not 
only physical and social wellbeing but also emotional and psychological ability to find 
(existential) meaning or comfort at the end of life, it would be important to pay close attention 
to spatial and structural matters when planning palliative and hospice care. As described in this 
work, the space affects the practices; differents spaces support, allow, or perhaps hinder 
different care practices. In order to create the kind of patient-centered care which is called for 
today, the planning ought to consider how strongly the space can affect and even produce 
different types of care. 
 Second, I would like to highlight the mediated and embodied nature of the existential 
experiences and emotions, such as fear, grief, or a sense of meaninglessness, but also positive 
emotions like hope. Based on my analysis, patients could express sentiments of their existential 
situation by accounting experiences related to their illness trajectories, which often became 
marked by certain, and at times very strong, emotional memories and affects. These accounts 
and stories contained significant seeds of anxiety, fear, unresolved suffering, or even trauma, 
which the patients seemed compelled to recount. Listening to stories and validating emotions 
about subjective experiences can be an important form of recognizing and addressing a patient’s 
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existential distress. This type of listening could be practiced more systematically in patient care. 
Further research on how past medical experiences affect and possibly shape a patient’s illness 
and dying trajectory would enhance the knowledge about meaning-making processes at the end 
of life. Since mediatedness similarly works with positive memories, they could be evoked by 
small creative activities; this could bring about empowering meanings and a sense of 
connectedness for the patient—and family members as well.  
This relates to my third point. What became very clear to me through my analysis was that 
the patients reacted to their terminal diagnosis with an almost compulsory need to do something. 
Many research participants commented on how there was “nothing to grasp onto,” or that they 
were “losing their grasp” during the illness trajectory. There was a need to handle the 
challenging existential situation with something tangible, which could concretize the situation 
for the patient.219 When faced with the threat of death, people understandably wanted to ensure 
that everything possible in terms of medicine was done. At times, however, this need to “do 
medicine” seemed to continue even after the doctors had told that further biomedical treatments 
would not ameliorate the prognosis. Persistently continuing with biomedicine in situations 
where it is medically futile can be seen as an attempt to avoid death. I would also suggest that 
an underlying motive for this might be the compelling need to simply engage in action and 
actively be “doing something.” It is a way to gain some sense of authority in a situation that 
otherwise seems completely out of one’s control. I see it, therefore, as an attempt to practice 
agency. In the lack of any other things to do, such as religious rituals which could also bring 
about the sense of agency, biomedicine can become a ritual to cultivate.  
Biomedicine or religious rituals are not, however, the only possible things one might engage 
in when faced with approaching death. There are a plethora of ways for a patient to enhance 
their sense of agency and various ritualized manners to bring closure to one’s ending life. 
Palliative care can support and implement some of these concrete things; the embodied 
involvement in the doing can already augment one’s sense of authority. One possible ritual of 
this kind could be dignity therapy (Chochinov et al. 2005; Julião et al. 2017), which has been 
developed especially for palliative patients in their terminal phases in order to ease their distress 
and help them find some solace in the face of death.220 Another, even more concrete example 
might involve compiling a memorial photo album. Such rituals can function simultaneously as 
a way to process one’s current life situation, remember one’s lived life, and create something 
concrete to leave behind for the bereaved. This kind of ritualized and aesthetic endeavor brings 
me to my last suggestion. 
                                                 
219 In Finnish, the verb ‘to comprehend’ (käsittää) is derived from the word ‘hand’ (käsi), suggesting that there is 
a manner of understanding that happens in a tactile and tangible way. 
220 Dignity therapy is a form of short psychotherapy in which the patient is invited to discuss the issues that matter 
most for them, or which they would most want remembered as death draws near (Chochinov et al. 2005). The 
conversations are recorded, transcribed, and edited into a returned final version, which the patient can then 
bequeath to a friend or family member.  
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Perhaps the most striking finding that surfaced from my research was the impact that 
aesthetics had on my research participants. Aesthetics in its various forms—in art, nature, 
environment, visions, and dreams—brought solace and a sense of connectedness in a way that 
nothing else could. Moreover, aesthetics was not only a source of comfort but actually 
engendered metaphysical imagination and meaning-making, thus comprising significant 
existential support for the patients. The positive effects of art and art therapy are widely 
recognized in the realm of end-of-life care (e.g., Helin 2011; Lin et al. 2012; Safrai 2013). Art 
is increasingly used in hospitals; for instance, the palliative and hospice wards at Oulu City 
Hospital are involved in a cultural project that aims to enhance the use of art for the wellbeing 
of the patients.221 It would be important to support these kinds of projects by implementing 
research that would describe and measure the actual effects that art and aesthetic endeavors in 
the care space can stimulate in patients. 
There is no need to wait for special projects, however, to be able to benefit from aesthetics 
in palliative and hospice care. Raising awareness about the potentialities of aesthetics to comfort 
and support patients’ existential wellbeing, and enhance the practical understanding of how 
aesthetics can work as a tool to process and make meaning of one’s past life and approaching 
death, would enable a transformation of the care culture for the benefit of patients. This is 
especially crucial in an increasingly secular society like Finland, where people can be estranged 




                                                 
221 See https://www.oukapalvelut.fi/kehittamishankkeet/Hankekortti1.asp?ID=778.  




D1 – Diary 1 (pp. 1–139) 
D2 – Diary 2 (pp. 1–121) 
D3 – Diary 3 (pp. 1–89) 
D4 – Diary 4 (pp. 1–34) 
 
The recorded interviews 
The interviews are referred to in the text by the first name of the research participant and the 
interview number (instead of dates). 
 
AILI/ interviews 1-6 
HEIDI/ interviews 1-2 
HEIKKI/ interviews 1-3 
HELENA/ interviews 1-2 
INKERI/ interviews 1-4 
KIRSI/ interview 1 
MARJO-RIITTA/interviews 1-2 









Written sources by the research participants 
A copy of Inkeri’s “Since one could even die from it” -artwork 
 
Blogs by the research participants  
Sairaan rakas elämä by Heikki Honkala http://sairaanrakaselama.blogspot.com  
Syöpä tarinoituu todeksi by Marjo-Riitta Karhunen http://syopatarinoituutodeksi.blogspot.com  
 
 
All the research material is stored in the Umpio storage space for sensitive data at University 
of Helsinki. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Research Information 
 
Tutkimustiedote 
Tutkimus toiveista ja tarpeista palliatiivisessa hoidossa 
Kysyn tässä tiedotteessa halukkuuttanne osallistua tutkimukseen. 
Teen Helsingin yliopiston humanistiseen tiedekuntaan väitöstutkimusta (tutkimusnumero), jossa 
selvitetään palliatiivisessa hoidossa olevien potilaiden kokemuksia, toiveita ja tarpeita. Tutkimusta 
ohjaavat professori René Gothóni ja dosentti Terhi Utriainen uskontotieteen oppiaineesta. HUS:issa 
tutkimuksesta vastaa lääkäri Tiina Saarto.  
Kerään aineistoa tutkimustani varten havainnoimalla arkisia, jokapäiväisiä tapahtumia hoitoyksiköissä, 
osallistumalla vapaamuotoisiin keskusteluihin potilaiden, omaisten ja henkilökunnan kanssa sekä 
haastattelemalla (kerran tai useammin) tutkimuksesta kiinnostuneita potilaita. Haastattelut äänitetään 
potilaan suostumuksella. Saatte itse valita ne hetket, jolloin tutkija saa olla läsnä potilashuoneessanne. 
Myös yleiset tiedot sairaudestanne ja hoitolinjastanne ovat osa tutkimusaineistoa. Tiedot auttavat 
tutkijaa ymmärtämään kokemuksianne. Nämä tiedot kysytään pääasiassa Teiltä itseltänne. Osa 
tiedoista, kuten tarkemmat tiedot sairaudestanne kerätään sairauskertomuksesta.  
Osallistuminen tutkimukseen tarkoittaa käytännössä sitä, että tutkija saa tutkimuksessaan käyttää Teitä 
koskevaa aineistoa, jota kerätään yllä kuvatulla tavalla, kuitenkin niin, että Teitä ei voida siitä tunnistaa.  
Vapaaehtoisuus 
Tutkimukseen osallistuminen on vapaaehtoista ja siihen pyydetään Teiltä kirjallinen suostumus. 
Osallistumisesta kieltäytyminen ei vaikuta millään tavoin saamaanne hoitoon tai kohteluun. Voitte 
myös halutessanne keskeyttää osallisuutenne tutkimuksessa. Tutkimus ei häiritse 
hoitotoimenpiteitänne, eikä siitä aiheudu Teille ylimääräisiä sairaalakäyntejä tai kustannuksia. 
Luottamuksellisuus 
Kaikki tutkijan kanssa käydyt keskustelut ja tutkijalle annetut henkilö- ja potilastiedot ovat täysin 
luottamuksellisia. Tutkimusaineistoa käsitellään ja säilytetään tutkimuksen ajan luottamuksellisesti ja 
tutkittavien henkilöllisyyttä suojaten. Henkilötietojanne ei luovuteta tutkimushankkeen ulkopuolisille 
henkilöille. Henkilöllisyytenne ei ole tunnistettavissa valmiissa tutkimusjulkaisuissa. 
Toivon, että tämän tutkimuksen avulla palliatiivista hoitoa voidaan kehittää entistä 
kokonaisvaltaisemmaksi hoitomuodoksi. Vastaan mielelläni kaikkiin tutkimukseen liittyviin kysymyksiin.  




Maija Butters FM, Helsingin yliopisto, Maailman kulttuurien laitos 
Puhelin: XXX-XXXXXXX Sähköposti: maija.xxxxxx@helsinki.fi 
 
Tutkimuksen ohjaaja professori René Gothóni    Tutkimuksen vastaava lääkäri Tiina Saarto 
Uskontotiede, Maailman kulttuurien laitos     vs. syöpäklinikkaryhmän johtaja 
Puh. XX-XXX XXXX            HYKS, Syöpätautien klinikka, puh. XXX-XXXXXX 
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Minua ________________________________ on pyydetty osallistumaan FM Maija Buttersin 
suorittamaan väitöskirjatutkimukseen palliatiivisten potilaiden toiveista, tarpeista ja 
kokemuksista. 
 
Olen saanut, lukenut ja ymmärtänyt tutkimuksesta kertovan tiedotteen (versio 11/2013). 
Olen myös saanut tutkijalta riittävän selvityksen tutkimuksesta ja sen yhteydessä 
suoritettavasta tietojen keräämisestä, käsittelystä ja luovuttamisesta. 
 
Suostun osallistumaan tutkimukseen ja annan luvan itseäni koskevien, tutkimuksen kannalta 
tarpeellisten tietojen keräämiseen. Minusta tutkimuksen aikana kerättyjä tietoja käsitellään 
luottamuksellisesti. Henkilöllisyyttäni ei voida päätellä valmiista tutkimusjulkaisuista. 
 
Osallistumiseni tähän tutkimukseen on täysin vapaaehtoista. Olen tietoinen siitä, että voin 
peruuttaa tämän suostumuksen ja luopua tutkimuksesta, jolloin minusta kerättyjä tietoja ei 
käytetä enää tutkimustarkoituksessa. Tutkimuksesta kieltäytyminen tai suostumukseni 
peruttaminen ei vaikuta hoitooni tai kohteluuni millään tavalla. 
  
 
Haastatteluni    saa _______  
ei saa _______   
äänittää myöhempää analyysiä varten. 
 
Tutkija    saa  _______ 
ei saa  ______  




Allekirjoituksellani vahvistan osallistumiseni tähän tutkimukseen. 
 
_____________________________________        ____________________________________ 
potilaan allekirjoitus           päiväys 
 
_____________________________________  
Tutkija FM Maija Butters 
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Appendix 3: Research Participants 
1. AILI 
A woman in her seventies whom I met in the day hospice group. She was actively 
involved with the research for a number of years. Aili is still alive and well today.  
 
2. AURORA 
An older woman in her eighties whom I met on the hospice ward. We met quite often, but I 
never conducted an actual interview with her for health reasons other than her terminal illness. 
Aurora did not die on the ward. After her condition ameliorated, she was moved into an 
elderly home, where she lived for another year before she passed away. I continued seeing her 
until her death. 
 
3. EEVA 
A woman in her seventies whom I met on the hospice ward. We met often and had many 




A woman in her fifties whom I met on the hospice ward. We had a few intense 
conversations but she died on the hospice ward only some weeks after I met her. 
 
5. HEIKKI 
A man in his sixties who was the author of the blog “Sairaan rakas elämä.” I had already been 
following Heikki’s blog when I finally met him via other patients. We met a few times and I 
interviewed him about his blog. Heikki survived his cancer. 
 
6. HELENA 
A woman in her forties whom I already knew before the research. She mostly received 
home care and was admitted to a healthcare center to receive palliative care at the end of 
her life. I met her a couple of times and interviewed her for the study.  
 
7. INKERI  
A woman in her sixties whom I met at the day hospice. I knew Inkeri for about half a 
year, but we met often and talked a lot one-on-one. She died on the hospice ward.  
 
8. IRMA 
An older woman in her nineties whom I met at the day hospice and who was admitted to the 
hospice ward soon thereafter. We talked, yet there was no time for an interview before her 
condition deteriorated. She died a couple months later. 
 
9. KIMMO  
A man in his fifties whom I met on the hospice ward. He spent some time on the ward 
and then moved to home care. I met him few times at the hospice and later also at his 




A woman in her sixties whom I met at the day hospice. We met only a couple of times and 
had one long interview. She died several months later on the hospice ward. 
 
11. KRISTIINA 
A woman in her sixties whom I was invited to interview via our common friends. I met with 
Kristiina few times at her care place.  
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12. MARJO RIITTA 
A woman in her forties who maintained a blog called “Syöpä tarinoituu todeksi.” I 
followed Marjo-Riitta’s posts and finally contacted her for further interviews. She died 
in a medical care facility three months after our interviews. 
 
13. MARTTI 
A man in his sixties whom I met on the oncology ward. I kept meeting Martti over the 
years at various care locations and at home. We had many conversations and interviews. 
Today he is at home and doing well. 
 
14. MATTI 
A man in his sixties whom I was invited to interview by him and his close relative. We met 
only once and spoke on the phone one time, but nonetheless had an intense conversation. 
 
15. OIVA 
A man in his seventies whom I met in the day hospice group. We met regularly for 
months and had a number of conversations. I followed Oiva to the end and met with him 
still on the hospice ward during his last weeks and days.  
 
16. PETER 
A man in his fifties whom I met on the hospice ward. We met a few times, and I had one 
longer interview with him. He died after a few weeks on the hospice ward. 
 
17. PEKKA 
A man in his fifties whom I met on the oncology ward. We met a few times and had some 
long conversations. After Pekka was sent home I visited him there. He died at home a 
couple of months later, and afterwards I talked with his wife about Pekka’s end of life. 
 
18. RAUHA 
A woman in her seventies whom I met in the day hospice. We met and talked a few times but 
I never had a personal interview with her before her death on the hospice ward.  
 
19. SIRU 
A woman in her fifties whom I met in the day hospice. I knew Siru for years and we met 
regularly and talked often. She died on the hospice ward. 
 
20. TAINA 
A woman in her sixties whom I met in the day hospice. I met her often for a period of time, 
but we conducted only one interview together. 
 
21. VIVIAN 
A woman in her fifties whom I got to know in the day hospice. I knew Vivian for several 
months, and we met a few times for interviews at the day hospice, at her home, and on 
the hospice ward, where she died. 
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Appendix 4: List of Possible Interview Questions 
Questions around the illness 
 How and when did you learn about your illness? 
 What was your initial reaction? 
 Has your attitude toward the illness changed in the course of time? If yes, how?  
(Further questions around this, depending on the answers) 
 What is the most important thing in life to you at this moment? 
 Could you say what was most important before the illness? 
(Further questions around this, depending on the answers) 
 
Questions around daily life at the moment 
 Tell me something about your typical day? 
 What is the best part of the day or best thing in your day? What is the dullest? 
 Have you noticed any (new) routines that have become important to you since your illness? 
 
Relationships 
 Have your relationships to your closed ones changed? 
 Are there people, old friends, for instance, you would like to contact? Have you done that? 
 (How) has your relationship changed since becoming ill?  
 How about the relationship with time? With space/place? 
 
Emotions, expectations 
 Do you have any specific wishes or dreams for today / for the future? 
 Do you have fears? Of what? 
 Worries? Etc. (Further questions around this, depending on the answers) 
 
Worldview 
 Do you belong to the Church (Lutheran or other)? 
 Do you (ever) think existential thoughts? (“God,” “supernatural,” “afterlife”?)  
(Questions modified, according to the person) 
 Have you talked about these things with anybody? 
 Would you like to talk about them with somebody? 
 Do you have any experiences in regard to supernatural phenomena? 
 What is your understanding about the meaning of life?  
 Has this changed over the years? 
 
If the person is able to talk about death  
 Have you lost someone close to you? 
 What kinds of thoughts/feelings did this cause in you? 
 Do you have any specific wishes in relation to your own death?  
 Would you like to say goodbyes? In some specific way? How/in what kind of 
circumstances/to whom? Have you done this?  
 Would you like to leave a letter or a recording for someone? Have you done so? 
 Do you have any experiences in relation to the afterlife? 
 Is there anything else that you would like to talk about? 
